The Ruin of the Soudan

Henry Russell

526

10/6

Sampson Low and Co. Ltd. Collotype Lemercier, Paris.

The late General Gordon, from a negative taken at Khartoum, and kindly lent by Miss Gordon.

THE

RUIN OF THE SOUDAN

CAUSE, EFFECT

AND

REMEDY

A RESUMÉ OF EVENTS, 1883—1891

BY

HENRY RUSSELL

RESIDENT FOR TWELVE YEARS ON THE RED SEA LITTORAL

ASSISTED BY

WILLIAM GATTIE

WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

"Renovanda est Æthiopia"

LONDON
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY
Limited
St. Dunstan's House
FETTER LANE, FLEET STREET, E.C.
1892

LONDON:
PRINTED BY GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, LD.,
ST. JOHN'S HOUSE, CLERKENWELL, E.C.

Dedicated

TO THE MEMORY OF

GENERAL GORDON AND COLONEL STEWART

WHO LOST THEIR LIVES

IN THE EXECUTION OF THE DUTY INTRUSTED TO THEM OF WITHDRAWING

THE GARRISONS AND PEACEABLY INCLINED INHABITANTS

OF THE SOUDAN, AND OF ESTABLISHING SOME FORM OF GOVERNMENT

TO PREVENT THE BULK OF THE POPULATION

BEING LEFT AT THE MERCY OF THE FANATICAL MAHDIISTS—

AN EVENT WHICH HAS BEEN SUBSEQUENTLY REALIZED.

PREFACE.

As the title-page so completely defines, in elementary terms, the scope and purport of this volume, and as each chapter is accompanied with introductory comments on its particular subject, a preface in the more usual form would really be a work of mere supererogation. I shall therefore simply here refer to the circumstances, not mentioned elsewhere, that led me to the conception of writing a book on the Soudan, which, with the aid of my coadjutor, Mr. William Gattie, is now completed.

I was for twelve years, in all, located on the Red Sea Littoral, having been in Jeddah from 1875 to February, 1884, and from that date to April, 1887, in Suakin. I had thus many opportunities of judging of the situation—opportunities which were improved by my being at the time "Special Correspondent" to the *Daily News* and *Daily Telegraph*; and being well acquainted with colloquial Arabic, I was also enabled to form a very good estimate of the character of the Soudanese, and I can safely say that in all my business transactions with them

they were thoroughly trustworthy if fairly treated. I make special reference to this, because the character of these people constitutes one of the two most important factors in the proposed schemes for their regeneration—the other being the fertility of the soil. Of this I have no personal experience, but the testimony of all the best authorities, including Sir Samuel Baker, the foremost of them all, puts this beyond all possible doubt. On these two factors all the contemplated arrangements for the future development of the Soudan substantially depend. As regards the past or historical view of this subject, it has been derived mainly from official documents, and thus this portion of the work, as apart from its ultimate purpose, may be very fairly described as a narrative by the "light of the Blue Books."

The consideration of the British "occupation" in Egypt and the Soudan, now being imminent, I trust the publication of such a book as this will prove most opportune, as affording that species of information which is an absolute essential for arriving at a reliable opinion on this much vexed and protracted question. It will be found to appeal especially to the philanthropist, the politician and statesman, the merchant and manufacturer, and generally to the British public.

To the philanthropist, as it seeks to establish the independence of the Soudanese, and to emancipate them from the tyranny of an admittedly corrupt

Government, and at the same time to insure the most effectual means of suppressing the slave trade.

To the politician and statesman, as indicating a means of opening up a vast and productive territory to the benefit of the whole British community, and also to the advantage of Egypt, as affording, without cost, a protection to her frontier.

To the merchant and manufacturer, as exposing a field for the investment of capital in the development of a country exceptionally fertile, especially in the produce of cotton, gum, and grain, which could be supplied from this source alone in quantities sufficient to meet the demands of the manufacturers, and the wants, in cereals, of the whole population of Great Britain.

To the British public, as demonstrating how an "occupation" can be made a source of National wealth, which has hitherto proved a source of fruitless expenditure.

It now only remains for me to say that it has been the endeavour of Mr. Gattie and myself to convey the truth as accurately as it could be gathered from our text, and I can but express my fervent hope, that our efforts will result in emphasizing the force of the aphorism: *Magna est veritas et prævalebit.*

H. RUSSELL.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

PAGE

The territory known as the Soudan briefly described—Short account of its inhabitants and their religion—Their former prominent position among civilized nations—The distinguished reputation for learning attained by its ancient capital Senaar—The ancestors of the present population—Causes of decadence—Consequent occupation by Egypt—Its damaging effects. . . . . 1 to 8

CHAPTER II.

Cause of rebellion by Mahdi—Col. Stewart's report of the resources of the Soudan—Present condition and description of Senaar—Besati Bey, late Secretary to General Gordon, his opinion on rebellion—Capacity of soil—Excessive taxation, ruinous effects—Corruption of Egyptian Government officials—Dilapidated state of Government offices—Successful cultivation of cotton begun—Difficulties of transport and oppressive taxes, cause of its abandonment—Mal-administration of justice—Atrocities to slaves, men and women—Khartoum described—Its Sanitary condition—Manufactures and trade—Climate—Population—Slave hunters chief adherents of the Mahdi—How taxes were paid—Manner of collecting by Government troops—Troops paid by bills, discounted by merchants, at a loss of 40 or 50 per cent.—Slave trade indirectly encouraged by Egyptian Government—Suggestions as to best means of suppressing it—Brief history of Mahdi—Fakis and Dervishes, their extraordinary influence with the people—How the rebels fight—Egyptian army, and ignorance of its officers—Dual control deprecated—Her Majesty's Government and Egyptian Government, diametrically opposite views

PAGE

—General Hicks complains of want of money, provisions and steamers—Asks to be made Commander-in-Chief—Malet virtually recommends appointment, but disclaims responsibility—Hicks complains that 5000 troops are insufficient—Wants twice the number—Malet's opinion that Hicks should confine himself to Blue and White Nile—Hicks wishes to resign—He complains of insufficient equipment—Advocates keeping the two rivers and Senaar only—Malet congratulates Hicks—Hicks' anxiety about Berber-Suakin route—Hopeless muddle at Khartoum—Egyptian method of recruiting, and state of army in the Soudan—Hicks tenders his resignation—Malet persuades him to keep command—Resignation withdrawn—Baring's report, probable destruction of Hicks' army—English and Indian troops probably required—Granville refuses troops, English or Egyptian, and recommends abandonment . . . . 9 to 40

CHAPTER III.

Abandonment of the Soudan recommended to the Egyptian Government—Egyptian policy, hold Khartoum—Reopen Suakin-Berber route—Withdraw all garrisons from outlying districts, except Senaar—Coetlogon advises opening Suakin-Berber road—Physical incapacity of troops—Responsibility ignored by H.M.'s Government—Granville does not object to employment of Turkish troops—H.M.'s Government will defend ports in the Red Sea—Objections to the employment of Zebehr—Baring recommends employment of Zebehr, if responsibility is cast on Egyptians—Gordon's services offered by H.M.'s Government to go to Khartoum—Egyptian Government decline—Baring again advises neither Gordon nor Wilson required—Baring consents to appointment of Gordon—Granville's meagre instructions to Gordon—H.M.'s Government admit ignorance of situation—Baring authorized to make all arrangements upon Gordon's advice—Gordon's appointment fully approved by all—His views identical with those of Nubar and Baring—Khedive appoints Gordon Governor-General of the Soudan, and urges pacific policy, and opening of roads for commerce—Khedive's proclamation on the appointment of Gordon, advising all inhabitants to obey his orders, not a word of abandonment—Khedive's instruction to Gordon to evacuate garrisons, civil officials and inhabitants and to establish organized Government in the Soudan—Waddington concurs in the

PAGE

necessity of abandonment by Egypt—Full instructions Baring to Gordon calling attention to the fact that H.M.'s Government are willing that he should go for Egyptian Government under Baring's orders, promising English and Egyptian authorities will afford co-operation and support—Memorandum of Gordon's policy—Col. Stewart's comments thereon—General Baker's views—Gordon's views of Hicks' defeat—Hadendowah revolt caused by robbery by Egyptian Government officials—Impression as to revolt—Suakin-Berber route recommended—Lord Dufferin's opinion that revolt was caused by Egyptian misgovernment and cruel exactions—Advises evacuation of remote provinces—retention of Senaar, Khartoum, Dongola, and Eastern Soudan . 41 to 60

CHAPTER IV.

Mischief of interference at home proved by history—Important memorandum by Gordon received by Baring, 4th February, 1884—Task set himself to bring down Egyptian employés' families, etc.—to form Soudan native Government in lieu of Egyptian—to federate tribes against Hadendowahs and open Suakin-Berber and Suakin-Kassala roads—to relieve Senaar, and country between Blue and White Niles—to evacuate Equatorial and Bahr-el-Ghazelle provinces—to arrange at Dongola for refugees from Darfour—Five officers required for a pacific purpose—If outcry in England do without them—To use Conservative element in the people to suppress communism, for peace and prosperity—Baring considers the appointment of Gordon as Governor-General necessary—3000 Turkish troops advocated by Gordon for Suakin—Fall of Tokar and Sinkat predicted by Gordon—Absolute necessity for appointment of his successor—Formation of Native Government the object—Zebehr the only man—Analogous cases in Afghanistan—Terms of engagement—Sudden determination of H.M.'s Government to utilize Gordon—Promptitude with which the summons was obeyed—Thus no time to formulate any policy—Gordon thwarted *in limine*—Arrived at Khartoum exactly one month after leaving England—Interference continued—H.M.'s Government object to King of the Belgians protecting the Equatorial and Bahr-el-Ghazelle provinces—Gordon not to go south of Khartoum—Arrival of Gordon at Khartoum—Enthusiastic reception—Obstruction by H.M.'s Government—Gordon's pro-

clamation to people of Khartoum, cautioning arrival of British troops—Baring's review of the situation—Agrees with policy to form a Native Government in place of Egyptian—Points out the consequences of the anarchy that would ensue for want of government—Baring fixes all responsibilities on H.M.'s government—Advises Gordon and Khedive to be allowed to act without interference—Zebehr's appointment strongly advocated as best for Egypt—Nubar concurs—Points out the mischief that must arise by yielding to English ignorant prejudices running counter to superior knowledge on the spot—Gordon's opinion that Mahdi must be smashed for safety of Egypt—Urges to leave Suakin and Massowah alone—Granville wants time to consider—Zebehr's family helping Gordon, yet Zebehr is sued in Cairo for debt—Gordon expects to be "caught in Khartoum"—Garrisons must be lost without Zebehr—Col. Stewart confirms Gordon's opinion *re* Zebehr—Baring opposes Gordon's wish to open Suakin-Berber route—Baring advocates Zebehr's appointment, as being in harmony with the policy of H.M.'s Government—Gordon again distinctly points out Zebehr is only chance of saving garrisons—Dr. Bohndorff concurs with Gordon—Stewart suggests Zebehr being sent with British forces from Suakin—Gordon's appeals all in vain—March 15th, 1884, Telegraph cut—Baring changes his mind—Suakin-Berber route—Neutrals joining rebels in self-defence—Expeditious aid imperative—Rebels four hours from Khartoum—Gordon resigns—Determines on taking steamers and stores to the Equatorial and Bahr-el-Ghazelle provinces for King of the Belgians—Sarcastic thanks—H.M.'s Government having got Gordon into a mess, leave him to get out of it the best way he can—Trust he won't resign his commission—To do as he pleases *re* steamers and stores—Baring of opinion neither Gordon nor Stewart will leave unless garrisons are rescued, and Suakin-Berber route best—Suggests a portion of Graham's army going to Berber, as Gordon expects help from there—Granville again leaves Gordon in the lurch—H.M's Government antiticipate failure—Gordon's opinion as to the trumpery nature of the revolt, and how to quell it—He anticipates his abandonment—Proclamation of Gordon proclaiming abandonment of the Soudan by the Egyptian Government—Appoints Zebehr Sub-Governor-General of the Soudan—Baring determines to thwart—Baring expects the entire

PAGE

isolation of Khartoum—Gordon's appeal to Sir Samuel Baker to raise funds in England and America to pay for Turkish troops to crush the Mahdi—Zebehr's inability to go to Khartoum—Granville refuses English or Egyptian aid—Gordon leaves indelible disgrace of abandoning all garrisons to H.M.'s Government—Stewart concurs with Gordon and elects to follow him—Gordon determines to share the fate of his charge—Kubar clearly fixes responsibility of the fate of the garrison on H.M.'s Government . . . . 61 to 98

CHAPTER V.

History of the march of "Desert Column" of the "Nile Gordon Relief Expedition"—Sent out in expected failure of the river route—From Portsmouth to Cairo, 21 days, including stoppage at Cairo—Assiout to Wady Halfa by steamer and rail, 16 days—Wady Halfa to Dongola, 235 miles, on camels, 14 days—Dongola to Korti, 135 miles, on camels, 18 days—Making journey Portsmouth to Korti 69 days—Comparison with Suakin-Berber route—This route would have saved Khartoum and Gordon's life—Stephenson superseded for urging Suakin-Berber route—River column arrived 11th March, 1885 !!—Intelligence Department efficiency, no guides provided—Totally inadequate supply of camels for transport and of ammunition for Gardner gun—Account of battle of Abou Klea—Intelligence Department at fault, unaware of presence of enemy, and of position of wells—Account of battle of Abu Kru, one of the most risky ever fought—Metemneh could not be occupied, being five times larger than reported—Korti to Metemneh, 170 miles, in 37 days—Result of march of Camel Corps, 540 miles in 69 days—Suakin to Berber done by Hicks with 1000 men, 280 miles, in 11 days—Proving Nile expedition an utter fiasco. . . . . 99 to 116

CHAPTER VI.

Speedy's suggestion for plan of relief of Kassala—Baring says, no prospect of Speedy's plan being entertained—Instructed to take no action as to relief of garrisons—Relief to be arranged by Chermside at Suakin—Objects to relief by Abyssinians—King John having already ordered Generalissimo to withdraw garrisons, he was asked to countermand the order—King John agrees to

PAGE

defer expedition to Kassala, but is willing to relieve Gallabat, provided Egyptian officer is sent—Molyneux advises Kassala, Gallabat, Ghirra, all in critical position —Chermside confirms this — Communications cut— Chermside hesitates to inform the above garrisons that they are to be abandoned—Chermside's scheme for relief —Granville approves Chermside's scheme—Sir Donald Currie urges relief of Kassala—Mudir of Kassala refuses to abandon his post to save his life—Chermside seeks King John's aid—For relief of Kassala, money up to 50,000*l.* and munitions of war to be given for Abyssinian services—Chermside ready with another plan—Nubar sends 10,000*l.* to Suakin to back up Chermside— Details of Chermside's plan—Asks for a Special British Commissioner — Estimates cost of projected relief 200,000*l.*—Salisbury willing that Chermside should relieve Kassala at his own personal risk—Salisbury agrees that Major Macdonald be sent to assist Chermside —Only chance of Abyssinians moving in the matter, is on condition of dealing with British Government, but not Egyptian officials—Chermside to Marcopoli Bey, confused instructions—Atrocities committed on the inhabitants of Kassala, abandoned by H.M.'s Government —Chermside reports 6000 camel loads of treasure and stores taken to Khartoum—Kassala garrison, 2500, surrendered . . . . . 117 to 134

CHAPTER VII.

Baker Pasha advises 3800 troops moved to relieve Tokar— Less than 1000 rebels there defeated the Egyptians, killing 2346—Munitions of war lost—Abject cowardice of Egyptian troops—Granville undertakes defence of all the Egyptian ports in the Red Sea—Wishes Chermside to assist Hewett—500 Royal Marines required for the defence of Suakin—Chermside's services unavailable— Wood, R.E., sent to Suakin—Baring suggests Suakin be proclaimed in a state of siege—Granville disapproves of appointment of military officer—Hewett in supreme command at Suakin—H.M.'s Government throw down the glove at Suakin—10,000 rebels in vicinity of Suakin— Fall of Sinkat—Garrison annihilated—British relief of Tokar, determined on in opposition to previous declaration—Gordon opposed to fighting at Suakin—Gordon advises issue of proclamation—Full power to settle with tribes—Hewett suggests fight first—Baring *concurs* with Gordon's views, but *advises* Hewett's proposal— Tokar surrendered—Gordon strongly advocates march

PAGE

to Berber, as withdrawal of troops would justify Osman Digna's remark that English troops could do no more—Three sheikhs tendered submission to Graham—Hewett's proclamation, 5000 dols. on Osman Digna's head—Granville orders withdrawal of proclamation—Hewett withdraws it . . . . . 135 to 147

CHAPTER VIII.

Suakin defended by H.M.'s troops, Egyptian garrison having been sent back to Cairo—Important position of Suakin, commercially and politically—Berber easy of access by railway from Suakin—British Consul Cameron admits, that neither he nor any one at Suakin knows what is going on—Senior naval officer of H.M.'s ships blockading ports, harassing probable friendlies—Tokar, the granary of Eastern Soudan, abandoned by English in 1884, and no attempt made to hold it as a basis for pacific operations—Over 2000 Dervishes killed out of 10,000 or 12,000—British square broken—Molyneux's report on position—Friendly tribes perforce obliged to join Osman Digna—Deprecates withdrawal from Agig, as it would occasion loss to Egyptian revenue, and encourage smuggling and slave trade—Chermside arranges with friendly Sheikhs to attack Dervishes—Brewster Bey makes arrangements with 11,000 "friendlies" to stop rebellion on promise to re-open trade—Commodore Molyneux, most interesting account of negotiations with tribes, with object of federating them against the Dervishes pure and simple, drawing from Osman Digna all the waverers, and with this force crushing the power of the Mahdi—Appeals to the honour and interest of H.M.'s Government not to implicate the friendly tribes in blood feuds with the powerful and warlike Hadendowahs, unless H.M.'s Government were prepared to stand by them morally and otherwise—Molyneux, several despatches clearly indicate the advantages of a pacification policy, which coincides with General Gordon's views, that the Conservative tribes desired to protect themselves from the Communistic—Great stress laid on Brewster Bey's knowledge and influence with the tribes—Advises holding Tokar and Kassala, the keys of the position, which would cause Hadendowah revolt to collapse—Bishiri tribe on the Nile friendly, on the coast near Suakin, hostile—Starvation policy of H.M.'s Government the reason—Egerton backs Chermside's suggestions to subsidize tribes, vitally important—Chermside in difficulties as to what course to advise—Granville agrees to 5000*l.* being spent in subsi-

PAGE

dies—Inactivity of H.M.'s Government cause of Hadendowah Sheikh throwing in his lot with the Mahdi—Principal Tokar Sheikhs ready to join H.M.'s Government—Chermside advocates occupation of district—Federation falling to pieces—Neglect of tribes compels them to join Mahdi—Molyneux urges action—Osman Digna coerces tribes who rejoin him, cause self-preservation—Five notables actually went to Cairo to endeavour to make terms with H.M.'s Government—Object settled Government and cessation of civil war—Sundry Sheikhs write to Brewster Bey, sub-Governor Suakin, appealing for military aid—Watson's peaceful policy—Regrets Warren's departure—Deprecates want of fixed policy—Recommends H.M.'s Government to declare war at an end, and re-open trade to settle country—Strongly urges the presence of a plenipotentiary to deal with the whole question, without interference—Watson points out Suakin costs British 50,000*l.* and Egyptians 40,000*l.* annually for defence, but this would be much reduced by the adoption of a fixed policy, as local revenue would in that case almost cover expenses—Military in Cairo obstruct — Baring states export trade amounts to 1,997,968*l.*, amount furnished by Khedive's cabinet—Consul Baker estimates export trade in 1882 2,244,500*l.*—Principal imports Manchester goods, and cutlery, etc.—Reports export kept down to an "insignificant minimum by the difficulties and cost of transport"—Strongly advocates railway Suakin to Berber, being the natural *entrepôt* of Soudanese commerce, Berber to Mediterranean being nearly 1800 miles and cost of transport 5*l.* to 10*l.* per ton—Berber to Suakin 5*l.* 8*s.* per ton being tantamount to a prohibitive tariff of transporting grain, and low-priced articles—Consul Baker estimates revenue of railway, Suakin and Berber, 160,000*l.* per annum at first—Feels convinced that it will be a financial success—An enormous benefit to the Soudanese and check slave trade—Specimen of merchant's petition against blockade—Amount paid by H.M.'s Government for expenses of defence of Suakin by Egyptian troops 56,440*l.* per annum—Cost of water and ice 4750*l.*—Increase of cost of troops for defence of frontier of Egypt 40,500*l.* per annum—British and Indian troops replaced by Egyptian in British pay—Particulars of staff, etc., etc. 148 to 182

CHAPTER IX.

Opening of trade strongly advocated by Stephenson, Nubar,

PAGE

Wolff, and Baring—Wolff urges reply from H.M.'s Government — Butler concurs — Rosebery obstructs, reasons being "want of information"—Wolff disposes of these—Wolff's scheme proposing to open up trade to the utmost limits of the Soudan, supported by Baring, Hussein Pasha Khalifa, Egyptian Ministers, Nubar, Abdul Kader Pasha, Stephenson, Moukhtar Pasha, and the Khedive—Consul Cameron and Watson anxious to re-open trade—Military authorities raise futile objections —Wolff and Stephenson require permission to re-open trade—Excellent substantial reasons for the necessity of opening trade by Brigadier-General Butler, who had two years' experience in the Soudan—Fifteen Sheikhs arrived at Suakin to treat with Watson Pasha—Watson unable to carry out his personal views, without H.M.'s Government's authority—Kitchener's policy—Fall of Tamai, slaughter of Dervishes—Spoil of camp, accommodating over 3000 taken, guns, rifles, etc.—2000*l.* asked for friendlies, clearly proving encouragement of "friendlies" to raid—Extract from Egyptian native paper shewing inhumanity of blockade which sacrificed all friendlies—Miserable failure of attempt to take Tokar—Grenfell Sirdar of Egyptian army, permits Kitchener to attempt capture of Tokar—2000*l.* for "friendlies" granted—Complaint to Stephenson against Kitchener not quoted in Blue Books—Refusal to pay just dues to Seyed Mahmoud, religious notable who had aided every Governor-General by useful information, and giving pacific advice which was followed—Spoils, value 101,800 dols., large quantity of jewellery and 300 slaves captured at Tamai, slaves nearly all shipped to Jeddah. Reinforcement of troops and ships required, enemy collecting to make reprisals—To dislodge 1000 Dervishes from trenches at Suakin, 5000 troops composed of British, Egyptian, and Soudanese required—Commander May's account of battle—Victory barren of results—Refusal of H.M.'s Government to follow up victory, and thus settle the question once for all—Another attempt to negotiate, 20 Hadendowah Sheikhs tender submission —Baring presses that a non-aggressive policy be proclaimed, peaceful relations with the tribes, trade encouraged, conference with Sheikhs invited—Threat to tribes that English will return if necessary—Salisbury approves —Baring's suggestion for a peaceful settlement approved, but not acted upon—Egyptian Government declare officially their determination to abandon absolutely and for ever their authority in the Soudan, bar the Red Sea Littoral—Guarantee by Egyptian and English Govern-

PAGE

ments to acknowledge independence of tribes—Proclamation more warlike than peaceful—Second proclamation in nearly same terms, inviting Sheikhs to conference, but not a word about re-opening trade, although tribes in the vicinity had never assisted Dervishes—Salisbury approves of proclamations—In spite of proclamations, two ports closed, excuse, want of garrison—Harassing effects on "friendlies," two dhows captured with their food supplies—Baring's apology for Kitchener's "raiding"—Baring states Kitchener followed out his instructions—Making H.M.'s Government responsible for his actions—Egyptians abandon idea of re-conquest—Trade from Suakin not advised—Contradictory instructions, advocate re-opening trade, yet order strict blockade of ports—Salisbury forbids raiding—Holled-Smith advocates attack on Dervishes—H.B.M.'s Consul Suakin reports raid by a Government employé; result, 27 "friendlies" killed, women and children wounded—Peaceful prospects become sadly marred—Baring instructs Consul to try and prevent raids on Tokar—Salisbury agrees raids should be discouraged—Baring points out blockade starves the well-disposed—Famine prevailing round Suakin—3000 starving—Local subscriptions and appeals to England for relief—Egyptian Government send 500*l.* for relief—Famine and distress the result of H.M.'s Government's policy—Consul states natives emaciated—Great mortality among children—Aborigines Protection Society send 500*l.* collected from British public . . . . . 183 to 222

CHAPTER X.

Wolff advises, Khedive, Egyptian ministers, Stephenson, Baring, concur with him on the necessity of opening trade—Rosebery obstructs—Wolff disposes of all objections—Butler shows the mischievous results of blockade—Wolff begs for reply to his questions *re* trade—Egyptian revenue suffering—All Egyptian authorities advocate opening trade—Egyptian trade diverted to Massowah and Tripoli—Wolff sums up the arguments *pro* and *con* for opening of trade, and urges H.M.'s Government to adopt his views—Rosebery objects to re-open trade, by advice of military at home, in opposition to all authorities on the spot—Butler's opinion, blockade sets whole population against authorities—Baring considers blockade a grave political mistake—Wolff believes, "we are driving the Soudanese, by starving them, to attack us from sheer necessity"—Reply required to lay before meeting next day—Rose-

PAGE

bery objects, wants further information—An officer to be sent to report—Wolff repeats his reiterated advice to open trade—Butler shows the fallacy of the blockading policy—Opinion of former Egyptian rulers concurs with Wolff's—Grove, Special Commissioner, considers there are strong reasons for opening trade with the Soudan, wired three days after arrival—Change of Grove's opinion, apparently affected by official atmosphere of War Office—A most meagre report of a colourless type —Sheikh Ibrahim-el-Senussi strongly advocates peace—Soudanese must either trade or fight to live—Matheson & Co. protest against H.B.M.'s authorities stopping trade—Orders already given to Lancashire manufacturers, countermanded—Earnest appeal of Wolff to open trade and thus reduce army of occupation in Egypt—Smith refuses to open trade, as General commanding H.M.'s Forces in Egypt said to object—Wolff again insists on necessity of opening trade — Moukhtar, Stephenson, and Grenfell recommend this course—Advances of Dervishes pure fiction—Moukhtar annoyed about refusal of H.M.'s Government to open trade—Italian trade at Massowah flourishing at expense of Egyptian revenue—Stephenson lays stress that H.M.'s Government are "in honour bound" to open trade at Suakin—Wolff concurs—Reluctant consent of H.M.'s Government with restrictions . . . 223 to 243

CHAPTER XI.

October 6th, 1886, H.M.'s Government agreed to opening trade at Suakin, yet on the 25th January, 1887, Baring points out all authorities here agreed, and asks whether H.M.'s Government still objects—Salisbury agrees to re-open trade tentatively after consultation with the Secretary of State for War—Baring suggests vexatious taxes on merchants—Points out Egyptian Government has no authority over any part of the Soudan—Baring's semi-official letter to Kitchener indicates that H.M.'s Government are the real sponsors of all actions in the Soudan—Subsidies to Sheikhs advocated—Egyptian Government has no intention of occupying inland portions of Soudan—Check on slave trade advisable —Salisbury entirely approves of foregoing semi-official letter—Kitchener's appointment of Sheikh of Sheikhs (unwelcome to all tribesmen), favouritism to certain merchants—Proposes to appoint paid agent at Tokar implying direct opposition to Baring's policy—Inhabitants of Tokar refuse to attack Suakin—Kitchener told

PAGE

Consul he intended to form stations in interior to collect a "new 7 per cent. export tax"—Consul's protest against it—Massowah trade reviving at expense of Suakin—The proposed new 7 per cent. export tax affects British trade—Consul at Jeddah reports large contraband trade, and slaves being run from ports north of Suakin—The way Kitchener opens up trade—British Indian merchants petition to open trade at Suakin—Baring's reply—Fox's letter to Salisbury proposing to send cotton seed to Tokar to encourage cultivation—Kitchener objects to this although Chermside, Acting Sirdar of Egyptian army, sees no objection—Strange to say opinion of Egyptian Government is not quoted—London Chamber of Commerce ask for precise information of H.M.'s Government on re-opening and keeping open trade by land and sea—Foreign Office promise to re-open trade fully at Suakin with interior—Coast south of Ras Kasar under Italians—Protection to British merchants promised—London Chamber of Commerce, on behalf of merchants, protest against espionage of Kitchener's police as detrimental to trade—Request Customs to be worked on same basis as Egypt, without interference of military or police—Ask for permission to encourage cultivation in Tokar—Baring considers the only possible policy, to encourage trade at Suakin—Kitchener withdraws his restrictions, while endeavouring to justify their imposition — Consul Cameron strongly advocates removal of restrictions, etc., on trade, and reconciliation of Tokar by trade—Raids on Tokar, and mischievous effects of policy—Commander Rooke, R.N., reports "friendlies" having been taken by Kitchener to attack Tokar—Slaughter of cattle belonging to Tokar provoked attack on "friendlies," natural consequence a force of 800 exasperated people appear on Tamai road, and Kitchener requests H.M.'s ships to fire on them—More raids, Kitchener and McMurdo wounded—Stephenson instructs Kitchener not to assist with British officers or Egyptian regulars—No instructions as to "friendlies"—Strategical movement to the rear, as usual with Egyptian troops—Egyptian Government's report clearly fixes responsibility in attacking on Kitchener—Consul Cameron's opinion, that Kitchener has quarrelled with all the tribes, by his refusal to permit trade—Consul Cameron thinks that Fadlab "friendlies" useless, and no other tribes will help us—Baring strongly objects to raiding, and wishes legitimate trade to be encouraged—Novel "Stamp Act" instituted by Kitchener repealed owing to Baring's

PAGE

influence—Dormer reports on military defences of Suakin, and shows that eight-tenths of the important tribes are anxious for a government—Tribes ready to co-operate with troops to crush Osman Digna's power —Dormer urges "friendlies" should be subsidized and fed—Dormer hints that an alliance should be made with "friendlies" to crush Osman Digna—Reiterates that "friendly" Sheikhs in and outside Suakin should be subsidized and fed—Diplomatic answer from Salisbury to Fox and Wylde, signifying nothing—Senior naval officer at Suakin considers trade should be opened—In October, 1888, International Peace Association protests against continuation of hostilities—Salisbury's assurance of a pacification policy by trade (yet in December 5000 British and Egyptian troops have to clear the trenches at Suakin)—A few days later Baring reports that Commander May, R.N., informs him that "a portion of the garrison marched out and engaged the enemy"—Grenfell orders only strictly defensive measures, as previously given—One month after protest of International Peace Association, Dervishes besieging Suakin—Grenfell reports that "none of the tribes in the vicinity are taking part in the present operations"—Reinforcements required—Wylde's visit to Suakin objected to—Baring impresses the fact that he and the Egyptian Government have always consistently advocated trade—Baring concurs with Kitchener's policy of stopping all supplies even to "friendlies," who have always remained passive, for fear of feeding the Dervishes . . . . . .244 to 283

CHAPTER XII.

Cost of military expeditions to 1885, 13,061,451*l.* in excess of normal cost of troops—Question asked, What has the sacrifice of blood and treasure led to?—Soudan trade estimated at 2,000,000*l.* per annum—Soudan produce realized in Cairo alone in the year 1873-4 1,554,600*l.*—Cultivable land in the Soudan 14,125,000 feddans or acres—Cultivated, 212,418; lying waste, 13,912,582—If one quarter area were cultivated with cotton would yield 20,000,000*l.* per annum. Consular reports, Suakin —Showing falling off imports and exports since British occupation—British shipping interests suffering —Slave trade flourishing—Iniquitous system of Raftiehs, being malversation of Soudan revenue to benefit Egypt and Turkey—Imports and exports Suakin, 1882-3, compared with those in 1886-7 and 8, showing the ruin of

PAGE

trade and commerce—Contraband from Jeddah, one shipment alone about 40,000*l.*—Payment for goods effected by sale of slaves—Principal exports from Alexandria, showing nine-tenths of the whole due to cotton—Gum arabic trade ruined—Fellaheen destitution proved by selling gold and silver ornaments, in 1884-5 nil, evil gradually increasing, until in 1889 251,000*l.*—Statistics of imports and exports show a falling off between 1884 and 1889 of 1,873,000*l.*—Produce of soil shows a falling off of 1,336,311*l.* per annum on the average of the comparisons of the years 1880-3 and 1886-9—Soudan produce on the average of 1880-3 compared with 1886-9 show a falling off per annum of 206,777*l.*—Diversion of mother of pearl shell trade to Massowah—Prospects of trade with an English company—Ivory and other Soudan products rotting away for want of means of transit—Egyptian cotton crops and Alexandria prices—Barley—Gum arabic—Falling off of Manchester piece goods—Soudan revenue and expenditure account for 1882 from Col. Stewart's report, and comments thereon—Summary showing loss of 105,405*l.*—Soudan budget for 1881 showing loss of 36,840*l.*—Soudan accounts for 1882 dealt with, arrears due taken into consideration, estimated Custom's dues credited, which would convert Soudan budget from a deficiency of 105,405*l.* to a surplus of 119,516*l.*—Col. Wodehouse's creditable administration—Falling off of Suakin revenue—Land tax in Egypt more than equivalent to all other sources of revenue—Net cost of retaining Suakin in 1890, 99,514*l.*—Estimated net cost of retaining Suakin for 1891, 98,428*l.*—H.M.'s Government during 1886-7 contributed 411,175*l.* towards Egyptian expenses 284 to 318

CHAPTER XIII.

Retrospect as to foregoing Chapters—Justification of title—Stephenson asks distinctly what are the responsibilities of General Officer commanding H.M.'s Forces in Egypt? War Office reply thereto, clearly placing all responsibilities for defence and appointments on General Commanding, consequently on H.M.'s Government—British Chartered Company advocated with full powers—Reasons why it would be impossible for Egypt to successfully rule and develop the Soudan among others, 11,000,000*l.* were borrowed to balance accounts with Europe, therefore future loans impossible—All objections of an International character to the formation of a Chartered Company removed by the action of H.M.'s Government

PAGE

in defining British and Italian spheres of influence, and entirely ignoring Turkey and Egypt—Means suggested for a Chartered Company to work amicably with the Soudanese, thus securing a profitable trade to the United Kingdom as well as the Soudan—Developing effects of railways in India—Mr. F. W. Fox's letter *re* pacification policy, pursued by him since 1885, resulting in Sir Charles Warren being sent out by H.M.'s Government to pursue this course, his unfortunate recall, and reversal of policy inaugurated by him—Letter to Salisbury, *re* pacification of the Soudan and proposals for its future Government—Proof that Suakin Governors-General are nominees of H.M.'s Government—Salisbury makes inquiries on what lines a Chartered Company should be formed—Tentative and brief outline of proposed manner of dealing with tribes, and subsidies to be granted for a term of years as a guarantee and moral support towards construction of railway; when it became a paying concern the Egyptian Government to benefit—Salisbury's refusal to entertain proposals—Hartington's speech *re* Railway—Extracts from Mr. Fox's report on the Soudan —Fox's letter to one of the authors as to views for restoring peace and tranquility in the Soudan, and insuring to the United Kingdom a large amount of trade in Manchester goods, etc.—Two proposals on different bases—Point at issue, presence of Egypt fatal to any British undertaking —British occupation of Zeila and Berbera in 1884—Temporary Italian occupation of Massowah in 1885, from Ras Kasar to Massowah, an accomplished fact in 1887, extent 170 miles Red Sea Littoral; large slice of territory in interior secured in 1891—Thus Egypt's rights in Soudan *de jure* and *de facto* extinct—British rights advocated—Salisbury considers Chartered Companies best means of advancing British influence in savage countries, and advocates railways—Sir Samuel Baker concurs, but insists on an unfettered management—Shows the absolute necessity of the occupation of the Littoral, not under Italian influence, by England—No improvement possible under any Egyptian Government —Salisbury points out benefits to Aborigines, and extinction of slavery by administration of Imperial British East Africa company—Gordon advocates Suakin-Berber Railway—Useless unless made by a Chartered Company with full powers to develop the country—Sir Samuel Baker's opinion as to the fertility of the soil, test of growth of cotton, and necessity of railway—*Artificial irrigation unnecessary*—Wheat grows to perfection—Advantage to England in case of war, or famine in India,

PAGE

independent of foreign countries—Societies appealed to—Aborigines Protection Society; London Chamber of Commerce, and all other chambers in the United Kingdom; International Arbitration and Peace Association; Anti-Slavery Society; and others interested in philanthropy and advancement of our Empire . 319 to 364

APPENDIX "A."

Letters from Dr. Harpur and General Haig, protesting against the barbarous action of military authorities at Suakin; and advocating a Parliamentary investigation to fix responsibility as regards the military policy adopted in the Soudan . . . . . 365 to 371

APPENDIX "B."

Leading article from the *Times*, 3rd June, 1887, commenting upon, and strongly advocating Mr. F. W. Fox's policy and proposals for the benefit of the Soudan and United Kingdom . . . . . 372 to 375

APPENDIX "C."

Article in the *Times*, 3rd June, 1887, entering fully into the prospects of the proposed Soudan Company, discussing each point in Mr. F. W. Fox's report, and expressing the opinion that great benefits would accrue to the African continent if it were found practicable to give effect to Mr. Fox's proposals . . . . . 376 to 383

APPENDIX "D."

Showing how wheat crops in India increased in almost geometrical progression, when railways were constructed . . . . . 384 to 386

APPENDIX "E."

Article in the *Times* on the threatened famine in India; if the Soudan were under the control of a British Chartered Company, wheat, in the periodical famine in India, could be drawn from the Soudan at far better prices for our starving subjects than elsewhere, as it would not have to bear heavy canal dues . . . . 387 to 394

APPENDIX "F."

Returns of those who died and were invalided between January, 1882, and July, 1885 395

INDEX 397

APPENDIX "C."

PAGE

Article in the *Times*, 3rd June, 1887, entering fully into the prospects of the proposed Soudan Company, discussing each point in Mr. F. W. Fox's report, and expressing the opinion that great benefits would accrue to the African continent if it were found practicable to give effect to Mr. Fox's proposals . . . . . 376 to 383

APPENDIX "D."

Showing how wheat crops in India increased in almost geometrical progression, when railways were constructed . . . . . 384 to 386

APPENDIX "E."

Article in the *Times* on the threatened famine in India; if the Soudan were under the control of a British Chartered Company, wheat, in the periodical famine in India, could be drawn from the Soudan at far better prices for our starving subjects than elsewhere, as it would not have to bear heavy canal dues . . . 387 to 394

APPENDIX "F."

Returns of those who died and were invalided between January, 1882, and July, 1885 395

INDEX 397

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

		PAGE
General Gordon	*Frontispiece.*	
Soudan warrior	*To face*	26
Portion of Suakin harbour and town . . .	,,	86
Map of Nile, Wady Halfa to Khartoum, to illustrate Desert Column march, also showing Suakin-Berber route	,,	104
Armed Soudanese	,,	136
Group taken at Suakin	,,	186
Soudan warriors	,,	200
Mahmoud Ali Bey and some of his tribesmen .	,,	222
Slave boys	,,	254
Soudan veteran	,,	278
Soudan youths, armed	,,	292
Gate at Suakin, commanding causeway . .	,,	364
Map of Egypt, Abyssinia, and Soudan .	*In cover*	
Facsimile of General Gordon's map, Suakin to Berber, and itinerary	,,	

THE RUIN OF THE SOUDAN:

CAUSE, EFFECT, AND REMEDY.

CHAPTER I.

The territory known as the Soudan briefly described—Short account of its inhabitants and their religion—Their former prominent position among civilized nations—The distinguished reputation for learning attained by its ancient capital Senaar—The ancestors of the present population—Causes of decadence—Consequent occupation by Egypt—Its damaging effects.

THERE are few tracts of country, of such enormous extent, about which so little is generally known, as that designated the Soudan, and considering that this part of Africa is the cynosure at the present moment of public curiosity, a few words touching its history and the character of its inhabitants can scarcely fail to prove interesting, more especially as it is appropriate to one of the purposes of this book, which is to urge, *inter alia*, the advantages of developing the resources of the land and the capacity and native intelligence of its occupiers.

Looking down the vista of ancient history almost to its vanishing point, there are found illustrations on temple walls, dating some four thousand years ago, depicting the Arabs at that remote epoch, as they appear now, even to the manner of dressing their hair. Their most ancient national records recall the struggles between the Egyptians and those anarchical tribes, which appear to have been

chronic up to the present time with the people who now bear the generic title of Soudanese, and who are no doubt identical with the inhabitants of the Nubian and Libyan deserts, under the name of Ethiopians, who were driven back by Moses, and who stormed their capital Soba on the Blue Nile, as narrated by Josephus. It may be well to observe here that the word Soudanese does not signify a distinct nationality, but is applied to the coloured peoples of North Africa generally, and it appears to be used by the Egyptians much in the same manner as the Greeks used the word "Kelt," as indicating the nations in the north and west of Europe outside their own pale of civilization, such as the Gauls, Teutons, Scandinavians, and Sclavonians, &c.

Passing from the periods of remote history to comparatively recent times—the seventh and eighth centuries of our era, and the first and second of the Mahomedan—events occurred which afford a fair means of judging the more immediate ancestry of the present existing tribes. It appears that about this time there were internecine dissensions in Arabia, which led to a considerable immigration from that country into the districts round Senaar inhabited by the negro tribes Fung, Hamagh, &c., under the guidance of a chief Beni Omr, who became master of those districts and converted the negroes to Islamism. From this nucleus of immigration may be traced by slow degrees the merging of the Arab and negro races in this part of the country, and in 1493 the name of the chief Beni Omr gives place to the tribal names Fung and Hamagh and other original tribes, who, under an energetic sheikh, made themselves masters of both sides of the Blue Nile—a country inhabited by Nubians, some of whom migrated, while others remained, embraced Islamism, intermarried with their conquerors, adopted their language, and became members of the dominant

tribe under the name of Fung. About the sixteenth century Senaar, under the administration of Sheikh Idris, celebrated for his ability, became a centre of attraction for men of learning, who resorted thither from Cairo and Bagdad, but this city attained the zenith of its fame during the reign of Baadi Abu Shellouk, who came to the throne in 1719, when a great victory was gained over the King of Abyssinia the renown of which eventually reached Constantinople, and crowds of learned celebrities visited Senaar from Arabia, Egypt, and India.

These incidents are specially referred to as bearing testimony to the intellectual and physical vigour then possessed by the Fung tribe. Strange to say, however, this exceptional prosperity seems to have been doomed to almost immediate collapse. In 1758 the Hamagh tribe became very powerful and the Fung lost much of their prestige, and in 1786 their King, Adlan, was deposed by the Hamagh, and the kingdom of Fung disappears. For the next thirty-three years anarchy prevailed, and the Hamagh, taking advantage of the situation, devastated the Soudan with fire and sword.

It was this state of things which induced Mahomet Ali to interfere, and in 1819 he ordered his son Ismael, with a numerous army, to invade the country. This occupation was accompanied by terrible barbarities committed by Ismael, for which he suffered a dreadful retribution at the hands of the ruler of Shendi. This sheikh, wishing to avenge the wrongs of his countrymen, invited Ismael and his followers to a banquet, and when the guests were all more or less intoxicated the house was set on fire and Ismael and his followers perished. It would appear from this incident that one of the cardinal features of the Mahomedan religion, sobriety, was not rigidly observed by the Egyptian followers of the Prophet.

It will thus be seen that the period of Egyptian Government of the Soudan commenced in 1819, which the Mahdi's rising terminated in 1883; the Khedive's dominion therefore lasting some sixty-three years. Whether during that time the country benefited by the change may be an open question, but one thing is certain, that the new Government did not engage either the affections or respect of the Soudanese, as is shown by the frequent outbreaks that occurred from time to time, and the present universal rebellion. Some twenty governors were appointed during the above period—a prejudicial fact in itself—and whether from their own shortcomings or that of their subordinates, their administrations could hardly be considered successful. It is only just to admit, however, that some of them earned a most creditable record. For instance, Kurshid Pasha appointed in 1826 was remarkable for his rectitude, and he was the first Governor who induced the people of Khartoum to abandon their huts of skins and reeds, and to build their houses with bricks. Abdel Latif Pasha, in 1849, spent his time in rectifying the wrongs committed by his predecessors and opening schools. Again, in 1856, Arakel Pasha was distinguished for justice and administrative capacity. The administration of General Gordon of course needs no comment.

The extent of the territory under his jurisdiction was enormous. From north to south, that is, from Assouan to the equator, it measures some 1600 miles, and in width, between Massowah and the Darfour province, say about 1300.

The country in the northern division from Assouan to Khartoum, outside the valley of the Nile, is nearly a desert occupied by supposed aboriginal nomad tribes. The climate is dry, yet enervating. The summer is excessively hot, the regular rains occurring in June, July, and August.

West of the White Nile the country has the appearance of a vast steppe covered with gum trees and prickly grass. Water is scarce. On the western side of the Darfour province the country improves and cultivation is luxuriant. As far as the eleventh parallel the inhabitants are nomad Arab cattle owners (Baggara). South of this lattitude the negro race appears. In the province of Darfour, however, the two races intermix. East of the White Nile, and some degrees south of Khartoum, the country is a well-watered and well-cultivated plain. The inhabitants of this zone of country are mostly pure Arabs, mixed with a small proportion of negroes. There are, however, far more fertile regions than these, lying between the Atbara and Blue Nile rivers, fit for the cultivation of cotton and tropical products generally, which only require the means of exit to the coast, which a railway could readily supply, to make them immediately profitable to work. At present there are only camel tracks which are not always practicable.

Although by far the larger proportion of the population of the Soudan consists mainly of Arabs and negroes, there are other tribes claiming a primitive occupation, and having a language of their own, some of them hardly understanding Arabic, such as the natives of Dongola, and the tribes of Bishareen, Hadendoa and others.

The religion of the Soudanese is nominally Mahomedan of the Maliki school, but on account of their general ignorance it has degenerated into one of emotion and superstition, and the negro tribes, although officially called Mahomedans, are practically Pagans, or of no religion whatever.

The systems of administration, both in the courts of justice and in the government of the provinces are, like the Turkish, fairly good in themselves, but the efficiency of the systems, also as in Turkey,

becomes ineffectual, owing largely to the corruption and inefficiency of the executive officials. Independently of this, further difficulties present themselves in the ministering of justice, in the facility with which false testimony can be procured, the general disinclination to give evidence, the contempt for the summonses to attend court, the great distances from which witnesses have to be brought, coupled with the difficulty in finding them. And, *mutatis mutandis*, the same may be said of the lay establishments.

As to taxation, as is general in the East, the Government is the admitted owner of the land, and charges the cultivator a tithe of its produce, and also further charges are levied on live stock and agricultural plant. Now it is in the manner of assessment, and in the means of collecting, that opportunities for vexatiously oppressing the cultivator of the soil arise. For example of the former, in 1865 a certain Pasha, Jaafar by name, openly stated that the tax of 500 piastres levied on water-wheels was excessive, but that he had fixed it at that rate to see how much the peasant would really pay, and that he hoped after three years' trial to be able to arrive at a just mean. He was, however, removed long before his three years were over, and his successors, either through ignorance or indifference, allowed the tax to continue. As a consequence, many were reduced to destitution, others had to emigrate, and so much land went out of cultivation that, in 1881, in the province of Berber there were 1442 water-wheels (sakiyés) abandoned, and in Dongola 613! These facts are gathered from a government report on the subject of taxation in 1881. The second grievance referred to is the employment of Bashi-Bazouks to collect taxes. Most of these men are swaggering bullies, plundering and ill-treating the people with impunity, and Lieut.-Col. Stewart says in his report, dated

Khartoum, 1883, which is the authority for what is here stated, "that probably for every pound that reaches the treasury, these men rob an equal amount from the people."

Two recommendations from the Government report already mentioned also speak volumes: "To remit the taxes due on ruined Sakiyés since 1877, with a view to encourage the return of the owner." "To discontinue the levying of taxes on lands and dates carried away by the floods!" Can it be wondered that the Soudan proved a financial failure to the central government, and destructive to the prosperity of its cultivators? As, however, Egyptian dominion is not likely to be resumed, further consideration of an exploded system would not be profitable, beyond quoting the two last budgets. With reference to these under the head of "expenditure," it must not be inferred that any money was spent for the benefit of the tax-payer, the whole is absorbed in the payment of salaries, rations, &c., of an oppressive official staff. Not a penny even appears to have been devoted to making roads, the want of which is so bitterly felt, as will be seen by what Lieut.-Col. Stewart says: "All the districts south of Khartoum, between the Niles, and also about Karkotsch and Ghedariff, are celebrated for their corn-growing capacity, and may be said to be the granary of the Soudan. Were easy communications opened with the sea, there can be little doubt that a considerable export trade in grain would spring up. *At present grain is allowed to rot in the ground in those districts, while it is at a famine price at Suakin and Jeddah.*"

In concluding this introductory chapter, it is hoped enough has been said to show that the Soudan and its people are worthy of recognition by Western Europe, and how this may be profitably accomplished will be indicated later on. It must

be borne in mind that the Arab and the negro compose the bulk of the population. The former race we know are the fathers of mathematics, and have been the distinguished patrons of arts and sciences, and as to their capacity for refinement, the Alhambra is the finest specimen of decorative and luxurious architecture in existence; and as to the Negro, Professor Blumenbach possessed a library of works written by that people, from which it appears that there is not a single department of taste or science in which some negro has not been distinguished. With such records as these, can it be doubted that it is only the opportunity that is wanting to revive and direct the energies of these peoples? It is true they are turbulent now, but give them a common interest, which will be done by opening up the country for trade and commerce, and all their vigour will be devoted to a common cause. And last, but not least, of the good results which would follow such a policy, would be the decay of the slave trade.

Touching this, Lieut.-Col. Stewart says, after commenting upon the restrictive measures for its suppression: "When all, however, is done that can be done, I look with more hope on the opening up of the country, and in the extension of legitimate trade, to bring slavery to an end than on the most stringent treaties that can be devised, and I am convinced no instrument will be more effective in bringing about this result, than a railway bringing Khartoum within an easy distance of the sea."

CHAPTER II.

Cause of rebellion by Mahdi due to corrupt and iniquitous practices of Egyptian Government officials—Slave trade and means of suppressing it—History of Mahdi and his supporters—Deplorable condition of Egyptian army—Hicks' resignation and inducement to withdraw it—Suakin-Berber route advocated—Destruction of Hicks' army—British, Indian, or Egyptian troops refused—Abandonment recommended.

BEFORE reviewing the rebellion from the point of actual and active hostilities that took place during the year 1883, it will be both interesting and instructive to inquire into the immediate and proximate causes that gave birth to these hostilities, and really brought about the insurrection. To this end no better source of information presents itself than the able report, dated April, 1883, of the late Lieut.-Col. Stewart—the agent appointed by the English Government—upon the general condition, socially and otherwise, of that large tract of country lying, broadly, between Khartoum and Senaar, and mostly of so fertile a character as to have earned for itself the title of the "Granary of the Soudan,"—a fact which should assure those who might entertain a scheme for the development of the district, that their enterprise would be crowned with success, in so far, that is, as the soil could contribute to such a result.

As a signal evidence of decay the present condition of Senaar, the capital of the province, furnishes a pregnant example. The report says: "It is a miserable, poverty-stricken place, with a

population variously estimated at from 10,000 to 15,000, mostly of the Djaaleen race. Although most of the houses are of mud, there is a fair proportion of Tokhuls (beehive-shaped straw huts). The town is situated on the left bank of the Blue Nile, and during the late insurrection a ditch and rampart had been built round it. There is a market-place beyond the ramparts, where markets used to be held twice a week, but which is now only occupied by the spiked and sun-dried heads of Amr-el-Makashfi (a rebel chief) and some six or seven of his followers." This is a melancholy picture of a town which had, comparatively speaking, not so long ago, a world-wide reputation; and for which sixty years of Egyptian rule had evidently done less than nothing towards reviving its former prosperity, for Besati Bey, the Governor of the province, says, "that the real cause of the rebellion was misgovernment and oppression, and that all the Mahdi did was to apply a lighted match to the fully prepared tinder!" Further, Lieut.-Col. Stewart says that "Besati Bey, in common with other officials, appeared very hopeless as regards the present condition of affairs. He stated that no revenue had been paid for two years, and that salaries were seven months in arrear. I even heard that some of the irregular troops had not been paid for twenty-five months. He appeared to have little faith in his ability to do any good." The evidence of this Bey may be accepted with considerable confidence, as he had lately been secretary to General Gordon, than whom none knew better how to select his officers. To continue from the report: "Several of the residents complained of the conduct of the Egyptian troops on their march through the town, and I was assured they had robbed and plundered so impartially as to pick the

pockets of their own commanding officers. Others related the history of the rebellion, showing that it was greatly owing to the folly and want of judgment of the officials that the town had ever been in the actual possession of the rebels." As further showing that nothing has been even attempted to develop the latent resources of the district, the report says: "The plough is unknown, and planting is done by hand. I was told that on fairly good soil, where weeds were kept down and the rains abundant, the return was simply marvellous;" and again, on the subject of agriculture, "I was told that the area under cultivation had diminished instead of increasing. The usual reasons were given—the indolence of the people, venality of the officials, and the pressure of taxation." The depressing effects of excessive taxation are not only manifest as regards the cultivation of the soil, but they also appear in their relation to commerce, in this respect quoting from the report, at a town in the Soudan—Ghedariff: "I found that the octroi dues levied on sales in the Bazaar and market were sold by public auction, and that the present multezim, or farmer, was Sheikh Ali Wad Amara, who had paid 60,000 piastres for them. I also heard that some years ago the fair had been much more prosperous, and that the octroi dues had been sold for 160,000 piastres; also that the reason why the importance of the fair had so greatly diminished, was the outrageous way in which the sellers were robbed by the multezim and Government officials. To verify this statement, I caused several of the traders to be examined, and they stated:—

"'1. That a butcher paid for every slaughtered bullock, valued from 5 to 10 dollars, a tax of 1 dollar 2 piastres, besides giving half a hind quarter to the tax farmer.

"'2. That grass mats, valued at 2 piastres each, pay a tax of 20 paras.

"'3. That wood is charged 2 piastres the bullock load, the wood merchants besides giving two logs of wood to the police officer, two to the military, two to the multezim, two to the Government official, and two to the vakeel, per bullock load.

"'4. Salt valued at 2 dollars the half cantar, pays a tax of 4 piastres.'

"(N.B.—The legal tax on these articles is 5 per cent. on the selling price.)

"'5. For the privilege of putting up a screen or seat in the market 1 piastre is charged per day, besides which each trader has to give a handful of all he sells to the farmer.

"'6. The local timber trade has been quite ruined in consequence of heavy dues.'"

Upon the local Governor being questioned on the above facts by Lieut.-Col. Stewart, their existence was freely admitted, and they had been reported without any result. He also stated that the state of affairs had considerably improved, owing to the absence of the Bashi-Bazouks, "who it appears were in the habit of occupying all the approaches to the market in order to plunder the traders and Arabs." The Sheikh Ali Wad Amara, the octroi farmer, was then questioned, and "at first he strongly denied the above statement, but eventually took refuge in generalities, saying that he was no worse than his neighbours, that for every piastre he took others stole dollars; that he robbed the poor but did not meddle with the wealthy." Col. Stewart in reply said he should "certainly report the case," and gives it as his opinion "that the whole local Government is in league to rob and plunder."

The town of Kasala or Taka—a capital of a province and of some importance—presents another

sad spectacle of decay, the "Government offices, barracks, and gaol being in ruins," thus showing that the Egyptian Government could not even preserve buildings, which, comparatively speaking, could not but very long ago have been erected by themselves, and the Mudir told Col. Stewart "that last year not one third of the revenue had been collected, and that although the first quarter of the present year had passed, nothing as yet had been realized."

A cotton factory had been erected seven years ago, at a cost of from 20,000*l.* to 30,000*l.*, complete in every respect with a 100 horse-power steam engine and twenty-one gins; all was in excellent order when Colonel Stewart was there, but he was told that it had "never been worked"; also "that although the culture of cotton had succeeded the first year it had been tried, it had since unaccountably failed.

"Further inquiry elicited the fact, that the usual causes, indolence, dislike to change, oppressive and illegitimate taxation, difficulty of communication, &c., were at the bottom of this, as of other Egyptian commercial ventures." Again, the peasantry complained that "they had to give up the cultivation of cotton, as every passing traveller and Bashi-Bazouk was in the habit of allowing his camels to graze in their cotton fields." The report goes on to state: "It is almost needless for me to point out how utterly ruinous the system is to discipline, *esprit de corps*, and other military requisites." "In the prisons I found fifty-three prisoners, and discovered that none had been legally sentenced, although some had been six or seven years in prison. The president of the local court had recently been dismissed for incapacity, but I sent for him and inquired why justice had not been more speedy, and why at least some of the cases had not been com-

pleted. He stated that as regards seventeen of the prisoners they had come in since the 17th March, 1883, the date of his dismissal, and that as regards the remainder, he had done all in his power to accelerate matters, by bringing the state of affairs to the notice of the Mudir. That the causes of delay were partly the difficulty of procuring evidence, and partly due to the dismissal of the Cadi some two years ago, and who had not been replaced. To my inquiry he replied that the presence and signature of the Cadi was rendered necessary at all trials by an order of Réouf Pasha, Ex-Governor-General of the Soudan ; that he, the President, had tried to get over the difficulty by replacing the Cadi by the Mufti, but this had been overruled. I would beg to bring the case of the tribunal most urgently to your Excellency's (Sir E. Malet's) notice, and to point out that it is far from reflecting credit on the administration of Ala-el-Deen Pasha, the late Governor-General of East Soudan. It is useless for him to plead ignorance of the state of affairs; as Governor-General it was his business to make himself acquainted with them, and to devise measures to put an end to the scandal."

It would be tedious to pursue further this very instructive report, as it would only amount to a repetition of flagrant instances of corruption, incapacity, oppression, and plunder in all its branches; it is a case of *hoc genus omne.* In the bare possibility, however, that it may be thought Lieut.-Col. Stewart had a little over-coloured his statement, a quotation is given from Mr. F. L. James, M.A., F.R.G.S., "Personal experiences in the Soudan in 1878." "We paid several visits to the old Mudir (of Dongola); on one occasion the Mudireh was full of people who had come to pay their taxes, some of them did not bring sufficient, and *were promptly bastinadoed.* Morning and evening crowds of black

slaves, both men and women, might be seen filling their water-jars at the river; many of them had heavy iron shackles on their ankles, which were fastened together with chains. I saw women, shackled in this way, shuffling along with heavy water-jars on their heads, and not able to move more than a few inches each shuffle." It is difficult to imagine a more revolting and demoralizing spectacle, and yet this is countenanced, if not encouraged, by a power with which western civilization goes through the solemn farce of entering into treaties for the "suppression of the slave trade!"

Can it be wondered, after these revelations, that the Soudanese broke out into such a sudden blaze of revolt, and it is not surprising that Mr. Gladstone should have officially stated that the Arabs were "rightly struggling for their freedom," though the expression of the sentiment, for political reasons, might have been ill-timed.

Before concluding these brief commentaries on the southern portion of the Soudan, Khartoum, though not mentioned in the foregoing report, is deserving of especial notice here, not only as being the capital of the Soudan, but as being the city where the career of that most extraordinary and unique man, General Gordon—the Bayard of the 19th century—came to such an untimely though heroic end.

Khartoum is described by Colonel Stewart as of irregular shape. The general habitations poor and miserable; the Government House and one or two other buildings being the only structures worthy of the name of "house." The other dwellings are built of sun-dried brick, generally without an upper storey, and nearly all surrounded by courtyards with mud walls. To prevent these houses crumbling away during the rains, they are every year plastered

over with dung before the rainy season commences. This plastering process is supposed to be the cause of a good deal of illness—and it hardly could be otherwise—as the town is so low, there is no drainage, consequently during the rains the whole place is deep in water, making it almost impossible to move about. As there is no stone throughout the whole district, the streets are full of dust during the summer, and mud during the rains. Notwithstanding this uninviting picture of the city, it is the chief trade emporium of the whole country; its situation between the Blue and White Niles, almost at their junction, practically places it on the banks of two large navigable rivers, each at their lowest level being some 600 to 800 yards wide, thus exceptionally fitting it for all purposes of trade and commerce. And when it is considered through what a productive district these rivers take their course, it is almost impossible to estimate the amount of profitable business that would accrue, if there were railway communication effected with the Red Sea, bringing it into contact with both Europe and Asia. In its present undeveloped state it has a resident population of some 50,000, and there is a floating population of Europeans, Syrians, Copts, Turks, Albanians, and a few Jews, of something like 2000. Their political creed, it is said, teaches "to side with the strongest," consequently, if this be so, there would be little difficulty in any power securing their allegiance, if it assured and secured their protection. The manufactures are chiefly confined to making mats, cotton cloths, ropes made from palm leaves, and some filagree silver work. The Bazaar is of considerable size, and fairly well supplied with Manchester goods, cheap cutlery, &c. There is a good import and export trade even now, and much is done in grain with Senaar and Karkotsch. As regards the climate it is fairly

healthy, having much in common with other tropical regions; the winter is the most favourable season, the average temperature at that period has been estimated at about 81° Fahr., and in the summer 111°, but these figures are thought to be exaggerated. It is curious to notice as regards its altitude, that although at times it is below the level of the two Niles, the town stands some 1400 feet above the level of the sea.

Having reviewed generally what might have been proximate causes, those more immediate will be found worthy of consideration, and, among them, the slave trade has a prominent place. Of this Colonel Stewart says, "That the suppression of the slave trade, or rather the difficulties thrown in its way, is also a potent cause (of the rebellion), is evident from the list of tribes who support the Mahdi. Many, if not the majority, of the tribes are 'Baggara,' or owners of cattle. These tribes are all of Arab descent, and from *time immemorial* have been inverate slave hunters. As they were also poor and unwilling cultivators, they were in the habit of paying the sum their tribe was rated at by selling slaves, whom they would steal from Jebel Nuba, or other districts farther south. How this slave traffic was managed was somewhat as follows: Say the annual tribute of the tribe was 5000*l.* Having no money, and no wealth but their cattle, it was evident that they were quite unable to pay the sum. In such cases the Kordofan merchant (Djellab) would offer to pay it, if the tribe would supply him with an equivalent in slaves, say 1000. Should the required number of slaves not be forthcoming, then the tribe would agree to pay the balance by selling him cows at a certain rate. Should the tribe fail in the bargain, the merchant would refuse to pay the Government, and the latter would have to send troops to harry the tribe. These troops

would probably plunder and destroy far more than was necessary, with the result of still further impoverishing the tribe, making the Government detested, and the people only too willing to seize any opportunity of escaping from it.

"To complete this picture of Soudan administration (I hope as it was), it is necessary to show how the merchant settled with the Government.

"Now when he made his bargain the trader well knew that the Government, having generally but little money in the Treasury, its *employés* were mostly some fifteen to twenty months in arrears, and were compelled to discount their pay, with a loss of 40 to 50 per cent. With these bills the merchant would pay the Government.

"Lately the Government would seem to have become really desirous to put down the slave trade, so that these tribes have lost the *only means of paying their taxes. Notwithstanding this, the annual tribute expected from them is still the same.*"

The foregoing statement is very suggestive and instructive. From this it appears that certain tribes of Arabs, who from "time immemorial" have been taught by custom and habit to look upon slave dealing as a prescriptive practice, are comparatively suddenly brought face to face with the fact that the trade is contraband, and a proscribed crime. Notwithstanding prohibitive legislation, however, they found that the Egyptian Government were quite willing to receive their tribute from the proceeds of an illegitimate trade (for it is absurd to suppose that the Government officials were ignorant of the source which provided the funds), and that while the Government denounced the slave trade *de jure*, they encouraged it *de facto*. All at once, doubtless by pressure from without, this trade is, it appears, actively suppressed, and although it was known to be the only means by

which the tribal tribute could be met, it was still nevertheless expected. What else could possibly be looked for, but revolt from these tribes at the first opportunity? It must not be supposed for a moment, that it is here contended that this abominable traffic should be tolerated, but on the other hand it was just as much an injustice, if not more so, to tax these tribes and at the same time deprive them of the means of paying, as it would have been for the British Legislature, some sixty years ago, to have liberated the West India slaves without compensation to their owners. There is a rough and ready kind of justice which is everybody's due, and when any trade, however objectionable it may be subsequently considered, has had for any length of time the countenance of any government or state of society, it is due to those who have been engaged in it, on being deprived of their means of living, that they should be treated with some consideration.

The fact is, this Slave Trade Question is a *bête noire* of the situation, and is brought out, in season or out of season, by the Anti-Slavery party, very often to the ultimate defeat of the laudable object they have in view. That they mean well is beyond question, but the proverb tells us to what an uncomfortable destination the way leads "that is paved with good intentions." Good intentions, unless seasoned with wisdom, usually lead to mischief; like the little girl with the sick owl, who insisted upon putting the poor bird back again into the sun every time it crawled out of it, till the unhappy animal died. It is hardly too much to venture that, had not Her Majesty's Government expressed their disapproval of the employment of Zebehr Pasha, the remarkable influence that this man could admittedly exercise over the tribes, might have had the effect of saving Khartoum and General Gordon's life.

He was, however, a most notorious slave-dealer, and it is doubtful whether any minister, were he a Pitt or a Palmerston, would have dared—whatever his private opinions might have been—so to affront the susceptibilities of so powerful a party as to give consent to the employment of anyone with such a record. It is a pity the Egyptian Government did not act without it. Thus much has been said on this subject, because it is only too probable that in the event of any proposal to open up commercial negociations with the sheikhs personally, it will be met with the suggestion that they are all more or less contaminated.

There is, however, Colonel Stewart's opinion, no mean authority, and a strong anti-slavery man, that there is no better way of getting rid of the slave trade. Experience teaches that no contraband trade was ever suppressed by penal statutes alone. The example of smuggling in this country in the early part of the century exemplifies this. Notwithstanding coastguard stations and armed cruisers, smuggling drove a roaring trade, and the reader of the present day would be astonished if he were told how great a financial name was associated with it. Smuggling died out because altered circumstances so reduced its profits, that the game was not worth the candle.

And it would be the same with the slave trade if those engaged in it had other channels opened to them. Let Exeter Hall be at one with the Halls of Commerce, and the *raison d'être* of the Anti-Slavery Society will soon disappear.

As among the immediate causes of the insurrection the Mahdi (False Prophet) is the most prominent, though perhaps not the most powerful, a brief history of his early life, derived from a report of Colonel Stewart's, will prove of some interest. His name was Mahomed Achmet, a native of the province of

Dongola. His father, Abdullahi by name, was a carpenter. In 1852 he settled in Shindi, a town on the Nile, south of Berber. At that time his family consisted of three sons and a daughter, called respectively Mahomed, Hamid, Mahomed Achmet (the Mahdi), and Nur el Sham (Light of Syria). At Shindi another son was born—Abdullah.

As a boy Mahomed Achmet was apprenticed to Sherif-ed-deen, his uncle, a boat-man, or boat-builder, residing at Shakabeh, an island opposite Senaar. Having one day received a beating from his uncle, he ran away to Khartoum, and joined the free school or "Medressa" of a Faki (a learned man, head of a sect of Dervishes), who resided at Hoghali, a village close to Khartoum. This school is attached to the tomb of Sheikh Hoghali, the patron saint of Khartoum, and who is greatly revered by the inhabitants of that town and district. (The Sheikh of this tomb or shrine, although he keeps a free school and feeds the poor, derives a very handsome revenue from the gifts of the pious. He claims to be a descendant of the original Hoghali, and through him of Mahomet.) Here the Mahdi remained some time studying religion, the tenets of his Sheikh, &c., but did not make much progress in reading and writing.

After a time he went to Berber, where he joined another free school, kept by a Sheikh Shubush, nearly opposite to Berber, also attached to a shrine greatly venerated by the natives. After remaining here six months, he went to Aradap (Tamarind Tree), a village south of Kana, and in 1870 he became a disciple of another Faki—Sheikh Nur-el-Daim (Continuous Light), who ordained him a Sheikh, or Faki, and he then left to take up his home in the island of Abba, near Kana, on the White Nile. Here he began by making a subterranean excavation (Khalion —retreat), into which he made a practice of retiring

to repeat for hours one of the names of the Deity (of which there are ninety-nine in Arabic), and this accompanied by fasting, incense burning, and prayers.

His fame and sanctity by degrees spread far and wide,—he became wealthy, collected disciples, and married several wives, all of whom he was careful to select from among the daughters of the most influential Baggara Sheikhs (cattle-owners) and other notables. To keep within the legalized number (four), he was in the habit of divorcing the surplus and taking them on again according to his fancy.

About the end of May, 1881, he began to write to his brother Fakis (religious chiefs), and to teach that he was the Mahdi foretold by Mahomet, and that he had a divine mission to reform Islam, to establish a universal equality, a universal law, a universal religion, and a community of goods ("beyt-al-mal"); also that all who did not believe in him should be destroyed, be they Christians, Mahomedans, or Pagans. Amongst others, he wrote to Mahomet Saleh, a very learned and influential Faki, of Dongola, directing him to collect his Dervishes (followers) and friends, and to join him at Abba. This sheikh, instead of complying with his request, informed the Government, declaring the man must be mad.

In person the Mahdi was tall, slim, with a black beard, and light-brown complexion. Like most of his immediate countrymen, he wrote and read with difficulty. He was local head of the Gheelan, or Kadrige order of Dervishes, a school originated by Abdul Kader-el-Ghulami, whose tomb is believed to be at Bagdad.

Of his capacity, Colonel Stewart says: "Judging from his conduct of affairs and policy, I should say he had considerable natural ability. The manner in

which he has managed to merge the usually discordant tribes together denotes a great tact. He had probably been preparing the movement some time back." This view, however, rather conflicts with an anecdote on the occasion of the assault by the Mahdi on Obeid. It appears that on the day of the assault, he accompanied the Arabs till within half an hour of the town, and then left them, saying that the Nebbhi (Prophet) had told him the bullets of the soldiers would do no harm, and that, after taking the town, they were to return to him the following day, when together they would march to the mosque in the big square, and return thanks for the victory. In the firm persuasion that they would remain unharmed, the Arabs advanced impetuously to the assault, and were repulsed with frightful loss. (The Mahdi appears to have adopted a less spiritual, perhaps, but a more prosaic and practical method of avoiding the soldiers' bullets.) That after the failure of the assault, the Mahdi and his followers were so disheartened that they decided to move away, and were only prevented from doing so by a wealthy notable of Obeid, called Elias Pasha, who pointed out to the Mahdi that the town was badly provisioned, and if blockaded must soon succumb. His advice was followed, and the Mahdi sent letters to the tribes, asserting, that in ordering the assault he had misunderstood the Nebbhi, and that in a subsequent revelation the Nebbhi had told him he was an ass ("enta homar"), (qy.: not the only one, apparently), that he (the Mahdi) had made a great mistake, and what he must do now was to blockade the town. The narrator of this anecdote said, in his opinion, the Mahdi well deserved the name the Prophet had called him.

Another sample is afforded of the extreme susceptibility to superstitious influence of these emotional people, in an incident that occurred after a

defeat of the rebels before Senaar, which was relieved by Abdul Kader.

Achmet-el-Makashfi—the rebel chief—during the flight, drew his sword, and flourishing it in the air told the people that, for every cut he made, the Nebbhi would slay 100 infidels (Turks or Egyptians). He also assured them that all those slain in battle would rise again after six months, adding that there were "many other things he could tell, but could not tell them yet." And there is no reason to suppose that he was not implicitly believed.

As the Fakis (learned men—teachers) and their followers, Dervishes, are also important factors in this rebellion, a few words touching their system and doctrine will be appropriate and instructive. In Arabic there are ninety-nine names for God, and it is popularly believed that to each of these names numerous guardian angels are attached; it is also a popular belief that, by continuous repetition of one of these names, accompanied by fasting, incense, and prayers, God will be induced to send the guardian angels of the name to the worshipper, and order them to become his humble slaves and servants. Now these Fakis are those who, in the estimation of the people, are thus supernaturally endowed. They consequently acquire enormous power, wealth, and influence, as it is thought by a word they are able to cure the sick, cause death, remove sterility from women and cattle, give hegabs, or charms, &c., for all which advantages the Arab is prepared to pay heavily. In cases where the Faki's charm has not proved efficacious, he gets out of the difficulty by asserting that its failure is owing to the recipient's want of faith.

By degrees the Faki becomes rich and powerful. In order to look after his wealth and increase his importance, he collects a number of followers—Dervishes. These are only too happy to join him,

partly on account of the lazy life, partly because it is pleasant to be looked up to by one's fellows, and partly to escape paying taxes. (The Government, to humour the people, have foolishly exempted the Fakis and Dervishes from taxes.) Owing to these and perhaps other favouring circumstances, the number of Fakis and Dervishes has enormously increased, and it is now almost impossible to find a village or tribe throughout the Soudan which is not invaded by these holy men, who have practically become the spiritual guides of the people and the teachers of the young.

In return for these spiritual advantages, they exact from all a tithe, disguised under the name of charitable gifts. As an instance of the pitch to which the system has reached, in the wealthy tribe Dabagné, south Ghedariff, there are no less than sixty-two villages belonging to the Fakis.

The result is that people are no longer able, in many instances, to sustain the Faki and his Dervishes, and at the same time pay the imposts of Government.

As regards the course of the actual hostilities themselves, in the greater part of the year 1883, there is much less to interest than the various circumstances which promoted them. The usual characteristics of guerilla warfare present themselves,—fluctuating fortune of the combatants, followed with no definite results. The principal exceptions to this vacillating state of things being the relief of Senaar by Pasha Abdul Kader—by the way, apparently one of the best officers in the Egyptian army—and the final capture of Obeid by the Mahdi. As an example of the manner in which the rebels attack, the following quotation from a despatch from Colonel Stewart is by no means uninteresting. He says, "They seize a moment when the troops are occupied and unready, such as drawing water

and unloading the camels, and then rush madly on them in a dense mass of men, women and children. The women and children, of course, do not fight, and are only there to encourage the men through their low, continuous, and weird cries, along with a frantic beating of drums. Those who have seen the attack tell me it is really formidable-looking, through its suddenness, rapidity, and clamour. The men fight mostly with flat-headed lances, with which during the advance they shield their faces. Of late, it is said, they have begun to use the captured rifles. They are also in the habit of shutting their eyes when advancing. Of all the supporters of the Madhi, the Dervish is much the most formidable. I hear the fearless and desperate way with which he rushes on a square armed with Remingtons, is really marvellous."

Then as to the means adopted by the troops to meet this sort of attack, which it seems are rendered nugatory by want of the commonest precautions, Colonel Stewart goes on: "One of the first things that is done after unloading the camels is to build a "zerriba," or circular thorny hedge, round the camping-ground. Everyone then retires inside this enclosure. Practically the precautions of posting outposts, scouts, and videttes *are never taken*, so that the troops are always liable to surprise."

Again, in another despatch, dated Khartoum, January, 1883, touching the character of the Egyptian army, he says: "The troops in garrison here are working at elementary drill and tactics, and are *making some progress!*" (Imagine such a state of things existing in the army of an established Power!) "It is, however, very uphill work; the officers are so ignorant, and so incapable of grasping the meaning of the simplest movement. Quite one third of the troops are also ignorant of

Sampson Low and Co. Ltd., London. Collotype Lemercier, Paris.

Soudan warrior.

the use of the rifle, and they would be more formidable adversaries were they armed simply with sticks. Many have also superstitious ideas of the power of the Mahdi.

"Besides the ignorance of the Egyptian officers, nothing is more striking than their want of initiative, and their unwillingness to assume any responsibility. Not one of the officers in any of the out-stations will think of attacking unless they have previously sent into Khartoum to ask for leave, the result being an enormous loss of valuable time, and of many favourable opportunities. It is owing to this cause that the enemy, although there are several strong garrisons along the White and Blue Niles, can move unmolested about the intermediate country and pass almost within gun-fire of the forts."

If such was, and doubtless is, the army[1] of the Khedive, can any surprise be felt that his dominion over the Soudan, or anywhere else, should have crumbled to pieces, like a mummy at the first touch? When venality, corruption, incapacity, rapacity, and impecuniosity are the prominent features of a civil government, and its military department supplements these with pusillanimity, what else but dismemberment of an empire can be looked for?

It is a marvel that General Hicks should ever have consented to take command of an army composed of such materials, and it must be the painful regret of every Englishman that he ever recalled his resignation, and thus sacrificed his life, like General Gordon, to a worthless cause. But be this as it may, regrets now are vain, save as a warning for the future; suffice it to say that, with the failure of his expedition to relieve Obeid was ushered in the beginning of the end of the Egyptian dominion in the Soudan.

[1] Egyptian *fellaheen* troops are alluded to, not Soudanese.

In concluding this chapter, although the following extracts from communications between General Hicks, the English Plenipotentiaries, Earl Granville, and Chérif Pasha, have not now any immediate bearing on the primary objects the authors of this volume have in view, yet they are given to illustrate the inevitable damage that must arise to any cause, whatever its character, when prejudiced by the influences of a dual control. All dual controls, unless the objects of both parties are absolutely identical, and not always then, cannot be expected to end otherwise than in disaster, and this the result has proved in the present case.

The broad facts of the situation, as shown by the despatches, demonstrate that notwithstanding an apparent concurrence in certain instances, the objects of each of the parties, instead of being identical, were diametrically opposed. The Egyptian Government wished to retain the Soudan, while H.M.'s Government, with qualifications, wished it to be abandoned.

The means to the end that the former had in view were deplorably inadequate, and of this H.M.'s Government are shown to have been perfectly well aware. In these circumstances it is to be regretted that H.M.'s Government should, by permitting the employment of their own officers in active service, in a manifestly hopeless cause, have given an indirect encouragement to a course which it is clear they expected would have a calamitous termination, or they would not have taken every occasion to disclaim any responsibility. It may be said now it is easy to judge after the event, but the shadows of the coming events were sufficiently unmistakable at the time to justify decision. It may be urged in defence that it was a delicate matter to advise a *protégé* to dismember his empire without a struggle, but when there was never any intention of assisting

in that struggle, and when it was apparent that that struggle could not be successful without external aid, the inevitable should have been grappled with at all cost.

There is little doubt at that time, that arrangements might have been made for the evacuation by the garrisons of the various outlying districts without bloodshed, and probably by conciliatory means some agreement might have been come to with the sheikhs for a more congenial form of government, which would have been advantageous both to the Soudanese and Egypt proper. But the golden opportunity was lost, and now, after eight years' British occupation, the last state is worse than the first.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM GENERAL HICKS 14TH APRIL 1883, SHOWING THE DEPLORABLE STATE OF HIS ARMY.

P.S.—My great anxiety now is for provisions for the troops, also for money for their payment. As regards the first, there are only fifteen days for some and twenty days for others. No supplies have arrived from his Excellency Aladin Pasha. The steamer I sent to Khartoum about the pay and money for expenses has not returned. I am in hopes my staff officer will bring both money and food, otherwise I fear there must be delay in the departure of the army from here.

It is eight marches to Gebel Ain, and with only fifteen days' supply, and nothing to be obtained in that country, the question is one of great difficulty. I do not like to leave on my expedition to take possession of the ford until I get news from Khartoum by the returning steamer.

The native Bashi-Bazouks who came from Wad-el-Zaki yesterday told their officers that, if they did not get pay to-day, they would go no further. This is not reassuring.

I shall endeavour to do what is possible, and get to Gebel Ain as quickly as I can, but I must point out to your Excellency, for His Highness the Khedive's information, that at present I am without sufficient supply of provisions; with an army several months in arrears of pay; with steamers out of repair and too few in number to bring up food, take possession of the ford, patrol the river, and stop communication between the banks; and I am without store of fuel, all of which I have to cut.

General Hicks requests to be made commander-in-chief.

Inclosure 1 in No. 17.

GENERAL HICKS TO THE EARL OF DUFFERIN.

(Telegraphic.) *Island of Aba, May 13th*, 1883.

I am glad to tell your lordship I have induced many of the Baggara and other chiefs to submit and beg for forgiveness. Ten chiefs have come in to me during the last few days. The country on both sides of the river about here is settled. The movement is spreading, and I expect numbers to submit. I met the chiefs on the western bank, unaccompanied by the army, and this gave confidence. The victory of the 29th has had a great effect. I am now hastening to Duem, and shall be there to-day. Possibly attacked there by Mahdi. Mahdi is evidently going to do something, but what I do not know. I am moving the army to Duem.

I ask General Baker to submit to His Highness *that I should be in indisputable command.*

Request forwarded. Recommending the officer, but practically repudiating the cause.

Inclosure 2 in No. 17.

SIR E. MALET TO CHERIF PASHA.

Cairo, May 22nd, 1883.

MY DEAR CHERIF PASHA,—I inclose herewith to your Excellency, confidentially, a telegram from General Hicks to Lord Dufferin. Your Excellency will perceive that General Hicks requests that this telegram may be sent to General Baker, but instead of doing so I send it only to your Excellency for such action as your Excellency may deem advisable. Because, although General Hicks finds it convenient to communicate with Lord Dufferin or with me, it must not be supposed that we indorse in any way the contents of his telegrams.

It is, I am sure, unnecessary for me to repeat to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are in no way responsible for the operations in the Soudan which have been undertaken under the authority of His Highness' Government, or for the appointment or actions of General Hicks.

In this particular instance I desire to guard against any supposition on the part of your Excellency that my sending a copy of the telegram to your Excellency indicates any expression of opinion with regard to the recommendations contained in it.

These remarks must not, however, be taken in any way to the prejudice of General Hicks, *who appears already to have shown himself to be a very capable officer.* They are merely intended to prevent any misunderstanding as to the position of Her Majesty's Government in regard to operations in the Soudan.

Condition of General Hicks' army, and comments by Sir E. B. Malet to Lord Granville.

Inclosure in No. 18.

GENERAL HICKS TO SIR E. MALET.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, June 3rd,* 1883.

Although in my absence the Mahdi has lost influence, he has no doubt a considerable number of men, and after the season for cultivation of fields has passed he may be joined by many more. He has a very large amount of money. The force we have is not nearly sufficient to undertake the Kordofan campaign. Every ounce of food must be taken from here. We march through a hostile country, inhabited by powerful tribes. The line of communication must be kept open, and depôts must be formed which must be sufficiently garrisoned. Each convoy will require escort. Our available strength will be under 6000; of these, many will most likely be sick after the fever season. I cannot withdraw a man from the Blue Nile station. Khartoum is full of rebels, and a sufficient garrison must be left there. The garrison on White Nile will be reduced as much as possible. I shall have available for the campaign about 5000 infantry. Of these, at least 2000 will be necessary on the line of communication, thus leaving only 3000 infantry for the attacking force. I consider this number quite inadequate. It should be 10,000 men. What number of men will it be possible for the Government to send me in augmentation? When we consider that a defeat might mean not only the loss of Darfour and Kordofan, but also of Senaar, and possibly Khartoum, I think no risk should be run. Do me the favour to submit this to the Egyptian Government. The estimate of cost of present field force for next six months shall be forwarded. It amounts to about 120,000*l.*, without transport charges.

No. 18.

SIR E. MALET TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph June 5th.*)

Cairo, June 5, 1883.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inclose copy of a telegram from General Hicks, in which he asks that the force under his command in the Soudan should be increased by 6000 men to

enable him to undertake an expedition into Kordofan as soon as the rainy season is over.

Your Lordship is aware that it is already impossible for the Egyptian Government to supply the funds demanded for the Soudan, and the proposed operations will run a considerable risk of failure unless they are conducted on a large scale, and unless the army is well supplied in every respect.

Under these circumstances, a question arises as to whether General Hicks should be instructed to confine himself to maintaining the present supremacy of the Khedive in the regions between the Blue and White Niles.

I have furnished Chérif Pasha with a copy of General Hicks' telegram, as requested, but without any comment or expression of opinion upon its contents.

The Egyptian Treasury gives permission to General Hicks to draw as he may require.

Translation.—Inclosed in No. 47.

(Telegraphic.) *June* 11, 1883.

In my[1] despatch of the 28th Ragheb, 1300 (5th June, 1883), I told you that you could, according to need, draw upon the Minister of Finance for the sums asked for in your despatch of the 15th May. Amending my above-mentioned despatch, I notify below the sums which the Egyptian Treasury will be able to place at your disposal from the present time to the end of the current year, to wit:—

	£
Pay for seven months for the army at present engaged in the war	13,000
Seven months' rations	32,000
Forage	37,500
Purchase of camels	25,000
Arrears	80,000
Total	187,500

From which 40,000*l.* must be deducted, which you have in hand, which leaves 147,000*l.*, which the Egyptian Treasury will be able to give you up to the end of the year 1883. The Treasury will, besides, undertake to bear the expense of the reinforcements which shall be sent to you. As to the expense of the Civil Administration or of the soldiers not engaged at present in the war, you must meet them with the help of the

[1] Chérif Pasha.

revenues of the Soudan, the Egyptian Treasury not being in a position to furnish you with any funds beyond the sums mentioned above.

On the 28th June, 1883, General Hicks replies, "There is not any sum like 40,000*l.* in the Treasury here" (Khartoum).

As to the "revenues of the Soudan" it was a well-known fact that they yielded *nil* at the time.

GENERAL HICKS BEGS TO BE RECALLED.

Inclosure in No. 59.

GENERAL HICKS TO SIR E. MALET.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, June 28th*, 1883.

With reference to your telegram of the 31st May, will you tell me if Chérif Pasha has repeated his orders, or if any steps have been taken to support me and insure my military arrangements being carried out? I most urgently request that distinct orders be sent *that all directions I give*, especially as regards the organization of the forces now collecting, as also for all military arrangements for and during the campaign, *be obeyed. If this is not done, my being here is of no use, and I beg to suggest that I may be recalled.*

SOME OF GENERAL HICKS' DIFFICULTIES.

He states on the 5th August, 1883: "The men at Kerkoj are twenty-five months in arrear of pay, and Fazoglu nine months, and have neither clothes nor food."

The 80,000*l.* arrears not forthcoming—troops insubordinate—all means of transport wanting. To wind up, he adds,—

"Our column will have gone to Kordofan; and to keep Senaar in order there will be this army on the Blue Nile without money and without transport. It is almost impossible to contend against all these adverse conditions; to-day, the first time I have heard of the condition of the Fazoglu garrison, although the Moudir says he has reported frequently. The garrison was left by Abdul Kader. *Taking into consideration the whole state of affairs in this country, I am convinced that it would be best to keep*

the two rivers and Province of Senaar, and wait for Kordofan to settle itself."

This advice concurs with Lord Dufferin's, but neither the Egyptian nor H.M.'s Government seemed able to appreciate its value, and under an engagement to give General Hicks an absolute control, in which there can be no doubt Sir E. B. Malet concurred, as shown by his telegram, General Hicks undertook an enterprise pregnant with all the elements of failure.

SIR E. B. MALET'S CONGRATULATIONS.

Inclosure in No. 80.

SIR E. MALET TO GENERAL HICKS.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, August 18th*, 1883.

I congratulate you on your appointment as Commander-in-Chief and General of Division.

The act is spontaneous on the part of the Egyptian Government, for although I am ready to transmit to it telegrams that come from you, I am debarred by my instructions from giving advice with regard to action on them, the policy of Her Majesty's Government being to abstain as much as possible from interference with the action of the Egyptian Government in the Soudan.

As to the most advantageous routes, that by Suakin to Berber for communication with Khartoum is clearly indicated.

No. 14.

SIR E. MALET TO EARL GRANVILLE.

(Received September 26.) *Cairo, September 10th*, 1883.

MY LORD,—According to a telegram from General Hicks, dated the 6th instant, he was to start on the 8th instant on his expedition to Kordofan. *He appears to be anxious as regards the communications between Berber and Suakin*, but it is believed here that the disturbances in that part of the Soudan have been suppressed.

He expects to encounter great difficulties in supplying his force with water, but trusts that his arrangements in this respect

may prove successful. All the deserters from Obeid declare that the Mahdi is no longer believed in.

I have forwarded General Hicks' telegram to Chérif Pasha.

There is every reason to suppose the following were kept back, as doubtless it was thought desirable to keep England in the dark as much as possible as to the hopeless confusion that the dual control was leading to.

No. 197.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received March 4th.*)

Cairo, February 20th, 1884.

MY LORD,—With reference to your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to inclose copies of such telegrams to and from the late General Hicks as have not hitherto been forwarded to your Lordship.

Inclosure 1 in No. 197.

GENERAL HICKS TO SIR E. MALET.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, March 13th*, 1883.

Some decision regarding the position of the recently-appointed Governor and Abdul Kader Pasha is most urgently required from Cairo. There is now such confusion in the administration, such distrust and intrigue, that I doubt if the two successes against the rebels compensate for the chaos caused by the departure of Abdul Kader Pasha before the arrival of the new man. Pray get decisive order sent here. I am hampered by the state of the affairs here. I can get no active co-operation and no full information. The Government intends to have new Head of the civil and military here, viz., the successor of Abdul Kader Pasha and Suleiman Pasha. By Abdul Kader Pasha's departure these intentions were completely checkmated. The civil and military administrations are still in the same hand, with the disadvantage of the new man remaining in a false position here, and the old and still existing authority absent from Khartoum; consequence—distrust and suspicion. Ala Eddeen has yesterday only shown me a telegram directing us to consider whether, with regard to Abdul Kader Pasha's operations, he would be superseded or Ala Eddeen should wait until these operations are over. Ala Eddeen says he will do as I think right, but this is not a matter for me to decide; the Government should consider the situation and order.

The following indicates the state of the army, and exposes those who compelled such troops into action to a charge of recklessly sending them to inevitable destruction :—

Inclosure 7 in No 197.

GENERAL HICKS TO GENERAL WOOD.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, June 8th*, 1883.

The Government have been asked to send 5000 more troops here. These can only be collected by dragging from their homes and fields unwilling men, and sending them away in chains. These men are to be taken at once before an enemy, having been previously in no way organized. And with what kind of officers? Of course, I can have no kind of reliance whatever on them. Will you send me instead four battalions of your new army, and I shall be content? They could return in six months. Fifty-one men of the Krupp battery deserted on the way here, although in chains. We get here many contradictory reports regarding Kordofan, but I do not telegraph to Cairo, unless I know there is a foundation of truth. I keep a steamer constantly on the river, to obtain information.

This telegram illustrates the mischiefs of a divided command, and induces General Hicks again to proffer his resignation.

Inclosure 10 in No. 197.

GENERAL HICKS TO SIR E. MALET.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, July 23rd*, 1883.

I have to-day sent to the War Office my resignation of my appointment with the Soudan army. I have done so with regret, but I cannot undertake another campaign under the same circumstances as the last. Suleiman Pasha tells me that he does not understand from the telegram of the President of the Council, dated the 14th July, that he is bound to carry out my views with regard to the order or mode of advance or attack of the army now preparing for Kordofan, unless he approves of them. In fact, he says he should be acting contrary to the instructions if he carried out my views, and did not agree with them. As my views and his were so opposed in the last campaign, and would be more so in the Kordofan campaign, I can only resign. Within the last few days, on two important occasions, my views have been disregarded. I beg that General Baker will tender to His Highness

the Khedive my resignation, and assure him of my regret for the necessity, and telegraph me a reply.

Then follows the reply :—

Inclosure 11 in No. 197.

SIR E. MALET TO GENERAL HICKS.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, July 23rd,* 1883.

Suleiman Pasha will be recalled as soon as a new Governor has been selected. Please do not mention this till it is done officially. I hope that this concession being made you will find your task easier and your way clear. Ala Eddeen will be nominal Commander-in-Chief.

Inclosure 12 in No. 197.

SIR E. MALET TO GENERAL HICKS.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, July 27th,* 1883.

Your telegram of the 23rd received to-day, but I presume you do not press your resignation, as Suleiman Pasha is to be recalled, as mentioned for your own information only in my telegram of 23rd instant.

It is thus pretty clear from the foregoing, that Sir E. B. Malet brought pressure to bear upon the Egyptian Government, which seems to imply that at this period Her Majesty's Government approved of the unfortunate contemplated expedition, or he would have counselled the acceptance of General Hicks' resignation. This course appears to involve Her Majesty's Government in a contradictory policy. All along they repudiate all responsibility for operations in the Soudan, and yet indirectly encourage an expedition for its subjection.

GENERAL HICKS WITHDRAWS HIS RESIGNATION.

Inclosure 14 in No. 197.

GENERAL HICKS TO SIR E. MALET.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, July 31st,* 1883.

Your telegram of 27th received.

I do not press my resignation under circumstances, but may I

understand that I am not to be so obstructed in future? Pray insist on the order being sent here by telegraph. At Khartoum things are at a standstill. I hope matters will improve when Ala Eddeen Pasha returns. River very high; great delay will occur in getting arms and stores from Berber, and I anticipate considerable delay in the departure of the forces for Kordofan.

Inclosure 18 in No. 197.

GENERAL HICKS TO SIR E. MALET.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, August 15th*, 1883.

Kindly inform Chérif Pasha that my resignation was sent in before I knew that Suleiman Pasha was to be recalled. Ala Eddeen Pasha is quite different.

GENERAL HICKS IS FORMALLY APPOINTED COMMANDER OF THE FORCES.

Inclosure 19 in No. 197.

GENERAL HICKS TO SIR E. MALET.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, August 19th*, 1883.

The Governor-General has received a telegram that His Highness has appointed me Commander of the forces here. I think it is best.

With regard to the religious feeling, I think there is no fear of any increase of fanaticism. The two districts which are now kept in best order are Darfour and Bahr Gazelle, the one commanded by an Englishman, the other by an Austrian. Ala Eddeen and I will get on very well.

The following telegram comments on the rumour of the destruction of General Hicks' army, which all the world knows was eventually confirmed :—

No. 90.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, November 20th.*)

(Extract.) *Cairo, November 19th*, 1883.

I regret to have to inform your Lordship that the present state of affairs in the Soudan is a subject of great anxiety to the Egyptian Government. It is clear that their authority in the Eastern portion of the Soudan is limited to the coast of the Red Sea, and even there it is seriously threatened. As regards the

Western Soudan, there has as yet been no confirmation of the report telegraphed by the French Consular Agent at Khartoum, which formed the subject of my telegram of yesterday. But, on the other hand, no definite news has been received from General Hicks since the 27th September. He had only two months' provisions for his army when he started on his present expedition. The Egyptian Government is becoming very anxious, and evidently expects to get bad news of him. This morning I saw Giegler Pasha, who was formerly in the Soudan under Colonel Gordon; he says that, if General Hicks' army is defeated, Khartoum will probably fall into the hands of the rebels.

The Egyptian Government has no funds to meet an emergency, and they have already despatched almost every available man to the Soudan, with the exception of the forces under Sir Evelyn Wood and General Baker. *If General Hicks' army is destroyed, it is nearly certain that the Egyptian Government will lose the whole of the Soudan, unless some assistance from outside is given to them;* and once they begin to withdraw, it is hard to say at what point along the valley of the Nile they could stem the rebel movement.

I think that it is not at all improbable that the Egyptian Government will *request Her Majesty's Government to send English or Indian troops.*

My own opinion is that, once General Hicks' army is defeated, it would be wiser for the Egyptian Government to accept the fact, and to withdraw to whatever point on the Nile they can be sure of defending, although *a great impulse would thus be given to the Slave Trade.*

Another alternative which the Egyptian Government will not improbably suggest is to send a portion of General Wood's army to the Soudan. Chérif Pasha has already spoken of the desirability of sending one of the English officers who are serving under General Wood to command at Suakin. But I think that General Wood's army should be retained in Egypt proper, especially in view of the partial withdrawal of Her Majesty's troops.

EARL GRANVILLE'S REPLY.

No. 92.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 20th*, 1883, 7·30 P.M.

Your telegram of 19th.

We cannot lend English or Indian troops.

If consulted, *recommend abandonment of the Soudan* within certain limits.

With a full and complete knowledge of all the circumstances beforehand, what other result could possibly have been reasonably anticipated, than the desperate catastrophe that followed. It was but the legitimate offspring of a dual control at head-quarters, with its inevitable conflictions, aggravated by vacillations, contradictory courses, and incapacity, and an expedition composed of troops that were marched to the field of action in chains.

Thus "bad begins and worse remains behind."

CHAPTER III.

British and Egyptian policy—[illegible]—Opening of Suakim-Berber route reopened—H.M.'s Government become responsible for Red Sea Ports—[illegible] the independence of Zeila—Gordon's services forced on Egyptian Government—The Khedive appoints him Governor-General—Instructions to evacuate all outposts and garrisons and establish a government—H.M.'s Government advise Khedive's firman—Cause of Halendwiks' revolt—Lord Dufferin's opinion: revolt caused by Egyptian misgovernment and oppression, and advises evacuation of Soudan. Khartoum, Dongola and Eastern Soudan.

The destruction of General Hicks' army was the signal for an immediate change of front by the Egyptian Government. This is shown by Sir E. Baring's telegram quoted below. From the other despatches, etc., which are given in this chapter, it will be seen that broadly, with certain modifications and minor differences, the consensus of opinion amounts to this: that the Soudan should be abandoned, saving certain exceptional positions that are mentioned by the several authorities: that to establish another autocracy in lieu of the effete Egyptian Government would, in the first place, probably cost more than it would be worth, to say nothing of the doubt of such a course being practicable: that some kind of Federal arrangement might be effected which would encourage a common interest, and at the same time insure the individual independence of the petty sultans or sheikhs, and be in accord with the wants and wishes of the tribes generally, accompanied with such facilities

for promoting commerce—that best and most effectual instrument for civilizing—as situation would fairly admit: that the Egyptians having been for so long engaged in sowing the wind, with the result of reaping the whirlwind, that the question to be discussed, and determined if possible, was what was the best way to moderate its effect and confine its ravages within manageable control.

For the best means of considering the value of the above propositions, attention is especially directed to the following official documents, arranged mostly in chronological order :—

No. 102.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, November 23rd*).

Cairo, November 23rd, 1883.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to report that the Egyptian Government have determined to try and hold Khartoum, and to reopen the route between Suakin and Berber. They will concentrate all their efforts on the accomplishment of these two objects.

It has accordingly been decided to try and withdraw the Egyptian troops from Darfour, which operation, if successful, would add about 5000 men to the force available for the defence of the valley of the Nile. The officers in command at Bahr Gazelle and at Gondokoro will likewise receive orders to endeavour to retire to Khartoum, or to reach the valley of the Nile by way of El Fasher. Boats will also be sent to Fashoda, on the White Nile, to bring down the garrison to Khartoum. It is believed that the troops at Duem are already falling back on Khartoum. It is thought necessary to maintain the garrison at Senaar for the present, in order that supplies may be furnished to Khartoum from thence.

As regards the Berber-Suakin route, a force of 2000 gendarmerie and 6000 Bedouins will be dispatched to Suakin, with instructions to reopen the line of communications. In the absence of this force of gendarmerie, General Sir Evelyn Wood will undertake the duties which have hitherto devolved upon them, and it is quite understood that his troops will remain in Egypt proper.

I feel bound to add that, according to several telegrams received from Khartoum, there appears to be a general opinion on the spot that it will be impossible to hold the town, and that it will be necessary to fall back on Berber.

It is apparent from the above that Khartoum was from the first in a critical condition, and this opinion is confirmed by the following telegram :—

Inclosure in No. 111.

COLONEL DE COETLOGON TO GENERAL SIR E. WOOD.

(Telegraphic). *Khartoum, November 25th*, 1883.

I think it is right to let you know the situation. Khartoum and Senaar cannot be held in two months' time. There will be no food. All supplies are cut off to save what remains of the army of the Soudan. A retreat on Berber should be made at once, and *by a combined movement from Berber and Suakin, that route should be opened.* Reinforcements arriving could not reach Khartoum, except by land, and for that a very large force is necessary, and no supplies for them if they did arrive. The river route cannot be relied upon, as it can be stopped any day at Sabaloke [?], where mountains overhang the river, which at that point is narrow and shallow. We have only two steamers that could do towing work. Both are small, of no power, and old. To carry a force by river would be very difficult in a month's time even if unattacked. *The troops that are left are the refuse of the army, mostly old and blind.* Again I say the only way of saving what remains is to attempt a general retreat on Berber. This is the real state of affairs here, and I beg of you to impress it on His Highness the Khedive.

It must here be noted the sort of troops with which the Egyptian Government garrisoned a most important strategical post—no wonder General Gordon should describe the Government as "effete."

The advice to fall back is concurrent with that tendered by H.M.'s Government, as shown by this message :—

No. 108.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, November 25th*, 1883.

I have received your telegrams of the 22nd and 23rd instant, informing me of the measures which the Egyptian Government propose to adopt in consequence of the defeat of General Hicks' army in the Soudan.

Her Majesty's Government can do nothing in the matter which would throw upon them the responsibility of operations in the Soudan. This responsibility must rest with the Egyptian Government relying on their own resources.

I have to add that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Egyptian Government would be right to restrict their action to defensive operations.

Considering the deplorable condition into which the Soudan had been for years allowed to drift by the Egyptian Government, it is not surprising that H.M.'s Government should still repudiate any responsibility in that quarter.

The following is an embodiment of certain views and courses, recommended in a letter from Sir E. Baring to Earl Granville, dated 3rd December, 1883. That the Sultan's permission be asked to recruit in Turkey. General Stephenson and Sir E. Wood advise opening the Suakin-Berber road as best means of retreat for garrisons, and consider if Khartoum is abandoned, the whole valley of the Nile to Wady Halfa will be lost, but think that Suakin, Massowah, and Kassala ought to be held; in these views Baker Pasha concurred. Cherif Pasha and his colleagues object to abandon Khartoum. Great stress was laid on the fact that if the Mahdi were allowed to advance, tribes must join him, thereby threatening the frontiers of Egypt proper, and thus enhancing the difficulties of the Government which were at the time sufficiently great.

Sir E. Baring also advises that Zebehr Pasha should aid at Suakin, his influence with the tribes being great, and he says in the same letter that "the policy which they (the Egyptian Government) are now endeavouring to carry out, of holding Khartoum and opening up the Berber-Suakin road, is not only in name but in fact one of their own invention. I trust that this attitude will meet with your Lordship's approval."

The following is the definite attitude taken by H.M.'s Government:—

No. 151.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, December 13th, 1883.

SIR,—Her Majesty's Government have had under their consideration your recent telegrams on the subject of the Soudan.

Her Majesty's Government have no intention of employing British or Indian troops in that province.

Her Majesty's Government have no objection to offer to the employment of Turkish troops, provided they are paid by the Turkish Government, and that such employment be restricted *exclusively to the Soudan, with their base at Suakin.*

Excepting for securing the safe retreat of garrisons still holding positions in the Soudan, Her Majesty's Government cannot agree to increasing the burden on the Egyptian revenues by expenditure for operations which, even if successful—and this is not probable—would be of doubtful advantage to Egypt.

Her Majesty's Government recommend the Ministers of the Khedive to come to an early decision to abandon all territory south of Assouan, or at least of Wady Halfa.

They will be prepared to assist in maintaining order in Egypt proper, and in defending it, as well as the ports in the Red Sea.

The proposed employment of Zebehr Pasha appears to Her Majesty's Government inexpedient, both politically and as regards the Slave Trade.

With respect to the foregoing, it is but fair to H.M.'s Government, considering the contents of Colonel de Coetlogon's telegram to Sir E. Wood as to the condition of Khartoum, and the opinion of Sir E. Baring derived from "a general opinion on the spot," although somewhat in conflict with the opinion of others not on the spot, to admit there was ample to justify the neutral attitude they took up. That also, in the event of Turkish troops being employed, that as Suzerain, the Sultan should bear the expense; the more especially as the object in view, whether they were right or wrong, did not meet with their approval. The engagement to assist in saving the garrison, and protecting Egypt

proper, is all that could be reasonably expected. As to how these engagements were eventually met will in due course be matter for future comment.

As regards the Egyptian Government it is all very well to say that the policy they proposed to carry out was "their own invention." But that is all the more reason why they should have provided themselves with proper means to carry it out, which it certainly appears they had not. The opinions here expressed are derived exclusively from the despatches, and are strictly within those limits.

The objection to the employment of Zebehr Pasha has been previously criticized, but the following very pertinent, reasonable and practical remarks touching this personage are well worthy of note:—

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM SIR E. BARING, DATED 9TH DECEMBER.

Whatever may be Zebehr Pasha's faults, he is said to be a man of great energy and resolution. The Egyptian Government considers that his services may be very useful in commanding the friendly Bedouins who are to be sent to Suakin, and in conducting negotiations with the tribes on the Berber-Suakin route and elsewhere. I may mention that Baker Pasha is anxious to avail himself of Zebehr Pasha's services.

Your Lordship will, without doubt, bear in mind that up to the present time the whole responsibility for the conduct of the affairs in the Soudan has been left to the Egyptian Government. It appeared to me that, under present circumstances, it would not have been just, whilst leaving all the responsibility to the Egyptian Government, to have objected to that Government using its own discretion on such a point as the employment of Zebehr Pasha.

I make these remarks as the employment of Zebehr Pasha may not improbably attract attention in England.

The period has now arrived when the idea of employing General Gordon seems first to have been entertained by H.M.'s Government, presumably with the view of assisting in relieving the garrisons to which they had pledged themselves, as shown by this telegram.

No. 1.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 1st*, 1883, 5·35 P.M.

If General Charles Gordon were willing to go to Egypt would he be of any use to you or to the Egyptian Government, and if so, in what capacity?

REPLY:—

No. 2.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received December 2nd.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 2nd*, 1883, 11·45 A.M.

Reply to your telegram of the 1st December.

The Egyptian Government is very much averse to employing General Gordon, mainly on the ground that, the movement in the Soudan being religious, the appointment of a Christian in high command would probably alienate the tribes who remain faithful.

I think it wise to leave the whole responsibility of Soudan affairs to them, and not to press them on the subject.

Some six weeks after the question appears to have been raised again, as thus indicated:—

No. 5.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received January 11th*, 4 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 11th*, 1884, 3·30 P.M.

I have consulted with Nubar Pasha, and I do not think that the services of General Gordon or Sir C. Wilson can be utilized at present.

As a result, however, of further conference, the Egyptian Government seem to have waived their objections, and Sir E. Baring wires:—

No. 9.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received January 16th*, 11·15 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January, 16th*, 1884.

With reference to my telegram of to-day and your telegram of yesterday, General Gordon would be best man.

And Earl Granville instructs General Gordon to go out.

No. 10.

EARL GRANVILLE TO GENERAL GORDON.

Foreign Office, January 18th, 1884.

SIR,—Her Majesty's Government are desirous that you should proceed at once to Egypt, to report to them on the military situation in the Soudan, and on the measures which it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in that country, and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum.

You are also desired to consider and report upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan, and upon the manner in which the safety and the good administration by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the sea-coast can best be secured.

In connection with this subject, you should pay especial consideration to the question of the steps that may usefully be taken to counteract the stimulus which it is feared may possibly be given to the Slave Trade by the present insurrectionary movement, and by the withdrawal of the Egyptian authority from the interior.

You will be under the instructions of Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, through whom your Reports to Her Majesty's Government should be sent, under flying seal.

You will consider yourself authorized and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to intrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring. You will be accompanied by Colonel Stewart, who will assist you in the duties thus confided to you.

On your arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with Sir E. Baring, who will arrange to meet you, and will settle with you whether you should proceed direct to Suakin, or should go yourself or dispatch Colonel Stewart to Khartoum *viâ* the Nile.

Further instructions :—

No. 14.

EARL GRANVILLE TO CONSUL BURRELL.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January, 21st*, 1884, 2·30 P.M.

Give following message from me to General Gordon immediately on his arrival at Port Said on board mail-steamer from Brindisi :—

" Sir E. Baring gives strong reasons why you should go to Cairo, in which we hope you will concur."

No. 15.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, January, 22nd, 1884.

SIR,—I inclose herewith a paper containing some suggestions made by General Charles Gordon as to the steps which should be taken with regard to the present state of affairs in the Soudan.

Her Majesty's Government have not sufficient local knowledge to enable them to form an opinion as to the practicability of these suggestions, and I therefore authorize you, as time is valuable, either immediately to make the arrangements suggested, or to await General Gordon's arrival and consult with him as to the action to be taken.

The foregoing exhibit on the part of H.M.'s Government as complete a confidence, and confer as wide a latitude as could be desired—that this attitude was not maintained throughout is deeply to be regretted, but of this in its proper place anon.

The appointment of General Gordon gave satisfaction all round, as the following telegrams show.

No. 18.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received January 25th*, 10·50 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 25th*, 1884, 10·45 A.M.

The interview between the Khedive and Gordon was very satisfactory.

No. 19.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received January 26th*, 4·8 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 26th*, 1884, 4·55 P.M.

Everything has gone most satisfactorily with Gordon. He leaves in very good spirits.

No. 23.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received February 1st*, 4·45 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, February 1st*, 1884, 2·35 P.M.

Gordon's suggestions have been followed in every particular. Although under my instructions, he has, as a matter of fact, been left *the widest discretionary power*. His visit to Cairo was most useful, as it will enable the authorities here to help him much more than would otherwise have been possible. *There is no sort*

of difference between his views and those entertained by Nubar Pasha and myself.

As immediately associated with General Gordon's appointment by Her Majesty's Government, the Khedive's order, making him Governor-General of the Soudan, and his proclamation, are given below in full. The high encomiums he passes upon General Gordon cannot but be most gratifying to every Englishman. Of course, his remarks on the blessings of his Government of the Soudan, which are in open conflict with recent events, must be taken very much *cum grano.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

HIS HIGHNESS THE KHEDIVE TO GORDON PASHA.

(Translation.) *January 26th*, 1884.

EXCELLENCY,—Having confidence in your tact and experience, and being aware that the excellent services rendered by you in the Soudan have endeared you to the people of those provinces, and made them acknowledge the good derived from your efforts to introduce among them tranquillity and good government; and seeing that the present state of affairs in those territories requires a person capable of grappling with the difficulties of the situation, and of ameliorating the condition of the inhabitants by restoring public tranquillity on a sure basis, as it is our earnest desire to do what is just and right, to remove all sources of discontent, and to observe equity towards the native populations, we do hereby appoint you Governor-General of the Soudan, by reason of your perfect knowledge of that country, and we trust that you will carry out our good intentions for the establishment of justice and order, and that you will assure the peace and prosperity of the peoples of Soudan by maintaining the security of the roads open to commerce.

Now by these presents we make known to you our desire, and urge upon you a speedy departure for those provinces, so that good government may be restored by your tact and experience.

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

PROCLAMATION OF HIS HIGHNESS THE KHEDIVE TO ALL THE MUDIRS, GOVERNORS, CADIS, ULEMA, NOTABLES, MERCHANTS, BEDOUIN SHEIKHS, AND TO ALL NATIVES AND BEDOUINS OF THE SOUDAN.

(Translation.) *Jannary 26th*, 1884.

It is known to you that when my ancestor the late Mohammed

Ali, of blessed memory, assumed the Government of Egypt, he introduced education, commerce, and agriculture among the people, and established prosperity and made Egypt a civilized country of the world.

Imbued with the same desire for the promotion of civilization, he, with the blessing of God, conquered the Soudan, from which time forth those provinces have been prosperous, commerce has expanded, and the peoples have advanced in civilization.

The contrast between the condition of the Soudan before its conquest, and its actual state, will reveal to any one its progress in prosperity, and the height of civilization which it has attained.

For the last three years, however, the state of affairs has been reversed in those parts, and a person styling himself the Mahdi has appeared deceiving the inhabitants, and, in spite of being repudiated by all the learned Moslem Ulema, has through his intrigues and false pretences, won over the ignorant classes and corrupted them; and has been the cause of rapine and of the shedding of the blood of Moslems, all of which is contrary to the precepts of Islam, and the source of ruin in the Soudan.

It is known to you that Gordon Pasha has previously resided in that country as Governor-General, and that his justice towards the inhabitants has won their hearts. His tried abilities as a good administrator and his impartiality have convinced us of his future success in ameliorating its condition, and we have, therefore, appointed him once more Governor-General of the Soudan, for the purpose of inquiring into your affairs, and of bettering your condition.

We do, in consequence, command you to obey his orders, to follow his advice, and in no way to oppose his counsels. Be all of you united as one man in aiding him to bring about a better state of affairs, to restore order, and tranquillity, and to expel from the minds of the people the false notions which the leaders of revolt have instilled into them, and may the blessing of the Almighty fulfil my earnest entreaties to Him on your behalf!

Inclosure 3 in No. 15.

HIS HIGHNESS THE KHEDIVE TO GORDON PASHA.

(Translation.) *January 26th*, 1884.

EXCELLENCY,—You are aware that the object of your arrival here, and of your mission to the Soudan, *is to carry into execution the evacuation of those territories, and to withdraw our troops, civil officials, and such of the inhabitants, together with their belongings, as may wish to leave for Egypt.* We trust that your Excellency will adopt the most effective measures for the accomplishment of your mission in this respect, and that after completing the evacuation, *you will take the necessary steps for establishing an organized*

Government in the different provinces of the Soudan, for the maintenance of order, and the cessation of all disasters and incitement to revolt.

We have full confidence in your tried abilities and tact, and are convinced that you will accomplish your mission according to our desire.

As evidence that Her Majesty's Government were keenly alive to their responsibilities—and that is why, doubtless, they were so anxious to obtain the services of so able a man as General Gordon—Earl Granville writes, on the 15th January, to Viscount Lyons (then ambassador in Paris), giving the substance of a conversation on the subject with M. Waddington (the French Ambassador here), as follows:—

I then made some remarks on the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government with regard to the Soudan. I said that it seemed clear that the Egyptian Government were incapable of holding Khartoum or of reconquering the country by themselves, and whatever the feeling here might be at the moment, I was convinced that public opinion would not countenance the considerable expenditure of money, or the risk of loss of life which must be attendant on an expedition of English troops with that object.

M. Waddington said that he agreed with me, that the decision taken was the right and prudent one, though it might be much criticized if any disaster were to occur at Khartoum.

I admitted that such an occurrence would be likely to produce an unfavourable impression.

As a conclusion to this chapter, as they formed the basis of the general view of the case at its commencement, the following documents and extracts, containing instructions and opinions, &c., of several high and unimpeachable authorities, are quoted in the belief that they will not only prove interesting, but will enable anyone to acquire a very good general idea of the complicated character and difficulties of the situation.

All comment is here forborne, as it is felt it would be an impertinence for any layman to criticize the opinions of such excellent experts.

SIR E. BARING TO MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON.

Cairo, January 25th, 1884.

SIR,—The instructions of Her Majesty's Government were conveyed to you in a letter of the 18th January, 1884, a copy of which has been communicated to me by Lord Granville.

In that letter, after drawing attention to certain points which were to engage your special attention, Lord Granville "authorized and instructed you to perform such duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to intrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring."

I have now to indicate to you the views of the Egyptian Government on two of the points to which your special attention was directed by Lord Granville.

These are (1) the measures which it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in the Soudan, and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum. (2) The best mode of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan.

These two points are intimately connected, and may conveniently be considered together.

It is believed that the number of Europeans at Khartoum is very small, but it has been estimated by the local authorities that some 10,000 to 15,000 people will wish to move northwards from Khartoum only, when the Egyptian garrison is withdrawn.

These people are native Christians, Egyptian employés, their wives and children, &c.

The Government of His Highness the Khedive is earnestly solicitous that no effort should be spared to insure the retreat both of these people and of the Egyptian garrisons without loss of life.

As regards the most opportune time and the best method for effecting the retreat, whether of the garrisons or of the civil populations, it is neither necessary *nor desirable* that you should receive detailed instructions.

A short time ago the local authorities pressed strongly on the Egyptian Government the necessity for giving orders for an immediate retreat.

Orders were accordingly given to commence at once the withdrawal of the civil population.

No sooner, however, had these orders been issued than a telegram was received from the Soudan, strongly urging that the orders for commencing the retreat immediately should be delayed.

Under these circumstances, and in view of the fact that the position at Khartoum is now represented as being less critical, for the moment, than it was a short time ago, it was thought desirable to modify the orders for the immediate retreat of the civil population, and to await your arrival.

You will bear in mind that the main end to be pursued is the evacuation of the Soudan.

This policy was adopted, after very full discussion, by the Egyptian Government, on the advice of Her Majesty's Government.

It meets with the full approval of His Highness the Khedive, and of the *present* Egyptian Ministry.

I understand, also, that you entirely concur in the desirability of adopting this policy, and that you think it should on no account be changed.

You consider that it may take a few months to carry it out with safety. You are further of opinion that "the restoration of the country should be made to the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mohammed Ali's conquest, and whose families still exist;" and that an endeavour should be made to form a confederation of those Sultans.

In this view the Egyptian Government entirely concur. It will, of course, be fully understood that the Egyptian troops are not to be kept in the Soudan merely with a view to consolidating the power of the new rulers of the country.

But the Egyptian Government has the fullest confidence in your judgment, your knowledge of the country, and of your comprehension of the general line of policy to be pursued. You are therefore given full discretionary power to retain the troops for such reasonable period as you may think necessary, in order that the abandonment of the country may be accomplished with the least possible risk to life and property.

A credit of 100,000*l.* has been opened for you at the Finance Department, and further funds will be supplied to you on your requisition when this sum is exhausted.

In undertaking the difficult task which now lies before you, you may feel assured that no effort will be wanting on the part of the Cairo authorities, whether English or Egyptians, to afford you all the co-operation and support in their power.

No. 2.

MEMORANDUM BY GENERAL GORDON.—(*Received February* 1*st*, 1884.)

I understand that Her Majesty's Government have come to the irrevocable decision not to incur the very onerous duty of securing to the peoples of the Soudan a just future Government. That, as a consequence, Her Majesty's Government have determined to restore to these peoples their independence, and will no longer suffer the Egyptian Government to interfere with their affairs.

2. For this purpose, Her Majesty's Government have decided to send me to the Soudan to arrange for the evacuation of these countries, and the safe removal of the Egyptian employés and troops.

3. Keeping paragraph No. 1 in view, viz., that the evacuation of the Soudan is irrevocably decided on, it will depend on circumstances in what way this is to be accomplished.

My idea is that the restoration of the country should be made to the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet Ali's conquest, and whose families still exist; that the Mahdi should be left altogether out of the calculation as regards the handing over the country; and that it should be optional with the Sultans to accept his supremacy or not. As these Sultans would probably not be likely to gain by accepting the Mahdi as their sovereign, it is probable that they will hold to their independent positions. Thus we should have two factors to deal with, namely: the petty Sultans asserting their several independence, and the Mahdi's party aiming at supremacy over them. To hand, therefore, over to the Mahdi the arsenals, &c., would, I consider, be a mistake. They should be handed over to the Sultans of the States in which they are placed.

The most difficult question is how and to whom to hand over the arsenals of Khartoum, Dongola, and Kassala, which towns have, so to say, no old standing families, Khartoum and Kassala having sprung up since Mehemet Ali's conquest. Probably it would be advisable to postpone any decision as to these towns till such time as the inhabitants have made known their opinion.

4. I have in paragraph 3 proposed the transfer of the lands to the local Sultans and stated my opinion that these will not accept the supremacy of the Mahdi. If this is agreed to and my supposition correct as to their action, there can be but little doubt that as far as he is able the Mahdi will endeavour to assert his rule over them, and will be opposed to any evacuation of the Government employés and troops. My opinion of the Mahdi's forces is, that the bulk of those who were with him at Obeid will refuse to cross the Nile, and that those who do so will not exceed 3000 or 4000 men, and also that these will be composed principally of black troops who have deserted, and who, if offered fair terms, would come over to the Government side. In such a case, viz., "Sultans accepting transfer of territory and refusing the supremacy of the Mahdi, and the Mahdi's black troops coming over to the Government," resulting weakness of the Mahdi; what should be done should the Mahdi's adherents attack the evacuating columns? It cannot be supposed that these are to offer no resistance, and if in resisting they should obtain a success it would be but reasonable to allow them to follow up the Mahdi to such a position as would insure their future safe march. This is one of those difficult questions which our Government can hardly be expected to answer, but which may arise and to which I would call attention. Paragraph 1 fixes irrevocably the decision of the Government, viz., to evacuate the territory, and, of course, as far as possible involves

the avoidance of any fighting. I can therefore only say that having in view paragraph 1 and seeing the difficulty of asking Her Majesty's Government to give a decision or direction as to what should be be done in certain cases, that I will carry out the evacuation as far as possible according to their wish to the best of my ability, and with avoidance, as far as possible, of all fighting. I would, however, hope that Her Majesty's Government will give me their support and consideration should I be unable to fulfil all their expectations.

5. Though it is out of my province to give any opinion as to the action of Her Majesty's Government in leaving the Soudan, *still I must say it would be an iniquity to reconquer these peoples and then hand them back to the Egyptians without guarantees of future good government.* It is evident that this we cannot secure them without an inordinate expenditure of men and money. The Soudan is a useless possession, ever was so, and ever will be so. Larger than Germany, France, and Spain together, and mostly barren, it cannot be governed except by a Dictator who may be good or bad. If bad, he will cause constant revolts. No one who has ever lived in the Soudan can escape the reflection "What a useless possession is this land." Few men also can stand its fearful monotony and deadly climate.

6. Saïd Pasha, the Viceroy before Ismael, went up to the Soudan with Count F. de Lesseps. He was so discouraged and horrified at the misery of the people, that at Berber, Count de Lesseps saw him throw his guns into the river, declaring that he would be no party to such oppression. It was only after the urgent solicitations of European Consuls and others that he reconsidered his decision. Therefore, I think Her Majesty's Government are fully justified in recommending the evacuation, inasmuch as the sacrifices necessary towards securing a good government would be far too onerous to admit of such an attempt being made. Indeed, one may say it is impracticable at any cost. Her Majesty's Government will now leave them as God has placed them; they are not forced to fight among themselves, and they will no longer be oppressed by men coming from lands so remote as Circassia, Kurdistan, and Anatolia.

7. I have requested Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart to write his views independent of mine on this subject. I append them to this Report.

(Signed) C. G. GORDON, *Major-General.*

Steam-ship "Tanjore," at Sea, January 22nd, 1884.

Inclosure in No. 2.

OBSERVATIONS BY COLONEL STEWART.

I have carefully read over General Gordon's observations, and cordially agree with what he states.

2. I would, however, suggest that, as far as possible, all munitions of war be destroyed on evacuation.

3. I quite agree with General Gordon that the Soudan is an expensive and useless possession. No one who has visited it can escape the reflection: "What a useless possession is this land, and what a huge encumbrance on Egypt."

4. Handing back the territories to the families of the dispossessed Sultans is an act of justice both towards them and their people. The latter, at any rate, will no longer be at the mercy of foreign mercenaries, and if they are tyrannized over, it will be more or less their own fault. Handing back the districts to the old reigning families is also a politic act, as raising up a rival power to that of the Mahdi.

5. As it is impossible for Her Majesty's Government to foresee all the eventualities that may arise during the evacuation, it seems to me as the more judicious course to rely on the discretion of General Gordon and his knowledge of the country.

6. I, of course, understand that General Gordon is going to the Soudan with full powers to make all arrangements as to its evacuation, and that he is in no way to be interfered with by the Cairo Ministers. Also that any suggestions or remarks that the Cairo Government would wish to make are to be made directly to him and Her Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, *and that no intrigues are to be permitted against his authority. Any other course would, I am persuaded, make his mission a failure.*

(Signed) D. H. STEWART, *Lieutenant-Colonel, 11th Hussars.*

Steam-ship "Tanjore," at Sea, January 22nd, 1884.

Inclosure in No. 10.

GENERAL BAKER PASHA TO SIR E. BARING.

Suakin, January 7th, 1884.

MY DEAR SIR EVELYN,—In your last letter you ask me to write you my opinions on the general situation of the Soudan as expressed at the conference held at your house, and at which General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood were present.

My views were as follows:—

1. I did not believe that, without the aid of some exterior power, Egypt could reconquer or hold the Soudan.

2. I believed that the loss of the Soudan would be a disastrous blow to Egypt, and that the expenditure necessary for the defence of Egypt proper would be ruinous to her financially in the future, and far in excess of the sum which the Soudan had cost in the past.

3. I thought it necessary that both England and Egypt should both immediately adopt a definite policy, and that the latter

should prepare to withdraw from the Soudan, unless England could afford such aid as would enable her to recover it and hold it.

4. I considered it very necessary that the line of the Nile from Assouan to Korosko and Wady Halfa should be more strongly held in order to reclaim and influence the Bishareen tribes; and that Dongola should, if possible, be reinforced.

5. I considered the concentration of troops at Suakin as necessary, but was averse to an attempt to force and hold the road between Suakin and Berber, as I believed it to be impracticable on account of want of water.

6. I hoped that the concentration of a force at Suakin, and the support thus given to friendly tribes, might induce them to reopen the route.

Those were my views, and they are but very slightly modified in the following respects:—

1. I believe that the mere occupation by England of the Red Sea ports might give Egypt the opportunity of retaking and holding a contracted and less expensive Soudan.

2. I am convinced that an advance, if made, or a retirement, if decided on, should be by the Massowah-Kassala route, and by an English arrangement with Abyssinia.

3. The movement has assumed a more rapidly extended and fanatical character, and, consequently, I believe that the danger to Egypt and her finances, which would be occasioned by a complete abandonment of the Soudan, are augmented.

Inclosure in No. 117.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

Assouan, February 1st, 1884.

SIR,—With reference to my letter requesting that officers should be sent me, I have the honour to state that for the moment they are not necessary.

So far as I can make out, the present state of affairs is as follows:—

The Mahdi has with him the deserters of the Egyptian army who were at Obeid, and some half-a-dozen Arab tribes, who can put perhaps 6000 to 8000 horsemen in the field. These tribes belong to Kordofan, and it is improbable that they will quit it. With him are also several influential Chiefs who are interested in the Slave Trade.

The Mahdi, through his agents, has also caused the revolt of the tribes round Senaar. These tribes have also been joined by the inhabitants of the town of Senaar.

As regards the Hicks and Ala Eldeen expedition, as both Chiefs were in command, they of course probably quarrelled, and even

began to do so, if I may believe the common report, on the first day's march from Khartoum.

It appears that *their march lasted from the 10th September till the 3rd November, or some forty days.* During this interval they only succeeded in getting over ground which *I have ridden over in four days.* Owing to the great heat the troops were probably greatly worn out. It would then appear that Hicks separated from Ala Eldeen, but subsequently rejoined him, and found him engaged with the enemy. In the confusion of the fight both parties would appear to have fired into each other. The tribal cavalry then came down on them and crushed them.

As for the *Hadendoa revolt*, it would appear to have been caused by the *robbery of Reshid Pasha and Ibrahim Bey.* These officials engaged to pay this tribe 7 *dollars* per camel to transport the Egyptian troops to Berber. Instead of paying them the sum promised, they however only paid at the rate of 1 *dollar per camel.* The loss to the tribe was considerable, for at least 10,000 troops marched over the road. It would seem also that only a part of the Hadendoa tribe is in revolt.

Altogether, my impression is that the revolt in the Soudan, although perhaps serious, was and *is only dangerous owing to the utterly effete Egyptian Government,* and that there is no danger for the Equator and Bahr Ghazelle provinces. I have also no great fear as regards the Darfour provinces if Slatin Bey has only enough provisions to hold out until my arrival and that of the Darfour Sultan becomes known.

Hussein Pasha Khalifa, the new Berber Mudir, hopes that in a few days he will be able to open the Suakin-Berber road ! !

I may be wrong, but I feel confident that you need not be alarmed either for me, Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, for the Suakin-Berber route, and the Bahr-Gazelle and Equatorial provinces. The only province I feel any very great anxiety for is that of the Darfour.

As regards the advance of the Mahdi on Khartoum, I think that for the present it is most unlikely.

Of course in the event of the Suakin-Berber road being opened, there will no longer be any necessity for the large force at Suakin.

This opinion of Lord Dufferin's is quoted last, as he was no longer at the time on the staff of officials in Egypt, but as an independent opinion it is of course, from so capable a man, of great value.

LORD DUFFERIN TO EARL GRANVILLE.

(Extract.) *Constantinople, December 14th,* 1883.

"The recent disturbances were mainly to be attributed to the

misgovernment and cruel exactions of the local Egyptian authorities at Khartoum, and that, whatever might be the pretentions of the Mahdi to a Divine mission, his chief strength was derived from the despair and misery of the native population. If the Egyptian Government were wise," I added, "it would confine its efforts to the re-establishment of its authority in Senaar, and would not seek to extend its dominion beyond that province and the bordering river banks. By this modest policy the annual drain on the Egyptian Treasury would be greatly diminished, if it did not altogether cease, and if he succeeded in endowing Dongola, Khartoum, and Senaar with a just, humane, and beneficent administration, there could be no doubt the ultimate recovery of so much of the abandoned territories as it might be desirable to reannex would be easily effected at a later period."

Thus far all seemed to give fair promise of an extrication from the difficulty. Why this promise was not subsequently fulfilled, it will be the business of this volume, as events occur in their course, to demonstrate, and to endeavour, without extenuation or malice, to put "the saddle on the right horse."

CHAPTER IV.

Federation of tribes urged by Gordon—Suakin-Berber and Suakin-Kassala roads to be opened—Gordon's ideas as to evacuation—3000 Turkish troops required—Zebehr's services essential to success of Gordon's mission—Gordon's suggestions thwarted throughout—Baring advocates native in lieu of Egyptian government—Fixes responsibility on H.M.'s Government — Gordon's appeals vain, and therefore resigns appointment, which on pressure he resumes—Gordon's appeal to Sir Samuel Baker to raise money and troops—Gordon charges H.M.'s Government with "indelible disgrace" of abandoning garrisons—Nubar clears himself from all blame.

"HISTORY repeats itself" is such a commonplace phrase, that the remark would need an apology, were it not so singularly applicable in the present instance. Also almost as commonplace is the fact that the interference by a Government at home with the freedom of action of its officers and executants abroad has always proved embarrassing, often damaging, and sometimes disastrous. Take as a salient example in ancient history the case of Hannibal, by many considered the greatest general that ever lived, whose military triumphs were neutralized by the powers in Carthage, and whose influence ultimately led to *his* suicide, and *their own ruin.*

In modern times, take a few prominent cases during the wars with the First Empire. The interference of the Aulic Council with the military movements of the Arch-Duke Charles so hampered him, that it eventually contributed largely to the victories of Napoleon, and the consequent crippling of Austria. The Duke of Wellington left the

Peninsula in disgust, and it was only on the assurance of his brother, the Marquis of Wellesley, that he would not be interfered with and that his orders would be executed, that he consented to go out again. Sir John Moore was the victim of incapacity and interference at home. In fact the common teaching of history leads to two conclusions, that failure is ever the child of interference, and that success is usually the offspring of unfettered action on the spot. Napoleon never would have marched from victory to victory, notwithstanding his genius, if he had not been his own master.

Such being the experience of the past, it would appear from documents about to be quoted, that history has been read in vain, for the errors and blunders there recorded have been repeated with aggravation. In fact the blunders occur in such a supreme and cumulative shape, supplemented with quite an "Ossa on Pelion" of contradictions, that the question naturally arises whether their authors have read history at all. It is said of a former Duke of Newcastle—sometime premier—that he was very much surprised at hearing that Borneo, or some equally well-known place, was an island! The late Lord Derby, though an accomplished student of Homer, spoke in the House of Lords some 50 years ago of Tamboff in Russia, 400 miles inland, as a sea port, and there are other statesmen of the present century of whom it has been asserted that they had never read a book in their lives; be this as it may, it is at any rate pretty clear, that if they did read, they did not profit by their readings. Only the other day Mr. Gladstone, a leading scholar of his time, seemed by his own account, although after 50 years' experience of political life, to be considerably in the dark as to the history of Ireland until Mr. Lecky's book was published.

When instances are so numerous of the want

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

3. To concentrate the neighbouring tribes against the Hadendowa (Rebellion C), and to *open road from Suakin to Berber and Suakin to Casala.*

4. To relieve Sennar and the triangle between Blue and White Niles (Rebellion B).

5. To send up expedition of five steamers to bring down families of the troops of Equatorial Province and Bahr Gazelle.

6. To arrange at Dongola for the exodus of those who remain in Darfour, if they still exist.

For this programme I need five officers to assist me, their pay to be that of their rank (which rank is indifferent), and 3*l.* a day allowances. I shall need them for six months. I would wish Lord Wolseley to choose them. The Egyptian Government to pay for the interpreter each would need.

These five officers to be my agents; *they are not to lead troops or enter into active operations*, but merely to hold together the well-disposed Soudan tribes against these pillaging tribes, and to insure harmony among the well-disposed.

I particularly point out that these officers are in no way supposed to lead troops, that the suppression of the Rebellion (B) and (C) will be the act of the Soudanese themselves (who are to be rendered independent of Cairo), and on which suppression depends the establishment of the independent Soudan Government *which Her Majesty's Government desires.*

If your Excellency feels any difficulty about these officers, or thinks that it would lead to trouble, never mind sending them, for I humbly believe we will manage without them, only it may take a longer time than if they were sent, and I may mention that, to me, it is of far greater import *not to raise an outcry in England* than to have these officers.

Any way, this memorandum will show you what I design, and give you to understand that if fighting occurs it is the Soudanese conservatives of their property fighting the Soudanese communists who desire to rob them, and that in the fighting, if it occurs (which is not certain and which I hope may be avoided), *there is no idea of asserting the Khedive's authority over the Soudan*, but only of forming a firm conservative Soudan Government, which I believe Her Majesty's Government has in view.

Should you be inclined to send the officers, let them come up Nile to Khartoum, when I will give them their instructions; it may be that the Darfour garrisons may have been destroyed, also that the Hadendowa have given in; if so, then you can diminish the number of officers called for.

At any rate, I would impress, *if there is the slightest chance of an outcry in England in sending these officers, do not send them*, for I can do without them with an increase of time.

These telegrams show Sir E. Baring's approval of H.H. the Khedive's appointment of General Gordon, about which H.M.'s Government seemed anxious.

No. 17.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 4th*, 1884, 3·50 P.M.

Has General Gordon accepted any appointment from the Khedive?

No. 20.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, February 5th.*)

Cairo, February 5th, 1884.

MY LORD,—In reply to your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that General Gordon was given, at his own request, a Firman from His Highness the Khedive, appointing him Governor-General of the Soudan, with full powers, civil and military.

Under the circumstances it was very necessary that this step should be taken.

The following, as to the best course to pursue, are valuable as indicating General Gordon's comprehensive views of the situation, and therefore show that he was a man to be implicitly relied on.

Inclosure in No. 69.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Berber, February 11th*, 1884, *midnight*.

I would not, were I supreme, try again any Egyptian forces at Suakin, but *would engage* 3000 *Turkish troops in British pay. That would settle the affair.* It would be sufficient for the Padishah's troops to appear to cause a collapse of all fanatical feeling.

Inclosure in No. 67.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Berber, February 11th*, 1884.

The force which defeated Baker will never leave their tribal limits, and will remain in the vicinity of the garrisons. As for the rise of the tribes near Kassala, it is to be expected; but in

spite of this, I think that a satisfactory solution of the question may be expected, especially as the Soudan people fear that unless they accept peace and independence from me, they will be exposed to an invasion of the Sultan's troops.

I would carry out what you say is being done at Suakin, namely, the formation of a fresh force of blacks. I would accompany it with Proclamation signed by Baker or by Wood, that no operation will be undertaken unless they refuse terms which I am authorized to offer. The garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat may be considered lost. I must say that it would reflect great discredit on our name to recall me after having seen these people; also as I firmly believe, in spite of all, God will bless our efforts. I feel confident that *if you keep up unofficially the fear of Turkish invasion that you will aid me and that I shall succeed* D.V. I feel sure of this, and I pray that you do not flinch, but that you will continue your policy as if this had not occurred.

Inclosure in No. 124.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Berber, February 11th*, 1884, 10 A.M.

I understand your desire to be the pacification of the country without bloodshed and the formation of native Government; also that, on public grounds, I am to run no risks. I will fulfil your orders, *and feel sure I am not presumptuous in assuring you that I have every hope of success and of running no danger.* I have been well received everywhere.

The following despatch claims particular attention as exhibiting General Gordon's remarkable capacity as statesman and diplomatist in addition to his qualities as a soldier.

Inclosure 1 in No. 114.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, February 18th*, 1884.

In a previous memorandum I alluded to the arrival of an epoch when whites, fellaheen, troops, civilian employés, women and children of deceased soldiers—in short, the Egyptian element in Soudan—will be removed; when we shall be face to face with the Soudan administration, and when I must withdraw from the Soudan. I have stated that to *withdraw without being able to place a successor in my seat would be the signal for general anarchy throughout the country, which, though all Egyptian element was withdrawn, would be a misfortune, and inhuman.*

Also, I have stated that even if I placed a man in my seat unsupported by any Government, the same anarchy would ensue.

Her Majesty's Government could, I think, without responsibility in money or men, give the Commission to my successor on certain terms which I will detail hereafter. If this solution is examined, we shall find that a somewhat analogous case exists in Afghanistan, where Her Majesty's Government give moral support to the Ameer, and go even beyond that in giving the Ameer a subsidy, which would not be needed in the present case.

I distinctly state that if Her Majesty's Government gave a Commission to my successor, I recommend neither a subsidy nor men being given. I would select and give a Commission to some man, and promise him the moral support of Her Majesty's Government and nothing more.

It may be argued that Her Majesty's Government would thus be giving nominal and moral support to a man who will rule over a Slave State, but so is Afghanistan, as also Socotra.

This nomination of my successor must, I think, be direct from Her Majesty's Government.

As for the man, Her Majesty's Government should select one above all others, namely, Zebehr. He alone has the ability to rule the Soudan, and would be universally accepted by the Soudan. He should be made K.C.M.G., and given presents. The terms of nomination should be as follows:—

1. Engagement not to go into Equatorial or Bahr-Ghazelle Provinces, and which I should evacuate.
2. Engagement not to go into Darfour.
3. Engagement, on payment of 200*l.* annually, to telegraph height of Nile to Cairo.
4. Engagement to remain at peace with Abyssinia.
5. Engagement not to levy duties beyond 4 per cent. on imports or exports. Of course he will not have Suakin or Massowah.
6. Engagement not to pursue any one who was engaged in suppressing his son's revolt.
7. Engagement to pay the pensions granted by the Egyptian Government to old employés.

To the above may be added other clauses as may seem fit.

P.S.—I think the decision of any Council of Notables for the selection of candidates for the post of my successor would be useless.

Zebehr's exile at Cairo for ten years, amidst all the late events, and his mixing with Europeans, must have had great effect on his character. Zebehr's nomination, under the moral countenance of Her Majesty's Government, would bring all merchants, European and others, back to the Soudan in a short time.

Despatch as above by post.

I have asked Stewart to give his opinions independently of mine, in order to prevent a one-sided view.
He is a first-rate man.

In order to fully appreciate both General Gordon's fertility of resources, and the promptitude with which he could so rapidly formulate a course of immediate and prospective action, as indicated in these preliminary despatches, by only taking counsel with himself, it should be remembered that it was not definitely decided that he should go out till 16th January, 1884, on the morning of which date he left London for Brussels, *en route* to the Congo. On the evening of the 17th he was telegraphed for by Her Majesty's Government, requesting his services—arrived in London on the morning of the 18th, and left same evening—arrived at Cairo on the 24th—thence for Khartoum on the 26th, arriving at Assouan on 31st—Korosko on 2nd February—Berber on 11th—remaining two days to see the sheikhs, reaching Shendi on 16th, and Khartoum on 18th—exactly a month from the day he left England.

His original intention was to go to Khartoum *via* Suakin and Berber, make terms with the sheikhs of the tribes *en route*, and secure by this means a safe retreat for all the garrisons of the Soudan, which he had pledged himself to accomplish by virtue of his office. He was, however, requested by Lord Granville to proceed *via* Cairo, and thus *ab initio* began his experience of the ultimately disastrous effects of ministerial interference—an interference to be repeated only twenty days later, as will be seen by the following requests and reply.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO NUBAR PASHA.

Korosko, February 2nd, 1884.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency of the following:—

I have appointed Colonel Stewart Sub-Governor-General of the Soudan, and Ibrahim Bey Fevzi, Director of War and Marine in the Soudan. These two nominations are due to the respective qualities of the two Colonels.

I especially recognize in Fevzi Bey the desired activity which he has displayed while with me previously in the Soudan, and he has already given proof of his abilities, and I am more than ever satisfied with him. I therefore ask that these two Colonels may be promoted to the rank of General of Brigade.

I have written to each of them, instructing them to enter upon their duties, and to consider themselves as on the pay of Generals of Brigade until the arrival of the Khedive's Decree.

Will your Excellency kindly recognize these two appointments by telegraph, and send me the decrees by post.

My respects to His Highness.

SIR E. BARING AND NUBAR PASHA TO MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON, AT BERBER.

Cairo, February 4th, 1884.

Your telegram of the 2nd respecting Colonels Stewart and Ibrahim Bey Fevzi.

The Firman appointing Stewart as your deputy, with power to succeed you if necessary, will be sent. We understood it was your wish that Stewart should be paid by English Government, but we can pay him as the Deputy-Governor of the Soudan if you wish. He would then receive no pay from English funds. Please telegraph your wishes on this point.

As regards Ibrahim Bey Fevzi, we suggest that you should allot to him such pay with local and temporary rank as you may think proper during the time he is specially employed under you, but as he is not a Soudani, and will therefore probably return to Egypt, we hesitate to ask the Khedive to make an officer a General who entered the army eleven years ago, and whose contemporaries are still Lieutenants and Captains. Moreover, if he were named a General, as he has no regimental experience, he would be a burden to the Egyptian War Office Budget for the remainder of his life.

Thus General Gordon's most arduous mission was inaugurated by discouragement. Exception taken to his original route, his first recommendation towards the success of his enterprise thwarted upon seemingly a trivial pretext, and his striking example of promptitude of action is not only not seconded by Her Majesty's Government, but per-

sistently neglected, as is shown in the sequel. Again, in his laudable desire on the score of humaneness, to save the rich provinces of the Bahr-el-Ghazelle and Equatorial, he proposed that they should be put under the protection of the King of the Belgians—a responsibility which H.M.'s Government declined, as is shown by the following:—

No. 3.

SIR E. BARING to EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, February 9th*).

Cairo, February 9th, 1884.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inclose copy of a letter from General Gordon, inclosing a letter to be forwarded to the King of the Belgians, in which he urges His Majesty to occupy the Bahr-Gazelle and the Equatorial provinces, and to appoint him Governor-General of all that country.

He seems to intend to go straight on in that direction from Khartoum.

I do not think that General Gordon should be allowed, at all events for the present, to go anywhere south of Khartoum.

Inclosure in No. 3.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

Korosko, February 1st, 1884.

MY DEAR SIR EVELYN BARING,—Here is a letter I have written to the King of the Belgians. His Majesty told me he would take these two provinces if he could get them when I was at Brussels; also that he would take over the troops in them.

You might mention this to the Foreign Office, and send them copy of the letter. It would settle the slave trade.

No. 4.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, February 11th, 1884.

SIR,—I have received your telegram of the 9th instant, informing me that you have received a letter from General Gordon, from which it appears that that officer contemplates proceeding to Bahr-Gazelle and the Equatorial provinces.

I have to state that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that General Gordon should not at present go beyond Khartoum.

No. 6.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, February 12th.*)

Cairo, February 12th, 1884.

MY LORD,—With reference to your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have to-day received a telegram from General Gordon from Berber, stating that he will not go further south than Khartoum without my permission.

It should not be forgotten that he had a previous engagement with the King of the Belgians to go to the Congo, but he resigned this office out of consideration to his duty to his own country, but being on the spot he offered to the King of Belgium to place these provinces under his control, and as a return for his devotion to his own Government he finds himself perforce bound to forego his own convictions of what was necessary, not only for the safety of the provinces, but of their Governor the gallant Lupton Bey (an Englishman), whose ministration had for many years been successful both financially and in the suppression of the slave trade, and who as a consequence of the expected protection not being provided, was eventually taken prisoner by the Mahdi, made a slave, and it is believed died in want.

The following clearly shows that now was the time for Her Majesty's Government to assume prompt action in redemption of their implied promise to protect the garrisons and others, for whose safety they had expressed their determination to become responsible.

No. 106.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received February 18th*, 10·30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, February 18th*, 1884, 7 P.M.

Power telegraphs from Khartoum to-day as follows :—

"Gordon arrived here this morning, and met with wonderful

demonstration of welcome on part of population. State of affairs here since it was heard that Gordon was coming gives every promise of speedy pacification of this portion of Soudan. His speech to people was received with the greatest enthusiasm."

Instead of beginning to act they begin to obstruct.

No. 137.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR. E. BARING.

Foreign Office, February 22nd, 1884.

SIR,—With reference to your telegrams of the 18th and 19th instant on the subject of General Gordon's mission to the Soudan, *Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the gravest objections exist to the appointment by their authority of a successor to General Gordon.* The necessity does not, indeed, appear to have yet arisen of going beyond the suggestions contained in General Gordon's Memorandum of the 22nd ultimo, by making a special provision for the government of the country.

In any case, the public opinion of this country would not tolerate the appointment of Zebehr Pasha.

Earl Granville here seems to exceed his authority in taking the name of the British public in vain. How could he or anyone else say what public opinion would have been, had the public known the facts—which they did not, and could not, at the time—of which he was perfectly well aware; but it makes a good stalking horse to relieve him of his own responsibilities. General Gordon was the last man in the world to do anything that might encourage slave dealing, and with this sentiment he ought to have been unreservedly credited. The manner in which he proposed that Zebehr should be appointed was the most effectual way to check it, and even if this should not be apparent to everyone, the fact that it was General Gordon's suggestion ought to have, and would have been, a sufficient answer to any objection.

Justifiably relying upon Her Majesty's Government's promise to furnish any aid he might need—

vain expectation — General Gordon issued this Proclamation to the people of Khartoum :—

No. 163.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received February 27th*, 3·45 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, February 27th*, 1884, 3·30 P.M.

Gordon has issued following Proclamation to inhabitants of Soudan :—

"Since my arrival I have constantly assured you of good treatment and justice, and advised you to desist from rebellion which leads to war and bloodshed; but finding that this advice had no effect on some people, I have been compelled to use severe measures, so much so that British troops are now on their way, and in a few days will reach Khartoum; then, whoever persists in bad conduct will be treated as he deserves. Therefore upright men should have no intercourse with rebels, or they will share the same fate. I am watching things closely, and you should not think I am ignorant of what goes on. The present rebellion will bring ruin on country and much loss of life. The wise man is his own guardian."

It is a most significant fact that Her Majesty's Government do not appear to have taken any exception to the intimation in the above, "that British troops are now on their way." It is clear, as it seems they had no intention of sending any troops at all in aid anywhere, that they ought not to have allowed General Gordon to remain under a false impression for a moment. But had they the courage to enlighten him, which would mean eating their own promises?

The following despatch is so terse, so complete, and so statesman-like in its conception, that comment would be out of place, excepting to point out how unmercifully Sir E. Baring fixes, irrevocably, responsibility on Her Majesty's Government and how thoroughly in the main he concurs with General Gordon.

No. 169.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, February 28th.*)

Cairo, February 28th, 1884.

MY LORD,—I communicated to General Gordon your Lordship's telegram of the 22nd instant, asking him at the same time whether he could suggest any one besides Zebehr Pasha to succeed him at Khartoum.

I have the honour to inclose copy of my telegram to General Gordon on the subject, and of his reply. I also forward herewith another telegram from General Gordon, in the course of which he recommends that 3000 black troops should be kept in the Soudan, and that the cost of their maintenance, which he estimates at 70,000*l.* a year, should be defrayed by the Egyptian Government.

Besides these telegrams, I have before me a Report addressed to me by General Gordon from Abou-Hamad, on the 8th instant, a copy of which was forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch of the 25th instant. Your Lordship will observe that this Report is dated ten days before his long telegram respecting the future government of the Soudan, which will be found in my despatch of the 18th instant.

I will now submit to your Lordship my views upon the main points at issue, after having carefully considered the different proposals made by General Gordon. There are obviously many contradictions in those proposals; too much importance should not be attached to the details. But I venture to again recommend *to the earnest attention of Her Majesty's Government the serious question of principle which General Gordon has raised.*

Two alternative courses may be adopted. One is to evacuate the Soudan entirely, and to make no attempt to establish any settled Government there before leaving; the other to make every effort of which the present circumstances admit to set up some settled form of Government to replace the former Egyptian Administration.

General Gordon is evidently in favour of the latter of these courses. I entirely agree with him. The attempt, it is true, may not be successful, but I am strongly of opinion that it should be made. From every point of view, whether political, military, or financial, it will be a most serious matter if complete anarchy is allowed to reign south of Wadi Halfa. And this anarchy will inevitably ensue on General Gordon's departure, unless some measures are adopted beforehand to prevent it.

With regard to the wish of Her Majesty's Government not to go beyond General Gordon's plan, as stated in his Memorandum of the 22nd ultimo, I would remark that he appears to have in-

tended merely to give a preliminary sketch of the general line of policy to be pursued. Moreover, in that Memorandum he makes a specific allusion to the difficulty of providing rulers for Khartoum, Dongola, and other places where there are no old families to recall to power.

It is clear that Her Majesty's Government cannot afford moral or material support to General Gordon's successor as Ruler of the Soudan, but the question of whether or not he should be nominally appointed by the authority of Her Majesty's Government appears to me to be one of very slight practical importance.

Whatever may be said to the contrary, Her Majesty's Government must in reality be responsible for any arrangements which are now devised for the Soudan, and I do not think it is possible to shake off that responsibility.

If, however, Her Majesty's Government are unwilling to assume any responsibility in the matter, then *I think they should give full liberty of action to General Gordon and the Khedive's Government to do what seems best to them.*

I have no doubt as to the most advisable course of action. *Zebehr Pasha should be permitted to succeed General Gordon.* He should receive a certain sum of money to begin with, and an annual subsidy of about 50,000*l.* for the first five years, to depend upon his good behaviour. This amount would enable him to maintain a moderate-sized army, and the whole arrangement would be an economical one for the Egyptian Government.

The main difficulty lies in the selection of the man. It is useless to send any one who has no local influence. There are certain obvious objections to Zebehr Pasha, but I think too great weight is attached to them, and *I believe that General Gordon is quite right when he says that Zebehr Pasha is the only possible man. I can suggest none other, and Nubar Pasha is strongly in favour of him.*

It is for Her Majesty's Government to judge of the importance to be attached to public opinion in England, but *I venture to think that any attempt to settle Egyptian questions by the light of English popular feeling is sure to be productive of harm, and in this, as in other cases, it would be preferable to follow the advice of the responsible authorities on the spot.*

Telegram referred to in Sir E. Baring's foregoing despatch:—

Inclosure 2 in No. 169.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, February 26th,* 1884.

Telegram of the 23rd February received respecting Zebehr.

That settles question for me. I cannot suggest any other. Mahdi's agents active in all directions. No chance of Mahdi's advance personally from Obeid. You must remember that when evacuation is carried out Mahdi will come down here, and, by agents, will not let Egypt be quiet. Of course my duty is evacuation, and the best I can for establishing a quiet government. The first I hope to accomplish. The second is a more difficult task, and concerns Egypt more than me. *If Egypt is to be quiet Mahdi must be smashed up.* Mahdi is most unpopular, and with care and time could be smashed. *Remember that once Khartoum belongs to Mahdi, the task will be far more difficult; yet you will, for safety of Egypt, execute it.* If you decide on smashing Mahdi then send up another 100,000*l.*, and send up 200 Indian troops to Wady Halfa, and send officer up to Dongola under pretence to look out quarters for troops. Leave Suakin and Massowah alone. *I repeat that evacuation is possible, but you will feel effect in Egypt, and will be forced to enter into a far more serious affair in order to guard Egypt.* At present, it would be comparatively easy to destroy Mahdi.

Her Majesty's Government discovered, when "too late," that General Gordon was a true prophet. Below is their meagre reply to Sir E. Baring.

No. 177.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, February 29th, 1884.

SIR,—The arguments advanced by General Gordon and yourself in favour of the appointment of Zebehr Pasha as Governor-General of the Soudan are under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government; and I have to point out to you the principal grounds upon which they apprehend danger from such an appointment.

In the first place, it would appear not unlikely that he might, either *by allying himself with the Mahdi*, with whom he is already supposed to have some connection, or in some other manner, *become himself* a source of increased danger to Egypt from the Soudan, *instead of a security against them.*

Secondly, his reputation as a slave trader and the absence of any reason for supposing that he would find in his new position an object of ambition sufficient to induce him to give assurances in the fulfilment of which reliance could be placed, might raise grave doubts as to whether his power and influence after his appointment would be used for the prevention, or at all events, for the discouragement of the Slave Trade.

In the third place, it is impossible to overlook the danger in which General Gordon might be placed, owing to Zebehr Pasha's

hatred of that officer, if they should both be in the same region at a time when Zebehr had the supreme control.

I shall be glad to receive your observations upon these points.

Was there ever a more puerile document concocted, assuming the dignity of a State paper? Are the public really to suppose that Her Majesty's Government had so modest an opinion of their accredited agents' capacities, that they should unreservedly advise on a course, without having considered and disposed of the very obvious objections raised by Her Majesty's Government? As to the danger to General Gordon, of that he was the best judge; the danger he had to fear was to be found in another quarter. There is something almost ludicrous in this unexpected anxiety for General Gordon.

The following telegram refers to the same subject; but it appears quite unimportant, its only purpose seemingly being to procrastinate.

No. 185.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, March 1st, 1884.

SIR,—I have received your telegram of the 28th ultimo, informing me of General Gordon's views with regard to the proposals which he had made for placing Zebehr Pasha in power at Khartoum.

Her Majesty's Government desire further information as to the urgency of any immediate appointment of a successor to General Gordon, who they trust will remain for some time longer at Khartoum.

If it be found necessary to make an arrangement on this subject eventually, Her Majesty's Government will carefully weigh your opinions as to the proper person for such a post.

They are at the same time of opinion that if such an appointment be made, it might be advantageous that it should receive the confirmation of the Sultan.

The following is very important, as showing the disposition of Zebehr's family and justifying his

selection by Gordon. Why he was sued for debt just at this moment is rather curious.

Inclosure in No. 184.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING AND NUBAR PASHA.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, March 1st*, 1884.

Zebehr Pasha complains that an execution has been put in against his property at Cairo for 10,000*l.*, and asks me to recover debts owing him in Soudan. Is it not possible to stay action in this matter till he can recover his debts up here? It is most important, for his family are helping me.

The succeeding telegrams urge so conclusively the absolute necessity of employing Zebehr, that nothing short of blind infatuation can account for the course taken by Her Majesty's Government. Surely Sir E. Baring, Gordon, and Stewart were better judges of such a point than they were!

Inclosure.

No. 229 (No. 12).

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

Khartoum, March 1st, 1884.

Re policy. I maintain firmly policy of eventual evacuation, but I tell you plainly it is impossible to get Cairo employés out of Khartoum unless the Government helps in the way I told you. They refuse Zebehr, and are quite right (may be) to do so, but it was the only chance. It is scarcely worth while saying more on the subject.

I will do my best to carry out my instructions, but *I feel conviction I shall be caught in Khartoum* [?].

Inclosure 2 in No. 202.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, March 2nd*, 1884.

If Zebehr comes up, it will be absolutely necessary for me to stay here with Zebehr for four months.

Inclosure 3 in No. 202.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, March 3rd*, 1884.

The combination at Khartoum of Zebehr and myself is an absolute

necessity for success, and I beg you and Lord Granville to believe my certain conviction that *there is not the slightest fear of our quarrelling*, for Zebehr would know that the subsidy depended on my safety. To do any good we must be together, and that without delay.

Inclosure 4 in No. 202.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, March 3rd*, 1884.

About policy of a hurried evacuation of the Soudan, *pray abandon fear of Zebehr's hurting me.* His interests are bound up with mine. Believe me I am right, and do not delay.

Inclosure in No. 221.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, March 8th*, 1884.

The sending of Zebehr means the extrication of the Cairo employés from Khartoum, and the garrisons from Senaar and Kassala.

I can see no possible way to do so except through him, who, being a native of the country, can rally the well-affected around him, as they know he will make his home here.

No. 204.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, March 4th.*)

Cairo, March 4th, 1884.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inclose copy of a telegram from Colonel Stewart, discussing General Gordon's proposals. I have telegraphed to your Lordship that *Colonel Stewart entirely agrees with General Gordon in thinking that Zebehr Pasha should be sent at once to Khartoum.*

Inclosure in No. 204.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL STEWART TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, March 4th*, 1884.

In re your telegram of yesterday. The principal desire of General Gordon is to have Zebehr here as soon as possible. His reasons are: Zebehr is the only man with sufficient prestige to hold the country together, at any rate for a time, after the evacuation. Being a Pasha among the Shagié irregulars he will be able to get at sources of information and action, now closed to us. He will be opposed to the Mahdi. I agree with Gordon. *It*

seems evident to me that it is impossible for us to leave this country without leaving some sort of established Government which will last at any rate for a time, and Zebehr is the only man who can ensure that. Also that we must *withdraw the Senaar and other besieged garrisons*, and here also Zebehr can greatly assist us. The principal objections to Zebehr are his evil reputation as a slave dealer, and his enmity to General Gordon. As regards the first, it will have to be defended on the plea that no other course is open except British annexation or anarchy. As regards the second, if precautionary measures are taken, such as making the subsidy payable through General Gordon, I think Zebehr will see that his interests are in working with General Gordon.

Of the secondary measures proposed by General Gordon to assist the evacuation, they are: When the Berber-Suakin road is clear to send a small force of Indian or British cavalry to Berber. To send a small force of British cavalry to Wadi Halfa. These measures showing that we had forces at our disposal would greatly assist negotiations with rebels, and hasten evacuation. *I assure you none are more anxious to leave this country than myself and Gordon, and none more heartily approve the Government's policy of evacuation.* Unless, however, Zebehr is sent here, I see little probability of this policy being carried out. *Every day we remain finds us more firm in the country, and causes us to incur responsibilities towards the people, which it is impossible for us to overlook.*

From the following telegram it will be seen that Sir E. Baring on purely a *military question*, objects to General Gordon's and Colonel Stewart's proposal as to the adoption of the Suakin to Berber route—he does not give his reason. On such a point, who were likely to be the best judges, he, or they? General Gordon, though a splendid soldier, was not a Samson, he could not fight the rebels single-handed, but it would seem this was what was expected.

No. 205.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, March 4th.*)

Cairo, March 4th, 1884.

MY LORD,—Your Lordship will have observed from my preceding despatches, and especially from Colonel Stewart's telegram in my last despatch, *that both General Gordon and Colonel Stewart strongly urge the desirability*, from the point of view of the success

of their present mission, of *opening out the Berber-Suakin route.* I should think that when once Osman Digna has been defeated, Hussein Pasha Khalifa will be able to accomplish this, and in one of my telegrams to General Gordon I have suggested to him to employ Hussein Pasha Khalifa in this way, if possible.

I cannot agree with the proposal mentioned in Colonel Stewart's telegram that a force of British or Indian cavalry should be sent through from Suakin to Berber.

On the 9th March, 1884, Sir E. Baring to Earl Granville advocates Zebehr's appointment.

I think that the policy of sending Zebehr Pasha to Khartoum and giving him a subsidy is in harmony with the policy of evacuation. It is in principle the same policy as that adopted by the Government of India towards Afghanistan and the tribes on the north-west frontier. I have always contemplated making some arrangements for the future government of the Soudan, as will be seen from my despatch of the 22nd December, 1883,[1] in which I said that it would be "necessary to send an English officer of high authority to Khartoum with full powers to withdraw all garrisons in the Soudan and make the best arrangements possible for the future government of that country."

And on the same subject General Gordon telegraphs to Sir E. Baring, 8th March, 1884:—

It is impossible to find any other man but Zebehr for governing Khartoum. No one has his power. Hussein Pasha Khaleefa has only power at Dongola and Berber.

If you do not send Zebehr you have no chance of getting the garrisons away; this is a heavy argument in favour of sending him.

The above opinions are confirmed by an independent authority, as under:—

No. 225.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, March 10th.*)

Cairo, March 10th, 1884.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to report to your Lordship that Dr. Bohndorff, the African traveller, whom I saw yesterday, fully confirms what General Gordon says of the influence of Zebehr. He thinks that if Zebehr were paid he would probably not join the

[1] No trace of this despatch in Blue-books. A most important document. (Error—documents referred to, see No. 15, page 45.)

Mahdi, and that his presence in the Soudan would not constitute a danger to Egypt proper.

Colonel Stewart's suggestion as below, for a small force to follow up General Graham's victory at Suakin, meets with no better fate than Sir E. Baring's proposals.

Inclosure 2 in No. 219.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL STEWART TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, March 7th,* 1884, 9 30 P.M.

The Mahdi has attempted to raise the people of Shendy by means of an emissary. Should he succeed we may be cut off. I think it, therefore, most important to follow up the success near Suakin by sending a small force up to Berber. *The home Government should not delay in sending Zebehr.* He has great influence with his tribe between Berber and Khartoum. He might come up with the British force to Berber.

The chivalric character of Gordon, as manifested by his keen sensibility to his responsibilities as a man of honour and a gentleman, is shown in the following :—

Inclosure 1 in No. 231.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, March 3rd,* 1884.

This is a digest of the state of affairs. Senaar has no rebels round it, but between it and Khartoum there is a body of rebels hemming in Saleh Bey. Kassala was menaced and an attack repulsed, and I have no doubt but that Graham's victory will withdraw the enemy from the vicinity. Dongola and Berber are quiet. Khartoum has a body of rebels on left banks of White Nile, twenty miles from here, and the body of rebels who are on Blue Nile, and who hem in Saleh Bey. Mahdi is quiet, and fearing the Bedouin tribes about Obeid, he, by his emissaries, tries to stir up the people around Khartoum, so as to hem it in and capture it by famine. In the present state of affairs it is impossible to withdraw the Cairo employés from Khartoum without its falling into the hands of Mahdi's emissaries, and if this took place then of course all hope of saving the Cairo employés of Kassala and Senaar and the garrisons of Equator and Bahr Gazelle fails, and Berber and Dongola must fall also, not by the force of Mahdi but by sheer collapse. I am strongly against any permanent

retention of the Soudan, but I think we ought to *leave it with decency*, and give the respectable people a man to lead them, around whom they can rally, and *we ought to support that man by money and by opening road to Berber*. Pray do not consider me in any way to advocate retention of Soudan; I am quite averse to it, but you must see that you could not recall me nor could I possibly obey until the Cairo employés get out from all the places. *I have named men to different places, thus involving them with Mahdi; how could I look the world in the face if I abandoned them and fled? As a gentleman, could you advise this course?* It may have been a mistake to send me up, but having been done *I have no option but to see the evacuation through*, for even *if I was mean* enough to escape I have no power to do so. You can easily understand this; would you do so? If you were the people of Khartoum, you would, like they would, make terms with Mahdi by making me backsheesh Mahdi.

This appeal to Sir E. Baring "as a gentleman" is almost melancholy. Whether in H.M.'s Government at the time "honour," about which Gordon felt so sensitive, was an unknown quantity or not, does not appear, but it is not referred to in any way in any of their despatches.

The effects of indifference and procrastination begin to be apparent.

No. 252.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received March* 15*th*, 10·15 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, March* 15*th*, 1884, 9·30 A.M.

The telegraph line, which up to yesterday was working as far as Shendy, has now been cut between Shendy and Berber.

No. 253.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—*Received by telegraph, March* 16*th*.)

(Extract.) *Cairo, March* 16*th*, 1884.

It has now become of the utmost importance not only to open the road between Suakin and Berber, but to come to terms with the tribes between Berber and Khartoum.

Further evidence of the effects of inaction on the part of H.M.'s Government.

Inclosure in No. 254.

TELEGRAMS FROM MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

Khartoum, March 10th, 1884.

It is hardly worth while giving you all the rumours here. *Through the weakness of the Government many have joined the rebels.* All news confirms what I have already told you, viz., that we shall before long be blockaded. The utility of Zebehr is greatly diminished owing to our weakness, which has forced the loyal to join our enemy.

Khartoum, March 11th, 1884.

In the event of sending an expedition to Berber, the greatest importance is in speed. A small advanced guard at Berber would keep the Riparian tribes between this and Berber quiet, and would be an assurance to the population of the towns.

Khartoum, March 11th, 1884.

The rebels are four hours' distance on Blue Nile. There is not any panic so far.

Neglect and failure of all his expectations of aid promised by H.M.'s Government, General Gordon resigns his commission.

Inclosure in No. 242.

TELEGRAM FROM MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

(No. 5.)

Khartoum, March 9th, 1884, 11·40 P.M.

If the immediate evacuation of Khartoum is determined upon, irrespective of outlying towns, I would propose to send down all the Cairo employés and white troops with Colonel Stewart to Berber, where he would await your orders. *I would also ask Her Majesty's Government to accept the resignation of my commission*, and I would take all steamers and stores up to the Equatorial and Bahr Gazelle Provinces, and consider those provinces as under the King of the Belgians.

You would be able to retire all Cairo employés and white troops with Stewart from Berber to Dongola, and thence to Wadi Halfa.

If you, therefore, determine on the immediate evacuation of Khartoum, this is my idea. If you object, tell me.

It is the only solution that I can see if the immediate evacuation of Khartoum, irrespective of the outlying towns, is determined upon.

This telegram, dated two days later than the above, is manifestly sent in a humour of bitter irony, "every assistance I could have expected" can mean nothing else.

Inclosure in No. 303.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, March 11th*, 1884.

I would like to express to you and Her Majesty's Government my sincere thanks for the support you have both afforded me since I took up this Mission, and to acknowledge that you have both given me *every assistance I could have expected.* It is not in our hands to command success.

I say the same for the Khedive and Egyptian Ministers.

The following from Earl Granville, being translated into plain English, amounts to this; "We have got you into a deplorable mess, we don't intend to keep any of our promises, we decline to agree to any of your proposals, or to furnish you with the aid you ask for, but we give you permission to get out of the difficulty the best way you can."

No. 244.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, March 13th, 1884.

SIR,—I have received your telegram of the 13th instant on the subject of General Gordon's suggestions with regard to the appointment of Zebehr Pasha as Governor of Khartoum and the dispatch of British troops to Berber.

Her Majesty's Government are unable to accept these proposals. If General Gordon is of opinion that the prospect of his early departure diminishes the chance of accomplishing his task, and that by staying at Khartoum himself for any length of time which he may judge necessary he would be able to establish a settled Government at that place, he is at liberty to remain there.

In the event of his being unable to carry out this suggestion, he should evacuate Khartoum and save that garrison by conducting it himself to Berber without delay.

Her Majesty's Government trust that General Gordon will not resign his commission.

Sampson Low and Co. Ltd. London — Collotype Lemercier, Paris

Portion of Suakin harbour and town.

He should act according to his judgment as to the best course to pursue with regard to the steam-vessels and stores.

That the situation is becoming very grave is clear from the following :—

No. 301.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, March 24th.*)

Cairo, March 24th, 1884.

MY LORD,—In my despatch of the 18th instant I had the honour to inform your Lordship that the instructions contained in your telegrams of the 13th and 16th had been forwarded to General Gordon. I have not heard from him since he received my telegram, but it appears to me that under the present circumstances he will not be able to carry out your Lordship's instructions, although those instructions involve the abandonment of the Senaar garrison on the Blue Nile, and the garrisons of Bahr Gazelle and Gondokoro on the White Nile.

The question now is how to get General Gordon and Colonel Stewart away from Khartoum. *In considering this question it should be remembered that they will not willingly come back without bringing with them the garrison of Khartoum and the Government officials.*

I believe that the success gained by General Graham in the neighbourhood of Suakin will result in the opening of the road to Berber, but I should not think that any action he can take at or near Suakin would exert much influence over the tribes between Berber and Khartoum.

Unless any unforeseen circumstances should occur to change the situation, only two solutions appear to be possible.

The first is to trust General Gordon's being able to maintain himself at Khartoum till the autumn, when, by reason of the greater quantity of water, *it would be less difficult to conduct operations on the Suakin-Berber road than it is at present.* This he might, perhaps, be able to do, but it of course involves running a great risk.

The only other plan *is to send a portion of General Graham's army to Berber* with instructions to open up communication with Khartoum. There would be very great difficulty in getting to Berber, but if the road were once open it might be done by sending small detachments at a time.

General Gordon is evidently expecting help from Suakin, and he has ordered messengers to be sent along the road from Berber to ascertain whether any English force is advancing.

ٮ

Under present circumstances, I think that an effort should be made to help General Gordon from Suakin, if it is at all a possible military operation.

General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood, whilst admitting the very great risk to the health of the troops, besides the extraordinary military risks, are of opinion that the undertaking is possible. They think that General Graham should be further consulted.

We all consider that, however difficult the operations from Suakin may be, they are more practicable than any operations from Korosko and along the Nile.

This telegram, in reply to the above, is open to the same comments as Earl Granville's despatch of the 13th and 28th March.

No. 1.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, March 25th, 1884.

SIR,—Her Majesty's Government have had under their consideration your telegram of the 24th instant, in which it is suggested that a force of British troops should be sent from Suakin to Berber, with instructions to open up communication with Khartoum.

Having regard to the dangers of the climate of the Soudan at this time of the year, as well as the extraordinary risk from a military point of view, *Her Majesty's Government do not think it justifiable to send a British expedition to Berber, and they wish you to communicate this decision to General Gordon*, in order that he may adopt measures in accordance therewith.

Her Majesty's Government desire to leave *full discretion to General Gordon to remain at Khartoum, if he thinks it necessary, or to retire by the southern or any other route which may be found available.*

No. 2.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, March 28th*, 1884.

General Gordon's Mission, even though it be not successful, will have added to his very high reputation. No other man could have produced the extraordinary impression which he created on his arrival in the Soudan, or obtained the influence he has acquired over a considerabe portion of the population, apparently checking the advance of the Mahdi.

Her Majesty's Government are aware of the complicated

difficulties of the undertaking, but they believe that there is a reasonable hope that at least a portion of what they desire may be accomplished. *They know how much they may depend upon your ability, judgment, and energy in contributing to such a result.*

This next telegram shows how grossly H.M.'s Government were deficient in the commonest foresight, but unfortunately the consequences of their neglect did not fall on their shoulders, but on their officers and the British tax-payers.

No. 12.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received April 9th*, 7 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, April 9th*, 1884, 6·10 P.M.

In a telegram from Khartoum, General Gordon says: "*I wish I could convey to you my impressions of the truly trumpery nature of this revolt, which* 500 *determined men could put down.* Be assured, for present, and for two months hence, we are as safe here as at Cairo. If you would get, by good pay, 3000 *Turkish infantry and* 1000 *Turkish cavalry, the affair, including crushing of Mahdi, would be accomplished in four months.*"

General Gordon thinks he is to be abandoned, and is justly indignant—unfortunately for him he thought right till assistance was "too late."

No. 24.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received April* 18*th*, 4·5 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, April* 18*th*, 1884.

I have received another telegram from Gordon; it is dated 8th. A report had reached him that Zebehr was at Korosko. This may account, possibly, for his telegram to Zebehr. He says scarcely a day passes without his inflicting losses on rebels. *He repeats statement that* 3000 *Turkish troops from the Sultan "would settle Soudan and Mahdi for ever."* It is most unfortunate that of all the telegrams I have sent to him, only one very short one appears to have reached him. *He evidently thinks he is to be abandoned and is very indignant.*

The following specimen of one of the numerous proclamations issued by General Gordon will give

an idea of his principles of government, and his method of dealing with the people :—

(Translation.)
To all the Notables and Inhabitants in the Soudan,

Let it be known to you all that I have been appointed, in concert between the Khedive's Government and the Government of Great Britain, Governor-General of the whole Soudan, and the Soudan has now become an independent State to govern itself without the intervention of the Egyptian Government in any way whatever. The Mudirs and Governors have been informed accordingly.

I am now ready to see to your prosperity and good government, and endow you with the privileges which were granted to you by the late Saïd Pasha. It should be known to you that the Sultan had the intention of sending an expedition of strong Turkish troops to subdue the rebellious provinces, but his knowledge of your condition and of my kindness to you during the four years I was Governor-General of the Soudan has prevented him from sending such an expedition, and I have come in person, by the will of God, to prevent war between the Moslems and the shedding of blood, which is contrary to the will of God, his Prophet, and his Saints.

Know ye that I propose to convene a Council composed of the Kings and Notables of the Soudan, and I have ordered that you be governed by natives of the Soudan, in order that you may not be deprived of your rights as heretofore. I have wiped off all taxes due from you up to the end of the year 1883, and reduced by half those due for 1884. My main object in doing so is to give you prosperity. Justice is the basis of good government.

The Council in question will meet twice a week, and as often as emergency may require. You are pardoned. My words are true, and God is my witness.

(L.S.) GORDON,
Governor-General of the Soudan.

General Gordon, on his own authority, appoints Zebehr Pasha Sub-Governor-General of the Soudan.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO ZEBEHR PASHA.

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.) (*Received in Cairo, April 16th,* 1884.)

We have appointed your Excellency Sub-Governor-General of the Soudan. Please note this. On your arrival at Berber inform me and do what you can to get peace, and I will see if it be

possible to send two steamers on your arrival; and we shall send them, and your Excellency will arrange everything for your arrival at Khartoum by the two steamers above mentioned; and the two other steamers, which are at Berber, your Excellency must arm them with iron against the bullets of soldiers; and your Excellency must bring the needful ——, and take all necessary precautions against danger on the road.

From the following it appears that the British authorities in Egypt would take active measures to thwart General Gordon.

No. 21.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received April 17th*, 6·45 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, April 17th*, 1884.

Zebehr has received a telegram from Gordon appointing him Sub-Governor-General of the Soudan, and directing him to proceed to Berber. *He will be watched, and his departure will be prevented.*

Another urgent, but vain warning from Sir E. Baring. He must have often thought with Crabbe, "I preach for ever, but I preach in vain."

No. 22.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received April 18th*, 9·30 A.M.)

(Telegraphic) *Cairo, April 18th*, 1884, 8·40 A.M

Lately I have been sending telegrams to Berber, to be forwarded to Gordon. Since communication between Berber and Khartoum was cut, his telegrams to me have taken from a week to ten days. My telegrams to him appear to have taken even longer, and some, I think, have not reached him at all. We know that some messengers were captured by rebels; but if Her Majesty's Government wish to send anything to him it is quite worth while to make the attempt, although it is not certain that the message will reach him. No time, however, should be lost, as it is possible that before long communication with Berber will be entirely cut off.

The next telegram with "inclosure" conveys, by implication, the gravest charge to which any British Government has ever been exposed. Imagine a

British officer finding himself compelled to seek aid through private channels to save himself and his charge, when there was every possible obligation for it to be afforded by his own Government!

No. 25.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received April 19th*, 3·30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, April 19th*, 1884, 2·42 P.M.

In a telegram which he has sent to Sir S. Baker, General Gordon says:—

"We are in this position: we have provisions for five months, and are hemmed in. Our position will be much strengthened when Nile rises. Do you think that an appeal to the millionnaires of America and England for the raising of 200,000*l.* would be of any avail? With this sum you might get permission of Sultan for the loan of 2000 or 3000 men, and send them up to Berber. With these men we could not only settle our affairs here, but also do for the Mahdi, in whose collapse Sultan will be necessarily interested. I would not send many Europeans with them, as they cost too much, and I would put Zebehr in command."

Inclosure in No. 45.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR S. BAKER.

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, April* , 1884.

I have received a meagre telegram from Baring to the effect that it is not intended to send British troops to open road to Berber, but that negotiations are going on with Arabs for opening road. You will be able to judge of the value of such negotiations with the Arabs, and also of the time such arrangements would last after the withdrawal of the British from Suakin. We are in this position. We have provisions for five months, are hemmed in by some 500 determined men and some 200 (? 2000) rag, tag, and bobtail Arabs. As you know, our position will be much strengthened when Nile rises. Senaar, Kassala, and Dongola and Berber are quite safe for the present. Do you think an appeal to the millionnaires of America and England for the raising of 200,000*l.* would be of any avail? With this sum you might get the permission of the Sultan on certain terms for the loan of 2000 or 3000 Nizams, and send them up to Berber. With these men we could not only settle our affairs here, but also do for the Mahdi, in whose collapse the Sultan will be necessarily interested. I would not send many Europeans with them, as they cost too much, and I would put Zebehr in command. You know that by

the Firman granted to Mehemet Ali in 1842 Egypt was given by one Firman to him and his family, while by a second Firman the Soudan was given to the individual, Mehemet Ali. Thus the Sultan kept the nomination of the Soudan Pashalik in his own hands. These Firmans are considered by the Foreign Office as abrogated by the Firmans by which Ismaïl was made Khedive and succession given to the direct line. I feel sure that if it was known the loyal way the townspeople and troops here have held to me in such difficult circumstances, and the way my lot is involved in theirs, I should be justified in making this appeal. I should be mean indeed if I neglected any steps that occur to me for the security of their safety. Rumour says Zebehr is at Korosko, but I have no official intimation of this from Cairo. If true, it is remarkable I am not informed.

I leave you full discretion to put forward this appeal or not, as you think fit. Unless it is likely to be carried out it would do more harm than good.

The following telegrams refer to Zebehr's appointment by General Gordon.

No. 27.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received April 19th*, 3·30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, April 19th*, 1884.

Zebehr has telegraphed to General Gordon that he cannot go to Khartoum. I am told that he would be willing to go if Government made good his previous losses, which he fixes at a very high figure. I have not seen him myself.

Inclosure in No. 47.

ZEBEHR PASHA TO MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON.

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic) *Cairo, April 17th*, 1884.

We have been ennobled by the receipt of your Excellency's telegram appointing us Deputy-Governor-General of the Soudan.

We inform your Excellency that we are extremely grateful and obliged for the kind notice of your Excellency towards us in every way, and I regret very much to have to tell your Excellency with the greatest regret that affairs as at present do not permit of my passing through now, and I pray God to perpetuate your health and success.

Zebehr's hatred to General Gordon, about which

Her Majesty's Government seemed so anxious, appears by the above to have subsided.

ANOTHER REFUSAL TO AFFORD ANY ASSISTANCE.

No. 35.

EARL GRANVILLE TO MR. EGERTON.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 23rd,* 1884, 8·15 P.M.

We cannot sanction attempt to send English force at this season to Berber *via* Korosko, or to send Egyptian troops alone. Tell Hassan Khalifa that no immediate assistance can be given to him, as an expedition by the river could not, if undertaken, arrive at Berber according to your telegram in less than sixteen weeks from starting.

General Gordon, finding himself deserted by Her Majesty's Government, determines to take all responsibility on himself, as he will not incur the disgrace of deserting his post and his charge—a course in which Colonel Stewart fully concurs, as his telegram shows.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.—(*Received at Cairo, April* 16th.)

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, April* , 1884.

As far as I can understand, the situation is this: *you state your intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber, and you refuse me Zebehr.*

I consider myself free to act according to circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I can suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall retire to the Equator, and *leave you indelible disgrace of abandoning the garrisons of Senaar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola, with the certainty that you will eventually be forced to smash up the Mahdi under great difficulties if you would retain peace in Egypt.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL STEWART TO SIR E BARING.—(*Received at Cairo, April* 16*th.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Khartoum, April* , 1884.

General Gordon has acquainted me with your intention of not relieving Khartoum, and proposes I should go to Berber and trust to success *of your negotiations for opening road from Suakin to*

Berber. General Gordon has given you his decision as to what he himself intends doing, and weighing all circumstances and doubting the success of your opening the road to Berber, unless by advancing troops, I am inclined to think my retreat will be perhaps safer by the Equator. *I shall therefore follow the fortunes of General Gordon.*

On the 8th April, 1884, General Gordon telegraphs to Sir E. Baring as follows :—

I do not see the fun of being caught here to walk about the streets for years as a Dervish, with sandalled feet ; not that (D.V.) *I will ever be taken alive. It would be the climax of meanness,* after I had borrowed money from the people here, had called on them to sell their grain at a low price, &c., *to go and abandon them without using every effort to relieve them,* whether those efforts are diplomatically correct or not; and I feel sure, whatever *you may feel diplomatically,* I *have your support—and that of every man professing himself a gentleman—in private.*

Nothing could be more meagre than your telegram, "Osman Digna's followers have been dispersed." Surely something more than this was required by me.

It is hardly possible to conceive a more melancholy position for a British officer to find himself reduced to, and that solely due to the neglect of his own Government—as conveyed in this message.

All his appeals on the score of his necessities and his honour as an officer and a gentleman being systematically ignored, he resolves as a hero, which he was, like the Pompeian sentinel, to die at his post.

As to the question of responsibility, it is quite clear what was the opinion of the Egyptian Government as shown by this last telegram in this chapter, quoted below :—

Inclosure 1 in No. 48.

Cairo, April 20th, 1884.

DEAR SIR EVELYN,—The inclosed despatch from Hussein Pasha arrived while the Council was sitting.

The Council wishes to direct your attention to this despatch, and especially to the last paragraph, in which Khalifeh commends

himself to God, and demands clear and definite instructions before the wire is cut. The withdrawal from the Soudan having been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government, the Council directs me to ask you what instructions should be telegraphed to Hussein Khalifeh.

Yours, &c.,
(Signed) NUBAR.

Perhaps the most astonishing feature of this Egyptian difficulty, up to the present stage, is the alacrity with which Her Majesty's Government undertook a grave responsibility, and the corresponding alacrity with which they almost immediately afterwards proceeded, *coûte que coûte*, to evade and escape its inevitable consequences, a course which neither their agents abroad nor the British public at home, had they possessed the information in the hands of the Government, could ever have dreamt of their taking. But history proves the fact. At last, however, the "consequences" *had* to be reckoned with, and the very expensive and unhappily fruitless relief scheme was the result. This expedition will be the subject of comment in the next chapter.

NOTE.—The following messages, &c., from General Gordon, having arrived at such irregular dates, owing to the communications being cut, they could not very well be introduced into the above chapter with any pretence to sequential order, but they are here quoted as very interesting, not only as signally indicative of General Gordon's sentiments and character, but as being some of the last he ever sent. They speak so fully for themselves that they need no comment.

Inclosure 3 in No. 166.

GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING AND NUBAR PASHA.—(*Received October 15th.*)

(Extract.) *Khartoum, 30th July*, 1884.

Since the 30th March, 1884, date of your Cairo despatch, we

have had no news from you. Seyd Mahomet Osman, of Kassala, ought to be the route for your despatches, and you ought to give him a present of 500*l.*, for he saved Kassala. We have made a decoration, with three degrees, silver gilt, silver, and pewter, with inscription, "Siege of Khartoum," with a grenade in centre. School children and women have also received one; consequently I am very popular with the black ladies of Khartoum. We have issued paper notes to amount of 26,000*l.*, and borrowed 50,000*l.* from merchants, which you will have to meet. I have sent in addition 8000*l.* paper notes to Senaar. What Kassala is doing for money I do not know; of course we only get taxes paid in lead, so you are running up a good bill up here. The troops and people are full of heart; I cannot say the same for all the Europeans. The Arabs are in poor heart. I should say that about 2000 determined men alone keep them in the field. I expect it will end in a terrible famine throughout the land. Spy yesterday stated the *Queen of England* had arrived at Korosko. Perhaps it is a steamer. *The only reinforcements the Soudan has received since the 27th November,* 1883, *date when Hicks' defeat was known at Cairo, is seven persons, including myself!* and *we have sent down over* 600 *soldiers and* 2000 *people. The people here and Arabs laugh over it.* I shall not leave Khartoum until I can put some one in. If the Europeans like to go to the Equator, I will give them steamers, but *I will not leave these people after all they have gone through.*

Inclosure 1 in No. 117.

FORWARDED BY GENERAL LORD WOLSELEY TO SIR E. BARING, FROM DONGOLA.

November 29*th*, 1884.

Extract of letter from General Gordon addressed to H.H. The Khedive, Nubar Pasha, and Sir E. Baring, dated Khartoum, 9th September, 1884:—[2]

"How many times have we written asking for reinforcements, calling your serious attention to the Soudan? No answer at all has come to us as to what has been decided in the matter, and the hearts of men have become weary of this delay.

"While you are eating, drinking, and resting on good beds, we and those with us, both soldiers and servants, are watching by night and day, endeavouring to quell the movement of this false Mahdi.

"Of course you take no interest for suppressing this rebellion,

[2] On 12th August it was decided to order boats for "Gordon Relief Expedition" up Nile. Strange that Gordon was not advised!

the serious consequences of which are reverse of victorious for you, and the neglect thereof will not do."

No. 131.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received September* 18*th*, 1·30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, September* 18*th*, 1884, 11 A.M.

Following is translation of two telegrams from General Gordon, without date, in Arabic, received by Privy Seal of Khedive :—

"On my arrival at Khartoum I found it impossible to withdraw the soldiers and employés to Egypt on account of the insurrection of the Arabs and the communications being interrupted. Therefore I asked that I might be helped with reinforcements. Hitherto they have not come, and thus occurred the events at Berber. I had already warned Egypt to pay attention to that town. I will consider how it can be recovered from the rebels, or how troops can be stationed there for two months during high Nile. After which, if troops do not come, no doubt the same will again occur in Berber as before, and the troops will be destroyed. *Is it right that I should have been sent to Khartoum with only seven followers after the destruction of Hicks' army, and no attention paid to me till communications were cut?* I received a letter fifteen days ago from the Governor of Kassala, informing me that his province was in its usual condition, and road open and safe between it and Massowah, and telegraph in working order. If it is still intended to leave the Soudan, how is it that the Kassala province remains?"

Inclosure 1 in No. 58.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

Khartoum, December 12*th*, 1884.

SIR,—Having been sent up here to draw up a Report on the state of Soudan according to the instructions of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated the 18th January, 1884, and for this purpose having been placed under the orders of Her Majesty's Minister in Egypt, I have the honour to inform you that Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart took down that Report, and that, consequently, my connection with the Foreign Office and with you has ceased.

Inclosure 2 in No. 58.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

Khartoum, December 13*th*, 1884.

DEAR SIR,—The accompanying official will inform you that, as

I have fulfilled the object the Foreign Office sent me up to accomplish, I no longer consider I am attached to that Department, and consequently I am not under your orders.

As for the sums I have drawn on Chief Clerk, Foreign Office, I am responsible, and will pay them back. It is not my fault if the Report is lost. I regret I have no copy.

Inclosure in No. 52.

GENERAL GORDON TO COLONEL WATSON.

Khartoum, December 14th, 1884.

MY DEAR WATSON,—I think the game is up, and send Mrs. Watson, you, and Graham my adieux. We may expect a catastrophe in the town on or after ten days' time. This would not have happened (if it does happen) if our people had taken better precautions as to informing me of their movements; but this is "spilt milk."

Good-bye. Mind and let my brother (68, Elm Park Road, Chelsea) know what I owe you.

CHAPTER V.

History of the march of "Desert Column" of the Nile "Gordon Relief Expedition"—Desert march, Wady Halfa to Metemneh, 540 miles in 69 days—Hicks marched Suakin to Berber, 260 miles in 11 days with 1000 wretchedly equipped troops, some in chains—Battles of Abu Klea and Abu Kru, and other engagements described—Failure of Intelligence and Transport departments.

THE present chapter gives a brief review of the doings of what is known as the "Desert Column," or "Camel Corps," being a portion, and in fact the only active portion of that unfortunate enterprise, "The Gordon Relief Expedition,"[1] which, in common with almost all military expeditions devised and organized by the "Horse Guards" and "Downing Street," proved itself to be wanting in almost all the elements necessary to success, excepting the pluck of the men who composed it, an article which luckily is independent of all administrators. Former expeditions, though generally

[1] "*I will not allow that you came for ME; you came for the garrison of the Soudan.*"

General Gordon suggests Turkish arrangement,—

"Let Her Majesty's Government *find excuses* for it, it will not be difficult for *them*. Put yourself in my position: if you say '*rapid retreat and leave Senaar to its fate*,' I will say '*No, I would sooner die first*,' and will resign my commission, for I could not do it.

"*I am secure against any loss by the King of the Belgians, if I leave H.M.'S., therefore, I am, so to say, free of H.M.'S. If you turn me out of Governor-General I am relieved from all responsibility as to your action in Soudan towards the people.*"—General Gordon's Journal, 25th October, 1884.

marked by administrative incapacity at the beginning, have as a rule terminated in the surmounting of the original blunders, and in securing a brilliant success in the *finale*. Such was not the good fortune of this ill-starred venture, proving itself both in conception and development, *ab limine ad terminum*, a tortuous misadventure, failing in the accomplishment of the object which was the *sole occasion* that gave it birth—the salvation of Gordon.

This singular want of aptitude in English officials for matters of business—for transporting and provisioning troops is nothing else, it requires no knowledge of military tactics—should be more surprising in England than in every other country in the world. If England is distinguished for any qualities at all, it consists in the readiness with which its citizens adapt themselves with success to every kind of practical business. The First Napoleon called us—it is true in derision—"a nation of shopkeepers," but, unwittingly, it was the highest compliment he could pay us, as a prosperous commercial nation; and assuming it to be a compliment, it is more our due now than ever, seeing that some eighty per cent. of the commercial navy of the whole world fly the British flag; bearing this in mind the question naturally arises, How is it when, as a layman, the ordinary Englishman may reasonably be supposed possessed of these business qualities—latent it may be—that so soon as he gets into the harness of office, of which blinkers form a prominent feature, he can neither see to the right nor to the left, and very little in front of him, and the latent qualities which are a part of his constitution are not only never developed but appear to become obliterated? Although we have raised this question, we do not propose to answer it, but present it as a curious speculation,

believing that its appositeness to the situation will be admitted before the end of this chapter is reached.

The conception of the "Camel Corps" was really the result of an anticipated failure of the main body of the "Relief Expedition," even before it started on its elected, or rather mis-elected Nile route; it is apparent on the face of it, it would assuredly be "too late," and this Desert Route Column was improvised in a hurry.

Count Gleichen, whose interesting book, "With the Camel Corps up the Nile," furnishes the information that constitutes the subject of this chapter, was a lieutenant in 1st Battalion, Grenadier Guards, and he says as evidence that this expedition was an afterthought: "One day in September, 1884 (some weeks after the river scheme had been determined), on coming off one of those numerous guards in Dublin that make a subaltern's life a burden to him, I found the joyful news awaiting me that I was to go out to the Soudan at once with the Camel Corps detachment of my battalion. As everybody knows, this sudden despatch of troops to the Nile was due to the Government having suddenly taken into its head the idea that it was necessary to rescue General Gordon from his perilous position at Khartoum, which he had held since February. 'Better late than never' (which on this occasion unfortunately was not verified). Accordingly an expedition was equipped to proceed up the river, in pursuance of a determination which ought to have been carried out at least three months earlier.

"The idea had only recently been started that, in order to allow of troops acting with any success up the Nile, it was absolutely necessary that a certain proportion of them should be mounted on camels, both for facility of transport across the desert, if necessary, to Khartoum, and for rapidity of action.

Accordingly a camel corps was organized, drawn half from cavalry and half from infantry." After enumerating the various regiments, he says, "The grand total that left England was therefore 61 officers and 1121 men. The men had all to be marksmen or first-class shots, twenty-two years old at least, of course medically fit, and of as good character as possible. In fact, they were as good men as could be got anywhere, and a finer shipload than those on board the '*Deccan*' never left England." And it may here be remarked that it is very fortunate that they were, for had they not been, as will be seen in the sequel, it is very doubtful if any of the "Camel Corps" would ever have returned alive. They were joined on arrival by about 500 officers and men of the Mounted Infantry already in Egypt. They left Portsmouth 26th September, and arrived at Alexandria on the 7th prox., leaving Cairo by rail on the 16th for Assiout, about 250 miles up the Nile from the former city, where the rail terminates; this last journey taking only one day. So far the progress was expeditious enough, but hence rapidity of movement ceased, and attention is especially directed to the question of time, as it forms *the* most important feature in the conduct of the expedition—all depended upon it. Now although some 250 miles were accomplished in *one* day, it occupied by various means of transit *eight weeks* to arrive at Korti, their destination on the river line, some 960 miles further up the Nile. At the risk of being tedious the various stages are quoted from Count Gleichen's book, showing how these eight weeks were taken up—it is assumed, time being an object, that the stages were accomplished as quickly as possible, and thus a fair opportunity of comparison is afforded in point of time with any other route.

From Assiout to Assouan, by steamer some 400

miles up the Nile, occupying eleven days, i.e. from 17th to 28th October, 1884; per rail from Assouan to Philæ round first cataract, a distance of seven miles, when the Column took steamer to Wady Halfa, a distance from Assouan of 180 miles, occupying four days, arriving at the former on the 2nd November. After a halt of ten days Column received orders to start per camels to Dongola, 235 miles further up the Nile, arriving on 26th November, or fourteen days on the journey. A little higher up the column crossed the Nile and arrived at a camp established at Shabadub, about 60 miles further up river. On the 10th December Column left Shabadub for Ambukol, 75 miles up stream, on camels, and finally arrived at Korti, which is adjacent, on the 14th December, Lord Wolseley arriving the next day. Thus from the arrival at Alexandria to the arrival at Korti, exactly two months and one week were consumed. This will be an appropriate place to entertain the value of the route—Suakin to Berber—proposed by officers ou the spot, and others acquainted with the situation. Assuming the "*Deccan*" had, instead of going to Alexandria, proceeded to Port Said and thence to Suakin, she would have arrived at that port about the same time the Camel Corps started up the Nile from Cairo, i.e. 16th October, the additional distance by sea being about 1200 miles. Now the distance from Suakin to Berber, which lies west by south of the former place, is about 260 miles. That it was both practicable and expeditious does not depend upon opinion alone, seeing that the unfortunate General Hicks accomplished the distance with some 1000 Egyptian troops, defective in quality and equipment, in eleven days just about a year before.

Again, from Berber the distance to Metemneh is a little over 100 miles, whereas from Korti, the

point of departure across the desert for the same place, is about 170. Now, allowing a margin of time, say a week, for preparation for the march from Suakin to Berber, the camel column would have arrived at the latter place about the 2nd November; whereas, as a fact, they did not arrive at Korti till the 14th December, or nearly six weeks later, and some 70 miles further off from Metemneh —the starting point for Khartoum. It is therefore a most reasonable inference, considering that General Gordon did not meet his death till the 26th January, that the gain of this six weeks would in all probability have saved his life—the object in view from the first. This was the route advised by Major-General Sir Andrew Clarke, all the Naval and Military authorities, and by Sir F. Stephenson, the general in command, who was, in consequence of his difference with certain "experienced officers at home," relieved of his command[2] by the Marquis of Hartington on the 26th August, 1884, in favour of Lord Wolseley. That the reasons urged by "experienced officers" were apparently most cogent in the view of the Marquis,

---

[2] No. 80.

THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON.—(*Communicated to the Foreign Office, August 27th.*)

(Telegraphic.) *War Office, August 26th*, 1884, *midnight.*

After anxious consideration, Her Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that it is unjust to you to ask you to be responsible for directing an operation which, after full knowledge of plan, you consider to be impracticable. They have therefore decided to send Lord Wolseley to take temporarily the chief command in Egypt. Government highly appreciate the manner in which you have carried out the important and difficult duties of your command, and earnestly hope that you may feel yourself able to remain in Egypt whilst Lord Wolseley is there, and assist him with your advice. Lord Wolseley goes out with Lord Northbrook.


IN
OUM
MEL CORPS,
UTE
S.
Cape Elba
RED SEA
Ras Rowayah
Mersa Durrur
Suakin
Odrusa
Sinkat
Tamanib
Erkowit
Trinkatat
El Teb
Tokar
Ras Agig
Khor Baraka
ITALIAN
SPHERE OF
INFLUENCE
36
37
38
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
G. Philip & Son, London & Liverpool.

there cannot be a doubt, or he would not have opposed and superseded so able an officer as Sir F. Stephenson. Whatever, however, his confidence may have been in his advisers at the time, the shortly subsequent course of events must have considerably disturbed it. It must be borne in mind that the Marquis of Hartington made it a condition, referred to on several occasions, that the expedition was to *return before the end of winter*. On the 15th August, 1884, in a despatch to Sir F. Stephenson, he says: "It is essential to remember that the plan adopted should provide for the return to Egypt proper of all the troops employed before the end of the approaching winter season." Now, by a despatch to the same officer, dated the 12th August, he informs him that, after a conference with "experienced officers here," he has resolved on the Nile route. It is impossible to suppose that, at this conference on the 12th, he did not insist upon the condition of "return" conveyed to Sir F. Stephenson on the 15th, and this circumstance furnishes the opportunity of estimating the value of the calculations these "experienced officers" can have made as to the time necessary to carry out the programme, and get the troops back in Egypt proper before the winter was over, when taken in conjunction with Lord Wolseley's telegram: "Assiout, 4th November, 1884.—I do not expect to concentrate the whole force about Ambukol, until *end of year*," and the fact that the whole river force *did not arrive* there until the 11th March, 1885!

After this digression, which it is hoped the reader will think justifiable, the course of the Camel Corps will be followed.

On the 30th December they started for Metemneh, consisting of 73 officers, 1212 men and natives, and 2091 camels. There was some little difficulty in procuring guides, as the natives of Ambukol

were not in a friendly humour; but Sir Herbert Stewart forced them into his service in a very simple manner, as thus—Count Gleichen says—"He had sent for the chief men at Ambukol, who knew the route, sat them down in his tent, showed them many dollars, and told them they were to come as guides; they flatly refused, so the General said, 'You will come, anyhow. If you like a ride to Metemneh, tied on to your camels, well and good; if you prefer not being lashed on, you will get these nice presents,' so they came (six of them)." This difficulty overcome, they made for the first wells on the route—Abu Hashim, or Hambok, by name; but these being nearly empty, they proceeded to the next—El Howeiyat; here, however, the water was exhausted after the horses had had a bucketful apiece. By the 3rd January they arrived at Gakdul, where there was plenty of water, the distance travelled being 100 miles, accomplished, as Count Gleichen says, "in sixty-four hours, thirty-four hours on the move, and thirty in *short halts*," the rate of actual travelling being two and three-quarter miles per hour. Here two small forts were erected, and fortified as a military station for stores and refuge in case of need, about two-thirds of the way to the Nile, and invaluable in the sequel it proved itself to the corps. On the 11th January a convoy of stores and ammunition arrived with 400 infantry to provision and garrison the forts, these being brought by the camels sent back for the purpose, thus making the animals travel three times over the same ground, and losing valuable time. On the 13th January the corps, now consisting of some 1500 men, 90 horses and 2200 camels, started for Metemneh. As the means of taking a sufficiency of water in a desert is a most important item in the commissariat, a quotation is here given from Count Gleichen's book as to its inefficiency:—

"As much water as possible was taken in iron camel-tanks, two to a camel, but the condition of our private water skins and leather bottles was pitiable. Every man had been served out afresh with both skins and bottles on starting from Korti, and yet barely 20 per cent. of the skins held their full complement of water. Even after every visible hole had been carefully sewn up, and the whole skin thoroughly greased, at the end of the first day's march you would find more than half your water evaporated; next day the skin would be a damp, flabby bag, and the day after a dried, shrivelled-up article without an atom of water in it. How a committee of intelligent officers can ever have selected such an article beats my comprehension! The long Egyptian leather water bottles ('musseks') were even worse, letting the water out in streams through the seams. The orders about water were, that every man was to replenish his little wooden English bottle from the 'mussek' for his private use, and on no account to touch his skin, which was to be used for public purposes, such as making tea and cooking fresh meat. However, when his wooden bottle, holding one pint, was exhausted, and the water in his mussek had evaporated, what was he to do? We made a few men sew up their waterproof sheets into water-bags, but thorns and sharp stones had played havoc with the water-tightness of most of them. The sailors (numbering thirty) were better off; for they had brought up a quantity of large india-rubber bags, specially made for the purpose. I wish the Government would have gone to the expense of providing every one with them; it would have saved an enormous amount of pain and privation." Is it not astonishing that, with this example before them, the "experienced officers" did not perceive that what was necessary for the naval brigade would

also be so for the military? Such is the inconsistency of officialism! Again, as to the shortcomings in the means of transport, Count Gleichen says, "Only sufficient corn was brought on to allow of two feeds per camel of eight pounds each; the fact was that the authorities had stopped buying camels on the Nile, and two camels were made to do the work of three; consequently, there were not enough to carry grain for the force, and the camels had to sustain themselves on mimosa shoots, and long, dry, yellow grass, a hundred weight of which would barely produce a pound of nourishment." This was hardly a satisfactory condition of things to begin a march with across a desert, with every expectation of attack *en route* by a fierce, fanatical enemy numbering their thousands, to say nothing of the bad economy, as will be seen later on, by the consequent mortality of the camels. But it will scarcely be credited that this system of pinching extended to the supply of ammunition, and as the reader would naturally be sceptical, it is necessary again to quote Count Gleichen. "The naval division brought one Gardiner gun with them, but were only allowed 1000 rounds of ammunition. Considering that the gun (the identical ill-fated one that jammed at Tamai—and did so again at Abou Klea)—fired over 100 rounds a minute, this was only allowing it ten minutes' work at the outside—more false economy."

Notwithstanding the disadvantages under which the Camel Corps laboured, they by the 16th accomplished a distance of nearly fifty miles, and the enemy having shown themselves in considerable force at something over a mile off, orders were given to form a stone zeriba, and improvised breastwork for the protection of the baggage, &c., and leaving this extemporized fortified camp with a small garrison, Sir Herbert Stewart resolved to fight his way to the wells of Abou Klea. Advanc-

ing in square formation, he shortly found himself in presence of the enemy, this was the day after constructing the zeriba, i.e. 17th January. As this was the most desperate encounter of the campaign, and as will be seen would in all likelihood have terminated in the utter annihilation of the whole brigade, had it not been for the indomitable pluck of officers and men, Count Gleichen's account of it, as an eye-witness, in his own words, will doubtless be interesting: "After we had proceeded thus for nearly an hour, the stretchers and cacolets getting fuller every minute (from a dropping fire from the Arabs), a number of green and white flags on long poles were seen some way off in the grass to the left front. Much speculation took place as to what they could be—some took them for a burial ground, and others for the position of the enemy's camp. The main body of the enemy was supposed to be on the right, since most of the firing had come from that flank, and the ground seemed more favourable to attack from. So much did everyone expect the attack from the right, that the officer commanding the Mounted Infantry skirmishers on the left flank (Campbell of the 60th) sent a message to Sir Herbert, asking if he might go and take the mysterious flags. The General was on the point of giving leave, when suddenly a hundred more flags uprose in the same place, and the wady became alive and black with vast masses of Arabs, who had apparently sprung out of the ground. The square happened to be halted at the foot of a stony knoll when the enemy thus appeared, so it was moved some thirty yards on to a better position on top, and the skirmishers at once called in. With wild yells the Arabs (still about 500 yards off) moved across our left front in *column of companies*, and disappeared for a moment behind

the rocks and grass in the wady. In half a minute they reappeared, close on the left rear, *left wheeled into line*, and charged. So quickly was this done, that the skirmishers had barely time to run in before the Arabs were upon them, one unfortunate man of the 60th, an officer's servant who was not in good training, being speared before he reached the square.

"In moving this square up this hillock several tired camels, with their loads of wounded, had been left outside, lying down at the foot of the slope; and the native drivers could not get them on their legs, so bolted into the square to save their own skins when the enemy charged. It looked like certain death for the wounded, and no doubt would have proved so, if R—— (an officer of the G.C.R.) and one or two other privates of the H.C.R. had not gallantly rushed out and hauled several of the camels in by main force just as the Arabs reached the square. The moment the skirmishers were in, a terrific fire began from the left and rear faces upon the Arabs, volleys rapidly merging into independent firing. I was with my company on the right front, and anxiously my men looked for something beyond a stray skirmishing nigger to shoot at. The camels inside the square obstructed all vision to the fighting flank, and we had already concluded that the fire of the Heavies and Mounted Infantry had swept back the Arabs, when suddenly a terrific shock was felt, accompanied by redoubling yells and firing. I found myself lifted off my legs amongst a surging mass of Heavies and Sussex, and camels of all sorts were pressing with terrific force on our thin double rank, and it seemed every moment as if it must give; but it didn't.

"On getting through the other side of the press, a gruesome sight was seen. Immediately in front

were swarms of Arabs, in desperate hand-to-hand fight with our men, hacking, hewing, hamstringing, and yelling like a crowd of black devils on a ground literally piled up with dead and dying. On the right the Mounted Infantry were pouring in their fire with deadly effect, the niggers falling in hundreds. At my side Dr. Briggs, minus his helmet, his patients all killed or scattered, had drawn his sword, and was frantically endeavouring to rally the men near him. I shouted myself hoarse trying to get the men to aim carefully, but my voice was lost in the din. A rain of bullets whizzed dangerously close past my head from the rifles behind into the fighting mass in front. Numbers of the Arabs went down in that hail, and I fear several Englishmen too. Everything depended on the right and front faces standing fast. And well did they stick to it. With the rear rank faced about, the men stubbornly withstood the pressure, and do what they would the Arabs could not break in the solid mass of men and camels.

"It was too hot to last. At length the enemy, almost annihilated, wavered, turned, and retreated sullenly, our men shooting them down in scores till they disappeared out of range over the hill tops. Many of these brave fanatics turned and charged the square singly, being of course shot down long before they reached it. When we saw the Arabs in full retreat the General gave the word, and we raised cheer after cheer—a little attention evidently not appreciated by the enemy, many of whom turned and shook their fists at us."

The foregoing graphic account is not simply quoted for its own merits, which are considerable, but as illustrative of three salient features in the situation: the imminent peril to which this hastily conceived expedition was exposed: the

paramount bravery of the men which solely averted a disastrous catastrophe: and the astounding courage exhibited by the enemy. Men of such moral and physical fibre who could so vigorously try conclusions with the flower of the British Army —having a world-wide reputation for a capacity for fighting, if for nothing else—give evidence of material, which, judiciously handled, could but develop into the solidarity of a remarkable people. That they possessed intelligence as well as courage is manifest from their military tactics, which evidently struck Count Gleichen from his italicized remarks. If they could exhibit this intelligence in warfare, it may fairly be assumed that, properly directed, it would become apparent in other channels. It is hoped that this further little digression from the course of events will be excused as apposite to the occasion.

The respective losses in this action were 9 officers killed and 9 wounded, 86 privates killed and 106 wounded; the loss of the enemy about 1300 killed, and probably more than double this number wounded—a terrible, and as events proved, an utterly useless slaughter. Water being a desperate necessity, it was compulsory, notwithstanding the deplorable condition of the corps, to push on to the wells. Of the privations endured Count Gleichen says, "The men were now suffering greatly from thirst, yet there was hardly a drop of water to give them, nearly all the spare water being used for the wounded. Several men fainted, and many more suffered acutely, their lips turning black, and their tongues swelling so as to cause great pain." Had the corps been properly found for the conveyance of water, this suffering might have been completely avoided. The number of camels having been seriously diminished for want of sustenance, there were not sufficient to carry the wounded, who had

to be borne on stretchers by their comrades who, in spite of their exhausted condition, behaved splendidly. Count Gleichen says, "The men were fearfully weak themselves through fatigue and thirst, but stuck to their burdens manfully all the time." The long-looked-for wells of Abou Klea were at last discovered just in time to avert further disaster. The word "discovered" is used advisedly, because it appears that the corps had no certain knowledge of their immediate whereabouts. It will doubtless be thought surprising that the locality of the wells in a desert, which ought to have been as well known as a village pump to the *habitués*, should have been a matter of uncertainty, when the district had been traversed for centuries by caravans, and it is indeed strange that accurate information could not have been ascertained beforehand on such an important point. But lack of information did not only show itself in this respect. In the progress of the column, Count Gleichen says they found, in the shape of cooking utensils, evidence "sufficient to prove that thousands of Arabs must have encamped there for a fortnight, and yet our spies had reported the road quite clear to the river!" (the Nile). Again the same want was exhibited, for he says, "So much out of its bearing was the column that it was never discovered what mimosa wood we got lost in—no one ever came across it afterwards!"

At length they succeeded in arriving within four miles of the river close to Metemneh, where Sir Herbert Stewart determined to construct another "zeriba," and here, while giving his directions, he received his fatal wound from a long shot by one of the crowds of Arabs that were hovering around the column; from all accounts a man remarkable for soldierly and social qualities of the highest order—and consequently a cruel loss to the corps. The

command then devolved upon Sir Charles Wilson, the diplomatic messenger intended by Wolseley to communicate with Gordon at Khartoum. The necessity of another battle being absolute, and the situation being, if anything, more perilous than at Abou Klea, it is better to quote the Count in his own words: "At length, about 3·30 p.m., 19 January, 1884, Sir Charles made up his mind that it was no use waiting for reinforcements—(Lord Wolseley was popularly supposed to be following not far behind with more troops)—and that the whole force could not fight its way successfully to the river, encumbered as it would be with wounded and stores; the only alternative was the risky one of half of us fighting our way on foot, whilst the baggage remained behind with the other half. It was neck or nothing, for the fighting force could only number 900 bayonets, and the enemy were swarming round in thousands. I must say it looked as risky business as it well could; we all felt it was exceedingly doubtful if the two halves of the force would ever see each other again, yet it was the only thing possible to be done. Accordingly a square was formed, and moved out from the camel zeriba in a southerly direction, keeping as much as possible in the open, so as to repel any sudden attack from the scrub. . . . At length the Arabs began to collect in large bodies in front, and the long-wished-for moment arrived. 'Thank God! they're going to charge!' was the sigh of relief on all sides; and on they came. Several thousands had massed on the left front, and they came straight at us. The square was at once halted, and volley after volley poured into the black mass. As they got within 400 yards, the volley-firing became a continuous roar of musketry, and hundreds fell beneath the well-directed fire of the Mounted Infantry and ourselves. Aiming low, and firing steadily as on

parade, our men mowed the Arabs down like grass; not one got within eighty yards of the square. At last the masses of the enemy in reserve, seeing the fate of the charging lines, wavered, scattered, and bolted over the hills towards Metemneh, and the river was won!"

Thus ended the battle of Abou Kru, and it must be evident that but for the sterling qualities of the troops, a terrible disaster must have again awaited the whole column. This discipline in the presence of danger, it is almost more gratifying to witness, in the presence of good fortune.

On sighting the Nile "the wounded were held up for one look at the gleaming river, and then hurried to the banks. Still perfect discipline was observed. Not a man left his place in the ranks until his company was marched up to take his fill."

It would be exceeding the intended limits of this chapter to follow the Camel Corps any further, the motive being chiefly to show the inefficiency of its equipment and the dangers to which it was consequently exposed. Suffice it to say in conclusion, that Metemneh, which it was originally ordered to occupy, turned out to be *five times larger* than was expected—an astounding specimen of the want of knowledge of the "experienced officers" who advised the Marquis of Hartington—and therefore its capture had to be abandoned. The fall of Khartoum, and the death of General Gordon, on 26th January, 1885, left the Camel Corps nothing else to do but to get back again as quickly as possible; the retreat involving the abandonment of valuable stores with the loss altogether of 75 per cent. of the camels, mainly for lack of food, the regiment returning on foot. They reached Assouan 19th June, 1885—a considerable time after the prescribed period, viz., "before the end of the

approaching winter season,"—and left Alexandria for home 4th July.

"This, then," Count Gleichen says, "was the end of the Gordon Relief Expedition! After all our fighting we were to retire in this wise, having lost many valuable lives and much treasure, and gained absolutely nothing!"

After this brief review of the "Gordon Relief Expedition," it must be manifest that it was conceived in a feeling akin to panic, and that it terminated in a humiliating collapse, accompanied by a terrible sacrifice of life and treasure, without any compensating circumstances whatever, and considering the ample sources of reliable information *on the spot*, at the disposal of H.M's ministers, it is impossible to relieve them from the grave responsibility of all the disastrous consequences that ensued. Like the old Bourbons, "They seem to have remembered nothing and forgotten nothing."

CHAPTER VI.

Various plans suggested by Chermside and others for relief of Kassala—None definitely entertained, owing to indecision of H.M.'s Government—Mudir of Kassala refuses to barter his honour for his life—Large sums spent fruitlessly—King John of Abyssinia refuses to negotiate with Egypt; will only deal with Great Britain—Kassala garrison, 2500, surrendered through starvation; shocking atrocities attending surrender.

THIS chapter will refer to the fall of Kassala and the sacrifice of the garrison, also to the failure of H.M.'s Government to redeem their engagement to avert that catastrophe, or at least to take such measures as might reasonably be expected to do so.

It will be remembered that in the report which Colonel Stewart sent to H.M.'s Government, this town was described as being very important in a commercial sense, and as being situated in one of the most extensively fertile regions of the Soudan, and might therefore be thought worthy of serious consideration for these reasons alone, independently of the cause of humanity, and of the necessity, as a point of honour, to do their utmost to fulfil their sacred trust. To this end several suggestions were placed at their disposal. The first, and perhaps the best, both in the interests of efficiency and economy, was that proposed by Captain Speedy, as given by him in the following despatch:—

Inclosure 3 in No. 6.

CAPTAIN SPEEDY TO MR. EGERTON.

Sanheit, August 31*st*, 1884.

SIR,—In my despatch of to-day I recommended that Kassala should be relieved by a British force, but as this may not be feasible, I would suggest, on the score of economy, the employment of an Indian brigade, consisting of two regiments of Punjaub Infantry and one of Bengal Lancers, and a battery of mountain-train guns. It might also bring its own transport animals, so that the only transport required here would be for the Commissariat, and these could easily be procured from the Habbab tribe, who reside close to Massowah.

As the country between Massowah and Ain, a distance of 40 miles, is comparatively level, a railway could be run, for probably 50,000*l*. expenditure, within thirty days.

Troops, on reaching Ain, would march to Sanheit in four days. Water abundant, road rough along bed of Lebka torrent for two marches. The third march is over a mountain ridge (Mess-halib), and the fourth, after descent on the other side, across the Ain Saba Valley into Sanheit (elevation 4500 feet).

From Sanheit, one march to Barka Plain, and thence five marches to Dagga, and two thence to Kassala.

The above simple, practical, and practicable plan seems to have been dismissed without the compliment of even a criticism, as will be seen by the fourth paragraph of the following, from Sir E. Baring, which despatch at the same time indicates that the question of relief from Abyssinia had been on the *tapis*, but was not to be entertained for the reasons therein stated, and that Captain Speedy was to confine himself to the subject of a certain treaty with the Abyssinians, then pending.

Inclosure 5 in No. 6.

SIR E. BARING TO THE BRITISH CONSUL AT SUAKIN.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, September* 24*th*, 1884.

Inform Chermside that I have received letters from Speedy, dated Sanheit, the 31st August. He says that the Abyssinians are not going to Kassala, that letters from merchants of Kassala state that half the garrison belong to Kassala district, and refuse to leave, and that Kassala might be handed over to Osman

Morghani who is now at Dagga, to whose influence he says we owe the fact of so many tribes remaining loyal.

Speedy wishes British or Indian force to be sent to the relief of Kassala. Send by the first opportunity the following message from me to Speedy:—

"I have received your letters of the 31st August.

"There is not the smallest prospect of a British or Indian force being sent to Kassala. You and Mason should confine yourselves strictly to carrying out the Abyssinian Treaty, leaving negotiations about the evacuation of Kassala to be conducted from Suakin.

"The Abyssinians are not bound under the Treaty to go to Kassala, *and it is undesirable that they should make any attempt to do so;* but you should see that if any portion of the Egyptian garrison retire via Sanheit, the Abyssinians should, under the IIIrd Article of the Treaty, facilitate their withdrawal.

Notwithstanding Captain Speedy's intimation in the foregoing that "the Abyssinians are not going to Kassala," it would appear, for some reason or other, King John had changed his mind on this point, as shown from the accompanying despatch:—

No. 48.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, October 29th.*)

Cairo, October 29th, 1884.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inclose copy of a despatch from Captain Speedy, reporting that Colonel Chermside and he have each received a letter from Ras Aloula, informing them that he has been ordered by King John to proceed to Kassala to assist in the withdrawal of the garrison.

They have replied that it is most undesirable that anything of the kind should be done, and they have written to the King asking him to countermand the movement and instead withdraw the garrison from Gallabat, with the women and children.

Colonel Chermside has now returned from Massowah to Suakin. He informs me that Massowah is quite safe, and that previous reports were unnecessarily alarmist.

The following shows that the king defers to the above request, but that he is willing to relieve Gallabat under conditions, which were acceded to by Sir E. Baring:—

No. 72.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, November 11th.*)

Cairo, November 11th, 1884.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inclose copy of a telegram which I have to-day received from Captain Speedy via Aden, saying that King John promises to defer the expedition to Kassala, and is willing to relieve Gallabat, but requires the presence of an officer with authority from the Khedive to insure the garrison obeying its orders to evacuate.

I have repeated this message to Consul Baker at Suakin, and desired him to send a message from me to Captain Speedy to the effect that I suppose Colonel Chermside will depute an officer with the necessary authority from Massowah, but that if any one from Cairo was needed he was to communicate with me again.

In the meanwhile, nothing definite being done, the situation is becoming more serious, as shown by the following :—

No. 146.

COMMODORE MOLYNEUX TO THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY. —(*Communicated to the Foreign Office by the Admiralty, January 9th.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, January 9th*, 1885, 5·35 P.M.

Massowah news. Position Kassala very critical. Since Bakheet's death closely invested. Have grain for two months, no medical treatment. Loyal tribes shaky. Galabat, Gheera also critical.

Also from Colonel Chermside to Nubar Pasha, 6th January, 1885 :—

(Extract.)

Kassala, Ghirra, and Galabat are in great straits, and all open communication is completely cut off; the crisis to which the attention of your Excellency and Sir E. Baring was recently called as a contingency has arrived; the posts are in urgent need of money and provisions, neither of which can be forwarded.

As the Commandant of the frontier, and the Mudir of Kassala, and Seyyid Morghani all insist *that reinforcements alone can save the situation*, the alternative of capitulation to the rebels must be faced by the garrisons. Although this has been discussed at Cairo, I hesitate to put plainly before the garrisons the two courses

t open to their own decision till I am ordered to do so by your xcellency :—

(*a.*) To make the best terms they can.

(*b.*) To hold out, trusting that an unsupported defence will be ufficiently influenced by British operations on the Nile to enable hem to await a natural subsidence of the rebellion.

To the same effect, the accompanying extract is quoted from Commodore Molyneux's despatch to Lord John Hay, dated Suakin, 10th January, 1885, showing that H.M.'s Government were kept well informed of the situation :—

6. Official reports from Kassala and along the border of Abyssinia, brought here on the 9th by Her Majesty's ship "*Falcon*," are very discouraging, and Colonel Chermside, the Governor-General, who arrived at Massowah shortly before the "*Falcon*" left, considers the position in the beleaguered towns very critical. They have no money, are running short of provisions, and have lost, apparently, the active aid of the Beni-Amers, to whom the successful defence of Kassala has hitherto been largely due. He even fears that their loyalty has been much shaken by recent events.

In these difficulties Colonel Chermside, being most laudably anxious for the relief of Kassala, clearly foreseeing that the garrison was doomed to be abandoned by H.M.'s Government, proposed to raise a body of irregulars for the purpose, which appears from the following to have met with Lord Wolseley's somewhat guarded approval.

No. 13.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, February 3rd.*)

Cairo, February 3rd, 1885.

MY LORD,—With reference to my previous despatch of to-day, I have the honour to inclose a copy of a telegram from Lord Wolseley in reply to my request for his opinion upon Colonel Chermside's proposal to raise a body of irregulars for the relief of Kassala.

I have repeated Lord Wolseley's telegram to Colonel Chermside, and have asked him to telegraph his views fully after considering it.

Inclosure in No. 13.

GENERAL LORD WOLSELEY TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Korti, February 3rd*, 1885, 3·10 P.M.

I know so little as to Chermside's chances of success, that I cannot express any opinion worth having. He must be best judge as to what the force he proposes could do. If he is satisfied, I think Her Majesty's Government might sanction proposal on his responsibility.

From the next despatch it will be seen that Earl Granville approved of Colonel Chermside's proposal, but as an expedition from Suakin to crush Osman Digna was proposed, Sir Evelyn Baring seems to think it should modify the situation, and telegraphs accordingly. Suakin expedition proved to be a failure as regards altering the situation, as will be shown in another chapter.

No. 30.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, February 9th.*)

Cairo, February 9th, 1885.

MY LORD,—I have received and communicated to Lord Wolseley and Colonel Chermside your Lordship's telegram of the 7th instant, approving Colonel Chermside's proposals in regard to Kassala.

Lord Wolseley has now replied :—

"I think it most unwise to inform Kassala and Sanheit of the fall of Khartoum; it is not believed in by the natives of this district, and this great haste in spreading such news in the Eastern Soudan seems quite unnecessary, *bearing in mind the determination of Her Majesty's Government to destroy the Mahdi's power in Khartoum and at Suakin.*"

Colonel Chermside's previous proposals were manifestly made on the assumption that no expedition was to be sent to Suakin.

I understand, however, that it has now been decided to send an expedition.

If so, this materially alters the position at Kassala, especially if, as I presume, the avowed object of the expedition is to crush Osman Digna.

I have telegraphed to Colonel Chermside, in case he has not already acted on his instructions, to await a further communication from me.

Have I your Lordship's authority to tell him that a force will be sent to Suakin to crush Osman Digna?

The next telegram shows that he has, and consequently such modifications as may seem necessary are left to Colonel Chermside's discretion.

No. 34.

SIR. E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, February, 12th.*)

Cairo, February 12th, 1885.

MY LORD,—Upon receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 10th instant I telegraphed to Mr. Consul Baker that the object of the British expedition to Suakin is to crush Osman Digna; that the dispatch of this expedition appears greatly to modify the situation of Kassala; and that I should therefore be glad if Colonel Chermside would reconsider the matter in conjunction with General Fremantle, Commodore Molyneux, and Mr. Baker, and let me know what orders he now thinks should be sent to Sanheit and Kassala.

I have this morning received the following telegram from Mr. Baker:—

"On the whole Colonel Chermside considers that the suspended instructions, slightly modified, should be confirmed.

"The Commodore and myself concur in Colonel Chermside's views, after fully discussing them together."

To which, after consultation with Nubar Pasha, I have returned the following reply:—

"Previous instructions confirmed, with discretionary power to Chermside to introduce the modifications which he considers desirable."

That the position was gradually becoming more critical is shown in this telegram:—

No. 57.

CONSUL BAKER TO LORD E. FITZMAURICE.—(*Received March 5th, 5 P.M.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, March 5th*, 1885, 3·45 P.M.

Following message has been handed to me by Sir Donald Currie for you:—

"I have visited Massowah. Kassala garrison reported in great extremities; their destruction will have serious effect; they should have been relieved, and it may be now too late. I was hoping that Italians would assist Egyptians."

But H.M.'s Government seem to have been still insensible to the danger till it *was* "too late." In the midst of hesitation and want of definite purpose on the part of Government, it is refreshing to find so clear and calm a sense of duty in the person of the Mudir of Kassala (as shown below), a sentiment which it may here be noticed proved itself common to all governors of towns.

Inclosure in No. 92.

MAJOR CHERMSIDE TO NUBAR PASHA.

(Telegraphic.)

Touching letter from Mudir of Kassala, dated 13th April. Owing to news of British expedition, they still hope for relief. All donkeys eaten.

A little grain issued to soldiers.

He received two letters from the Commander of Sanheit, telling him to escape through enemy's lines.

He refuses to leave his post and charge.

Starvation seeming from the above to be almost imminent, and the position evidently becoming desperate, the aid of King John, which was *rejected nine months ago*, is now earnestly sought and inducements offered, the holding of Sanheit being used as a lever to oblige him to take action. On this point Colonel Chermside writes Sir E. Baring: 28th June, 1885:—

(Extract.)

Prior, however, to all this, we had taken certain preliminaries as to assistance from Abyssinia. The support of the British Government as to Egyptian rights to hold Sanheit, combined with the King of Abyssinia's anxiety to get that place, gave us a strong diplomatic position.

The Mudir of Kassala, in consultation with the religious and civil notables and the military leaders; Seyyid Morghani, in conjunction with the tribal Sheikhs; and Khosrev Bey, in communication with Ras Alula, had all been instructed to consider this as "dernier ressort," because, as you will remember, I was always doubtful whether success at Khartoum would effect all that was required for Kassala.

The Mudir was empowered to offer all Egyptian Government property in Kassala, money indemnity, and reward to tribes assisting the Abyssinians, and either money to the Abyssinians, or a munificent present of arms and ammunition at Massowah. He and Morghani were either to correspond direct with Abyssinia, or, in case of difficulty, through Khosrev at Sanheit, or through Major Saad.

* * * * * *

In my letter to the King I wrote as follows :—

"The fortress of Kassala is still besieged by the rebels, the followers of Mohamed Ahmed, the false prophet. If Kassala, with all its stores and arms and ammunition, falls into their hands it will greatly increase the strength of the rebels, and they may prove very powerful and troublesome enemies on your Majesty's frontier. I write to ask your Majesty to send an Abyssinian army to Kassala to relieve the people and take possession of the place, and in addition of all the property of the Egyptian Government which is there. I have already told the Governor."

And I also wrote at the same time to Ras Alula in the same sense.

* * * * * *

The Abyssinians were duly forewarned, however. The grain and biscuit collected for the Kassala relief column was given to them and Sanheit handed over, and their assistance for Kassala was urgently asked.

The King, Ras Alula, and the Mudir of Kassala, were again written to, and the assistance of the tribal Sheikhs invited through Morghani.

The communication to the Mudir empowered him to make any terms he could with the Abyssinians, with the tribes, or for capitulation. He had been long since empowered to offer as many as 10,000 stand of arms with ammunition at Massowah to the Abyssinians, besides all the Government property and stores of Kassala, including some 25 guns, and to offer ransom money to the tribes. He was now authorized to offer rewards, exclusive of hire of any transport to either Abyssinia or the tribes, for safe conduct either *en masse* or of groups and individual refugees, prices for their rescue ranging from 30 dollars up to 5000 dollars were placed on the head of all in Kassala, it being suggested that the Egyptians, as being liable to massacre, should be rated highest. Liabilities up to 300,000 dollars on this head were guaranteed.

The King and Ras Alula were informed of the Mudir's power to treat, I think a copy of extracts of the letter were sent. They were further informed that the loyal Moslem tribes were ordered to assist them with transport and provisions, and would be indemnified for this by us. Seyyid Morghani had prepared a list

of those Sheikhs whose services along the Kassala-Amadib-Sanheit line deserved recognition; immediate effect was given to this by the payment of 12,000 dollars. This, it was explained, was for past services, and at the same time liberal offers were made for assistance to Kassala or refugees from that place, and the tribes were enjoined to give information and assistance as mentioned above.

Compare the above elaborate and expensive arrangements, which protracted action made necessary, with Captain Speedy's simple proposal at the commencement of this chapter, when it was *not* "too late."

Colonel Chermside again most energetic—determined, if allowed, to save garrison.

No. 144.

MR. EGERTON TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY—(*Received July 21st*, 10 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, July 21st*, 1885, 9 A.M.

Chermside reports that besiegers of Kassala were repulsed with heavy loss about 18th June.

Abyssinians on 8th June write that they intend to relieve Kassala.

Their aid must be considered an uncertain factor, but if Her Majesty's Government think that it is not too late to stimulate them by immediate subsidy instead of contingent indemnity, Chermside has a suggestion to submit.

Egyptian ministry anxious to insure something being done.

No. 149.

MR. EGERTON TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received by telegraph, July 23rd.*)

Cairo, July 23rd, 1885.

MY LORD,—Nubar Pasha proposes to send by to-morrow's steamer a sum of 10,000*l.* to be deposited at Suakin, in order to save time if it be judged necessary to use it as a subsidy to the Abyssinians or otherwise for the relief of Kassala, after learning the suggestion which Colonel Chermside has to make, as he stated in the message forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch of the 20th instant.

Telegraphic communication with Suakin may be restored at any moment, as the repairing ship is at work on the cable.

Colonel Chermside's earnestness and disinterestedness are further shown by the following telegram, in his readiness to surrender to another, whatever *Kudos* might come of his plan :—

No. 155.

MR. EGERTON TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received July 25th*, 11 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, July 25th*, 1885, 7·30 P.M.

My telegram of the 21st.

The following are Chermside's suggestions:—

"Send at once a present to Alula, and consider expediency of the same in cash or value to the King.

"Open a credit for me with British Government, and send an European or Egyptian paymaster and clerk from Cairo to record all special expenditure. Supply and transport will be our chief difficulty.

"A British Commissioner should be appointed, who should visit Alula, and, if he wishes, accompany him or assist his advance from such point as they might decide. A delegate should at once visit Alula and offer promptly to supply his wants as regards arms, supplies, and ammunition ; further, if expedient, he should arrange with Alula for payment of meat and grain supplies to the Abyssinian levies, and for the appointment of local agents to encourage same being furnished by Abyssinian merchants against receipts or cash or bills.

"The Commissioner should be associated with, independent of, or subordinate to me; when he arrives I can either hand over situation completely, or co-operate, or direct.

"Should the Abyssinians ever reach Kassala, the greater half of the work as regards organization would remain. It would be of advantage if Captain Speedy came out as the Commissioner, but an *ad interim* Commissioner is required, partly for direction of correspondence, partly for other evident reasons, the matter being extremely urgent.

"Neither I nor Consul Baker, who is unfortunately very unwell, knows of any suitable person here.

"I further propose to offer, if Abyssinians wish them, as many irregulars as we can get at Massowah.

"I have already ordered up delegate to Alula with small presents and with contingent power for contracts up to 9000*l*., and have sent general preliminary instructions to Massowah.

"In letter last night from Alula's camp Chief of Beni-Amers states that they hope to advance shortly.

"Should suggestions be generally approved, I will proceed to Massowah as soon as I know when *ad interim* Commissioner may be expected, and whether Speedy is coming, and when I have arranged as to certain stores from Cairo.

No. 157.

MR. EGERTON TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received July 26th*, 10 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, July 26th*, 1885, 8·20 P.M.

Chermside telegraphs that he asked for British Commissioner in case he became inefficient.

He would be willing to act both for England and Egypt. He thinks that he himself is the best person to control, as he is working through Morghanis with Mussulman tribes, who may now be influenced in consequence of death of the Mahdi.

Unless he thought by doing so he might delay him, he would go to Ras Alula. The advance may have already commenced.

He proposes to send at once to Alula, as delegate, a Colonel of Kassala irregulars, with presents, and power to make contracts.

Is ready to start at once.

Cost of Proposed Expedition:—Question and Answer.

No. 164.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO MR. EGERTON.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July 28th*, 1885, 8·10 P.M.

Ascertain from Chermside probable total cost of proposed expedition for relief of Kassala, and any further particulars which he may be able to give as to nature of operations.

No. 165.

MR. EGERTON TO MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received July 29th*, 11 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, July 29th*, 1885, 8·50 P.M.

Your telegram of yesterday.

Chermside says:—

"The proposed route is from Hamasin Province, through Beni Amers' country, which seems at this season the only practicable line. I have promised to indemnify the Beni Amers and others for assistance to Abyssinians in supplies and transport.

"Estimates of cost of such operations are necessarily vague, but

we can, if desirable, absolutely limit our promises to tribes and Abyssinians; there remain supplies we furnish and presents we make. If an Abyssinian force of 10,000 men reach Kassala, and has to bring away 10,000 people, I do not think we can bring them over 300 miles under cost of 100,000*l.*: the whole expedition, if successful, might cost 200,000*l.*; but I can limit promises as directed."

This estimate must surely have exceeded the expense of Captain Speedy's scheme. So much for the economy of procrastination.

Colonel Chermside is warned, his proposals being accepted, that in the event of failure he must shift for himself. This was hardly magnanimous or encouraging to a man who was doing his best to save the lives of his fellow-creatures, which was the duty of the Government.

No. 180.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO MR. EGERTON.

Foreign Office, August 10th, 1885.

SIR,—I have received your despatches relative to the relief of Kassala, and I have to instruct you to inform Major Chermside that Her Majesty's Government have no objection to offer to his proposals for the relief of this garrison.

It would, however, be desirable that you should impress upon Major Chermside at the same time the necessity for the exercise on his part, and on that of any European assistant who may accompany him, of the greatest circumspection, so as to avoid all risk of his being taken or detained as a prisoner, as it would be practically impossible for Her Majesty's Government to undertake an expedition for his relief in such an eventuality.

Her Majesty's Government exhibit their evident anxiety, and identify themselves with the proposed expedition by sending a British Commissioner at once to act with Colonel Chermside.

No. 186.

MR. EGERTON TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received August 11th*, 9.50 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, August 11th*, 1885, 9·40 A.M.

Your telegram of yesterday.

Chermside would like Major Macdonald and Egyptian officer Saad to go to him from here. Unless one is on the way from England, may I send Macdonald as British Commissioner?

No. 187.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO MR. EGERTON.

Foreign Office, August 11th, 1885.

SIR,—In reply to your telegram of the 11th instant, I authorize you to send Major Macdonald to Suakin, in order to assist Colonel Chermside in his negotiations with the Abyssinians for the relief of Kassala.

From the following it would seem that had the movement from Abyssinia commenced earlier it would have, in all probability, averted the disaster it was hoped to stay, and the sums asked for then were small compared with the present requirements, with the advantage of being much more useful than the larger amount later on, that having arrived "too late" for the accomplishment of the main object—the safety of Kassala.

Inclosure 1 in No. 188.

MR. CAMERON TO MR. EGERTON.

(Telegraphic). *Suakin, August 11th*, 1885.

Opinion of local tribes considers Abyssinian movement serious. Yesterday news from Tamai reported Kassala rebels discouraged, and expecting Abyssinian advance. Similar report by pilgrim from Kassala. Messenger to-day from the Head Sheikh of all the Amarars, who wants to parley with the Government, reports that Abyssinians are advancing on Kassala. Success at Algeden was important. We have lately sent 700 camel-loads of grain to loyal tribes, and from information from pilgrims, I believe some has got through, although at a heavy cost.

Marcopoly left Massowah 6th instant, with cheque for 10,000 dollars and other presents for Allonla. He is to return before the end of August, if possible. It would be well for Commissioner to be at Massowah by then, and to have 20,000*l.* in cash there. It may prove quite unnecessary for any European to accompany advance. Alula must work in his own way, and we will support him and insure support of loyal Mussulmans if possible.

A mission from Morghani to Mussulmans with this object, and independent of that of Marcopoli's, left on the 8th instant.

The following shows the various occasions that arise for outlay in supporting this kind of expedition. Of course all this might have been avoided had an Indian Brigade been permitted. The compliment to the British Commissioners at the expense of the Egyptians, is at all events satisfactory to our *amour propre*, and that is all that we got by the transactions.

No. 191.

MR. EGERTON TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received August 12th*, 5·45 P.M.)

(Telegraphic). *Cairo, August 12th*, 1885, 4·30 P.M.

Major Chermside considers British Commissioner's movements dependent on news brought from Abyssinians by Marcopoli, who has gone with presents and guns.

If advisable for Commissioner to visit Alula, he should have presents ready, and later if operation adopted may have to visit King.

Macdonald will start to-morrow week. Chermside proposes that Mr. Wylde should accompany him, and a doctor with drugs for natives. Advantage of British Commissioner lies in Abyssinians being willing to deal with English, but not with Egyptian officials.

The following despatches and extracts, which are the last that will be given, show the tentative and also the final phase of the situation. Among the conflicting statements, the absolute and particular truth is difficult to arrive at, but they establish the fact beyond all question, that Kassala fell at last, with more or less terrible consequences, and that the relief expedition resulted in a total failure. Unfortunately another example of unnecessarily expensive, but abortive schemes of H.M. Government in the Soudan, of which it may truly be said, *hoc genus omne*.

COLONEL CHERMSIDE TO MARCOPOLI BEY.

Suakin, August 21st, 1885.

I have received your letters of the 12th August from Asmara,

and read them with much interest. Copies have been sent to Cairo.

2. News reached this neighbourhood on the 9th August that Kassala had surrendered on the 30th July. The news is to this effect: that the garrison and the rebels have come to an agreement, that there was no massacre, but that the Government property is in the hands of the rebels.

Digna has left this, it is said, for Kassala, in hopes of getting the Hadendowas to give him up the garrison and Government property.

Under these circumstances, you must take no further steps which entail expenditure of money, nor make further promises unless you ascertain that the above news is incorrect. If the garrison is still united and intact, and with arms in their hands, and if the Mudir wishes the Abyssinians to advance, then in that case, my further instructions and offers hold good.

If the news is utterly untrue, and the garrison is holding out, of course former arrangements hold good.

3. The following points in my last letter have now been altered by circumstances:—

(*a.*) An English officer will not accompany Alula. You need therefore inquire no further on that point.

(*b.*) Your action in giving 50,000 dollars to the Abyssinians is approved. The portion of this (20,000 dollars, or whatever it may be) destined for Kassala can remain with Alula. We can afterwards decide whether it shall be counted towards the Girri expenses, or be given to the Abyssinians as a recompense for any help they may give to people escaping from Kassala.

(*c.*) I have told Izzet Bey that your action and his as to the money is approved. My instructions as to bills or written promises for money are therefore cancelled.

(*d.*) Supposing things at Kassala to be as represented, you must consider that, by giving over the 50,000 dollars, all sums promised on certain conditions have been paid.

Unless the Kassala garrison is brought away, we have no further liabilities. If necessary, you should explain this to the Ras; but I think that from the careful wording of former instructions, it must be clear.

4. I expect the Ras will advance against the rebels, and I have no wish to stop him unless the Mudir of Kassala wishes it. Alula's advance may prove of great assistance. Until I have further information, however, his action must be quite independent of us.

5. Long ago we offered rewards for any aid the Abyssinians might give to any people escaping from Kassala, and this arrangement will hold good.

6. Considering all the circumstances, I wish you to return to

Massowah as quickly as you can. If you do not come here (to Suakin) by the mail of the 25th August, which is possible, I shall send down a ship for you.

7. If these instructions find you at Asmara, please make no delay.

8. I shall be glad of any information as to how we can help the Girri people.

Extract from a deposition of Selim Agha, second in command of the Kassala garrison :—

The situation reaching a climax to a point of fearing cannibalism, the Mudir convened a meeting of all shades, and the question being put, surrender or not, the former was carried unanimously.

* * * * * *

6. On 17th Shawal, 1302 (30th July, 1885), the rebels began plundering the inhabitants, taking everything they could lay hands on, saying that that was the strict order of the Mahdi.

7. Plundering over, torture began indiscriminately, in order that everything hidden might be given up. The Sub-Governor and Salik Agha Sanjak, with his wife, suffered dreadfully; the latter woman died soon after.

8. The Mudir and Bashir Agha, who were kept hostages, were not tortured, but the former's household, being brought out by the rebels, were imprisoned in a place called Fakroof, about an hour's distance from town, issuing to them rations daily.

Some further particulars at the time of surrender from a memorandum of Colonel Chermside :—

Much gold and silver was found in Kassala; 6000 camels, half from the Dabaynas, half from the Shukuriyehs, have been ordered to convey treasure and stores to Khartoum.

The scale of rewards for refugees, as arranged by me, was perfectly well known at Kassala and to the tribes.

Mohammed Bey Wad-el-Zeyd, Sheikh of Dabaynas, did write a letter, as reported last week, offering asylum and one year's subsistence to refugees from Kassala.

Previous to the Kufit fight orders were sent to send the Mudir and Chief Clerk to Khartoum.

At the time of surrender the garrison were losing forty to fifty men a day from weakness and starvation; the numbers of the garrison at the time of surrender were 2500. Food was still very dear and scarce in the beginning of September.

Assassination of the Mudir of Kassala, who so bravely stuck to his post, by Osman Digna.

No. 143.

MR. EGERTON TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received December 28th.*)

Cairo, December 21st, 1885.

MY LORD,—An officer who has just arrived in Cairo with his company from Massowah brings the news that Osman Digna had ordered the assassination of the Mudir of Kassala and his servant and two other Europeans. Osman Morghani, at Suakin, confirms this intelligence about the Mudir's death.

The latest news from Kassala, brought by one Farag Agha Nini, who escaped with fifty-nine men and three women, is to the effect that Osman Digna is still at Kassala, where he had established a reign of terror.

Later on, Hamlin Bey reported to Colonel Chermside that "the Kassala garrison were massacred."

The foregoing survey of the Kassala question, being viewed through the medium of the various despatches, &c., quoted, is necessarily rather fragmentary, and less attractive than it might otherwise have been; but this method has been elected as the surest way of conveying the truth as exactly as possible, and at the same time of establishing, in the words of English officers, the heavy responsibilities incurred by Her Majesty's Government, and their consequent liability to all the disasters that ensued.

CHAPTER VII.

Baker Pasha's Egyptian troops annihilated at Tokar by one quarter their number of Dervishes—H.M.'s Government undertake defence of Suakin—Fall of Sinkat and Tokar—Sheikhs' tender of submission not entertained by General Graham.

THE present chapter is mainly confined to a general consideration of certain official despatches in the early part of 1884, relating, particularly, to the military operations at the time in and around Suakin.

The difficulty of thinking straight, and a singular infirmity of purpose, are the leading characteristics of these despatches. They vividly exhibit those abortive and fruitless results, which are the natural outcome of all enterprises wanting in a homogeneous direction. The marvel is that in such a whirlpool of heterogeneous elements some terrible calamity did not overtake the whole expedition. As it is, the fate of the first portion of it, at the commencement of operations, was sufficiently disastrous. It is true that it was solely due to the deplorable want of courage, and all military qualities in the Egyptian troops, but surely these deficiencies must have, or ought to have, been known to those who sanctioned such a helpless host being opposed to a fierce and fanatical opponent. The following will best show that this criticism is justified by fact and opinion:—

Inclosure in No. 24.

GENERAL BAKER TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.)
(Extract.) *Suakin, February 6th*, 1884, 12·5 A.M.

Having thrown up fort three miles from Trinkitat and moved 3800 there, marched yesterday morning with 3500 towards Tokar; met enemy after two miles' march in small numbers and drove them back about two miles further near wells of Teb. On square *being only threatened* by small force of enemy, certainly less than 1000 strong, Egyptian troops threw down their arms and ran, carrying away black troops with them, allowing themselves to be killed *without slightest resistance*. More than 2000 killed. They fled to Trinkitat. Unfortunately Europeans who stood suffered terribly.

Had erected earthworks at Trinkitat and embarked whole of material, leaving nothing behind, and reached Suakin this evening with 2000 men, mostly unarmed.

Have no fear for Suakin whilst Admiral Hewett and British fleet here. Force at my disposal 3500, but one third unarmed. All material with Tokar column lost. Details of killed and wounded to-morrow. Most serious loss of officers. Please send some superior officers immediately. *Troops are utterly untrustworthy, except for defence of earthworks.*

Inclosure in No. 22.

SIR W. HEWETT TO THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, February 6th*, 1884, 12·55 A.M.

Baker Pasha has returned here with 2000 men and about 700 rifles; lost Krupp guns, machine guns, large amount ammunition; the men at present perfectly disorganized; Arabs fanatically mad, and after this success will probably attack Suakin. Baker Pasha is in want of rifles and field cannon. *No faith can be placed in Egyptian troops.* Some trustworthy troops . . . . should be sent to protect the placed camps, only manning two forts with our men. Have ordered "*Briton*" and "*Dryad*" here; am keeping "*Coquette.*" Request small arms and Gatling ammunition.

No. 23.

CONSUL BAKER TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received February 6th*, 8 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, February 6th*, 1884, 1·30 A.M.

Town is quiet, and there is no firing at the outposts. It is the unanimous opinion that General Baker and his European officers did all that was possible, and maintained their coolness and presence of mind in the midst of the wildest confusion, caused by the

Sampson Low and Cᵉ, Ltd . London. Collotype Lemercier, Paris.

Armed Soudanese.

abject cowardice of the Egyptian troops and the unsteadiness of the raw black recruits. The total loss exceeds 2000 men.

That is, the loss exceeds by two to one the numbers of the assailants, which were admitted to be under 1000.

Here are the melancholy details :—

No. 38.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, February 7th.*)

Cairo, February 7th, 1884.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inclose herewith copy of a telegram from General Baker, from Suakin, giving the detailed numbers of officers and men in each battalion killed near Tokar, amounting in all to 96 officers and 2250 men killed, and 16 officers wounded.

Inclosure in No. 38.

BAKER PASHA TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, February 7th*, 1884, 1·20 A.M.

Officers killed, Alexandria battalion, 15, men killed, 381. Cairo battalion, 16 officers, 281 men. Bezinguers, 17 officers, 414 men. Sanhit, 10 officers, 267 men. Massowah, 13 officers, 234 men. European police, 2 officers, 35 men. Turkish infantry, 16 officers, 352 men. Turkish cavalry, 6 men. Arab cavalry, 24 men. Artillery, 8 officers, 101 men. Head-quarter Staff, 12 officers, 30 men. With camels, 3 officers, 125 men. Total officers, 96. Total men, 2250. Officers wounded (?) 16.

The following telegram determines the question of responsibility as to Red Sea ports, if it is to be implied by the appointment of officers of Her Majesty's Government, and it is difficult to understand otherwise :—

No. 41.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, February 7th, 1884.

SIR,—The defence of the Egyptian ports in the Red Sea having been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government, it is desirable that an engineer officer should be sent to Suakin to assist Sir Wm. Hewett, and to advise as to the defences and entrenchments which have been thrown up at that place by General Baker.

Major Chermside, who is at present serving in the Egyptian army under Sir E. Wood, and who speaks Arabic, is recommended for this mission.

In the event of his being dispatched at once to Suez, it is probable that he could sail in Her Majesty's ship "*Carysfort*" from that port.

Further evidence, in another and more absolute form, that H.M.'s Government assumed an individual responsibility:—

No. 39.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, February 7th, 1884.

SIR,—It has been suggested by Rear-Admiral Sir Wm. Hewett, that the force of marines at Suakin should be raised to 500, and orders in this sense have been issued by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

Admiral Hewett further recommends that 500 black troops should be retained at Suakin, as well as 100 Turkish cavalry to act as scouts, and that on the arrival of the marines, the entire Egyptian force now at Suakin should be withdrawn.

I have to instruct you to arrange with the Egyptian Government that the authorities at Suakin shall carry out Admiral Hewett's wishes as regards the withdrawal of the Egyptian soldiers.

Again:—

No. 45.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, February 8th.*)

Cairo, February 8th, 1884.

MY LORD,—In reply to your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to state that Major Chermside's services are not available, but that General Stephenson has selected Major Wood, Royal Engineers, to go to Suakin. He will proceed to Suez to-morrow, and will embark in Her Majesty's ship "*Carysfort.*"

Sir E. Baring proposes to place Suakin in the entire and undivided charge of a British military officer.

No. 46.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, February 8th.*)

Cairo, February 8th, 1884.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, in consequence of the recent defeat near Tokar, I propose, in concert with the Egyptian Government, to declare Suakin in a state of siege, and to give the senior English military officer full powers, military and civil, over the town.

This step is rendered necessary by reason of General Baker Pasha's return to Suez.

This first step in the assumption of authority, is, as might be expected, unfortunately inaugurated by a difference of opinion between Sir E. Baring and H.M.'s Government, as to its personality.

No. 47.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, February, 8th, 1884.

SIR,—I have received your telegram of the 8th instant, stating that it is proposed to declare Suakin in a state of siege, and to give the senior British military officer at that place full powers, both military and civil.

I have to inform you that this proposal is approved by Her Majesty's Government, but they are of opinion that for the present these powers should be conferred on Admiral Sir William Hewett.

The following is tantamount to a declaration of war, by Egyptian proxy, on the Soudanese. This policy does not coincide with General Gordon's views, as will be seen presently:—

No. 48.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, February 8th, 1884.

SIR,—With reference to my despatch of the 7th instant, I have to state that it would be well that the Egyptian Government should make known at Suakin that in the event of attack

on the part of the rebels the town will be defended by a British force.

Information as to movements of rebels—fall of Sinkat.

Inclosure in No. 57.

REAR-ADMIRAL SIR W. HEWETT TO THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, February 10th*, 1884, 10 A.M.

An Austrian Jew who escaped lately from Osman's camp, and became Mussulman to save his life, reports about 3000 rebels near Suakin; round Tokar 3000 to 4000; and 3000 round Sinkat.

No news of Tokar garrison has been received.

Inclosure in No. 60.

REAR-ADMIRAL SIR W. HEWETT TO THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, February 12th*, 1884, 9·5 A.M.

Tuesday. The garrison of Sinkat made a sortie, but were annihilated. The town has fallen.

No. 61.

CONSUL BAKER TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received February 12th*, 11 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, February 12th*, 1884, 10·30 A.M.

Garrison of Sinkat has been annihilated in attempting to fight its way here. There are 800 rebels within nine miles of Suakin.

The seriousness of the situation seems to have induced H.M.'s Government to order troops to Suakin, contrary to their former declarations.

They arrive "too late," even to save Tokar—had they been sent sooner they might have saved Sinkat and Tokar also.

No. 64.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, February 12th, 1884.

SIR,—I have to inform you that full instructions have this day been sent by telegraph to General Stephenson, commanding the

Army of Occupation, to arrange for a British force to be collected at Suakin, with the object, if possible, of relieving the garrison of Tokar.

General Stephenson is directed to communicate these instructions to you.

You will render him all the assistance in your power in carrying out his instructions, and you should arrange with the Egyptian Government that cavalry horses and the camel battery equipment required for the expedition be supplied at once from Sir Evelyn Wood's army.

Advance of troops advised:—

No. 149.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL STEPHENSON TO THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON.— *Communicated to the Foreign Office, February 25th.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, February 23rd,* 1884.

News just received that rebels are in force on Baker Pasha's late battle-field; eager to fight, and confident of victory. Strongly recommend Graham should be ordered to advance towards Tokar should this prove true.

General Gordon's views:—

EXTRACT FROM SIR E. BARING'S LETTER TO EARL GRANVILLE, *February 6th,* 1884.

We propose to await General Gordon's views before coming to a decision. When General Gordon was here he was strongly in favour of recalling General Baker from Suakin as soon as possible, leaving only 150 men, which he considered sufficient to hold the town.

General Baker has been authorized to send back the Egyptian gendarmerie if he thinks it is desirable to do so. I fear there is no longer any hope of saving the garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat.

No. 146.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received February 23rd,* 11 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, February 23rd,* 1884, 10·30 A.M.

I have received the following from General Gordon:—

"I think if Tokar has fallen Her Majesty's Government had better be quiet, as I see no advantage to be now gained by any action on their part; let events work themselves out. Fall of Tokar will not affect in the least state of affairs here."

Inclosure in No. 102.

MAJOR-GENERAL GORDON TO SIR E. BARING.

Telegraphic) *Khartoum, February 18th*, 1884.

Received information intention to relieve Tokar. Would advise Proclamation to rebels:—

"Gordon at Khartoum ready to redress wrongs. Chiefs to proceed there and see him, who is invested with full powers," &c.

Sir E. Baring concurs with General Gordon's views, but advises the adoption of Admiral Hewett's!

No. 102.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, February 18th.*)

Cairo, February 18th, 1884.

MY LORD,—With reference to my telegram of this day's date, I have the honour to inclose herewith copy of a telegram from General Gordon, still advising, after hearing of the intention to relieve Tokar by British troops, the issue of a Proclamation by Admiral Hewett for the assembly of the Chiefs at Khartoum.

My personal view is the same.

No. 101.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received February 18th*, 11·20 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, February 18th*, 1884, 11·10 A.M.

Admiral thinks that it is at present undesirable to issue a Proclamation such as is contemplated in your Lordship's telegram of 16th instant. He says that rebels must be defeated first, and Proclamation issued immediately afterwards.

I think it will be better to let Admiral act as he thinks best.

Notwithstanding Sir E. Baring's determination to await General Gordon's views, when in possession of them, he declines apparently to adopt any of them. Admiral Hewett is now directing affairs, as the following shows:—

Inclosure 3 in No. 150.

REAR-ADMIRAL SIR W. HEWETT TO THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, February 24th*, 1884, 11·20 P.M.

Sunday. Tokar has surrendered. We must proceed on there with our men. Rebels are in considerable numbers mustering, and are sure to stand. Our forces have landed. Decisive victory will re-establish order amongst tribes round here. Disaffected black troops trouble me. All my men are kept in the fort.

Inclosure 2 in No. 189.

REAR-ADMIRAL SIR W. HEWETT TO THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, March 2nd*, 1884, 7·25 P.M.

Tokar expedition most successful: advise troops to assemble here, and Osman Digna defeated; that will quiet the whole of this country.

Arabs at wells 10 miles off; *have some* 4000 *of friendly tribes ready to act.*

This is in decided opposition to General Gordon's advice that "Her Majesty's Government had better be quiet." How far his views might have been modified, had he been aware of the immediate proximity of the rebels, and of their assumed resolution, it is impossible to say, but the result of the opposite course can hardly be said to have been satisfactory or conclusive.

After the English victories at El Teb and Tamai, the following proposals of General Graham, which were in harmony with General Gordon's, are well worthy of particular attention, and it is difficult to understand why a course which had the concurrent support of two such able officers was not adopted by Her Majesty's Government.

No. 272.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March 18th*, 1884, 2 P.M.

Following from General Graham to the Secretary of State for War, dated Suakin, 17th, at 3·55 P.M., received 7·15 PM. :—

"Present position of affairs is that two heavy blows have been dealt at rebels and followers of the Mahdi, who are profoundly discouraged. They say, however, that English troops can do no more; must re-embark and leave the country to them; to follow up these victories and bring waverers to our side we should not proclaim our intention of leaving, but rather make a demonstration of an advance towards Berber, and induce a belief that we can march anywhere we please. I propose, therefore, making as great a show as possible, without harassing troops, as medical officers report they require rest.

"A strong battalion, with regiment of cavalry, advances to-morrow to Handuk, and from thence a reconnaissance will be made along the Berber road; this road, Suakin-Berber, passes through country occupied by various tribes from Suakin; Handuk, Otas, and Sibil are the Fadlab, whose Sheikh, Mohammet Ali Bey, is friendly, but has given no active support hitherto. He undertakes to accompany the troops in their advance to-morrow, and may be useful. He was formerly the wekil, or agent, of Sheikh Hamad Mahmoud of Mousiah tribe, the Khalifa, or Governor of the road, and conducted all bargains with camel-drivers.

"The road from Sibil to Aariab lies in country of Amrar tribes. Their head Sheikh, Hamad Mahmoud, just mentioned, is with rebels through the greater part; the sub-tribes of Amrar are still loyal.

"From Aariab to Berber the road lies in country of Bishareen, and must be dealt with from Berber.

"Reports of pilgrims state that an Egyptian garrison holds Obak; desirable to obtain from Berber attitude of Bishareen, and how far road is open

"Gordon should communicate to you, for my information; he can find out as to roads and tribes, and should endeavour to open road and send people across."

No. 277.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR G. GRAHAM TO THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON.—(*Communicated to the Foreign Office, March 19th.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, March 18th*, 1884.

Gordon Highlanders, with 19th Hussars and mounted infantry, have marched to Handuk, and are now in heliographic communication. The force is under General Stewart, accompanied by the Sheikh of Fadlab tribe. Osman Digna is reported at Tamanieb with 2500 followers, many of whom are reported as wavering, and to have sent to friends in Fadlab tribe, who have advised them to come to Handuk for protection from Osman. Stewart has instructions to conciliate and work with friendly Sheikh; also to

reconnoitre and report. An advance to Sibil, 50 miles on Berber road, could be made with 2000 men; 300 more camels would, however, be required, and preparation would take five days. Troops very healthy.

No 285.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR G. GRAHAM TO THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON.—(*Received at the Foreign Office, March 21st.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, March 20th*, 1884, 4 P.M.

Three Sheikhs of the Samara and Amrar tribes, with seventeen followers, have come in to-day to Handuk. Mahmoud Ali Bey says more will come to-morrow, when the Holy Sheikh Morgani and his brother are going there. Less than 2 per cent. on sick list.

No. 297.

CONSUL BAKER TO EARL GRANVILLE.

Suakin, March 23rd, 1884.

"*Yesterday and to-day, eight tribes, representing* 2200 *fighting men, have announced their submission;* they believe that other tribes will follow their example. Osman Digna is reported to have only 250 men with him at present, but to have sent urgent summonses for more."

Right or wrong, aggressive measures having been agreed to, and their adoption having been accompanied with initiatory success, it is astounding to find H.M.'s Government not placing unlimited confidence in their officers on the spot, whose knowledge of the situation must have been immeasurably superior to their own. The following despatch, it will be seen, only gives a qualified assent to General Graham's suggestions, and the qualification is most mischievous because it interferes with the method, approved by their officers, for the crushing of Osman Digna, which was the most vital part of the proposals:—

No. 286.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, March 21st, 1884.

SIR,—Her Majesty's Government have received a telegram from

General Graham, dated the 20th instant, relative to the measures which he proposes for the pacification of the country in the neighbourhood of Suakin.

They are of opinion that he should be instructed to supply rations to Mahmoud Ali, and to distribute some money amongst the Sheikhs who have come in, so as to induce others to follow their example. He should impress upon them that his object is to open the road to Berber for trade and to render it safe for travellers.

It might be advisable to divide the road into sections, and the Sheikh of the district traversed by a section might be subsidized to keep such portion open.

Her Majesty's Government have doubts as to the wisdom of llowing the British force to act with the tribes for fighting purposes, but they would give some discretion on this point to General Graham and to Admiral Hewett. They would, however, deprecate the dispatch of an expedition against Osman Digna, with whom they would be disposed to recommend, if possible, treating on the basis of his submission, and rendering himself answerable for the safety of the Berber road and the protection of traders and other travellers.

Her Majesty's Government have informed General Graham that the details of the instructions which he will receive from you are left to your discretion.

Admiral Hewett having issued a proclamation promising a reward for Osman Digna's head, is ordered by H.M.'s Government to withdraw it.

No. 271.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received March* 18*th.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, March* 18*th*, 1884, *noon.*

Following is Proclamation issued by Admiral Hewett:—

"To the people.

"I make it known to you all that any one who will bring Osman Digna, the murderer who spilt the blood of the tribes by his lies, alive or dead, will receive for the same a reward of 5000 dollars from me, British Admiral and Governor of Suakin."

No. 278.

EARL GRANVILLE TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, March 19*th*, 1884.

SIR,—I have received your telegram of yesterday, giving the text of Admiral Hewett's Proclamation offering a reward for the capture of Osman Digna.

Her Majesty's Government cannot approve the terms of that Proclamation, and they desire that it should be immediately withdrawn. They leave it to your discretion to settle with Admiral Hewett the terms in which this withdrawal should be made so as to cause the least injury possible, under the circumstances, to British credit and influence.

(2.)

REAR ADMIRAL SIR W. HEWETT TO THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, March 23rd*, 1884, 12·30 A.M.

Last Proclamation was as follows:—

"I hereby give notice that the reward of 5000 dollars for the rebel Osman Digna is withdrawn. In future no money reward will be offered for him."

CHAPTER VIII.

Important position of Suakin, commercially and politically—Useless Egyptian troops replaced by English at Suakin—Harassing policy against probable "friendlies" initiated—2000 Dervishes killed by British troops—Negotiations with 11,000 "friendlies" bearing on federation of tribes—Watson's peaceful policy and broad views—Consul Baker's advocacy of Suakin-Berber railway—Change of policy, British and Indian troops replaced by Egyptian, costs borne by Imperial Government.

THIS chapter is devoted to the consideration of the British occupation of Suakin, now spreading over a period of some eight years—viewing it from its military and diplomatic, commercial and fiscal aspects up to 1886. Before entering into these several phases of the question, however, it is essential to make known the importance of the town itself. Situate a little further south of midway between Suez and Aden, it has immense advantages as a trading port, thus being about equi-distant between Great Britain and her Indian territory, and, on the other hand, it is in more immediate and practicable proximity to the most fertile regions of the Soudan than any other port on the east coast, and in the event of a railway being constructed to Berber, it would be brought within twelve hours' journey of these productive districts. From surveyors' reports the intervening country from Suakin to Berber presents almost unequalled facilities for the construction of a railway, and it is astounding that, during the

past eight years, such a work has not been accomplished. Not only would such a means of transit be of inestimable benefit to the trade of the Soudan and our own mercantile community, but from a military point of view the advantages would seem equally apparent. On the assumption that Great Britain will, either *de jure* or *de facto*, hold a permanent position in Suakin, such a basis for warlike operations, when necessary, is all that could be desired for a maritime nation, and, being so, the presence of such a power at such a coign of vantage would become a security to the peaceably disposed Soudanese and a dread to the factious. Leaving these general considerations, attention will be directed by means of various despatches, in accordance with the plan adopted in compiling this book, to some of the particulars of this, as yet, unprofitable occupation. Although there are none of those stirring incidents to record that accompanied the movements in the interior, yet as regards the prospect of anything like a final settlement, the operations in the neighbourhood of Suakin possess a greater significance, and are, in this respect, more important than any other of a military character that have yet taken place. As an illustration of the hopeless condition into which matters had been either driven, or allowed to drift—the usual outcome of infirmity of purpose, convulsive energy, and culpable inaction—this quotation from a despatch from Consul Cameron speaks volumes, and although it bears date some six years ago, it is found, *mutatis mutandis*, that it is a true picture of the present state of things.

CONSUL CAMERON TO MR. EGERTON.

Suakin, December 22nd, 1885.

Our information here is almost *nil*, for the blockade is mutual. I know hardly anything of what is going on outside, at Tamai or

Tokar or Kassala, or generally in the Eastern Soudan; and I do not know of anybody who does know anything. A few score o the rebels may be visible from time to time, and minor raids may be attempted on our camels; but the Hadendowas are now very cautious, and no longer waste their ammunition. Their chiefs have learned our strength and our weakness; Digna trusts them alone while he is absent on the bigger business of Kassala, and they appear to be obeying orders, and are perhaps awaiting the course of events on the Nile. The so-called "friendly" Amarars have as yet been useless to us. Their value may be estimated by the contempt in which they are held by the Hadendowas.

For the last two or three months the Senior Naval Officer, Commander Jones, of the "*Falcon*," has been prosecuting as strict a blockade on this coast, from Elba to Agig, as the British men-of-war at his disposal have rendered possible.

But this maritime blockade, however prolonged and effectual and stringent, can have but little effect on the real situation in the Eastern Soudan, which for its vital strength and fanaticism is most obviously dependent inland on Khartoum, Kassala, and Berber, although commercially it may be supported by Jeddah.

Three years' experience ought to teach us that we are still ignorant of the latent indigenous power of the Soudan, and that we do not yet realize the progenitive action of the Mahdi's rebellion. We have never had any connected or comprehensive information to go upon. Our assumptions, our hopes, and our prophecies have all been falsified and turned against ourselves. The spirit of these Hadendowas is as high and as undaunted as ever; and no progress has been made towards the settlement of the Eastern Soudan since the death of Consul Moncrieff in November, 1883. That officer lost his life in the first attempt to relieve Tokar. Baker Pasha was soon afterwards defeated in the second attempt. General Graham took Tokar in 1884, but immediately abandoned it, and in 1885 no effort was made to reoccupy it. The value of Tokar has not lessened since the loss of Kassala. The occupation of Tokar by us will not, of itself, solve the problem, but it will be the first step towards obtaining definite information which may lead to the solution of the problem of the Eastern Soudan.

It is with the greatest respect that I venture to submit these few facts and opinions to you.

The pages of history might be searched in vain to discover so helpless and so humiliating a situation for a great power to be placed in. What a confession for an officer of H.M.'s Government to feel himself compelled to make! Blockades established, useless and more damaging to ourselves than the enemy.

A state of outer darkness as to his whereabouts. "Darkest Africa," indeed! Allies that cannot be relied on. A wanton—nay, criminal—sacrifice of life for ends, which, as soon as attained, are abandoned, and tending no more to the solution of "the problem of the Eastern Soudan" than when the cruel slaughter began. We can but commiserate the officer, who "with the greatest respect"—for whom and for what?!—had to submit such a deplorable report to his superiors.

The following is appropriate here, as an example, among many, of the extent to which lives were sacrificed.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR G. GRAHAM, TAMAI, TO THE MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON.

Suakin, March 14*th*, 1884, 4·40 P.M.

I deeply regret losses, mainly caused by 2nd Brigade square being broken by charge of enemy, who came on regardless of losses, 600 of their dead being counted at that point. Three officers, seven men, Naval Brigade, killed at their guns, which for a few minutes were in the hands of the enemy, but were retaken. Enemy also attacked 1st Brigade and zeriba at same time, but were repulsed. They were in great force, not less than 10,000 or 12,000, and their loss is estimated at over 2000 killed. Have withdrawn to zeriba occupied Wednesday, but marched out again to Tamai this morning. Wounded in tents, with all necessary requirements, and doing well.

The following from Commodore Molyneux gives a very good general idea of the situation, and of the native feeling towards us and Osman Digna and the rebels, and indicates that British protection should be extended to the peaceably disposed, and urges the assumption of a vigorous initiative. This view seems very reasonable.

Inclosure 2 in No. 11.

COMMODORE MOLYNEUX TO VICE-ADMIRAL LORD J. HAY.

(Confidential.) "*Sphinx*," *at Suakin, July* 14*th*, 1884.

MY LORD,—Before your Lordship left Suakin you were in

formed that Osman Digna was doing his utmost to induce the friendly and neutral tribes to join him, and had given them only a few days to decide.

2. They had, however, no choice; the power of Osman Digna is sufficient to enable him to carry off their women and flocks, and to seize the wells of those who refuse to obey his command. The Chiefs of the tribes have accordingly, *in self-defence*, given in their submission to him.

3. They have communicated their position freely to Lieutenant-Colonel Chermside, who believes they are acting towards him in perfect good faith, *and would rejoin us if they could depend on our protection.*

4. There are indications that the arbitrary rule of Osman Digna is causing great discontent amongst many of those who have all along been on his side, and there is reason to believe that if we again undertake offensive measures against him, we may still find a large body of tribesmen to assist us.

5. Latest reports from the rebel camp say that Osman Digna, having failed to induce his men to attack Suakin, has sent to the Soudan for further assistance, and in the meantime intends to attack all those who have not answered his summons to join him. His present force is variously estimated at between 8000 and 10,000 men.

6. I have also consulted Colonel Chermside regarding the affairs at Agig. He is strongly of opinion that, for political reasons, it would be a great mistake to deport the present inhabitants, as it would cause great dissatisfaction amongst their male relatives, who are now attending to their flocks in the mountains, and might probably counteract the bitter feeling which the action of the rebels will be sure to raise. It would also have a bad effect on the powerful tribe of Beni-Amers if they saw us giving up another position on the coast.

7. No doubt Agig and the Island of Badhur, where the inhabitants are now living, are at present unimportant, but the harbours are good, and the fertile district of Tokar being in the neighbourhood, they may some day be of more value.

8. If the people were all withdrawn, some small revenue would be lost to the Egyptian Government, and the places would probably become the centre of a smuggling trade, and convenient shipping ports for slaves.

9. On the other hand, the absence of water other than that which we can provide for them, unless a considerable guard is kept there, will cause great inconvenience, and I can see no way of improving matters unless we once more take the offensive, and crush the rapidly-growing power of the rebels on this coast.

The succeeding telegrams show the system at its

commencement of seeking the aid of "friendlies" which, for want of substantial support from Her Majesty's Government, led to the damaging result of irritating tribe against tribe, with such consequences to ourselves as Commodore Molyneux depicts in the above report—and nothing else.

No. 14.

MR. EGERTON TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, August 8th.*)

Cairo, August 8th, 1884.

MY LORD,—With reference to my telegram of this day's date, I have the honour to inclose herewith copy of a telegram from Colonel Chermside, reporting the arrangement come to with Korb Hamed and the friendly Sheikhs to take Disabel and Handoub, and to hold their part of the Berber road for the Government.

Inclosure in No. 14.

COLONEL CHERMSIDE TO GENERAL SIR E. WOOD.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, August 8th*, 1884.

Brewster returned "Camel" noon. Has arranged with Korb Hamed and friendly Sheikhs, on oath, to take Disabel and Handoub, and hold their part of Berber road for Government. Has issued 200 rifles, 20 boxes ammunition, and food for 4000 men one week, and taken five hostages, relations of head Sheikhs. Korb Hamed has 11,000 men, all very keen to put a stop to rebellion, for the sake of trade.

Suakin contingent, with Mahmoud Ali, marched with others.

Inclosure in No. 19.

COMMODORE MOLYNEUX TO THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, August 8th*, 1884, 12·20 P.M.

"Camel" returned, result of meeting very promising, five Chiefs representing large force swore on Koran loyalty [to] Government, retake Handoub and Disabil, and keep their section [of the] Berber road open. Gave as hostages five relations of Chiefs: were then supplied with 200 rifles, ammunition, and large quantity [of] grain [and] biscuit. Enemy supposed [to be] strong at Disabil, 600 [at] Handoub.

The following several despatches will be quoted *en bloc*, as they will more or less have reference to

the same subject, and individual criticism would be both tedious and unnecessary. Suffice it to say that throughout there are exhibited much the same characteristics that are found in the treatment of the "Gordon Relief Expedition." In the same way the counsel of the able officers on the spot is either neglected or thwarted—a reasonable and practicable policy is never entertained at home, and as an inevitable consequence of the "*laisser aller*" fashion in which Her Majesty's Government have chosen to deal with this question, the settlement is farther off than ever. From the very interesting despatches from Colonel Chermside and Commodore Molyneux, and especially those of the latter, though they are both first-rate men, and give evidence of thoroughly knowing what they are talking about, sufficient information is derived to judge of the situation from all points, and it is believed that the conclusion must be that if the course indicated by the above officers had been faithfully adhered to, and the Sheikhs been taught to have confidence in us, instead of the reverse—Osman Digna might have been crushed long ago—a wholesome federal government might have been established which would have been agreeable to the natives and advantageous to ourselves and Egypt proper. How long this invertebrate policy is to continue is a question for the British taxpayer to put, and to *insist upon an answer*. Whatever settlement, however, may be finally determined on, there is one definite sentiment—and only one—but it is very important, and is the only redeeming feature in all that Her Majesty's Government has said and done, but it is the fulcrum upon which any future arrangements *must* turn, and that is from the mouth of the prime minister at the time, Mr. Gladstone—the Arabs were "*rightly struggling for their freedom.*"

If the information conveyed by these despatches

appears in a somewhat desultory form, it will be excused—it is hoped, however, on the same ground that has already been pleaded—that the exact truth is better given by the actual documents, though it may be in a curt and abrupt form, than if filtered through the historian, who cannot fail to give it the complexion of his own views. They may seem rather voluminous, but it is not absolutely necessary for them all to be read—a selection of some of the most essential can easily be made—but the quotations are given tolerably full for the sake of those who may be disposed to examine more curiously.

As to negociation, policy, and attitude of tribes. (Molyneux).

Inclosure 1 in No. 117.

COMMODORE MOLYNEUX TO ADMIRAL LORD JOHN HAY.

"*Sphinx*" *at Suakin, August 12th*, 1884.

MY LORD,—The mission on which Lieutenant Phillipps and Mr. Brewster were sent, as reported in my letter of the 6th instant, seems to have been very successful. Whether any really important result will follow depends on many things, and tribal politics are always uncertain ; but at any rate, for a moment, the Arabs are again divided, and a strong friendly league has been formed by the solemn oath of the following very important Chiefs:—

Sheikh Kort Hamid, Sheikh Beshir, Sheikh Ali Kerai, Sheikh Isa Abdullah, Sheikh Hubal Otman, Sheikh Mousa Bachieri : these are said to represent a force of upwards of 10,000 fighting men.

2. It may be several days yet before they are able to attack the Hadendowas and others under Osman Digna, and they may require some substantial aid to keep them from falling away, as they did before. To avoid this, I think Lieutenant-Colonel Chermside ought to have authority to assist them with money, &c., if he finds it necessary. They have the opportunity here of rendering immediate and important service.

3 There is very little other local news of interest ; the nightly attacks continue ; but the Arab tactics have altered. They now generally commence early, sometimes before 10 o'clock, scattering themselves in small bodies all over the plains round the town, and keeping up a more or less brisk fire for some hours.

4. They have suffered some losses, especially one night when three or four sections seemed to direct their attacks chiefly against

the ships, with a result that out of sixty riflemen they lost seventeen killed, and several very badly wounded. They do not often come near except when there is very good cover, but their high angle fire keeps up a pretty constant fall of bullets in the town and round the ships. Several of the natives have recently been wounded.

5. The rebels are said to be in large numbers at Disibil (or Esibil), situated in the hills on the Berber road about forty miles from here; the 2000 Hadendowas mentioned in my last letter having joined Osman Digna's forces there, the numbers both at Tamai and Handoub being much reduced, being about 3000 or 4000 at the former and under 1000 at the latter. These numbers are, however, not entirely reliable.

Inclosure 2 in No. 117.

COMMODORE MOLYNEUX TO ADMIRAL LORD JOHN HAY.

"Sphinx," at Suakin, August 14th, 1884.

MY LORD,—In continuation of my letter of the 12th instant on the state of affairs, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the friendly concentration headed by the Northern Amarars is by all accounts progressing satisfactorily. Most of the Southern Amarars have joined them, and Colonel Chermside is trying to gain over the head Amarar Sheikh Hamid Mahmoud, who is still with the enemy.

2. The Northern Amarars concentration is said to amount already to over 6000 men, and they have been recommended to make Arbat the point of general concentration.

3. The Southern Hadendowas are reported to be inclined to waver, but this requires confirmation.

4. Certainly on the whole there appears to be reasonable hope of at least weakening very materially Osman Digna's influence here, and if we continue to show activity with railway works, &c., the hostile combination may very possibly melt away.

5. In the meantime the nightly attacks continue, and on the night of the 12th instant a native woman in El-Kaff was killed by a chance shot from the enemy.

Inclosure 1 in No. 111.

COMMODORE MOLYNEUX TO MR. EGERTON.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, August 29th*, 1884.

Messenger considered trustworthy reports Friendly League at Moshid under five Chiefs intending to attack Handoub and Sinkat.

They have many men, and expect to move to-day.

Ibrahim Hamed Dow, Chief of the Amarar, and formerly

with Osman Digna, is now at Otao, and swears he will remain there neutral.

Inclosure 2 in No. 127.

COMMODORE MOLYNEUX TO VICE-ADMIRAL LORD J. HAY.

"*Sphinx*," *at Suakin, August* 31*st*, 1884.

MY LORD,—I telegraphed yesterday to the Admiralty to the effect that the friendly Chiefs had sent in a letter to the Governor, under a strong escort, stating that the league was marching on the Berber road from Essibil towards Handoub, and were prepared to attack that place if ordered to do so, but wished for support or advice, and for information as to the Government intention.

2. In consultation with the Major-General and Colonel Chermside, Governor, we agreed that as Handoub was intrenched and occupied by about 700 men, it would be better to advise them not to risk a reverse by attacking, but to endeavour to continue negotiations.

3. We also considered the time had arrived when authority to spend some money amongst these tribes should be given, otherwise they may be obliged to disperse, owing to difficulties of obtaining food; a maximum sum of 5000*l.* was named.

4. Mehemet Ali, one of the Chiefs of the league, proposes to march towards Tamai with his whole force, and demand a meeting with Osman Digna to discuss the state of affairs. If he carries this out, there is some risk that they may be obliged to fight, and be beaten, or that Osman Digna's influence may have a contrary effect to that desired; but, on the other hand, it might lead to important and favourable results, Mehemet Ali having managed very well at Essibil, where he induced a large number of Osman's followers to disperse without fighting, and to return quietly to their homes.

5. The situation, in short, is this: the friendly league has faithfully carried out the promises made at Sheikh Baroud to clear the first section of the Berber road, Handoub now alone remaining; and the rebels there having refused to surrender, the Chiefs state they are prepared to attack if ordered to do so, and are now undoubtedly in a position which entitles them to ask us what support and assistance they may count on from the Government.

6. The situation is not entirely unexpected, and therefore we ought not to keep them too long waiting for an answer, on which so much, for them, depends.

7. Money to meet their immediate requirements, with a prospect of more active help presently, may be sufficient for the moment; and if they can maintain a strong position without fighting *they may avoid raising blood-feuds which will be a source of*

misery for years to come; but if we do not want their services, and do not intend to help them, we should lose no time to tell them so, and to advise them to make their own arrangements and act in their own interests, which, though ultimately must be to bring peace and trade into the country, may, for the present at all events, oblige them to give at least a passive support to Osman Digna, who remains still far above any other man on the coast in power and influence.

8. The league is a strong one, but the actual marching force is reduced to an estimated 2000 men (may be less), as the rest have to remain behind to defend their own localities.

9. Telegrams were sent yesterday by the Governor, the General, and the Consul, informing Nubar Pasha, General Stephenson, and the Consul-General at Cairo, respectively, of the state of affairs, and by me to the Admiralty.

Inclosure in No. 1.

COMMODORE MOLYNEUX TO ADMIRAL LORD JOHN HAY.

(Extract.) "*Sphinx,*" *at Suakin, September 6th,* 1884.

I have the honour to report that since my last letter, dated the 31st ultimo, respecting the state of affairs here, information from many different sources has been received, all agreeing that the Hadendowas, Swakinies, and others with Osman Digna are suffering great privation from want of food—grain especially, and that many are sick and suffering from wounds.

2. Getting no satisfaction from their appeals to Osman Digna, the following tribes, viz., Camerar, Garieb, Meshab, and Hamelab, held a meeting, and *decided that they would offer their submission to the Government on condition of a free pardon,* but that they would go to Mahomed Ahmed (the Mahdi) if he came here.

3. Up to this moment no communication from these tribes to the above effect has been received, and they are probably afraid to commit themselves to that extent at present.

4. No direct news has been received from the Chiefs of the Beni Amars as to their intentions; but it is admitted that the rebels about Tokar are much afraid of their hostility; and are quite as badly off for food as those about Tamai; and it is said that, owing to the unfavourable season, the usual planting about Tokar has not yet taken place, and that their animals are dying from want of pasture.

5. *The Amarars have succeeded in making some important captures of cattle, grain, &c., from the rebels along the Berber road;* but Lieutenant-Colonel Chermside has discouraged their attacking Handoub, as the rebels are entrenched there, and as we cannot support them a reverse might be fatal to the policy

we are trying to pursue. Osman Digna is said to have reinforced the Handoub garrison, which may number 1000 men, and has supplied them with two camel-loads of ammunition.

6. The news from Kassala is rather conflicting. The town is surrounded by rebels, but at some distance, and at present the garrison is in no want of food; but there seems to be an uneasy feeling amongst the Government officials there.

7. The night attacks on Suakin during the last week or more have been fewer, and have evidently been made by much smaller bodies of men than formerly, and with less spirit. We have been using torpedoes as a part of the flank defence for some time past, placing them in pits and other positions which the rebels have been in the habit of occupying at night, causing a good deal of annoyance by their fire, from which positions (owing to the excellent shelter) they are dislodged with difficulty.

8. The British Government has sanctioned the expenditure of money towards supporting and subsidizing the Amarar tribes, and Lieutenant-Colonel Chermside is arranging a meeting with the most important Chiefs, when he hopes to come to a distinct understanding as to future action.

9. All the indications just now seem to point to a more favourable prospect; but to take full advantage of it will require more than merely spending a few hundred pounds amongst the Amaras and others who are tired of the existing state of affairs. Some active co-operation will be necessary on our part, and if given at the right moment and in sufficient strength, it is quite possible that a decisive blow may be struck at the rebellion with little or no fighting; but I feel sure no lasting or satisfactory settlement wil be arrived at until Osman Digna and his principal advisers—such as Sheikh Tahar—have been secured. The force required would certainly not be large, but should include some good mounted troops and some field artillery.

P.S.—Rumours having reached this that the rebels were endeavouring to obtain supplies from the opposite coast *via* Rowaya, I despatched the "*Condor*" to that place on the 4th instant to make inquiries and to warn the officials. She will also visit the small dhow harbours along the coast on her way back. I propose occasionally sending a ship along the coast north and south to watch the rebels, and to prevent them receiving supplies by sea.

Submitted, observing that the active co-operation alluded to in paragraph 9 is, in my opinion, out of the question, as regards British troops, until the climate becomes more favourable.

(Signed) JOHN HAY, *Admiral.*

September 16*th*, 1884.

Inclosure in No. 22.

COMMODORE MOLYNEUX TO VICE-ADMIRAL LORD J. HAY.

(Extract.) "*Sphinx*," *at Suez, October 4th*, 1884.

In continuation of my letter of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I left Suakin in Her Majesty's ship "*Sphinx*" for Agig Bahdoor on the 20th September, taking with me Mr. Brewster.

On the way I looked in at Trinkitat Bay and Old Agig; both appeared quite deserted; no sign of life along the coast.

On arrival at Bahdoor Island, the Prefect came off and reported all quiet. They had seen no rebels for three weeks, but they were known to be guarding the mountain passes which cut off Agig from Beni Amers. There was no news from Kassala, and it was impossible to send messengers through.

The Egyptian ship "*Deeb-el-Bahr*" (Sea-Wolf) was condensing water for the village on Bahdoor Isle, which contains about 1000 inhabitants at present, chiefly women and children and old men, the younger men being in the mountains with their cattle, or gone elsewhere to seek work. Two large new reservoirs, each holding about sixty tons, were being filled with condensed water. There is at present no other means of supply; but after the first rains a large number of old cisterns, cut out of the rock, will begin to fill, and then the people will probably need no further assistance for some months.

Two messengers were sent ashore to land at a point some miles south, to get in touch with the Beni Amers and Rasheeda (Zebada) and Habbab Chiefs of that district, and to arrange a meeting if possible.

On the evening of the 21st the steam-ship "*Gaffaria*" arrived with despatches from the Governor of Suakin, giving disquieting news of Massowah. I at once decided to go there and learn the state of affairs, sending the "*Gaffaria*" back to Suakin with order to intercept the "*Condor*," then on her way to Gebel Zuhur, if possible, giving her fresh orders to follow me to Massowah. I reached Massowah on the morning of the 23rd, and found there considerable uneasiness among the Europeans on account of the Habbabs and Rasheedas (Zebadas) having declared for the Mahdi, and of the desertion of about fifty of the Massowah Bashi-Bazouks with their arms and ammunition.

I was fortunate in having the opportunity to meet at Massowah several of the Beni Amer Chiefs, including their head Sheikh, Ali Bey Birkeet, an intelligent man, still active, though apparently past the middle age. I had some long and interesting conversations with him. Mr. Brewster's assistance and knowledge of the language and of the people personally being most valuable in interpreting, &c.

The Beni Amers have rendered the greatest service to the Government during the siege of Kassala. They have been fighting day and night for some months successfully, keeping the Hadendowas at a distance, and occasionally inflicting some heavy blows on that tribe.

The religious Sheikh of Kassala, Sheikh Osman Morghani, whose influence over a wide extent of country is very great, has been throughout a warm supporter of the Government. It is he who has kept the loyal tribes together, and it is he who must order all tribal assistance for the removal of the Kassala garrison.

Sheikh Birkeet spoke very despondently on this subject. He said he was quite prepared to obey the orders of the Government; but to remove all those people, including women and children, safely, would be impossible without the assistance of troops. The first move would be the signal for all rebels and waverers to attack the caravans; when hampered, as the men would be, massacre would be the inevitable result. His opinion, which probably faithfully represents the feelings of the loyal tribes, is that the Hadendowas must first be brought to submission. The country would then settle down, and the removal could be easily accomplished by degrees. The Government once firmly established, Sheikh Osman Morghani would nominate a Ruler, who, as his nominee, would certainly be accepted by the tribes, and have a good, or at any rate the only chance of success.

Sheikh Birkeet says camels would be difficult to obtain at first, as so many have been lost, but if the people saw any support coming, confidence would be restored, and a sufficient number would soon be brought in.

All the chiefs I have seen since I have been on this service, including Sheikh Birkeet, consider the occupation of Tokar as of the utmost consequence, and that it would do more than anything else to reduce the Hadendowas to submission.

With Tokar, Kassala, and the coast held by the English, the Hadendowas could not live, Tokar especially being the granary of the Eastern Soudan and the key of the position.

There is no doubt that the Beni Amers look to the future with great anxiety, frequently asking what the Government intends to do for them; especially now that the Habbabs and Rasheedas having declared for the Mahdi, the tribe will have to look for its own safety.

Regarding the Habbab and Rasheeda tribes, there was still, when I left Massowah, some hope that negotiations which were in progress would lead them to reconsider their determination to fight for the Mahdi. A part only of the Habbabs have gone over, and their loyalty was always doubtful; but the Rasheedas have hitherto supported the Government, and the reason for their change of feeling is obscure.

The Rasheedas and Habbabs were about three days' march from Massowah when I left, but had not begun to move. Any hostile action on their part will be unfortunate just now, as, besides the injury it will do to the country, it will certainly interfere with our communication with Sanheit.

On the 26th ultimo I left Massowah for Suakin, leaving the "*Condor*" behind with orders to co-operate as necessary with the authorities for the protection of the place.

At Suakin everything has become very quiet. No attacks have been made for a long time, and though the Amarars have not fought another battle, they are keeping the Hadendowas from moving, causing them by all accounts to suffer much from want of food. It is reported that Teb and Handoub are deserted, the main body of the Hadendowas being in the mountains somewhere near Sinkat, I believe, as Osman Digna remains at Tamai with only a few followers.

Some of the principal Amarar Chiefs came to Suakin last week, and at a conference held on the 28th ultimo, it was decided that they should establish their base at Sheikh Bargoot; that provisions and necessaries should be despatched there; that the women, children, and flocks of the tribes should be sheltered in the hills, and the men to join the force at Bargoot, when they would proceed to attack the rebels wherever they are to be found.

I left Suakin in Her Majesty's ship "*Sphinx*" on the 30th ultimo, having previously handed over the unexecuted orders to Captain Stewart, Her Majesty's ship "*Caryafort*," whom I have left as Senior Officer of Her Majesty's ships in that part of the Red Sea, and have to report my arrival here to-day.

As to Osman Digna, and his movements, and Tokar.

Inclosure in No. 113.

COMMODORE MOLYNEUX TO ADMIRAL LORD J. HAY.

(Extract.) *November 21st*, 1884.

Osman Digna is said to have about 800 men with him at Tamai, and about 1000 at Handoub. He has lately suffered severe loss at the hands of Sheikh Birkeet, the Beni Amer Chief, who attacked and captured a very large caravan of camels bearing grain for the rebels in this neighbourhood. No less than 3000 camels are said to have been captured on this occasion. The Tokar grain must now be nearly fit for cutting, so that the importance of the capture may not be so great as would otherwise have been the case, as the rebels have been very short of grain, and are said still to be suffering great privations. There can be no doubt that

if we could destroy these crops it would be one of the heaviest blows that could be dealt to the rebellion.

Inclosure in No. 144.

COMMODORE MOLYNEUX TO ADMIRAL LORD JOHN HAY.

December 16*th*, 1884.

The movement against Tokar, the centre of the Hadendowa country just now, when the rebels are somewhat disheartened, might be of great importance, if supported, and would probably lead to the formation of another Friendly League amongst the Amarars, who would be on the rebels' flank; but, under existing circumstances, our support must, at any rate at present, be limited, apparently, to supplying them with arms and ammunition.

I propose going to Agig shortly to ascertain exactly what their wants are, and what their intentions, under various circumstances. It is an opportunity which has been foreseen, and which it would be a great pity to lose, especially as the Beni-Amer tribe has shown its loyalty to the Government by actively resisting the rebel attacks on Kassala, with great success, for months, while receiving little or no support from others.

No. 127.

COMMODORE MOLYNEUX TO THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY.—(*Received at the Foreign Office, December* 19*th*.)

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, December* 19*th*, 1884.

Going Agig to-morrow, return 23rd.

Beni-Amers assembling Agig ready to operate against Tokar; report rebels Kassala dispersed.

Inclosure in No. 168.

COMMODORE MOLYNEUX TO ADMIRAL LORD JOHN. HAY.

(Extract from letter.) *January* 2*nd*, 1885.

Touching the Bishari (Nile tribe.)

2. It is curious that the Bishari, a Nile tribe, but extending to the Red Sea north of Roweyya, should have become actively hostile now on the coast while being friendly on the Nile, and having held aloof during last summer when Osman Digna was at the zenith of his power, and when Roweyya was comparatively a place of some importance to the Egyptian Government, as then the salt works were in full operation; now they are stopped, as usual at this time of year, owing to the rains, and the people employed have returned to Jeddah.

As to the above, it is also "curious" that so keen a man as Commodore Molyneux should not see that the "starvation" policy, unless it could be confined to the rebels, was a double-edged sword, and cut friends as well as foes; it is not therefore to be wondered at that the former should determine to hold a port in self-defence.

The next set of telegrams and despatches give Colonel Chermside's views, &c., then Governor of Suakin, though not always direct from himself.

No. 89.

MR. EGERTON TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, August 30th.*)

Cairo, August 30th, 1884.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to report to your Lordship that General Stephenson has to-day received a telegram from Major-General Fremantle, informing him that the "crisis has now arrived," as the Amaras and Hadendowas "face each other" near Handoub, and that Major Chermside, "for good reasons," is anxious to discourage fighting.

General Fremantle asks whether Major Chermside can subsidize Amaras.

It is essential to encourage friendly tribes at present, and though I can give no opinion respecting the proposed advance of money, both General Stephenson and I consider that such reliance can be placed in Major Chermside's ability and judgment (supported by General Fremantle), that it might be well to leave to Major Chermside latitude in this matter, which is not a purely local question, but more important than it at first sight appears.

It is difficult, at present, for the tribes to remain entirely neutral, and our object must be to do our best to avoid throwing all the population between the Nile and the Red Sea under the influence of an active and bitter rebel, such as Osman Digna, which would not only imperil the security of the southern frontier of Egypt, but render more difficult the attempt by the Nile to bring away General Gordon and his garrison.

If Colonel Chermside believes that a small subsidy would strengthen the alliance against Osman Digna, and thinks it desirable to give it, it will, I have no doubt, be well spent, as it must not be forgotten that some of the tribes, such as the Amaras, with whom Colonel Chermside has been negotiating, are no less brave than Osman Digna's Hadendowas.

Inclosure in No. 100.

THE GOVERNOR OF SUAKIN TO COLONEL WATSON (FOR NUBAR PASHA).

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, August 30th*, 1884.

Letter brought by armed escort Amaras; main body of latter on Berber road, beyond Handoub, wish us to co-operate in attacking, but profess ready to attack alone; Handoub and two other clans dispersed, accepting neutrality. I could never counsel fighting until we can support; shall advise negotiations. If you wish to render these effective for any Government purposes shall require money credit, otherwise practical neutrality acknowledging Osman's supremacy is probably all we could insure.

It is quite plain from the above that Colonel Chermside considered material support, *vi et armis*, an absolute essential—but it never was rendered.

No. 102.

EARL GRANVILLE TO MR. EGERTON.

Foreign Office, September 1st, 1884.

SIR,—I have received your telegram of 30th and 31st ult., relative to the question of assistance to be given to the "friendly tribes" in the neighbourhood of Suakin. Colonel Chermside proposes to subsidize the Amaras, and his request that 5000*l.* should be spent in this manner is supported by General Fremantle.

Her Majesty's Government concur in your opinion that the decision should be left to the officers on the spot, and they agree that General Fremantle and Colonel Chermside should act on their own discretion in the matter.

This concession to discretion is all very well, but the following shows that General Fremantle had not, in his opinion, a sufficient force to accomplish his purpose.

No. 106.

MR. EGERTON TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, September 5th.*)

Cairo, September 5th, 1884.

MY LORD,—Lieutenant-Colonel Chermside telegraphs under to-day's date that Amaras are reported to have attacked the

Hakdab Hadendowas near Sinkat; they killed ten, took grain and a considerable amount of cattle, bayonets, and arms belonging to late garrison.

Fazzi Ali, Commander at Handoub, was summoned to surrender, but went to Tamaï to Osman Digna and insisted on reinforcements. These and ammunition being sent rendered it impossible for General Fremantle to make a diversion.

There was as usual unimportant firing last night at Suakin, small squads of the enemy very easily dislodged, one Egyptian wounded.

No. 140.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received September 22nd.*)

Cairo, September 14th, 1884.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inclose copies of two telegrams from Colonel Chermside, dated the 12th instant, in the first of which he reports the prevalence of rumours in Osman Digna's camp and in the bazaars about the advance of English troops up the Nile, while the second announces that a fight has taken place between the Amarars and Hadendowas, in which the friendly tribes seem to have suffered a repulse, and *now state their inability to open the Berber road without English assistance.*

Inclosure in No. 90.

COLONEL CHERMSIDE TO COLONEL WATSON.

(Extract.) *Suakin, November 6th*, 1884.

The Amarars for the last ten years have been great carriers on the Berber road, and are in favour of law and order, and would welcome any initiative from Suakin.

As regards the Hadendowas, the Head Sheikh, Ibn Musa, came from Filik to near Suakin, and on his return there told the Beni Amers that the energy of the Suakin Government had been greatly exaggerated, and that he intended to rally his men, and to continue to fight for the Madhi. His action is still doubtful.

Not long since Osman Digna and Tahar broached the idea of going to the Madhi to consult, but the tribesmen vetoed this idea, and said that they had suffered ruin with Digna, and if he abandoned them they would at once surrender to the Turks.

Digna's call to the tribes to join him has not been very successful, owing to their general nervousness about the Madhi, the railway, and the Nile expedition; and Moslem local opinion *has indorsed my view that he wishes to get the tribes to commit themselves irretrievably to his cause, so that those not enthusiasts at heart should find defection impossible.* Seyyid Morghani in Suakin has warned the tribes in this sense. No tribes have yet

joined him, and only some Amarars have made a pretence of doing so.

The above makes it quite clear that if Her Majesty's Government had given a proper assurance of substantial protection the rebellion would in all probability have collapsed there and then.

No. 99.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, November 27th.*)

Cairo, November 27th, 1884.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to report that Colonel Chermside arrived from Suakin yesterday evening.

He states that the grain crops about Tokar, which are very extensive, are now ripe, and will be of enormous value to the rebels unless some action is taken there, which we are most strongly urged to do.

He had sent a delegate to Trinkitat, on board the "*Jaafarieh*." News has arrived this morning that the "*Jaafarieh*" has returned to Suakin, and reports that *the Tokar Sheikhs in a body are ready to join the Government; but Colonel Chermside fears that without some show of force this will lead to a merely nominal result.*

It is hardly credible that this "show of force" was never forthcoming, and the following telegrams only emphasize its necessity :—

No. 27.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received October 16th*, 10.30 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October 16th*, 1884, 10 A.M.

General Fremantle telegraphs, under date of the 14th October, from Suakin, as follows :—

"Osman Digna has issued a Proclamation ordering the tribes to rejoin him on pain of death. Many sections of the Amaras *have been obliged to make terms with the enemy*, and have reluctantly ceded their cattle to them. Korb Mohamed says he is prepared *to return to the side of the Government as soon as the Government has determined to act.*

"Good news from Kassala dated the 29th September. The town was open and the crops were plentiful.

The Beni Amers and Ashrafs in that neighbourhood are reported friendly."

No. 109.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received by telegraph, December 4th.*)

Cairo, December 4th, 1884.

MY LORD,—I have received from Commodore Molyneux a copy of a Report addressed by him on the 27th ultimo to Admiral Lord John Hay, on the subject of the state of affairs at Suakin.

The Commodore states that "the rebel forces are gradually regaining their strength at Tamai and Handoub, and Suakin is now as closely invested, as regards communication with the interior, as ever.

"Osman Digna is practising his old tactics of oppression and coercion, combined with judicious lying, and as we show no signs of moving, *self-preservation obliges the tribes who have lately been ready to co-operate with us to rejoin him.*

"Though any great success gained by the Nile Valley expedition will undoubtedly have some effect here, the command of grain which the Tokar crops now give Osman Digna will enable him to hold his men together easier than has lately been the case, when his supporters were reduced to a mere handful. The people, generally, however, are heartily tired of the war, and we have therefore *good grounds for hoping that any decided move by us would be hailed with joy, and insure large defection and useful assistance.*"

The following relate more particularly to the questions affecting the trade of the Soudan, and outlay on garrison account. Although the first that are quoted only indicate the desire for peace among the Sheikhs—peace after all is almost a synonym for trade—and they are therefore introduced here. Special attention is directed to Colonel Watson's memorandum, the stress he lays on the departure of Sir Charles Warren, and the constant change of Governors—the insistance upon a competent officer being put in control and the importance of "carrying out a fixed policy" is straight to the point.

It is quite inexplicable why the advice dictated

by common sense, let alone their own officials, never seems to be taken by H.M.'s Government.

No. 29.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—
(*Received February 5th*, 12.55 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, February 5th*, 1886, 12·20 P.M.

Five Soudanese Notables have arrived at Cairo. They have been some time at Suakin with Skeikh Osman Morghani, who recently died here, and come from Shendy, Berber, and the Darfour-Kassala. *They say that a settled form of Government, which will prevent the people from killing each other, is what the Soudanese desire.*

Moukhtar Pasha told me last night that this impression is confirmed by the reports he receives from Soudan.

There will be a sitting of the Commission at Abdin to-morrow.

An appeal for protection, that the natives might live in peace, which, of course, was not afforded:—

Inclosure 7 in No. 59.

LETTERS FROM ———, SHEIKH OF ——— AND ———,
SHEIKH OF ———.

To Sub-Governor Brewster Bey, Chief of Police, and Mahmoud Bey Ali, all of which in one sense.

They have only joined Osman Digna from fear of being plundered, but now that they have been robbed and are likely to be killed on the least whim of Osman Digna, they have only to look to Government's help, military help, which they have long expected.

If no help is forthcoming, they should be told plainly, so as to resign to their fate, but if a succour is intended they wish to be told in time, five or six days before its approach, so as to hold themselves in readiness to join the troops.

An answer is urgently awaited with bearer of these.

Suakin, February 12th, 1886.

Inclosure 1 in No. 77.

MEMORANDUM ON THE PRESENT CONDITION OF AFFAIRS AT SUAKIN.

The present state of affairs at Suakin and the vicinity is as follows:—

Osman Digna has about 500 men with him at Tamai, where he has built a fort and mounted the guns he brought with him from Kassala. He expects to be attacked by the English, but the probability of his attacking Suakin is small. It is doubtful if he could induce the Arabs to do so, as many of them are tired of fighting and want peace. He keeps them under his power by fear, and takes the cattle of those whom he suspects are not loyal to him. *If the Government were to declare that the war was at an end, and to reopen trade, it is possible that after a time the country would settle down.*

It is much to be regretted that Sir Charles Warren has left. Had he remained, he might have succeeded in pacifying the country, as he had begun to inspire considerable confidence among the natives.

The constant change of Governors has had a bad effect, and tends to prevent a settlement.

It is of the greatest importance now that some one should be sent to Suakin with full powers to deal with the question and to reopen trade with the natives.

The garrison of Suakin is now to be paid by the English Government. The Egyptian Government has put a sum of 50,000*l.* in the Budget this year for Suakin. I think this might be reduced to 40,000*l.*, and if the policy of opening trade was adopted, and the Customs properly worked, it could probably be reduced to 30,000*l.* next year, and so on progressively until Suakin ceased to be a charge upon Egypt. But this would entirely depend upon carrying out a fixed policy.

(Signed) C. M. WATSON.

War Office, April 6th, 1886.

Generals object to peace negotiations on the ground that the moment is not "favourable." When in their opinion was the moment likely to arrive? according to some it had arrived long ago.

No. 69.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.—(*Received April 13th*, 3 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, April 13th*, 1886.

Generals say that, while desirous that negotiations should be opened with the Soudan, they do not think the present is a favourable moment, but that one of the objects desired by insurgents in asking for peace is removal of blockade.

They say that it is difficult, short of a complete blockade, to

prevent traffic in arms and slaves. See my despatch of April 6th.

The following refers directly to commercial affairs, and gives estimate of trade returns, which it will be seen, however, are speculative and not reliable; they are nevertheless given for what they are worth, but the report of Consul Baker as to the value of the Suakin-Berber Railway, unquestionably deserves attention.

No. 77.

SIR E. BARING TO EARL GRANVILLE.—(*Received April 14th.*)

Cairo, April 1st, 1885.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inclose copies of two despatches from Mr. Consul Baker on the trade of the Soudan, with especial reference to the prospects of the Suakin-Berber Railway as a commercial undertaking. The figures given by Mr. Baker from the Returns of the Custom House at Suakin can no doubt be relied upon. In regard, however, to the amount of the total export trade of the Soudan, more caution is necessary.

I have tried to collect statistics upon this subject from various sources, but the results I have obtained are so meagre in detail, and show such discrepancies, that they are of little value for purposes of comparison.

A Return which has been furnished me by the Khedive's Cabinet estimates the Soudan export trade for 1878-79 at £E.1,997,968.

Mr. Baker puts the total annual export trade of the Soudan before 1882 at £E.2,244,500; while a leading merchant of the Soudan trade here estimates it at only £E.541,212.

The details of these estimates vary as widely as the totals.

The following are, however, according to all the authorities, the chief articles of export:—

Gums, ostrich feathers, ivory, camels, senna, hides, sesame, beeswax, courbash thongs.

In regard to the import trade still less information is obtainable.

The merchant above mentioned estimates it at from £E.700,000 to £E.800,000 a year, in about equal proportions by the Nile route and by Suakin.

Mr. Baker gives the *Returns of the Suakin Custom House for* 1882 *and* 1883, *showing an average of* £E.264,294.

The principal articles imported into the Soudan are Manchester goods, liquors, sweets, cutlery, and hardware.

Inclosure 3 in No. 77.

CONSUL BAKER TO SIR E. BARING.

Suakin, March 19th, 1885.

SIR,—With reference to my despatch of the 2nd instant as to the Soudan trade prospects, I would beg to supplement the facts dealt with in that Report by the addition of the following observations:—

1. And first I would premise that production in the Soudan has hitherto been seriously affected by several causes, of which the following are the chief:—(1) insecurity; (2) excessive taxes on water wheels and other imposts, legal and illegal; (3) the cost and uncertainty of the means of transport, the high cost operating against heavy goods and the uncertainty against light goods.

2. The principal trade routes have been:—

(*a.*) The Nile route, about 1700 or 1800 miles from Berber to the Mediterranean, involving many transhipments between land and water transport, about four months' time, and a cost of from 5*l.* to 10*l.* a ton, or even more according to the state of the Nile. The difficulty, delay, and cost of this route have been so great that the total annual exports by it have not hitherto exceeded 2,000,000*l.*

(*b.*) The Berber-Suakin route, about 280 miles long, the transport over which has been by camels. Each camel carries about 450 lbs., and does the journey in about fourteen days, the cost per camel averaging six dollars, or 1*l.* 1*s.* 8*d.*, so that the freight amounts to 5*l.* 8*s.* per ton for the journey, a rate which is exclusive with regard to those articles which are heavy in comparison to their value.

(*c.*) Khartoum-Kassala-Massowah; but this route has never carried much Soudan produce, the caravans being always liable to pillage by Abyssinians and other marauding frontier tribes. The exports from Massowah are almost exclusively of Abyssinian produce.

3. Since 1882 the exports from the Soudan have been injuriously affected by political causes, but before that year the principal articles were as follows:—

Article.	Origin.	Nile Valley.		Berber-Suakin.	
		Weight.	Value.	Weight.	Value.
		Cwt.	£	Cwt.	£
Ostrich feathers... ...	Darfur	Unknown	800.000	Unknown	5,000
Gums	Kordofan, &c...	350,000	700,000	144,000	192,000
Ivory	Bahr-el-Ghazel	2,000	66,000	2,500	82,000
Coffee	Various... ...	5,000	12,500	9,000	22,500
Hides and skins	Bagarra tribes	Unknown	14,000	5,500	Unknown
Grain and miscellaneous	Dongola, &c. ...	190,000	350,000	...	...

Total Weight and Value.

	Weight.	Value.
	Cwt.	£
Nile Valley	547,000	1,942,500
Berber-Suakin...	161,000	302,000
Total	708,000	2,244,500

4. The Soudan produces many articles, the export of which is kept down to an *insignificant minimum* by the difficulties and cost of transport, as, for example, the following :—

(*a.*) Cotton, which is cultivated on the River Dinder (Senaar), in Darfur, and in Kordofan, and grows wild in the Sholluk country.

(*b.*) Tamarinds (Bahr-el-Ghazel).

(*c.*) Arrowroot (Bahr-el-Ghazel, where there are forests of it).

(*d.*) Honey (Bahr-el-Ghazel).

(*e.*) Caoutchouc (Bahr-el-Ghazel and other provinces).

(*f.*) Indigo (Lado).

(*g.*) Maize, Lentils, Beans (" Island " of Senaar).

(*h.*) Rice (Lado).

On the completion of the railway the production and export of these articles, *and especially of cotton, will undoubtedly increase in an enormous degree, and thus considerably assist the railway with freight.* Indeed there seems no reason why, with speedy and cheap means of transport, the Soudan should not in a few years' time *export half-a-million cantars per annum of cotton alone.*

5. The construction of the railway will doubtless create a demand for machinery and also for light draught steamers on the Nile, and as the distance from the Mediterranean to Berber is about 1700 miles, and the river is so seldom in a state favourable for getting up steamers, it is quite possible that the railway will have the carriage of a considerable number of steamers in sections from Suakin to Berber. But be that as it may, the steamers plying on the Upper Nile, as also stationary engines employed in the industries which will in all probability spring up at and south of Berber, will require coal; for there is no wood or other fuel on the Nile banks (as was remarked by Gordon ten years ago), and *the carrying of this coal will be a lucrative business for the railway.*

6. It is naturally difficult to make anything more than an

approximate estimate of the traffic the railway may expect, but the great bulk of it will no doubt consist of exports, inasmuch as the imports, being chiefly manufactured goods, will be of less bulk and weight in comparison to their value. It would seem a reasonable estimate to put the minimum tonnage carried on the railway the first year at 80,000 tons (or about twice the weight of the articles exported per annum up till now), which at 2*l.* per ton for the whole journey (280 miles) would produce a revenue for the year of 160,000*l.*, and this rate would be moderate in comparison with the present cost per ton (5*l.* 8*s.*) for the tedious and damaging transport by camels. Would such a revenue be sufficient to cover interest on capital and working expenses until the traffic developed? The capital might be put at 2,000,000*l.*, for if the line cost more *the balance might be carried to the account of the military operations the railway is intended to facilitate.* Four per cent. on this capital would amount to 80,000*l.*, or half the estimated revenue, leaving the other half for working expenses.

Whether the railway will pay the first year or not is perhaps doubtful, and it would not be wise to exact high rates, for the lower the rates the puicker the traffic would develop, and with the development of the traffic not only will the financial position of the railway be assured, but also the tranquillity of the Soudan, for *when once the inhabitants have learned the advantages of peace and trade they are not likely to sacrifice them at the bidding of interested fanatics*, and even the *slave trade* will decline under the influence of legitimate commerce, which will undoubtedly pay better.

7. Without placing too much reliance on past statistics or present estimates of quantities and values of particular articles of export which in a country like the Soudan are always more or less illusory, or at least merely approximative, *I am decidedly of opinion that the Suakin-Berber Railway will be a financial success* as well as an enormous benefit to the Soudan and its population, who without it would in all possibility relapse in the barbarism from which they have so recently (comparatively speaking) begun to emerge.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) A. BAKER.

Merchants' petitions :—

Inclosure 1 in No. 65.

STATEMENT.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO EARL OF ROSEBERY.

Cairo, April 5th, 1886.

We, the Undersigned, respectfully make the following statement:—

The Soudan regions were one of the most important theatres of Egyptian commerce.

Each of us had business agents or partners in the Soudan. But, owing to the late events, and the lack of security, some of our partners and agents succeeded in escaping and came down to Egypt.

As we then had on hand a large stock of goods fit only for the Soudan market, and another stock in Manchester, we were obliged to open houses in Assouan and Halfa, and succeeded in disposing of these wares and starting a good business.

After this had gone on without interruption for some time, fresh goods were called for from Manchester, and we enlarged our trade in those two places.

Afterwards the Government issued orders to all points forbidding every commercial intercourse with the upper country. *This put a stop to all our trade*, and we suffer in two ways:—

1. All goods on our hands cannot be disposed of, for they are fit only for the Soudan market; and the large quantities we had ordered are thrown upon our hands.

2. Our partners and agents cannot meet their pecuniary obligations towards us, because they cannot dispose of the goods.

We and they are therefore in an embarrassed position.

We beg that the prohibition of exit of these goods be rescinded.

If the prohibition is intended to cut off the supplies of the rebels in material of war, of contraband of war, the Government could effect this object by instituting a method of examination of all wares to be sent to the upper regions, and the application of repressive measures against such persons as may be found to have attempted the exportation of that which is forbidden.

(Follow 34 signatures.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 65.

PETITION OF MERCHANTS AND FIRMS IN CAIRO WHO HAD DEALINGS WITH THE SOUDAN PRIOR TO THE LATE EVENTS.

To his Excellency Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, &c.

SIR,—On a former occasion some of us presented a Memorial to your Excellency, and one of like tenour to his Excellency Moukhtar Pasha el-Gazi, and one also to the Council of Ministers, concerning the great injuries to trade and commerce arising from the closing of the roads to the Soudan, which territory is indeed the greatest part of the dependencies of Egypt.

We had hoped that that Memorial would have been well received by your Excellency, with a view to relieving our grievance, that we might succeed in obtaining relief, together with others of the inhabitants of Egypt, because your Excellency

is aware that commerce is an important cause of the growth of wealth.

By reason of the great and apparent injury done to us and to many of the inhabitants of Egypt by the blocking of that region, it is to be feared that if this state of things continues much longer, want and misery will increase, and many poor people who lived by this trade will be led to acts of open disturbance of the public peace.

Indeed, *the stopping of the trade with the Soudan may be considered one of the very important factors in the existing chronic stagnation of business in Egypt.*

We therefore beg to call the attention of your Excellency to the desirability of reopening this outlet to trade in merchandise as soon as possible.

We have this day presented Petitions of the like tenour to the following :—

To the Cabinet of the Khedive ; to his Excellency Moukhtar Pasha ; to the Consuls-General of France, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Austria, Italy ; and to the Council of Ministers.

If it is sought to stop the sending of goods to the Soudan that are contraband of war, this can be done by appointing a Mixed Committee, having a definite seat, to examine all goods and wares prior to their shipment or leaving Egypt by land route.

(Follow 54 signatures.)

March 30th, 1886.

The following from Sir F. Stephenson appeals directly to the British taxpayer, and it is surely time for him to ask what return he may expect for his money :—

Inclosure 1 in No. 89.

GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON TO MR. SECRETARY CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN.

Head-Quarters, Cairo, April 12th, 1886.

SIR,—In reply to your telegram of the 8th instant, calling for a full report showing the financial liability of Her Majesty's Government for raising, equipping, and maintaining the force raised by the Egyptian Government for the garrison of Suakin, together with that for incidental expenses, I have the honour to state that the force authorized to be raised for the Suakin garrison *at Imperial cost* is as follows :—

	All ranks.
1 battalion Black	708
2 battalions Egyptian (708 each)	1416

	All ranks.
1 squadron cavalry (90 horses)	104
1 battery garrison artillery	167
1 company Engineers	84
1 section Camel Corps	32

Authority to raise this force at Imperial cost was sanctioned by your letter of the 23rd December, 1885, *as an annual charge*, to the amount of 40,940*l.*, exclusive of 5000*l.* cost of first equipment.

A further annual increase to the above, of 12,000*l.*, was sanctioned by your telegram of the 18th February last, in reply to mine of the 25th January, 1886, and a still further annual increase of 3500*l.* for an Engineer company was sanctioned by your telegram of the 19th March, 1886, in reply to mine of the 8th and 9th March, 1886.

The total annual amount *for which Her Majesty's Government is liable for the above force is therefore* 56,440*l.*, exclusive of Department and other incidental items.

To meet the latter, my telegram of the 25th February, 1886, stated that a further annual outlay of about 11,000*l.* would be incurred.

This sum, however, included the cost of the Engineer company above referred to.

Your telegram of the 19th March sanctioned, in reply, the necessary charge for Staff and Departments.

This last demand of the Egyptian Government has now been raised from 11,000*l.* to 16,640*l.*, the details of which are included in the Acting Sirdar's letter, herewith annexed, of the 12th instant.

The yearly liabilities incurred by Her Majesty's Government amount, therefore, to 56,440*l.*, *plus such portion of the* 16,640*l.* now demanded by the Egyptian Government as may be sanctioned for Departments and other items, and for which an early decision is requested.

The total amount to be thus paid annually will free Her Majesty's Government from all future liabilities for raising, equipping, and maintaining the force specified above, as well as from departmental and all incidental expenses; the Egyptian Government must then undertake the provision and issue of all stores and supplies for the use of the garrison of Suakin, and all other expenses connected with it.

The only other question of expense will be that of transport for the future relief of the new garrison when required, and the removal of its sick, &c., which should be a matter for future consideration.

Returns showing the equipment already issued free, together

with the total amount required and its cost, and of the stores, now at Suakin, which the Egyptian Government apply for gratis, are forwarded herewith.

I forward, also, copy of a letter addressed to Sir E. Baring previous to the receipt of your telegram of the 8th instant, which will, I trust, meet with your approval.

Inclosure 2 in No. 89.

MAJOR WATSON TO GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON.

Head-Quarters, Egyptian Army,
War Office, Cairo,
April 12th, 1886.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward, by direction of Major-General Grenfell, Sirdar, extracts from a Report which I made to him on my return from Suakin, respecting the costs of the various Departments which will be required by the Egyption garrison now about to be sent to that station.

The amounts which will be required are as follows:—

		£
No. 1.	Staff	2,000
„ 2.	Commissariat and Ordnance Store ...	1,140
„ 3.	Medical Department	4,000
„ 4.	Water supply	4,150
„ 5.	Ice machine	600
„ 6.	Electric light	250
„ 7.	Repair of works	1,000
„ 8.	Engineering company	3,500
	Total	16,640

The details of each Department are given in the sheet inclosed herewith.

I have considered each question carefully while at Suakin, and do not think it safe to make a lower estimate.

Inclosure 3 in No. 89.

No. 1.—STAFF.

	£
1 English officer, A.A.G.	800
1 „ „ A.D.C.	440
1 Egyptian officer	300
1 „ clerk	120
	1660
Add for Suakin allowance	332
Total	1992

No. 2.—COMMISSARIAT AND ORDNANCE.

	£
Allowance to Chief of Customs, who will act as S.C.O. and S.O.S.O.	120
1 Chief of Stores	180
1 Assistant ditto	60
3 Clerks	336
1 Weigher	84
1 Measurer	36
1 Artisan	54
5 Labourers	120
Contingencies	150
Total	1140

No. 3.—MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

	£
1 English medical officer	613
3 Egyptian ditto	640
1 Egyptian apothecary	167
1 Clerk	188
20 Non-commissioned officers and orderlies ...	348
Diets and medical comforts	900
Hospital equipment and clothing	550
Drugs and instruments	400
Incidentals	194
Total	4000

The above includes all allowances.

No. 4.—WATER SUPPLY.

	£
1 Chief engineer	300
1 Egyptian engineer	180
3 Assistant Egyptian engineers	300
4 Leading stokers	120
11 Assistant stokers	264
	1164
Coal, 1300 tons, at 2*l.*	2600
Stores	386
Total	4150

No. 5.—ICE MACHINE.

The ice machine will be worked by the same staff as the condensers; therefore, the only cost will be for coal and stores.

	£
Coal, 260 tons, at 2*l.*	520
Stores, ether, &c.	80
Total	600

No. 6.—ELECTRIC LIGHT.

	£
1 Assistant engineer	60
2 Stokers	48
	108
Coals, 60 tons, at 2*l.*	120
Stores oil, &c.	22
Total	250

No. 7.—REPAIR OF WORKS.

	£
Probable requirements during the year... ...	1000
	£
No. 8.—ENGINEER COMPANY ...	3500

No. 93.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.—

(*Received May 6th*, 1.15 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, May 6th*, 1886.

General Stephenson writes me word officially that the following additions are at once needed in Egyptian army on account of increased duties on frontier and at Suakin: one squadron of cavalry, annual cost, 5,500*l.*, without that of first horses; two engineer companies, 7000*l.*; two infantry battalions, one Egyptian, one black, 28,000*l.*: total, 40,500*l.*

Correspondence will be forwarded by next mail.

Inclosure 4 in No. 89.

GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON TO SIR E. BARING.

Head-Quarters, Cairo, April 8th, 1886.

EXCELLENCY,—With reference to Major-General Lennox's letter to you of the 24th December, 1885, informing you that the Secretary of State for War was desirous that the Egyptian Government should raise two additional battalions as part of the Egyptian army, *the charge for which would be borne by the British Government*, I have the honour to inform you that Her Majesty's

Government has now authorized the following additional Egyptian troops for Service at Suakin, the charge for which will also be borne by the British Government:—

One additional battalion of infantry, thus completing the infantry for the Suakin garrison to three battalions of a total strength of about 2100, of which one to be a battalion of blacks.

1 squadron of cavalry.
1 section Camel Corps.
1 battery Garrison Artillery.
1 company Engineers.

Her Majesty's Government undertakes to meet the annual cost of the above force to the extent of 56,440*l.* in addition to the sum of 5000*l.* for first equipment.

This last telegram inaugurates a new departure in the situation, commencing with the evacuation by the British and Indian troops, and the consequent occupation by the Egyptian.

Inclosure in No. 103.

CONSUL CAMERON TO SIR E. BARING.

Suakin, May 11*th*, 1886.

SIR,—I have the honour to furnish you with the following details on the general situation at Suakin :—

The evacuation by the British and Indian troops began on the 16th April, and ended this day with the departure of Brigadier-General Hodding for Madras.

Watson Pasha, the new Egyptian Governor-General, arrived on the 3rd instant.

The present Egyptian garrison number about 2500, and is distributed as follows:—

Staff : C. M. Watson, Pasha and Governor-General ; A. Watson, Captain, Staff Officer ; L. Rundle, Acting Commandant of Troops ; H. Hickman, Lieutenant, Staff officer.

The Xth, or negro battalion, under Majors Donne and Campbell, hold the centre or main defence at the Geff and in the two water forts.

The IInd, a fellaheen battalion, under Majors Besant and Gordon, hold the left defence in Forts New, Quarry, and Foulah.

The Vth, also a fellaheen battalion, under Suleiman Bey and other native officers, hold the right defence in H Redoubt, Fort Hudson, and Quarantine Island.

There are also a battery of artillery, and a small force of cavalry and camelry, under two Egyptian officers.

There are thus eight British officers, or nine, including Surgeon-Major Galbraith.

The two men-of-war in harbour are the "*Condor*" and the "*Gannet*."

The "*Cygnet*" is near Shinab, and may soon be relieved by the "*Coquette*."

The Egyptian steamer "*Gaafaria*" is also in harbour. The "*Mukhbir*" has been sent to Rowaya to try and negotiate with certain well-disposed Sheikhs of the Amarars.

I am most glad to report that one of the first measures taken by Watson Pasha for the improvement of this town was to appoint Marcopoli Bey Sub-Governor of Suakin.

Any comments on the contents of this chapter would be more tiresome than a twice-told tale. The above despatches show extraordinary fluctuations of policy on the part of H.M.'s Ministers, and their advisers both military and civil.

CHAPTER IX.

The Khedive, Egyptian ministers, and officials, civil and military staff of H.M.'s Government in Egypt all strongly advocate pacification by trade—Military authorities and ministers at home obstruct—Fall of Tamai—Kitchener's raids, and reprisals by enemies—Salisbury forbids raiding—15 Sheikhs, and 20 Hadendowah Sheikhs anxious to come to terms—Blockade, and its results—Consequent famine round Suakin—Aid sent through Aborigines' Protection Society.

THIS chapter, like the preceding, relates to Suakin and its immediate neighbourhood, taking up the period from the departure of the British garrison and the assumption of that duty by the Egyptians, up to the date of the last despatches published in 1891. The change in the *personnel*, however, does not appear to have been accompanied by any change in the policy, or rather want of policy, that has prevailed since the British occupation. There has, it is true, been plenty of money spent, plenty of lives sacrificed, plenty of misery, plenty of starvation, plenty of movement, *but no progress*—the goal seems as far off as ever. This failure may possibly be accounted for by the fact that there is no goal to reach —that H.M.'s Government either can't or won't determine where or what it shall be. Such a conclusion certainly seems justified by the despatches that are quoted in this volume. However diligent the search may be, it is impossible to discover in them any clearly-defined purpose, when they are taken *en bloc*. Without doubt definite courses have been pro-

posed from time to time by various able, experienced and accredited officers in H.M.'s service,—witness specially in this chapter, as an example, the despatch of Sir H. D. Wolff to Earl Rosebery, dated Cairo, May 24th, 1886, and that of Brigadier-General W. F. Butler, dated Cairo, July 2nd, 1886, in which the situation is most logically and comprehensively surveyed—an exposition, in fact, which is unique for its completeness—an excellence, however, that did not insure, any more, the attention of H.M.'s Government. The antagonistic attitude constantly assumed by the authorities at home, whether in the shape of direct opposition, or qualified evasion to any proposals that would lead to a settlement, engender the impression that, secretly, it is not desired—that their "wish is not father to the thought"—but that for some esoteric reasons they prefer perpetuating the fermentation that has, by their action, become chronic.

On the hypothesis of an existing ulterior motive, it should be overwhelmingly cogent, when it is considered at what a terrible sacrifice it is pursued. The damages to trade, to the prospects of the Soudanese, to the development of the country's resources, and the fiscal interests of Egypt and Great Britain are grave and patent enough, but all these pale in the presence of the interests of humanity. One has only to read the despatches referring to the desultory warfare that has for years been promoted by the policy of countenancing, and sometimes even encouraging, "raids," — thus animating tribe against tribe—resulting from time to time in wholesale slaughter leading to nothing—to be lost in wonder as to what ulterior end could possibly justify such a course. While it is freely admitted that all hostilities must lead to the sacrifice of life—sometimes as a consequence of attaining a justifiable end, or sometimes as a necessity of self-preservation,

as in the battles of Abou Klea or Abou Kru—it is here contended, that what is narrated in the following despatches in respect of the sacrifices of human life, is not justified by either of these conditions. That the end does not justify the means is manifest from the fact that there is no end, and the means are self-condemned. It is perfectly astonishing that, while at home society is so greatly disturbed, on the grounds of humanity, that two athletes should try conclusions with one another, of *their own accord*, with a pair of boxing gloves, yet that it should contemplate with Spartan equanimity an internecine struggle, encouraged by Government, among a people when fighting is *not their bent*. What do they say? "We want peace," and H.M.'s Government appears to echo the sentiments, but while some of its emissaries hold out the olive branch, others with the same authority scatter apples of discord. This is the "Janus" sort of policy that has the British Government for its sponsor. And independently of the immediate consequences of conflicts, it will be seen that starvation follows in the trail of bloodshed—sacrificing the aged, women, and children. This last affliction—starvation—is mainly due to the presumed necessity for maintaining the blockade as a check to the slave trade. This distress furnishes another instance among so many of the effects of maintaining a blockade for the suppression of slavery which has already proved quite ineffectual, while it inflicts terrible suffering on innocent thousands, thus more than counterbalancing all the projected and expected good, and contraband flourished in spite of the efforts of H.M.'s cruisers to check it.

At the risk of being tedious we have taken occasion to refer to this phase of the subject again here, because we find that as matters stand now there are grievous grounds for complaint, though no faith is

to be placed in any method of substantially checking the slave trade but through the means of unrestricted commerce, the encouragement of which is one of our cardinal points.

If once a sympathetic chord is established between England and the Soudanese, it would result in promoting harmony and civilization generally, and the final destruction of the slave-trade.

Following this preface, attention is especially directed to the documents themselves, and it is believed that all must concur in the sentiments of the prefatory remarks. The documents, &c., are arranged in as perspicuous an order as the nature of this mode of narrative will admit, the reasons for adopting this method having been already given. It must, however, be borne in mind that anything like absolute perspicuity is an impossibility when dealing with official documents; they are often written in more or less diplomatic language, which reminds one of the aphorism "That speech was given to man to conceal his thoughts," and of the fact that the word "diplomacy," referred to its base, signifies to "fold double."

Sir Fred. Stephenson and Sir H. D. Wolff press the reopening of trade.

Inclosure in No. 5.

GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON TO MR. SECRETARY CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, May* 21*st*, 1886, 12.10 P.M.

At meeting yesterday, Nubar, Wolff, Baring, and self present, agreed to reopen trade with Soudan, establishing markets Wady Halfa, Korosko, Assouan, Assiout, to enable merchants to dispose of goods without risk of detention in Soudan. Similar course will probably be adopted Suakin. Wolff has asked for Government approval. I think time has arrived when this step should be taken and experiment made. Am authorizing payment of 300*l*. to Sala Kabbabish to retain his services, necessary under present circumstances. Wolff and Baring strongly recommend this course.

Sampson Low and Cie Ltd., London. 4 5 Collotype Lemercier, Paris

1 2 3 **Group taken at Suakin.** 6

1. Mr Oswald. — 2. Mr Cameron (*Standard war Correspondent*). — 3. Mr Melton Prior (*Illustrated London News Artist*). — 4. Blue Jacket. — 5. Sheikh of "Friendlies". — 6. Brewster Bey (Director of Customs).

No. 6.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.—(*Received May 25th*, 11 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, May 25th*, 1886, 10.55 A.M.

As delay causes some inconvenience, General Stephenson is anxiously awaiting answer to my telegrams of the 20th and 21st instant.

I am daily more impressed with the expediency of proposed measures being adopted. They could easily be stopped if they proved ineffectual as a pacifying agency.

In order that differences which now exist between dervishes and Kabbabish tribe may be profited by, a decision is earnestly required.

General Butler is also of this opinion.

H.M.'s Government procrastinates on the ground of insufficient evidence. Considering the subject had been for some years under discussion, it would be interesting to know how much was wanted.

No. 7.

THE EARL OF ROSEBERY TO SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 25th*, 1886, 5.45 P.M.

War-office, whom we are consulting on the subject of your telegram of to-day, have not yet received General Butler's Report. In any case I consider that it is not a matter to be treated precipitately, in view of the very insufficient evidence in support of the present recommendation possessed by Her Majesty's Government.

Sir H. D. Wolff follows up close, and disposes of the objections raised by Earl Rosebery.

No. 8.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.—(*Received May 26th*, 1.30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, May 26th*, 1886.

With reference to your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, I have to state that, as I had forwarded General Butler's suggestions, General Stephenson did not do so. General Butler is sending back part of the Kabbabish deputation, and has given them permission to take supplies. He has also authorized Saleh to obtain further supplies at Wady Halfa, and has given him 300*l*. He has

manumitted the slaves who were with the deputation, has married some to soldiers, and is sending the rest to Cairo. These steps have all been taken with the concurrence of Sir E. Baring and myself.

Sir H. D. Wolff's despatch referred to in preface to this chapter :—

No. 12.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.—
(*Received May 31st.*)

Cairo, May 24th, 1886.

MY LORD,—On the 19th instant Sir Frederick Stephenson addressed a letter to Sir Evelyn Baring, a copy of which is enclosed, together with the telegram which accompanied it.

I have already communicated to your Lordship, by telegram, the result of the Conferences held with the leading merchants of Cairo connected with the Soudan trade, and with Hussien Pasha Khalifa by the Egyptian Government, and the Conference held by Nubar and Abd-el-Kader Pashas with Sir Evelyn Baring, Sir Frederick Stephenson, and myself.

After very careful deliberation, it was decided that I should submit to your Lordship the proposal for the opening of trade at Wady Halfa, Assouan, Korosko, and Assiout, contained in my telegram of the 20th instant.

The routes opened by merchants stationed at these localities would be as follows:—

1. That of El Arbaïn, from Assiout to Darfour and Wadaï, and the adjacent countries.

2. From Wady Halfa to Dongola, and thence to Kordofan and Khartoum, and the Southern Soudan.

3. From Assouan to Berber, crossing the localities inhabited by the Ababdehs and Bishareen to the south.

4. The route from Korosko to Berber, and thence to Khartoum and Taka.

It was considered by all of us that the opening of trade by these different routes would have a pacific tendency. It would have the effect of engaging the Soudanese in trade by different roads, and of facilitating the commerce from Cairo to the Soudan, without endangering the lives or liberty of Egyptian merchants.

It was deemed desirable to organize open fairs or markets at the different points mentioned, where they could be regulated by the military authorities and subjected to such restrictions as to slaves, arms, and other munitions of war as might be considered necessary.

It was thought that by thus opening out the trade before the

high Nile in June, the introduction of a pacific element might anticipate the hostile action of the dervishes.

In case the experiment were not successful, it might be brought to an end at any moment.

The proposals had been initiated in another shape by the Khedive and Moukhtar Pasha, as reported in my despatch of the 6th ultimo, but the objection of the military authorities had then very properly prevailed against them.

But the deputation of the Kabbabish and the recommendations of General Butler have entirely altered the position, and would meet any charge of inconsistency. Even if such a charge could be brought forward and substantiated, it should not militate against any useful measure.

From all I gather, I believe the opening out of trade would at this moment prove of great advantage in the solution of the Soudan problem. It would probably divert the minds of the Soudanese from warlike enterprise, and satisfy those at Cairo who may be secretly in league with them, but who now see their interest in the resumption of peaceful pursuits.

I therefore respectfully venture to recommend this measure to the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

Consul Cameron and Colonel Watson both agreed as to the advantage of reopening trade in the interests of peace.

Inclosure 3 in No. 25.

CONSUL CAMERON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, May 28th*, 1886, 3.15 P.M.

Yours of to-day. Watson most anxious to reopen trade, but wishes to avoid premature action.

He has carefully considered question of Massowah trade, which, although important, is quite apart from question of trade further north. Osman himself has stopped trade between Massowah and his followers. Promise to reopen trade most powerful lever for re-establishment of peace. Watson now in communication with the Beni-Amers and other tribes on this subject, and they appear to realize the situation.

"Insufficient evidence," in face of the foregoing, being out of the question as an excuse, H.M.'s Government throw the onus on the military authorities in England, who deal with the subject on purely military considerations, irrespective of all others.

No. 27.

SIR R. THOMPSON TO SIR J. PAUNCEFOTE.—(*Received June 8th.*)

War Office, June 7th, 1886.

SIR,—I am directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant upon the subject of reopening trade with the Soudan, and soliciting Mr. Campbell-Bannerman's opinion, and that of the military authorities in England, upon the proposal.

In reply, I am to acquaint you, for the information of the Earl of Rosebery, that, *in the opinion of the military authorities*, in which Mr. Campbell-Bannerman concurs, it would be very unwise at present to open the trade as proposed.

I am to observe that the proposal emanates in the first instance from merchants whose object is to make money by the withdrawal of the blockade; but this consideration should not be allowed to influence the policy of Her Majesty's Government. Moreover, as it is not intended to carry on an aggressive campaign against the Khartoum authorities, all inexpensive measures for bringing them to reason should be adopted.

The blockade of the Soudan, as far as possible, both in the Red Sea and Nile Valley, would appear to be the best means of inducing the Soudanese to ask for peace, and make it on reasonable terms, and Sodeli's proposed movement north would seem to prove how discontented the great carrying tribes are becoming with the present condition of things in the Soudan.

The Soudanese, like all other peoples, require clothing and some few luxuries of life; they also require gunpowder and caps, neither of which, especially the latter, can they make themselves and, if trade is reopened, both these commodities will again find their way into the Soudan.

If trade is reopened, the only solid inducement the Khartoum rulers and the tribes generally have for making peace would be removed, and it is, therefore, considered that the time has not yet come for altering *the present policy of Her Majesty's Government*, and that the strong position now occupied should be maintained until the rulers at Khartoum ask for terms of peace.

Sir H. D. Wolff keeps pegging away in the interest of reopening trade as a pacifying measure.

No. 28.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.—(*Received June 8th.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, June 8th*, 1886.

We have had a meeting at the Palace to discuss means

of pacifying the Soudan and Youssouff Pasha Shuhdi's Mission.

It is of the greatest importance that we should be given discretionary power to open trade with the Soudan, or promise that it shall be opened in possibly impending negotiations.

General Stephenson concurs in this opinion.

Memorandum from Brigadier-General W. F. Butler on the situation especially referred to in the opening of this chapter:—

Inclosure in No. 75.

MEMORANDUM UPON THE REOPENING OF TRADE BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN.

I consider the reopening of trade between Egypt and the Soudan to be desirable for the following reasons:—

1. Because the prohibition of trade sets against us the feelings of the mercantile, carrying, and consuming classes in Egypt and the Soudan.

2. Because it does not prevent the introduction into the Soudan of the class of supplies most desired by the dervishes, such as copper caps, fulminates, powder, &c., all of which articles can be easily smuggled.

3. Because it fosters a wide and far-reaching spirit of smuggling, thereby creating an illicit carrying trade, to which the country is eminently favourable, which in turn demands fresh supplies to keep it going. This trade will necessarily seek the kind of merchandise which will best repay its hazard.

4. Because prohibition tends to exasperate the native riverain population against us. The people between Esneh and Wady Halfa have always depended upon trade as their principal means of support. Debarred from trade these people suffer severely; and *since they will attribute their sufferings to us, they will naturally welcome dervish invaders as their deliverers.*

5. Because absence of trade creates a blank in our knowledge of what is going on in the Soudan. Excepting through deserters from the dervishes, or by means of our spies, we get little or no information of the real state of affairs. A curtain has been drawn between the two countries which the constant passing to and fro of traders would do much to remove. All the information which it is possible for the dervishes to want about us they can now receive, but our information about them is very meagre. The interchange of trade would insure the receipt of better information on our part.

6. Because *the chief import to the Soudan, in the event of trade being reopened, would be English Manchester goods.* The return export would consist of gum, drugs, and money. I regard this last item as certain to flow out of the Soudan, and therefore I think that reopening trade would tend to deplete the dervish Treasury of the sinews of war. The longer disturbances exist in the Soudan the more desirous must the merchants be to get their money out of the country; trade would give them that opportunity.

7. Because *while trade is prohibited our frontier and the country lying behind our frontier must always be kept in a condition of chronic opposition to us; our patrols, searchings, and seizures must tend to the exasperation of the people against us.* From this state of things to one of active friendship with our enemies is but a short step. The people behind our frontier will come to wish for a dervish advance in the hope that it would mean to them relief from existing burdens.

8. I regard the objections to trade from a military point of view to consist chiefly in the assumption that a reopening of commercial intercourse would allow considerable supplies of grain to be collected between Wady Halfa and Akasheh, where these supplies might be used by a dervish army advancing to attack our frontier. I do not share that belief. I consider that a dervish army striking at Halfa must depend for its supplies upon Dongola and Shagiyeh. Cargoes of grain collected at the head of the Third Cataract can be run with the greatest ease to the head of the Dal Cataract, by boat, from the month of July to January. Dal is seventy miles by road from Wady Halfa. If the dervishes can establish magazines at Dal down-stream from the rich Province of Dongola, and if, in addition, they have in the small but fruitful district of Sukkote another base of supply close to Dal, I do not see what benefit could be derived by bringing grain from below Esneh past Assouan and Korosko and up to Halfa, where camel transport would have to begin to carry it forward into the Batn-el-Hajar. The fact that grain is the same price now at Berber and Assouan would go far to prove that the movement of grain up-river towards the Soudan would not exist.

I believe that a dervish invading army would find its strongest support, *not in a prosperous and contented community, but in one whose feelings had been exasperated against us, and who had come to regard any change as desirable.*

The material assistance which invaders might derive from increased food supplies in the Halfa district would, to my mind, be small compared with the moral support they would meet from discontented populations whose fanatical dislikes and religious feelings had been aggravated by a want of the necessaries of life, and who had come to regard us as the great obstacle between them and their former legitimate occupations.

I think that the real danger in the Soudan lies in what is behind us and not in what is before us. If the dervishes come as deliverers to the trading populations of Upper Egypt and Nubia—as the openers of trade and bringers of plenty, the fanatical side of the question, which undoubtedly at present exists, will receive additional stimulus. *Populations engaged in trade will naturally hesitate before they bring upon themselves the evils of war; not so if they are starving and discontented.*

Finally, I consider that our prohibition against trade has failed in the main object, which was to impress upon the Soudan populations the injurious effects, to them, of dervish rule; I think that the Soudan populations ascribe to us and not to the dervishes the ill effects from which they are suffering through trade stoppage, and I think that this impression has been very widely increased by the knowledge, now more or less general, *that it is the English and not the Egyptian Government who are opposed to the reopening of trade.*

So long as trade is prohibited, 300 miles of the river behind our frontier must remain a region where the population will be more and more forced to regard our presence as harmful to their interests, where our enemies will find sympathizers and friends, and where religious fanaticism will have material want, and tangible discontent to feed it.

(Signed) F. W. BUTLER, Brigadier-General.

Cairo, 2nd July, 1886.

The following shows that the desire exhibited by the Sheikhs to treat met with no cordial reciprocity, being contrary to the policy of H.M.'s Government:—

Inclosure in No. 111.

WATSON PASHA TO THE CHIEF OF THE SOUDAN DEPARTMENT.

Suakin, August 17th, 1886.

* * * * * *

There came from Akik in the *Tor* fifteen Sheikhs of the Beni Amer tribe, who were anxious to discuss the political situation and to learn what the Government proposed to do. I had several interviews with them, and pointed out that the Government was anxious for the restoration of peace and the reopening of trade, but did not propose to take any active steps in the interior of the country, as it was considered that the tribes themselves should, in their own interests, put an end to Osman Digna's influence.

The above is, of course, by orders from Her Majesty's Government, as Watson Pasha, personally, was most anxious to reopen trade.

The following indicates the amount of useless slaughter commented on *ante*:—

No. 129.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH.—
(*Received October 7th*, 1886, 3.30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October 7th*, 1886, 2.30 P.M.

A telegram has been received from Colonel Kitchener to the effect that Tamai was this morning taken by assault by the "friendlies," who are still in pursuit of the enemy. Orders have been sent to give quarter to every one. Number killed is not known. The guns taken will be brought into Suakin.

No hostile force now remains in the Eastern Soudan, and as the "friendlies" were told that if they took Tamai trade would be opened, this portion of the question appears to be solved.

Colonel Kitchener deserves great credit.

From Colonel Rundle information has been received by telegraph that he estimates the number of rebels at Dongola at less than 2000.

No. 131.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH.—
(*Received October 7th*, 5.50 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October 7th*, 1886.

I have to-day received the following telegram from Colonel Kitchener:—

"I have received from Ahmed letters, written from Fort Tamai, which confirm the news. His loss was twenty killed and twenty wounded. Almost all the rebels were killed, and about forty were taken prisoners. All their principal men were killed fighting, and booty to a very large amount was taken. I have ordered a salute of twenty-one guns to be fired."

No. 134.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH.—
(*Received October 8th*, 11 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October 8th*, 1886, 9.50 P.M.

Following received from Colonel Kitchener by telegraph to day:—

"I have just returned from Tamai. The affair there was a

bigger business than I at first thought. Camp for over 3000 men was taken, and with it a great number of rifles, besides eighteen guns, two rockets, two Gatlings, and a large amount of ammunition. Letters have been sent to Tokar demanding that it should submit within three days. Over two hundred bodies were found, and all the principal chiefs were killed, with the exception of Osman Digna's nephew, who escaped to Tokar wounded."

No. 137.

THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH TO SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 9th*, 1886, 3 P.M.

I have to request you to convey the warm congratulations of Her Majesty's Government to the Egyptian Government and to Colonel Kitchener on the brilliant success which the friendly tribes have achieved in capturing Tamai.

We approve of a grant of 2000l. being made to the friendlies.

The above grant clearly justifies the authors' charge that tribal warfare was encouraged by Her Majesty's Government. It may be contended that, financially, this was an economical way of conducting hostilities, but it must at the same time be admitted that it was a most damaging prelude to ultimate pacification among the tribes.

Attention is particularly directed to this extract from the "El Kakurah" October 2nd, 1886. It gives a most statesmanlike view of the consequences, both commercially and politically, of the mischievous efforts of the oppressive and vexations policy of Her Majesty's Government.

Inclosure in No. 141.

"If it be proper to bring distress upon the enemy, is it wise and right to cause distress to both the enemy and the friend? Should we not fear lest we should thus drive the friend over to the foe, when he sees that he is sacrificed, as is now the case of the Dongola Province?

"Moreover, it is not to be doubted that the cutting off of commercial relations to the day of resurrection with the Soudanese tribes, whilst there are no causes of fear and alarm in respect to them, entails heavy damage indeed to all the merchants of the

land of Egypt, for we have learned for certain that one of the native merchants has, up to the present time, lost about 15,000*l.* through the interruption of trade with the Soudan, and all our acquaintances residing at Assouan have assured us that business is at a complete standstill by reason of the stopping of commercial communications with the Soudan.

"Nor do we think that England will approve of this policy, which goes against humanity and humaneness, and which consists in reducing the Soudanese, by hunger and want, to give up disobedience and rebellion; whilst the English people, from the days of William Peel [*sic*] up to the present time, have been famous for defending the honour and rights of humanity.

"Beside all that we have stated, the betrayal by England of extreme fear of the Soudanese is calculated to lessen her prestige in the eyes of Eastern peoples, for they will fancy that such a thing is a clear sign of her weakness, and Europe will also fancy that the policy of this Power involves the continuance of the Soudan blockade, so that there should be there by a cause for the continuance of the occupation, by British troops, of those countries.

"For these reasons we find that, from all stand-points, it is not suitable for the Ministry of the Marquis of Salisbury to adopt such a policy devoid of all satisfactory results."

The impolicy of encouraging tribal warfare begins to manifest itself, as shown by the following. The Arabs doubtless feared the consequences to themselves at the hands of the powerful Hadendowahs. Like the bad engineer, Colonel Kitchener is "hoist with his own petard."

Inclosure in No. 160.

GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON TO MR. W. H. SMITH, M.P.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, November 10th*, 1886, 12.55 P.M.

Kitchener wires:—"Tokar did not surrender. *His Arabs would not fight.* Not a shot fired."

The above is given beforehand, though following in the order of date, to show that Colonel Kitchener "reckoned without his host," as will be seen by the next despatch:—

Inclosure 2 in No. 161.

MAJOR-GENERAL GRENFELL TO GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON.

Head-quarters, Egyptian Army, Cairo, October 31st, 1886.

* * * * * *

Tokar is still in possession of the rebels, but there appears to be a strong peace party inside the walls.

I telegraphed some days ago *your concurrence in the proposal to send the friendlies to Tokar viâ Trinkitat*, and Colonel Kitchener is confident that a show of force there will end in the submission of the town.

As regards the future policy to be carried out in the Eastern Soudan, I conclude that the promises given to the friendlies by Watson Pasha may be carried out, and that free markets be established under permits to be issued by the Governor-General of the Red Sea Littoral.

To establish these markets a small outlay is necessary, which would be eventually covered by octroi and customs duty.

There is some difficulty at present about obtaining funds, but I trust that they may be forthcoming when required.

* * * * * *

I would now venture to call your attention to the tact and skill with which Colonel Kitchener has managed the friendly tribes, and the good service rendered by the friendlies under Sheikh Ahmed and his brother.

Colonel Kitchener has received authority to expend 2000*l.* as a reward to the friendlies.

I have obtained the decorations from the Khedive, and I have applied for robes of honour.

The decorations and robes of honour were for services at Tamai. With respect to the spoils of a camp for some 3000 men, as stated in one of the despatches, the greater portion of the sum realized, viz. $101,800, was appropriated by Mahmoud Ali Bey and his tribe, causing great dissatisfaction to the other tribesmen. In addition to the above, £2000 was sanctioned as a reward by Government. The letter is quoted for the purpose of indicating the policy of previous Governors-General and the pacific missions entrusted to the writer, and shows,

amongst other things, certain slaves were taken as spoils of war, and what became of them. We can find no trace of letter in the Blue Books.

To GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON, K.C.B., Commanding Her Majesty's Forces, Cairo.

Suakin, February 17th, 1887.

SIR,—I have the honour to lay before you the treatment I have received from the present Governor-General Kitchener Pasha.

I was employed by the English in the campaigns of 1884 and 1885, by Admiral Hewett, General Graham, and by all the Governors-General appointed to Suakin, to whom I rendered every assistance in my power, which, as the head of the Northern Ashrufs, I was able to do, as my views were always accepted by the tribes to whom I was sent on behalf of the Government; and was recommended for a medal by the Intelligence Department.

My family and all my ancestors, since they came from Medina, have been Sheikhs of the Ashrufs of the Northern Soudan; and by right I am now the head of the Ashrufs in the North.

I was present at almost every engagement and skirmish that has taken place, and have always given most important information to the Intelligence Department, and my services hitherto have been fully appreciated.

Watson Pasha sent me on a Special Mission to pacify the Northern Soudan. Through my influence I obtained the Madhi's authority to open the Berber road. I succeeded in pacifying the whole of the North, and drove the Bishareen Ameer of the Madhi away to Tamai through my personal influence. I was employed in these services 84 days and was allowed a follower and the two camels to be paid for by Government. On applying for the amount due me, viz. $660, for which I rendered an account; after the utmost difficulty I succeeded in obtaining a portion of the amount, viz. $357: there is still a balance due to me of $303 for this trip.

The message to the Bazingers to run away to the English was sent by me. The tribes in the North were quieted by me. I heard what General Graham, Admiral Hewett, General Fremantle, and Colonel Chermside said to the Sheikhs; their words I repeated, as I believed them to be good; and the Arabs believe them and will act on them. There is no ill-will between the Arabs and English, they have always considered the word of the English is their bond. Through my persuasion Sheikh Mahomed Guillai went to Tamai with his followers, numbering almost half the force (516 men) that took the remnant of Osman Digna's men; I and six of my men were present and ought to

have had our share of the booty. Mahmoud Ali Bey's men and police amounted to 100.

	$
Gum sold, realized	42,000
Otto, incense wood, &c.	21,000
Cash in $	5,000
Huts, matting, and camel-hair rugs ...	30,000
600 swords	3,000
800 spears	800
Rifles, cartridges, cannon, knives. A large quantity. Government allowed for above	4,000
	$105,800

In addition to the above two boxes full of gold coins and jewelry were brought in and appropriated by Mahmoud Ali Bey; these I did not see personally; but it is well known that the two slaves who guarded them, on claiming a share were imprisoned.

Three hundred slaves were also brought in, Mahmoud Ali Bey and his family took possession of them, and the greater portion of them were shipped off to Jeddah for sale, from the different small harbours, where the boats are in the habit of practising their illicit trade.

It is very hard that I who did the greater portion of the work, should not get my share of the spoils; I risked my life over and over again, whereas Mahmoud Ali Bey and his family have quietly remained at home.

My land was rented by Government to slaughter animals on; it was agreed that I should be paid for the use of it $12 per month. 8 months' rent is due me, and when I claimed my money I was imprisoned for three days.

The Government obtain a large sum of money from the butchers who have to pay a heavy tax on animals slaughtered, viz. T.P.1. on every $1 value; a large revenue is derived from this source, yet I am not paid.

My brothers Seyed Yassein and Seyed Tahar are also well-known names to the Governors-General and Intelligence Department.

I have taken the liberty of addressing you, which I trust you will excuse, as I feel convinced you will do your utmost to see justice done me. I am anxious for the sake of the Arabs as well as the English to see trade opened up again, and will always do my utmost towards this end. General Fremantle and Colonel Chermside will vouch for the services I have rendered on behalf of the Government. Trusting to hear from you as to what steps you have taken to see justice done me, and with many apologies

for the trouble I am putting you to, and thanking you in anticipation,

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most humble obedient servant,
(Signed) SEYED MAHMOUD.

That the encouragement to "friendlies" to fight does not appear to have been followed by any results tending to a settlement is evident from this telegram:—

Inclosure in No. 144.

COMMANDER ROOKE TO ADMIRALTY.

(Telegraphic.)
"*Falcon*," *at Suakin, December* 16*th*, 1887, 4.10 P.M.
Enemy is collecting in force at Hashein, Handoub, Tamai. Skirmishes near forts to-day. Continued attack most likely.

Reinforcements required to cope with exasperated enemy, who were not as it seems disposed of by the "friendlies" who earned "grants," spoil, and "robes of honour," at the hands of Colonel Kitchener, for their services.

Inclosure in No. 145.

GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON TO MR. STANHOPE.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December* 17*th*, 1887, 1.50 P.M.
Should be glad of another war-ship at Suakin; Kitchener requires one; corvette size probably best.
Digna now at Handoub, making camp. He intends giving trouble.
Women and children arriving at Handoub.

No. 146.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received December* 17*th*, 1 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December* 17*th*, 1887, 11.40 A.M.
Could the Admiralty send *another and larger ship to Suakin?* There are now two gun-boats there. She should be fitted with electric light. Kitchener asks for the ship, and Stephenson agrees with him. I think it would be advisable.

Sampson Low and Cᵉ, Ltd., London. Collotype Lemercier, Paris.

Soudan warriors.

airs ere many months are passed.
ay would come down at night and
ts, but last night was absolutely
wo or three were to be seen. An
would, I believe, be comparatively
had a severe loss, and will not

of Commander May's de-
in order that the "victory,"
ghter of some 400 fellow-
barren of any substantial
urse should be taken that
nt. That this course was
n Sir E. Baring's despatch
ury, 15th January, 1889.
n is to advance on Osman
oub and capture that place
ary to establishing peace
This proposal has not met
M.'s Government, neither
."

o an expedition, to refuse
in a manner which, in
on the spot, might have
s very much as if this was
all. This view is con-
egram, from which it will
ago there was a fair
ling by negotiation, and
bloodshed :—

in No 12.

TO MR. W. H. SMITH, M.P.

ember 18th, 1886, 7.20 P.M.
Sheikhs from neigh-
submission. Letter from
Ali states large force under
or Suakin, offers terms of peace,
has been appointed in Osman

Inclosure 1 in No. 19.

COMMANDER MAY, R.N., TO SIR E. BARING.

Suakin, December 22nd, 1888.

SIR,—Since the date of my letter of the 13th December, the Sirdar has been waiting for the reinforcement of cavalry and the detachment of the Welsh Regiment from Cairo. The latter arrived on the 15th and the former on the 17th. Every morning various drills have taken place on the right front of the town, and once or twice the cavalry have gone out to reconnoitre, whilst the English regiments have taken up the position they occupied during the attack, and have fired at the trenches from thence.

On two evenings all fire was suspended from the garrison, while the Soudanese bugle-calls were sounded to induce the enemy's Black riflemen to come in; only a very few availed themselves of this opportunity. On the 20th, when the attack was to take place, H.M.'s ship "*Starling*," the "*Noor Bahr*," and two other Egyptian vessels, proceeded to Mirza Kuwai, six miles to the northward, to attract the attention of the Handoub men to that direction. The Egyptian troops marched out as if for drill, whilst the English troops, and the blue-jackets manning the naval battery, took up their position in rear of the embankment before daylight, so as not to warn the enemy of the coming attack. The cavalry and mounted infantry moved out in the direction of Handoub, as they have before done in reconnoitring. The attack was delivered on the enemy's left flank by the Blacks, under Kitchener Pasha, after a heavy bombardment by the guns and mortars, the cavalry and mounted infantry protecting the right flank of the attacking force. The men in the trenches were also subjected to a heavy fire from the 64-pounder and eight machine-guns of the Naval Battery, from the rifles of the British regiments, and that of the forts and lines, which mounted some fifteen guns, and six mortars of considerable power. The Blacks carried the trenches very steadily, and yet with considerable dash. The enemy, as a rule, ran before the Blacks' arrival, but a few charged. They were in nearly all cases shot down ere they came to close quarters.

As soon as the trenches had fallen, the troops in reserve moved out, and four strong entrenchments were thrown up, which are still occupied.

The 20th Hussars had a sharp fight with the enemy's cavalry when protecting the right flank of the Blacks. They routed the enemy, but lost four killed and eight wounded. The enemy are estimated to have numbered 1000. They were not apparently supported by the Handoub men. Their loss was heavy, probably about 400. It remains to be seen what effect this victory will have, but, in my opinion, unless Handoub be carried, we shall

lapse into the old state of affairs ere many months are passed. It was thought that the enemy would come down at night and fire on the new entrenchments, but last night was absolutely quiet, and this morning only two or three were to be seen. An immediate attack on Handoub would, I believe, be comparatively easy, for the Dervishes have had a severe loss, and will not recover for some days.

The last paragraph of Commander May's despatch seems to indicate in order that the "victory," and the resulting slaughter of some 400 fellow-creatures, should not be barren of any substantial consequences, that a course should be taken that might lead to a settlement. That this course was not approved is shown in Sir E. Baring's despatch to the Marquis of Salisbury, 15th January, 1889. Extract: "The other plan is to advance on Osman Digna's position at Handoub and capture that place and Tokar as a preliminary to establishing peace in the Eastern Soudan. This proposal has not met with the approval of H.M.'s Government, neither is it one in which I agree."

After preparing so large an expedition, to refuse to follow up a victory in a manner which, in the opinion of an officer on the spot, might have finished the business, looks very much as if this was not the real object after all. This view is confirmed by the following telegram, from which it will be seen that two years ago there was a fair opportunity offered of settling by negotiation, and thus saving all subsequent bloodshed:—

Inclosure 1 in No 12.

GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON TO MR. W. H. SMITH, M.P.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 18th*, 1886, 7.20 P.M.

Suakin wires, *about twenty Hadendowah Sheikhs from neighbourhood Sinkat now here tendering submission.* Letter from Khalifa Abdulla to Mohamed Bey Ali states large force under Abu Girgeh [? Abu Kurja] left for Suakin, offers terms of peace, and informs that Mohamed Ragat has been appointed in Osman

Digna's place; letter forty days old. No confirmation of force coming.

Strangely enough the above was only printed in Blue Book Egypt 2, 1888, in March of that year, and that no terms were made, seems fully to justify the opinion expressed in the "El Kakurah," an extract from which has been already quoted, that H.M.'s Government wanted "a cause for the continuance of the occupation by British troops."

Over two years from the date of the above, Sir E. Baring thinks "The policy of negotiation is worth trying." See following telegrams making tentative suggestions generally:—

No. 11.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received January 2nd*, 12.30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 2nd*, 1889, 10.30 A.M.

The prospect of forming an anti-Dervish coalition among local tribes appears somewhat better than heretofore. I have been in communication on the subject with General Grenfell. A further Proclamation is proposed to be issued, in which it would be stated very plainly that the policy of the Egyptian Government is non-aggressive; that they would be glad to enter into peaceful relations with the tribes, and to encourage trade, &c. Also the Head Sheiks would be invited to Suakin, where they would receive presents.

I am sure that the general lines are in accordance with the views of Her Majesty's Government, and the only point on which I should be glad to receive your Lordship's instructions is that General Grenfell proposes, after stating that Suakin itself will be held at all costs, to add the following sentence: "*You have seen that I have brought English soldiers down here, and should the necessity arise, the English Government is determined to support the Government of Egypt.*" May I authorize this addition? I see no objection; such pledge of support would, of course, only apply to the defence of Suakin, and *not to expeditions inland.*

The policy of negotiation is worth trying. It may be successful, and even if it fails it can do no harm, although, for the reasons stated in your Lordship's speech in the House of Lords on the 21st ultimo, I cannot say I feel very sanguine as to its success.

I shall be glad of an early reply.

No. 12.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 3rd*, 1889, 4.20 P.M.

With reference to your telegram of yesterday, *the proposed negotiation and Proclamation are quite approved.*

No. 20.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received January 7th*, 1889.)

Cairo, December 30th, 1888.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inclose copy of a telegram which I sent yesterday to General Grenfell at Suakin, on the subject of the general policy which it may be now advisable to follow with regard to that place and the Eastern Soudan.

At the time of the closing of this mail I have not yet received General Grenfell's answer on the whole question, but I have the honour to inclose copy of a telegram which I have received from him this morning, stating his opinion that any negotiations should be carried on by Colonel Holled-Smith, the Governor of Suakin, who is known to the natives, and who will remain there, while the General himself will be obliged to return to Cairo very shortly.

Inclosure 1 in No. 20.

SIR E. BARING TO GENERAL SIR F. GRENFELL.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 29th*, 1888.

I gather from your most recent telegrams, that late events have greatly shaken Osman Digna's influence with the local tribes. I should, therefore, be glad to know whether advantage could not be taken of the present state of things to endeavour to conciliate the latter by pacific means, and to induce them to separate themselves more completely from the tribes which are irreconcilable.

Now that the military operations are over, the political situation must be considered afresh, and it is of the utmost importance that every endeavour should be made to bring about some arrangement affording a fair prospect of peace in the future.

I would suggest for consideration the propriety of issuing a Proclamation in very clear terms to the following effect.

That the Egyptian Government have no intention whatever of reasserting their authority over the interior of the country, but that they will continue to hold Suakin; that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve this policy, and will continue, whenever necessary, to give effectual assistance for purposes of defence, though they have no aggressive views or intentions

for the trouble I am putting you to, and thanking you in anticipation,

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most humble obedient servant,
(Signed) SEYED MAHMOUD.

That the encouragement to "friendlies" to fight does not appear to have been followed by any results tending to a settlement is evident from this telegram:—

Inclosure in No. 144.

COMMANDER ROOKE TO ADMIRALTY.

(Telegraphic.)
"*Falcon*," *at Suakin, December* 16*th*, 1887, 4.10 P.M.
Enemy is collecting in force at Hashein, Handoub, Tamai. Skirmishes near forts to-day. Continued attack most likely.

Reinforcements required to cope with exasperated enemy, who were not as it seems disposed of by the "friendlies" who earned "grants," spoil, and "robes of honour," at the hands of Colonel Kitchener, for their services.

Inclosure in No. 145.

GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON TO MR. STANHOPE.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December* 17*th*, 1887, 1.50 P.M.
Should be glad of another war-ship at Suakin; Kitchener requires one; corvette size probably best.
Digna now at Handoub, making camp. He intends giving trouble.
Women and children arriving at Handoub.

No. 146.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received December* 17*th*, 1 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December* 17*th*, 1887, 11.40 A.M.
Could the Admiralty send *another and larger ship to Suakin?* There are now two gun-boats there. She should be fitted with electric light. Kitchener asks for the ship, and Stephenson agrees with him. I think it would be advisable.

Sampson Low and Cᵉ, Ltd., London. Collotype Lemercier, Paris.

Soudan warriors.

Matters having been in a state of fermentation for about a twelvemonth—falsifying all the military prognostics—and the tribes being irritated to desperation, H.M.'s Government becomes abnormally energetic, and regardless of expense, that not appearing any object, confronts the enemy in the proportion of *five to one*, as is shown by the following despatches :—

No. 133.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.

Cairo, December 5th, 1888.

"Captain Paget estimates the force of the enemy in the trenches before Suakin at about 1000 men, and their reserve at Handoub under Osman Digna at about 700; they have three small guns in the trenches, and two or three more at Handoub. To oppose this force, General Grenfell will in a few days have under his orders at Suakin an army of upwards of 4500 men, consisting of about equal numbers of Egyptian and Black troops, with about 800 English.

"N.B.—The guns in the trenches were two nine-pounders and one seven-pounder."

No. 30.

COMMANDER MAY TO DUKE OF EDINBURGH.

"950 British infantry, 135 hussars. Total force almost 5000 men. Two of H.M.'s ships, "*Racer*" and "*Starling*." Losses of enemy *mainly due to shell fire and the fire from the embankments of the Naval Brigade and British infantry*, when this fire had to be stopped owing to the Blacks coming to close quarters; *very few of the enemy fell, though they were being fired into at less than 200 yards*."

The above is italicized as about as unique an example of firing at point-blank ranges with such results as is to be found in the annals of modern warfare. The only conclusion is that our men were either firing with blank cartridge, or hitting their friends—that "cease firing" was the order, suggests the latter.

The next despatch gives Commander May's account of the engagement and its preliminaries.

Inclosure 1 in No. 19.

COMMANDER MAY, R.N., TO SIR E. BARING.

Suakin, December 22nd, 1888.

SIR,—Since the date of my letter of the 13th December, the Sirdar has been waiting for the reinforcement of cavalry and the detachment of the Welsh Regiment from Cairo. The latter arrived on the 15th and the former on the 17th. Every morning various drills have taken place on the right front of the town, and once or twice the cavalry have gone out to reconnoitre, whilst the English regiments have taken up the position they occupied during the attack, and have fired at the trenches from thence.

On two evenings all fire was suspended from the garrison, while the Soudanese bugle-calls were sounded to induce the enemy's Black riflemen to come in; only a very few availed themselves of this opportunity. On the 20th, when the attack was to take place, H.M.'s ship "*Starling*," the "*Noor Bahr*," and two other Egyptian vessels, proceeded to Mirza Kuwai, six miles to the northward, to attract the attention of the Handoub men to that direction. The Egyptian troops marched out as if for drill, whilst the English troops, and the blue-jackets manning the naval battery, took up their position in rear of the embankment before daylight, so as not to warn the enemy of the coming attack. The cavalry and mounted infantry moved out in the direction of Handoub, as they have before done in reconnoitring. The attack was delivered on the enemy's left flank by the Blacks, under Kitchener Pasha, after a heavy bombardment by the guns and mortars, the cavalry and mounted infantry protecting the right flank of the attacking force. The men in the trenches were also subjected to a heavy fire from the 64-pounder and eight machine-guns of the Naval Battery, from the rifles of the British regiments, and that of the forts and lines, which mounted some fifteen guns, and six mortars of considerable power. The Blacks carried the trenches very steadily, and yet with considerable dash. The enemy, as a rule, ran before the Blacks' arrival, but a few charged. They were in nearly all cases shot down ere they came to close quarters.

As soon as the trenches had fallen, the troops in reserve moved out, and four strong entrenchments were thrown up, which are still occupied.

The 20th Hussars had a sharp fight with the enemy's cavalry when protecting the right flank of the Blacks. They routed the enemy, but lost four killed and eight wounded. The enemy are estimated to have numbered 1000. They were not apparently supported by the Handoub men. Their loss was heavy, probably about 400. It remains to be seen what effect this victory will have, but, in my opinion, unless Handoub be carried, we shall

lapse into the old state of affairs ere many months are passed. It was thought that the enemy would come down at night and fire on the new entrenchments, but last night was absolutely quiet, and this morning only two or three were to be seen. An immediate attack on Handoub would, I believe, be comparatively easy, for the Dervishes have had a severe loss, and will not recover for some days.

The last paragraph of Commander May's despatch seems to indicate in order that the "victory," and the resulting slaughter of some 400 fellow-creatures, should not be barren of any substantial consequences, that a course should be taken that might lead to a settlement. That this course was not approved is shown in Sir E. Baring's despatch to the Marquis of Salisbury, 15th January, 1889. Extract: "The other plan is to advance on Osman Digna's position at Handoub and capture that place and Tokar as a preliminary to establishing peace in the Eastern Soudan. This proposal has not met with the approval of H.M.'s Government, neither is it one in which I agree."

After preparing so large an expedition, to refuse to follow up a victory in a manner which, in the opinion of an officer on the spot, might have finished the business, looks very much as if this was not the real object after all. This view is confirmed by the following telegram, from which it will be seen that two years ago there was a fair opportunity offered of settling by negotiation, and thus saving all subsequent bloodshed :—

Inclosure 1 in No 12.

GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON TO MR. W. H. SMITH, M.P.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 18th*, 1886, 7.20 P.M.

Suakin wires, *about twenty Hadendowah Sheikhs from neighbourhood Sinkat now here tendering submission.* Letter from Khalifa Abdulla to Mohamed Bey Ali states large force under Abu Girgeh [? Abu Kurja] left for Suakin, offers terms of peace, and informs that Mohamed Ragat has been appointed in Osman

Digna's place; letter forty days old. No confirmation of force coming.

Strangely enough the above was only printed in Blue Book Egypt 2, 1888, in March of that year, and that no terms were made, seems fully to justify the opinion expressed in the "El Kakurah," an extract from which has been already quoted, that H.M.'s Government wanted "a cause for the continuance of the occupation by British troops."

Over two years from the date of the above, Sir E. Baring thinks "The policy of negotiation is worth trying." See following telegrams making tentative suggestions generally:—

No. 11.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received January 2nd*, 12.30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 2nd*, 1889, 10.30 A.M.

The prospect of forming an anti-Dervish coalition among local tribes appears somewhat better than heretofore. I have been in communication on the subject with General Grenfell. A further Proclamation is proposed to be issued, in which it would be stated very plainly that the policy of the Egyptian Government is non-aggressive; that they would be glad to enter into peaceful relations with the tribes, and to encourage trade, &c. Also the Head Sheiks would be invited to Suakin, where they would receive presents.

I am sure that the general lines are in accordance with the views of Her Majesty's Government, and the only point on which I should be glad to receive your Lordship's instructions is that General Grenfell proposes, after stating that Suakin itself will be held at all costs, to add the following sentence: "*You have seen that I have brought English soldiers down here, and should the necessity arise, the English Government is determined to support the Government of Egypt.*" May I authorize this addition? I see no objection; such pledge of support would, of course, only apply to the defence of Suakin, and *not to expeditions inland.*

The policy of negotiation is worth trying. It may be successful, and even if it fails it can do no harm, although, for the reasons stated in your Lordship's speech in the House of Lords on the 21st ultimo, I cannot say I feel very sanguine as to its success.

I shall be glad of an early reply.

No. 12.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 3rd*, 1889, 4.20 P.M.

With reference to your telegram of yesterday, *the proposed negotiation and Proclamation are quite approved.*

No. 20.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received January 7th*, 1889.)

Cairo, December 30th, 1888.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inclose copy of a telegram which I sent yesterday to General Grenfell at Suakin, on the subject of the general policy which it may be now advisable to follow with regard to that place and the Eastern Soudan.

At the time of the closing of this mail I have not yet received General Grenfell's answer on the whole question, but I have the honour to inclose copy of a telegram which I have received from him this morning, stating his opinion that any negotiations should be carried on by Colonel Holled-Smith, the Governor of Suakin, who is known to the natives, and who will remain there, while the General himself will be obliged to return to Cairo very shortly.

Inclosure 1 in No. 20.

SIR E. BARING TO GENERAL SIR F. GRENFELL.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 29th*, 1888.

I gather from your most recent telegrams, that late events have greatly shaken Osman Digna's influence with the local tribes. I should, therefore, be glad to know whether advantage could not be taken of the present state of things to endeavour to conciliate the latter by pacific means, and to induce them to separate themselves more completely from the tribes which are irreconcilable.

Now that the military operations are over, the political situation must be considered afresh, and it is of the utmost importance that every endeavour should be made to bring about some arrangement affording a fair prospect of peace in the future.

I would suggest for consideration the propriety of issuing a Proclamation in very clear terms to the following effect.

That the Egyptian Government have no intention whatever of reasserting their authority over the interior of the country, but that they will continue to hold Suakin; that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve this policy, and will continue, whenever necessary, to give effectual assistance for purposes of defence, though they have no aggressive views or intentions

either on their own account or on that of their Egyptian allies; that the *sole objects of both Governments is to encourage legitimate trade and live at peace with the inhabitants of the Soudan*, though they are fully determined to repel all attacks. The possible grant of subsidies on good behaviour might also be foreshadowed.

I am aware of the objections to complete freedom of trade founded on the risk that the Dervishes may obtain supplies which will enable them to continue their operations, but if an anti-Dervish coalition could be formed, would it not be expedient even to run that risk?

Might not a promise be given to open trade everywhere, if the local tribes will give sufficient guarantees that they will not co-operate with the Dervishes?

You might also offer the Chiefs of the tribes a safe-conduct, and invite them to come and discuss matters with you at Suakin.

Full and impartial consideration should be given to this matter at once. I will make whatever representations may be necessary to the English and Egyptian Governments when you have communicated with me.

It is possible that it would tend to the success of the negotiations if it were impressed upon the Chiefs that any pledges of the nature above described will be given in the name of the *English as well as of the Egyptian Government*. If you think so, I will give careful consideration to any such proposal you may submit, and seek instructions from Her Majesty's Government.

You must understand that I make these suggestions on the supposition that it is quite hopeless to attempt to negotiate with Osman Digna himself. The best solution by far would be to come to terms with Osman Digna, and I think that an endeavour should be made to effect this if there is the least chance of success.

I understand that a Proclamation or Circular has been already issued, and should wish to have a copy of it.

Inclosure 2 in No. 20.

GENERAL SIR F. GRENFELL TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, December 30th*, 1888.

Your telegram of yesterday.

I will answer immediately, but in my opinion all communications with tribes had better now be carried on by Colonel Holled-Smith. They know him, but do not know me.

I think it would be a mistake for me to begin, and then leave before negotiations are completed.

The following Proclamations look fair, but in all

probability no faith was placed in them by the tribes, and this is not to be wondered at, considering how little was ever done to gain their confidence—no mention of raising blockade.

Inclosure 1 in No. 31.

PROCLAMATION TO THE TRIBES IN THE VICINITY OF SUAKIN.

(After salutations.)

It must be well known to you that Osman Digna had his forces in trenches near Shaata attacking Suakin. By the help of God I brought English and Soudanese troops and destroyed that force, and cleared the neighbourhood of them. Osman Digna is now left with only a few followers at Handoub.

Do not think that the Government will leave Suakin.

You have always said that you are loyal to the Government, and that you do not like the rebels; this is the time for you to drive the rebels away and restore peace to your country, because in clearing the country of these rebels it is more to your advantage than to that of the Government and the inhabitants of Suakin. Collect your forces, act together, and clear your roads to Berber and Kassala of the Dervish and drive him from his hiding-places; by doing so you will prove your friendship to the Government.

Inclosure 2 in No. 31.

PROCLAMATION BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE RED SEA LITTORAL TO HAMDAB HADENDOWA, AMARA, GAMBAB, AND OTHER TRIBES.

(After salutations.)

I was glad to get your letter in answer to mine, and I write you again so as to let you and all the tribes know clearly what the Government intends to do. *As you have often been told during the last few years, the Government does not wish to interfere with the freedom of the tribes or to impose any taxes upon you;* all that we wish is that you should live at peace among yourselves, that trade should revive, and that you should reap with us the benefit of the prosperity which we hope shortly to see established throughout this country; we intend to keep Suakin, and for this we will spare no trouble or expense. If the Dervishes come and attack us we will bring soldiers and defeat them as we have just done; it remains for you to see that your own country is kept clear of these.

I tell you also that it is not only on behalf of the Egyptian Government that I say this; you have seen that I have brought

English soldiers down here, and should it be necessary, the English Government is determined to support the Egyptians.

I am glad to inform you that the Government is pleased with you for opposing Osman Digna as you have been doing, and will be very glad to reward you.

If you will come in to Suakin and see us, we will assist you either with money or food, or in whatever way you prefer. We do not want you to stay here unless you wish, and you can depart again whenever you please; but I am anxious to hear from your own lips that you really wish to support the genuine religion of Mahommed which these Mahdists wish to overthrow, and to endeavour to bring about a happy termination to the troubles which have, for some time past, distracted this country.

Approval of the above :—

No. 33.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, January 25th, 1889.

SIR,—I have received your despatch of the 11th instant, and I have to express to you the approval by Her Majesty's Government of the terms of the Proclamations issued by General Sir F. Grenfell to the tribes in the neighbourhood of Suakin after the recent military operations, as well as of the instructions which that officer left with Colonel Kitchener and Colonel Holled-Smith on his departure from Suakin.

Yet in contravention of this proclamation, Tokar is at the present moment occupied by Egyptian troops, the liberty of the tribes interfered with, and inhabitants illegally taxed.

The practical effect of martial law on trading—approved by the Marquis of Salisbury—is shown in the following. Because a garrison could not be spared, the natives were to be starved. How is it possible that they should be well affected towards us, and believe in our Proclamation about our wish that they "should reap with us the benefit of prosperity," and rejoice on empty stomachs? Again, what merchant would care to ship under such possible contingencies?

Inclosure in No. 34.

ACTING-CONSUL MAY TO SIR E. BARING.

Suakin, January 7th, 1889.

I took an eight days' cruise up the coast to the northward between the 27th December and the 4th January. I saw no signs of slaving, and at Musa Halaib, where I communicated with the people, I found them very friendly. The "*Ajemi*" went north at the same time. *She captured two dhows on the charge of trading to ports which are now closed*, viz., Khor Shinab and Musa Halaib. The Halaib dhow came direct from Jeddah with grain and dates, which the people were much in need of. The dhows have not been tried yet. I am of opinion that, certainly with reference to the Halaib dhow, it would be wiser in the present state of affairs to exercise a little *clemency*, more *especially when it is considered that Halaib was closed for no fault of the people, but only because a garrison could not be spared.*

The epidemic of typhoid on board the "*Racer*" has now, I hope, died out. There were eighteen cases amongst 125 men; four deaths have already occurred, and several men are still in hospital. I can only attribute the outbreak to the unsanitary state of the upper part of the harbour where the ship lay during the siege so as better to support the forts. The health of the garrison has been good.

P.S.—Her Majesty's ship "*Racer*" leaves the Red Sea this week, being succeeded by the "*Scout*"; the two ships meet at Suez.

The next extracts have reference particularly to Colonel Kitchener and the extent to which he was associated with the "raiding" policy, a question which is pertinent to the situation that has just been considered. The apologetic tone that is adopted shows that the subject is a sore point, and its subsequent condemnation by H.M.'s Government is conclusive that raiding was a mistake.

No. 35.

SIR E. BARING TO LORD SALISBURY.

(Extract.) *Cairo, January 15th*, 1889.

Colonel Kitchener has been frequently accused of adopting a more aggressive and hostile attitude to the tribes around Suakin than was adopted by his predecessors, Sir Charles Warren and

Major Watson. I believe this statement to be devoid of foundation. The facts elicited in the documents annexed to this despatch show clearly that he effected no such change of policy as that of which he is accused, and which would, indeed, have been quite contrary to the spirit of his instructions (see Inclosure in my despatch of the 16th January, 1887).

As regards the opening of trade, my own opinion at one time was that *the policy adopted by Colonel Kitchener was somewhat unduly restrictive.* Acting under instructions received from Cairo, and of which I approved, Colonel Kitchener went somewhat further in the direction of opening trade than, in his opinion, was advisable.

* * * * * *

I have only to add that Colonel Kitchener is a very gallant soldier, who has often risked and, at least on one occasion, very nearly lost his life in the performance of his military duties. In the conduct of civil affairs his task was one of very exceptional difficulty. *He acted loyally up to his instructions* to the best of his ability, and if he did not succeed in tranquillizing the country around Suakin, the reason I believe to be that immediate success was, under the circumstances, impossible.

* * * * * *

There is not now, and since the destruction of General Hicks' army *there never has been, any serious idea of deliberately adopting a policy involving the reconquest of the Soudan by force of arms.* But it is essential to avoid the adoption of any measures which, without any such deliberate intention, might practically lead up to a policy of reconquest.

* * * * * *

Trade is now, as formerly, open from the ports to the north and south of Suakin. I do not think, after the experience we have gained, that it would be advisable at once to open trade from Suakin and thus supply Osman Digna's force with food; but in this, as on other points of detail connected with the execution of the policy of the English and Egyptian Governments, it will be advisable to be guided mainly by the reports received from time to time from the authorities on the spot.

Colonel Kitchener's "raiding" policy was certainly not inaugurated by him, but as he had a longer lease of power, he decidedly carried out the aggravation *versus* pacification policy of Her Majesty's Government to the best of his ability, and earned the thanks of the Government for his raiding, and eventually succeeding in drawing the Dervishes

down to the walls of Suakin, necessitated the employment of 5000 troops to dislodge them, and British troops had to be employed for the purpose. Inclosure 3 in No. 35, dated 1st January, 1889, is an attempt by Colonel Kitchener to justify his raiding propensities by accusing Sir Charles Warren and Major Watson of having likewise done so; his defence of his conduct is most ingenious, and the way in which he endeavours to prove his friendship towards the merchants and Soudanese is scarcely borne out by the despatches published, which show his actions in a different light. That raids eventually induced counter attacks is patent to all observers, and despatches prove that at the first sign of the enemy appearing more ships and troops were demanded. As far as fighting is concerned, Colonel Kitchener's worst enemy could not accuse him of being a coward, as he always did his best, like the proverbial "Irishman," to challenge the enemy to fight, and would have more frequently led his troops and "friendlies" in person, but for the prohibition of Her Majesty's Government's representatives in Cairo, as a peace policy was supposed to be inaugurated, and Colonel Kitchener's presence in the field would have been a serious inconvenience to Her Majesty's Government, who would have had to explain away their contradictory policy—viz. saying one thing and doing another. It is a great pity that Lieutenant Prinsep, Inclosure 5 in No. 35 of Egypt 1, 1889, in showing and enumerating the raids made by Sir Charles Warren and Major Watson, did not at the same time also state the raids by Colonel Kitchener, and show results of each, whether successful or not. His record would certainly beat theirs hollow. Major Watson has traversed in the Blue-book the statements of Lieutenant Prinsep.

The following is a curiosity in the way of "instructions." Sir E. Baring says he approves of them; he does not say that he understands them. Probably if he were asked he would admit that neither he nor any one else could reconcile contradictions. A hostile force was then at Handoub, which rendered the execution of the instructions by the terms next to impossible.

No. 37.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received February 4th.*)

Cairo, January 25th, 1889.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the instructions sent by General Sir Francis Grenfell on the 22nd instant to the Governor-General of the Red Sea Littoral with regard to the opening of trade. These instructions were seen and approved by me before being sent to Suakin.

Inclosure in No. 37.

GENERAL SIR F. GRENFELL TO COLONEL HOLLED-SMITH.

January 22nd, 1889.

The Government is very anxious that the tribes who have begun bringing in cattle should be encouraged in every way to open trade, and that trade should be opened as much as possible on the coast, at any post that does not directly supply the Dervishes.

At the same time, it is evident that no great improvement to local trade can be hoped for as long as a hostile force is quartered at Handoub.

Therefore, while trade at open ports should be encouraged, contraband should be rigorously repressed, and the coast constantly patrolled by steamers and dhows to prevent it.

Every means should be taken to detach the local tribes from the Dervishes, and to attach them to the Government. At the same time, they should be reminded that *the days of taxation and oppression are over*, and that the only desire of the Government is the establishment of peace and revival of trade.

The following telegrams refer especially to the encouragement of intertribal warfare and raiding, within the given dates. It will be seen that contradictions are here not only confined to terms,

but extend to acts and professions, as Colonel Holled-Smith expresses himself opposed to what by his acts he had encouraged. The concluding telegrams on this subject show that the Marquis of Salisbury, doubtless feeling alarmed at the mischievous complications that might arise, orders that all "intertribal raiding" should be discouraged.

No. 28.

The MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO MR. CLARKE.—(*Substance telegraphed.*)

Foreign Office, August 2nd, 1889.

SIR,—I have had under my consideration the proposal of the authorities at Suakin to accept the offer of Sheikh Abdul Kader, of the Hamdab section of the Hadendowas, *to collect forces and to take and hold Tokar for Egypt in return for money and arms.*

Her Majesty's Government entertain considerable doubts as to the wisdom of this policy, which has already been tried without success, in connection with the Amarars, and I shall be glad to learn from you whether Sir Francis Grenfell, who appears to have been consulted on the subject, has been placed in full possession of all the facts of the case, and whether he agrees *in the new departure proposed by the authorities at Suakin.*

No. 35.

MR. CLARKE TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received September 12th.*)

Cairo, September 5th, 1889.

MY LORD,—With reference to my despatch of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to state that the reports received within the last few days from the Governor of Suakin show that no decisive action has as yet been taken by the Hadendowas and the other friendly tribes. A slight engagement took place between them and the Dervishes about the third instant, but without any result. Colonel Holled-Smith is now inclined to doubt the sincerity of some of the more distant tribes, as none of them have, up to the present, joined the movement. He has told all the Sheikhs that unless they really show a desire to drive the Dervishes out of the country, all further assistance from the Government in the way of food and arms will cease.

The sum so far expended in dhurra, &c., is very inconsiderable.

No. 34.

MR. CLARKE TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received by telegraph, September 11th.*)

Cairo, September 11th, 1889.

MY LORD,—With reference to my despatch of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report that, in consequence of the irresolute action of the Hadendowas in the attempts they have been making to drive out the Dervishes from the vicinity of Suakin, the Arab force which had been collected together for that purpose has been disbanded.

Colonel Holled-Smith has been instructed to incur no further expenditure; to give no more assistance in the way of food and arms to the tribes, and not to renew his promises to the Sheikhs without authority from Cairo.

Inclosure in No. 36.

COLONEL HOLLED-SMITH TO COLONEL KITCHENER.

It is difficult to explain the dilatory action of the Hamdabs and neighbouring tribes. The Gemilats have been raiding round Tokar for some time past, and would have joined, I am sure, with some other tribes if they had advanced on Tokar. Three days ago, some other Sheikhs of the Shebodinab tribe arrived here with a few men to offer help, having heard that the tribes had risen in the district.

In the many interviews I had the Sheikhs appeared combined and honest in their desire to drive the Dervishes from Tokar. Possibly the absence of a head Sheikh to direct may have been felt, and the Sheikhs held back to see how affairs went before compromising themselves. I do not consider the movement entirely without good results. There are now no Dervishes at Sinkat, and almost all have left Erkowit. It has at least shown the Dervishes that a revolt against their cruelties and extortions is possible. I am still of opinion—the presence of the Dervishes at Tokar being inimical to trade and the well-being of the country—*that Government should lose no occasion of rendering their stay impossible.*

Inclosure in No. 43.

MR. BARNHAM TO SIR E. BARING.

(Extract.) *Suakin, November 26th*, 1889.

I regret to report an incident which occurred yesterday outside the gates of Suakin, in which several lives were lost, in the light of which the peaceful prospect I have described becomes sadly

marred. *One Onoor Anoyeh, a Gemelab Hadendowa, stated to be in the Government pay,* went to Tokar, stole a number of camels, and, finding he could not carry them off safely, cut their throats, and fled.

He was followed up to the gates of Suakin by thirty rebel horsemen (Komalab-Hadendowas and Baggara slaves), who attacked every one they met. Twenty-seven are said to have been killed, and several women and children wounded. Since things had quieted down many people had encamped outside the walls, and women and children might be seen wandering about alone for some distance from the town.

Objections begin to be taken to raiding :—

No. 48.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received December 30th.*)

Cairo, December 17th, 1889.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a telegram received yesterday by General Grenfell from the Acting-Governor at Suakin, reporting the arrival of refugees from Tokar, who said that they had left that place on account of the scarcity of food, and adding that letters from Tokar gave some reason for anticipating a cessation of raids on Suakin.

As soon as this telegram had been communicated to me I telegraphed to Her Majesty's Consul at Suakin instructing him to use his influence *to prevent anything being done on the Suakin side to encourage raids on Tokar.*

No. 50.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received December 30th.*)

(Extract.) *Cairo, December 20th,* 1889.

Since Colonel Holled-Smith's arrival here a few days ago I have had some conversation with him on the subject of Suakin affairs generally.

I should, in the first instance, explain, with reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 14th instant, *that Colonel Holled-Smith fully understands that he is not to occupy Tokar,* or, indeed, take any step of importance without reference to Cairo. For the time being, at all events, there can be no question of occupying Tokar.

I discussed with Colonel Holled-Smith the circumstances re-

ported in Mr. Barnham's letter of the 26th November (see inclosure to my despatch of the 6th instant). As usually happens in dealing with the details of the Suakin situation, *there is a good deal of divergence between the statements of the various local authorities.* Mr. Barnham appeared to think that the recent raid on Tokar was in some degree encouraged by the Suakin authorities, and that Onoor Anvie, the leader of the raid, was *in the pay of the Egyptian Government.*

On the other hand, Colonel Holled-Smith assures me most positively that he is entirely opposed to these raids, that he has done nothing whatever to encourage them, and that all the help he afforded to Onoor Anvie was limited to a small quantity of grain, which, he says, he always gives to persons who come into Suakin in a state of destitution.

I urged strongly on Colonel Holled-Smith that *these intertribal raids should be discouraged.* They can be of no sort of use in pacifying the Soudan, and *their only effect is to paralyze trade and to perpetuate a state of disturbance.* Colonel Holled-Smith assured me that he fully agreed in this view.

No. 51.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, January 1st, 1890.

SIR,—I have received your despatch of the 17th ultimo, and approve your having instructed Mr. Consul Barnham to use his influence *to prevent the Egyptian military authorities at Suakin encouraging raids on Tokar.*

No. 56.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, January 9th, 1890.

SIR,—I have received your despatch of the 20th ultimo, upon the subject of the state of affairs in the neighbourhood of Suakin and in the Eastern Soudan generally.

I approve of your having impressed upon Colonel Holled-Smith the necessity of *discouraging all intertribal raidings.*

The following, which are up to the latest date yet printed, refer exclusively to the starvation which was the inevitable consequence of the blockading and raiding policy, and to the measures of relief that had become absolutely imperative to cope with the dire distress that ensued:—

No. 70.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February 24th*, 1890.

I have been informed that there is much misery and starvation among the fugitive Arab women and children in and around Suakin, and the distress is increasing.

Ascertain the exact state of the case, and let me know whether anything is being done to relieve the sufferers.

No. 71.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received by telegraph, February 27th.*)

Cairo, February 27th, 1890.

MY LORD,—With reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 24th instant, I have the honour to inclose a Report I have received by telegraph from Her Majesty's Consul at Suakin, stating that great misery and starvation exists in the neighbourhood of Suakin.

In consequence of this telegram, I will move the Egyptian authorities to take such steps as may be in their power in order to help the people of the district in question.

There can be very little doubt that great distress, due in a considerable degree to the misgovernment of the Dervishes, prevails over a large portion of the Soudan. One of the main considerations which has led me to *resist* the arguments adduced by some of the military authorities in favour of *stopping the grain trade altogether from the Red Sea ports has been the serious responsibility of preventing the well-disposed inhabitants in the vicinity of Suakin from obtaining food.* There is doubtless considerable force in these arguments, considered exclusively with reference to the Dervishes.

Inclosure in No. 71.

VICE-CONSUL BARNHAM TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, February 27th*, 1890.

Your telegram of 25th.

There is great misery and starvation in and around Suakin. There are about 3000 to be fed.

There have been several deaths among young children.

I have seen Arabs eat cats and the undigested grain from animal manure.

Relief Committee formed yesterday.

Total of local monthly subscription, 48*l.* We want at least 250*l.* per month. More Arabs will come in from the mountains.

If we could have 600*l.* from England it would be sufficient for two months.

There is also great suffering at the other ports, but I cannot estimate it.

I will report by each mail.

No. 75.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received March* 10*th.*)

Cairo, March 2nd, 1890.

MY LORD,—In continuation of my despatch of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the Egyptian Government has placed 500*l.* at the disposal of Colonel Holled-Smith for the relief of the distress at Suakin. Colonel Holled-Smith has, at the same time, been directed to provide work for the able-bodied men. It is obviously undesirable to give gratuitous relief except to those who are physically unable to work.

Inclosure in No. 79.

CONSUL BARNHAM TO SIR E. BARING.

Suakin, March 5th, 1890.

SIR,—With reference to my telegram of the 27th ultimo, reporting upon the misery and starvation which exists in and around Suakin and the dependent ports, I have the honour to furnish the following details for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

The fact that famine exists in the Soudan has been before the public for the last nine months. It did not, however, excite attention at Suakin until the commencement of the present year, when *wasted frames of mere skin and bone* began to swell the number of ordinary mendicants in the streets.

Up to the month of August last the space outside the walls of the town and within the line of forts was clear of habitations. During the autumn and up to the present moment, however, crowds of Arabs have come in from the mountains bringing their mat shelters and a few chattels, and have formed a large encampment to the north of the town. I do not refer to these people as famine-stricken. They did indeed come to the coast because of the famine, but, as a whole, they appear to have found food without having recourse to charity. They were, however, the forerunners of the crowds of Arabs who have since come in who were already beggars in their own country before they faced the fatigues of the journey to the coast, and now present a pitiable appearance.

The famine has been caused partly by the rebellion, and partly by the absence of sufficient rain during the past three years. Its

effect is aggravated by the fact that the dhourra crop due in January was destroyed by locusts, and I think we must face the necessity of prosecuting relief operations until the autumn, when the next crop will be gathered. Therefore, when, in my telegram of the 27th ultimo, I spoke of a contribution of 600*l.* from England as sufficient for two months, I did not intend to imply that I expected a cessation of this state of things after that term. Many more will come in from the interior as time goes on, and relief must be given on an increasing scale, and continued through the summer. *There must be an enormous loss of life in the far interior, where no remedy can be applied.*

From the commencement of the year a large amount of private charity has been distributed, but *it was only when the inquiry from Lord Salisbury was made known to the authorities* that the question was taken up seriously.

On the 26th ultimo a meeting was held at Government House, and a Committee appointed, represented by all classes of the community.

A local monthly subscription of 48*l.* was promised, and a donation of 70*l.* Three days ago £E.500 was contributed by the Khedivial Government.

Relief has been distributed to nearly 3000 people during each of the last four days in the form of dhourra bread. Milk is given to the sick.

The distribution has hitherto been made close to the town walls, but as it is desirable on sanitary grounds to keep the town clear of the Arabs, two zarebas are to be constructed near the water-fort, one of which will serve as a hospital, the other as a point for the distribution of bread.

One has not to go far from the town gate in search of painful sights. I have seen children searching among garbage, collecting and eating the undigested grain from animal manure; cats are caught and eaten; and *there have been many deaths from starvation.*[1] There were eleven deaths last Saturday, and I do not believe that is below the average daily number. I believe it is the intention of the Governor-General to send relief to the ports of Agig, Mersa Halaïb, and Rowayah.

One feature of the distress here is *the number of Sheikhs, once in easy circumstances,* who are here in quest of help from the Government, but whose pride forbids them to accept the ordinary relief. Of these, a certain number receive small monthly payments from the Pacification Fund, but many do not enjoy this privilege, and are in great distress. It would be politic, and re-

[1] General Gordon's diary, November 21st: "I do not believe one person has died of hunger during the $8\frac{1}{2}$ months we have been shut up."

membered gratefully in the future, if a more liberal system of payments among these Sheikhs were adopted. Indeed, the famine, relieved by charity from Cairo or London, presents a grand opportunity for the authorities here to win a permanent hold upon the sympathy of these people.

Relief operations are never entirely satisfactory. It is difficult to discriminate between cases, and impostors will always be found. I am glad that we have a medical man upon our Committee. None of the Arabs, however famished, should require relief for an indefinite period, and it will be a proper question for our Committee to consider how they can be rendered independent. It is difficult to employ them on public works in a place where convict labour is so extensively employed. I will report upon this aspect of the question later on.

I would mention one point more, viz., *the large number of helpless women who have come in, evidently widows of those who have been killed during the course of the rebellion.* It will become an anxious question for the Government to decide what should be done with them.

In conclusion, I would express a hope that *steps may be taken at home to bring this question prominently before the public,* with a view to obtaining additional funds.

Inclosure in No. 85.

CONSUL BARNHAM TO SIR E. BARING.

Suakin, March 19*th*, 1890.

SIR,—With reference to the famine relief operations now in progress here, I have the honour to report that they have had a markedly good result, inasmuch as, having established a hospital at some distance from the town, where over 100 cases are under treatment, the mortality among these does not now exceed two, or, at the most, three a day. The patients are fed on milk and "belila," a species of dhourra porridge prepared with milk, and are under proper medical attendance.

The number of those receiving out-door relief in the form of dhourra-cake is about 2500, the distress being more apparent among the young children than among the women. The expenditure up to date has been at the rate of slightly under 200*l.* per month.

Strangers are coming in from Tokar and elsewhere, but as yet not in great numbers. These are all adult men, and in a very emaciated condition. I questioned one man about the distress in the Tokar district, and, pointing to his own wasted limbs, he answered that all those he had left behind were in as bad a plight as himself. *The young children there and at other points inland must have died in very great numbers.*

Inclosure in No. 90.

CONSUL BARNHAM TO SIR E. BARING.

Suakin, March 31st, 1890.

SIR,—I have the honour to inform your Excellency that on receipt of your telegram of the 21st instant, communicating an offer of assistance from the Aborigines Protection Society to the Suakin Famine Relief Committee, I laid the message before the Committee, and it was agreed that as measures of relief must be continued for nearly eight months from this date, we should require a further contribution over and above that voted by the Egyptian Government and that collected locally of 500*l*., as stated in my telegraphic reply of the 22nd instant.

While thanking the Society beforehand for their kind offer, we trust that they will be able to aid our efforts by contributing this sum.

Relief works were started this afternoon, when 200 men and boys were told off for light road work suited to their strength, and were remunerated by a double ration of bread. The total number of those receiving out-door relief is not so large as it was a month ago, although many adult strangers have come in. The fact is that some undeserving cases have been eliminated from the number of those who at first received out-door relief, and the most distressing cases have been removed into the hospital, which has gradually increased in usefulness, until we now have 200 patients receiving medical aid. They suffer from exhaustion, or from fever and dysentery. Deaths are still very frequent.

The object we have in view is to bring into hospital those who are physically unable to work, and feed them until they are able to do so. There are, however, a very large number of children too small to do any kind of work.

Should the Aborigines Protection Society afford us the assistance now asked for, I would be happy to furnish them with a detailed Report upon our work and the manner in which their charity will have been expended.

No. 90.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received April 21st.*)

Cairo, April 9th, 1890.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Barnham on the subject of the Suakin Famine Relief fund.

I have informed Mr. Barnham that, as soon as the present sum of 500*l*. has been exhausted, application should, if necessary, be made by the Governor for a further continuation.

The Egyptian Government will without doubt grant whatever further sums may be required.

The foregoing despatches show the piteous climax arrived at after some seven years' British occupation, furnishing another example in justification of Mr. Herbert Spencer's aphorism that "Europe contains some 200,000,000 of Pagans masquerading as Christians."

Sampson Low and Co. Ltd. London. Collotype Lemercier, Paris.

Mahmoud Ali Bey, Sheikh of "Friendlies" and some of his tribesmen.

CHAPTER X.

Necessity of opening trade again strongly urged by all English and Egyptian military and civil officials—H.M.'s Government objects—Mischief of blockade to Egyptian revenue—Baring, Wolff, and Butler agree blockade a mistake—Special Commissioner sent from War Office to report on trade question—Stephenson and Wolff think H.M.'s Government "in honour bound" to open trade at Suakin—Reluctant and restrictive consent by H.M.'s Government.

IN this chapter attention is especially directed to the paramount importance of opening up trade with the Soudanese.

The advocates of this course urge its necessity, as will be seen, on such substantial grounds, that the persistently *fainéant* attitude of the Government is only explainable by the supposition of a motive which it is, for awhile, desirable in their opinion to conceal.

If only in the general interests of civilization, and as the most effectual means of crippling the slave trade, the recommendations of such competent authorities should have commanded a more attentive ear,—but the interests were particular as well as general. It is most forcibly pointed out that the suggested proposals would, with every prospect of success, lead to peace and prosperity to the bulk of the Soudanese, distracted and terrified as they were by a factious and fanatical minority, but that, by the stoppage of trade, they were constantly compelled to ally themselves to this pernicious

faction as the only *modus vivendi*. From a financial point of view, it is shown that the blockade was producing a most damaging effect upon the Egyptian revenue—a charge which H.M.'s Government had made especially their own. From a military aspect, the concurrence of the officers on the spot with the civil authorities, demonstrates that the course they advised was the right one to adopt. And in the interests of the mercantile community, both in Egypt and in England, the subject does not admit of question.

The following from Sir H. Drummond Wolff—one of the ablest agents of H.M.'s Government—gives the idea of the initiatory step proposed :—

No. 1.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.
(*Received May 20th*, 6.15 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, May 20th*, 1886, 6.10 P.M.

A meeting was held to-day between *Nubar Pasha, Abdel Kader Pasha, General Stephenson, Sir E. Baring*, and *myself*.

With a view to opening trade with the Soudan, we propose the issue of a Proclamation to the effect that markets will at once be opened at Wady Halfa, Assouan, Korosko, and Assiout, at which the free exchange of all merchandise will be allowed, except slaves and munitions of war. The Egyptian merchants will thus be enabled to dispose of their goods without the risk of detention in the Soudan. The proposal is approved by the *Khedive and Moukhtar Pasha*, and the recommendation is made after consultation with some of the Cairo merchants who are interested in trade of the Soudan.

I shall be glad if your Lordship will inform me as soon as possible whether Her Majesty's Government approve.

We are waiting for a report about Suakin from Watson, which is on its way. I will telegraph again on its receipt.

General Stephenson is telegraphing to the War Office in the same sense.

No. 2.

THE EARL OF ROSEBERY TO SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 20th*, 1886, 8·30 P.M.

Proposal contained in your telegram of to-day's date *requires consideration*.

Her Majesty's Government understood that the stoppage of trade in the Soudan was still considered the best means of bringing the tribes to reason.

It is perfectly plain, from Sir H. D. Wolff's telegram above, whatever H.M.'s Government may have "understood," "that the stoppage of trade" was no longer considered "the best means," etc., by those from whom alone H.M.'s Government could have derived their information for forming their opinion, and that therefore that objection no longer existed.

It would be discrediting their own agents to suppose that they had not fully considered their former objection when they proposed a new departure. The reply of H.M.'s Government thus appears trifling, if not vexatious.

The rejoinder below shows that Sir H. D. Wolff did not reckon without his host, and proves how logically he approaches his subject—always having authority for what he advances. It must not be forgotten, also, that he and others had at hand the benefit of interviewing the Egyptian ministers.

No. 3.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.
(*Received May* 21*st*, 1·15 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, May* 21*st*, 1886, 11·30 A.M.

Your telegram of yesterday's date.

The recommendation respecting opening of markets for Soudan trade was made in consequence of telegrams from General Butler, commanding the frontier force, which I was under the impression had been forwarded to the War Office, as the result of an examination of Kabbabish tribesmen sent by Sheikh Saleh. On the 19th General Butler telegraphed:—

"Tribe are pressed for food, and are in fear of rebels, their former source of income being cut off by stoppage of trade caravans between Dongola and Assouan, and between Dongola and Kordofan. Tribe wish, therefore, to move north. Their number is uncertain, but roughly estimated at 3000 souls, with some

10,000 or 15,000 camels. Saleh's family alone consists of 300 souls.

"*In my opinion, a very important issue is now presented. If these men are not sent back with something more substantial than words, Saleh will be compelled to join the dervishes.* By the stoppage of trade the merchants are thrown on the side of the fanatics, *our own people are starved*, and the officials made more corrupt. Allowing *Manchester cotton to enter the Soudan means the extension of English trade and the extraction of the dervish dollar.*"

We have had the matter under consideration since my despatch of the 6th April was written. The arguments on both sides are strong, but from the Reports of General Butler we think the time has arrived to make a beginning in this direction. *It must come sooner or later.*

Sir E. Baring and General Stephenson, whom I have seen, concur in this recommendation.

The following is the full telegram from which Sir H. D. Wolff quotes above :—

Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

COLONEL BUTLER TO GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON.

(Telegraphic.) *May* 19*th*, 1886.

Following is result of Kabbabish examination :—

Tribe are pressed for food and afraid of dervishes ; former source of income stopped by stoppage of trade caravans between Assouan and Dongola, and Dongola and Kordofan ; tribe therefore desirous of moving north ; numbers vague, but roughly about 3000 souls, and perhaps 10,000 or 15,000 camels. Sala's family alone 300 souls. A very important issue, in my opinion, is now presented : unless this mission be sent back with something more substantial than words, Sala must join dervishes. *Stoppage of trade has thrown the merchants on the side of the fanatics, starved our own people, and made officials more corrupt.*

Manchester cotton going to Soudan means English trade extended and dervish dollars extracted. The slave matter is the first I have to deal with. The Dongola value of the caravan would be about £E.300. I have told head Envoy that we cannot permit sale.

Please instruct on entire question.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the opening up of trade is recommended by the best authorities (civil and military) on the spot, viz.,

Sir E. Baring, Sir H. D. Wolff, General Stephenson, and Colonel Butler.

Sir H. D. Wolff, after waiting twelve days, again presses H.M.'s Government for instructions. The questions of peace, prosperity and revenue, to which reference has already been made, forming the staple of his request.

No. 14.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.
(*Received June 2nd*, 5 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, June 2nd*, 1886, 4·35 P.M.

Could your Lordship inform me if it is likely that any decision will shortly be taken on the subject of the Soudan trade.

Inquiries have been made, and *the removal of the blockade* instituted in October would, it is generally thought, have a pacifying effect.

A bad effect is being exercised on the Egyptian Customs revenue by the suspension of commerce by stopping imports, principally from Manchester. There are accumulations of ivory, feathers, &c., in the Soudan, *which would create a brisk trade at once, and thus encourage peace party.*

The following convey two most important pieces of information—the withdrawal of the objections by the military authorities in Egypt, and the fact that other routes have been opened through which the dervishes could obtain supplies, showing that the blockade was ineffectual in cutting these off—therefore the primary and ostensible object of the blockade disappears, and its retention is simply mischievous.

No. 17.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.
(*Received June 3rd*, 10·45 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, June 3rd*, 1886, 10·1 A.M.

Question referred to in your telegram of yesterday is one of appreciation. In the present opinion of every authority in Egypt, *reopening of trade would have a peaceful effect. The only objections, those made by the military authorities, have not only been withdrawn, but converted into approval.* It is said that caravans are now going to Massowah from Khartoum, and that use is also made

of the Tripoli route. It is my strong opinion that the experiment ought to be tried, and that *the summer should be employed in trying by these means to bring about peace.* The blockade can be restored later if the experiment proves unsuccessful.

Owing to the fact that there is no Government in the Soudan, it is possible to judge of the effects of the blockade only by the attitude of certain tribes. The result has been satisfactory on these, notably on that of the Kabbabish.

Inclosure 2 in No. 25.

SIR E. BARING TO CONSUL CAMERON.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, May 28th*, 1886, 11·55 A.M.

About not reopening trade at once, *has Watson fully considered the point that trade is now going on through Massowah?*

If Massowah supplies Osman Digna's people, there would not appear to be much advantage in our closing Suakin; but I am not sure of the extent to which Massowah supplies tracts, which might be supplied from Suakin.

Perhaps you have local information on this subject.

Particular attention is called to the following despatch—it necessarily contains some matter which has been anticipated by telegram, but of course this does not affect its merits. In a few words it gives a comprehensive, moderate, and most perspicuous view of the whole question, and for lucidity it might bear a comparison with a charge of the late Sir Alexander Cockburn.

No. 25.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.
(*Received June 8th.*)

Cairo, May 31st, 1886.

MY LORD,—With reference to my despatch of the 24th May and to my telegrams on the proposed reopening of trade with the Soudan, I have the honour to inclose a copy of a Report addressed by General Watson to his Excellency Nubar Pasha, and of telegrams which have passed between Sir Evelyn Baring and Mr. Consul Cameron on the steps to be taken at Suakin.

It is now considered by a large majority of those who have spoken with me on the subject, that the time has arrived when it is desirable under certain restrictions that trade should be re-established with the Soudanese.

As there is no central authority in the Soudan with whom a Treaty of Peace could be concluded, the opportuneness of reopening the trade can only be appreciated by those on the spot who can balance the advantages and disadvantages of such a course. *If the peacefully inclined are cut off from their usual pursuits, they will be forced to join the dervishes; whereas if trade be restored and peaceful avocations be resumed, there will be every temptation for them to advocate the cessation of hostilities.* Were the markets suggested in my telegram of the 20th instant to be opened a brisk trade would at once be established, as I understand that large stores of ostrich feathers, gums, and ivory have been accumulating and will be brought into the market.

It cannot, of course, be anticipated that the restoration of trade will at once overcome all the fanaticism that has been the predominant feature in the recent wars. The effect of such a pacific measure can only be gradual, but it will introduce into the Soudan the means of establishing a peace party, and I consider that with the approaching rise of the Nile the time has arrived when the experiment should be tried.

The trade was stopped by a Ministerial Order of the 10th October, 1885, a translation of which is inclosed, and *the blockade has therefore been in force for nearly eight months.*

It is of course impossible to bring forward any evidence but argument in support of a measure the results of which are prospective, but I think it right to state my opinion that the arguments greatly preponderate in favour of the course suggested. *The Khedive and Moukhtar Pasha are in favour of it, as are the Egyptian Ministers and all the native authorities with whom I have spoken.*

M. de Derenthall on Saturday expressed to me his hope that means would soon be found to reopen the Soudan markets; the Egyptians engaged in the trade are naturally anxious to recommence their business, and the military authorities who two months ago objected have now *not only withdrawn their objections, but strongly recommend the same proposal.*

Under these circumstances, and being myself fully impressed with the advantages presented by the establishment of the proposed markets, I venture once more to urge the measure on the favourable consideration of your Lordship.

With respect to the opening of trade at Suakin, I would also recommend that it should be sanctioned in principle, the moment for carrying it out being left to the judgment of the civil and military authorities in Egypt.

I am the more impressed with the necessity of these measures being taken from the dormant state of trade in Egypt, and its consequent effect on the finances of the country. These considerations of course could not be urged in the face of military objections,

but in the absence of such objections, and believing that the probabilities of *tranquillity in the Soudan may be enhanced by the means proposed*, the relief to be afforded to merchants in Egypt is an additional argument in favour of the experiment being made.

The following telegram is due to a rumour of Dervish advance on the frontiers of Egypt reported to H.M.'s Government, which was much exaggerated by the "Intelligence Department."

No. 20.

THE EARL OF ROSEBERY TO SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 4th*, 1886, 7·45 P.M.

As regards your telegram of yesterday, am I to understand from it that it is not at present expedient that the blockade of the Soudan trade should be raised?

Permission is still asked to reopen trade.

No. 21.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.
(*Received June 5th*, 11·45 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, June 5th*, 1886.

In reply to your Lordship's telegram of yesterday I have to state that, had the raising of the blockade been sanctioned, we should, in the face of the recent news, have suspended its execution.

As regards the principle we still hold the same opinion, and should be glad of discretionary power to reopen trade with the Soudan when negotiations or circumstances seem to render it advisable.

Sir E. Baring and General Stephenson concur in this opinion.

The following is the restrictive and obstructive reply to the foregoing statesmanlike despatch. It appears to be an idiosyncrasy of H.M.'s Government always to defer to certain military officers at the Horse Guards, rather than to listen to the military officers on the spot. This disposition leavens their every action.

No. 31.

THE EARL OF ROSEBERY TO SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

Foreign Office, June 9th, 1886.

SIR,—Her Majesty's Government have considered your telegram of to-day and your previous communications regarding the suggestions for reopening trade to the Soudan and to the tribes in the vicinity of Suakin.

I have informed you by telegraph that, having regard to the unanimous opinion of the British civil and military authorities in Egypt in favour of the reopening of the trade to the Soudan, Her Majesty's Government approve the steps which you report to have been taken. *The military authorities* IN THIS COUNTRY *are, however, still strongly opposed to the withdrawal of the restrictions which have been placed on the furnishing of supplies to the tribes in the Soudan.*

I am therefore unable to sanction any but tentative measures in regard to the relaxation of those restrictions. Any arrangements which may be contemplated in this direction SHOULD BE REPORTED HOME BEFORE BEING CARRIED INTO EFFECT.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff, with his accustomed vigour, still presses H.M.'s Government hard on the trade question.

No. 48.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.
(*Received June 24th*, 11 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, June 24th*, 1886, 9·50 P.M.

A telegram has been received from General Butler, in which he says:—

"*I am strongly of opinion that it is advisable to open trade with the Soudan.* The present system of patrol suppression pursued by us tends to place against us the whole trafficking, carrying, and consuming population, whilst it does not meet the required end."

I propose to call a meeting of Sir E. Baring, the British Generals, and the Egyptian Minister in order to consider what suggestions should be submitted to Her Majesty's Government.

No. 49.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.
(*Received June 25th*, 1·10 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, June 25th*, 1886, 11·40 A.M.

Following telegram received from General Butler:—

"Mention was made in my reply of consumer, who would necessarily be Soudanese. I think that present state makes *our rule*, instead of that of dervishes, unpopular."

I *am authorized by Sir E. Baring to say that the continuance of the blockade is, in his opinion, a grave political mistake. Myself, I believe that we are driving the Soudanese, by starving them, to attack us from sheer necessity.*

Meeting takes place to-morrow morning. Might we take necessary steps at once if we are agreed as to opening of trade?

Please send reply immediately.

And this is their reply:—

No. 50.

THE EARL OF ROSEBERY TO SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

Foreign Office, June 25th, 1886.

SIR,—I have received your telegrams of yesterday and to-day, stating that General Butler is strongly in favour of opening trade with the Soudan; *that Sir E. Baring considers the continuance of the blockade a grave political mistake, and that you believe that by starving the Soudanese we are driving them, from sheer necessity, to attack us;* and you ask whether, if at a consultation between yourself, Sir E. Baring, the Egyptian Ministers, and British Generals it should be agreed that it is advisable to open tradethe necessary steps may be taken at once.

In view of the arguments recently advanced by you in favour of maintaining the blockade, of the total failure of the experiment of relaxing it last year, and of the unanimous opinion of the military authorities in this country that the blockade should be maintained, I CANNOT, *without further information, undertake the responsibility of consenting to the proposed opening of trade.*

It is therefore the intention of Her Majesty's Government to send out an officer to Egypt at once to report *confidentially* on the subject. He will start by the mail of the 29th instant. On his arrival in Egypt you should summon a meeting of those of the civil and military authorities who have already been consulted in the matter, and the officer should be present at this conference.

You will, I feel confident, give him all the assistance and facilities in your power to enable him to conduct the inquiry with which he is intrusted.

Sir H. D. Wolff explains the second paragraph of the above, and disposes of it as an obstacle to the course he recommends. He rejoices at the promised mission, doubtless accepting it as an

earnest of something like action on the part of H.M.'s Government. He can little have anticipated how bald it would prove of any substantial results, which will be seen later on.

No. 51.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, June 25th*, 1886, 10·55 P.M.

My arguments against reopening of trade with the Soudan, referred to in your Lordship's telegram of to-day, *were put forward during the advance of Dervishes. That advance being now over*, the views which I originally held are still in force. I am very glad of the mission of the officer in question, and I will naturally give him any facility in my power. I will telegraph the opinion of the meeting which will be held to-morrow, but we will defer making any recommendations until the arrival of the officer.

This telegram from General Butler is pregnant with sound arguments in support of raising the blockade:—

Inclosure 1 in No. 61.

GENERAL BUTLER TO GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON.

(Telegraphic.) *June 25th*, 1886.

Continuing yesterday's message.

Supposition that stopping Soudan trade would make Arab rule unpopular seems to me to be based upon the retention of an idea which has already cost us much. That idea is that Arab rule is the rule of a faction. Surely events have long since disproved that idea. A people who are enough in earnest at their work to come on again and again against our squares are not likely to be frightened by want of cotton or sugar.

Meantime, *stoppage of trade creates us innumerable enemies within our lines.*

Of course trade if opened should be carefully supervised. I discussed this question with Messedaglia at Korosko, on way down. I send his further reply. I do not agree with his views. What are the things indispensable to the life of a Soudanese he speaks of? His argument about money is fallacious, because trade means cloth going in and money coming out; therefore, trade will drain dollars from Soudan. As for everything done up to present time being undone by trade being opened, I would ask what has been done up to present? *Has stoppage of trade stopped der-*

vishes coming to Sarrass? One thing it has done; it has left us without a friend between Derawi and Second Cataract.

The following gives the views of some of the most competent native authorities, in favour of the removal of the blockade:—

No. 74.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.
(*Received July 13th.*)

Cairo, July 2nd, 1886.

MY LORD,—With reference to my despatch of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to inclose copy of a further Report from Youssouf Pasha Shuhdi.

This *Report*, together with the previous one, *confirms me in the belief that the opening out of trade, and the consequent absorption of the population in peaceful pursuits, would strengthen the hands of the orderly portion of the inhabitants in their resistance to the dictation of the dervishes.*

Such is the opinion of all those I have been able to consult at Cairo, and, as was shown by the telegram I forwarded to your Lordship recently from General Butler, such is the view of that officer.

The opening of trade, under certain restrictions, to be stopped at any moment if the consequences prove mischievous, would, as far as I can judge, exercise a pacifying influence on the tribes. If we are to wait for any overt acts of submission, the chances of peace may be indefinitely adjourned, and *both English and Egyptian forces may be detained in their present attitude of armed expectation for an unlimited period.* Some initial step should be taken, if only of an experimental character, to bring to a close the present vague and unsatisfactory condition of things.

* * * * * * *

Sir Frederick Stephenson attaches very great weight to the opinion and experience of General Butler, who has just arrived, and whom I have requested to give me his views on the subject in the form of a Memorandum. I need hardly add that the *opinions of Moukhtar, Nubar, and Abdel Kader Pashas*, founded as they are on a long and varied study of Oriental, and especially Arab, politics, should not be lightly dismissed. Moukhtar Pasha administered Yemen for three years in a very successful manner. Nubar Pasha has been mixed up in the affairs of the Soudan ever since the time of Mohammed Ali, his brother having been killed in an expedition to that country, as Governor-General of which Abdel Kader Pasha achieved a considerable reputation. All three are in favour of the removal of the blockade.

Colonel Grove's telegraphic despatch, and official report:—

No. 72.

SIR E. BARING TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.—(*Received July 9th*, 3 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, July 9th*, 1886, 2·30 P.M.

The following is from *Colonel Grove*:—

"I arrived at Cairo on the evening of the 6th July, and have consulted with Sir E. Baring, Sir H. D. Wolff, Nubar Pasha, Moukhtar Pasha, Generals Stephenson and Butler and others.

"*There are strong reasons for reopening trade with the Soudan, stronger than I thought before I was on the spot.* My personal opinion, however, is that the time has not yet come for raising the blockade.

"Before coming to a decision we should wait until about the end of August and see how affairs in the Soudan progress.

"I have, I think, fully mastered the views with regard to the trade question and other matters which are held here."

No. 88.

COLONEL GROVE TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.—(*Received July 30th.*)

War Office, July 28th, 1886.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to report that, in obedience to your instructions, I left London on the 30th June for Cairo, where I arrived on the 6th instant. I remained in Cairo until the 18th, when I returned to England, reaching London on the 26th instant.

During my stay in Egypt I inquired carefully into the whole question of the blockade of the Soudan, and the desirability or the reverse of reopening trade with that district. I had access to many sources of information, and I had numerous interviews and discussions with persons in all sorts of positions, from their Excellencies Nubar Pasha and Moukhtar Pasha down to quite minor officials and others, British and native, civil and military.

I saw people who were quite fresh from our frontier both up the Nile and at Suakin, and, on the whole, I think I am justified in believing that I arrived at a fairly correct appreciation of the general condition of affairs in Egypt, and of the working of the present blockade on trade with the Soudan. The conclusions to which my investigations led me are as follows:—

First, as regards the trade on the Upper Nile. In this case it would, I think, be premature to raise the existing blockade at the present moment. It is too soon after the recent dervish raid on

the railway at Sarras, and the Proclamation we published, that in consequence the interdict on commerce, which otherwise would have been removed, would now be kept up.

There are, however, many signs which tend to show that the hostile and fanatical spirit in the Soudan has to a considerable extent spent itself, and that no very serious movement or invasion is, for the moment, to be anticipated. If the present peaceful or semi-peaceful conditions continue for another month, I think at the end of that time the experiment of raising the blockade might be tried.

There is also another reason which makes the beginning of September an opportune time for reopening trade, if this be done at all.

There is at present considerable scarcity in the Soudan. *I do not myself consider that the blockade is the cause of this, or, at most, only very partially.* But it gets the credit of being the cause, and, in consequence, impresses the natives with the idea of our power, with the result of making them more peacefully disposed.

In the month of September the harvest will begin to come in, and then much of this scarcity will disappear. If, therefore, the blockade is raised, this may well be done at a time when, if maintained, it would be felt by the natives to be very ineffective.

I would therefore recommend that, if the present *peaceful conditions* continue, the blockade on the Upper Nile should be removed at the end of August, and trade permitted, as proposed by the Egyptian authorities, from four markets at Assiout, Assouan, Korosko, and Wady Halfa, which markets should be under very strict supervision. Any trade in munitions of war would, of course, be absolutely forbidden.

The conditions at Suakin are quite different from those on the Upper Nile, and I do not think that in its case any action from home is required at present. The markets established to the north and south of the town are working with good results, and the whole outlook of affairs is so satisfactory, that matters may well be left to develop themselves in the direction in which they are now tending.[1]

I will only add that one result of my visit to Egypt has been to lead me to the conclusion that the question of *permitting or preventing trade with the Soudan* has not the importance, one way

[1] A somewhat difficult point may arise in connection with the sea blockade of the Red Sea Coast, as, although markets have been established on shore, *dhows carrying goods to those markets are liable to be seized as prizes by our vessels carrying on the blockade.* This point, however, I conceive it to be beyond my province to deal with.

or the other, that is attributed to it. I do not think that the blockade produces the pressure on the dervishes that its advocates imagine, neither do I believe that its removal will give the stimulus to commerce anticipated by those who are opposed to it. No people will be more disappointed if trade is reopened than the Cairo merchants, who are now petitioning earnestly for the blockade to be raised.

In conclusion, I desire to express my most sincere thanks to Sir Henry Drummond Wolff and to Sir Evelyn Baring, not only for their personal kindness to me when I was in Cairo, but also for the valuable assistance they gave me in obtaining information of every kind.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) C. GROVE.

With respect to the foregoing from Colonel Grove, the first question that rises is,—Why was anyone sent out at all? Her Majesty's Government had already in their possession the collective opinions of some score of authorities—civil and military, English and Egyptian—and how could the value of the opinions of these gentlemen on the spot be affected by that of Colonel Grove, fresh from the War Office? Either the Government had lost faith in the accuracy of the information hitherto transmitted, or they were prepared to set Colonel Grove's opinion over all the rest. These are the alternatives that appear on the surface, but as they are both simply out of the question, the natural inference is that there is a *motive* that the Government did not care to reveal. The colourless character of the report, dated 28th July, looks as if it were intended as an excuse for the inactivity of the Government. The two reports are in themselves open to curious comment. Colonel Grove telegraphs, 9th July, after *two* days' experience, "I have, I think, fully mastered the views with regard to the trade question, and other matters which are held here." These questions having been under consideration for as many months by the most competent men on the spot without their having arrived

at any such complacent result. Then the "strong reasons for reopening the trade" arrived at on the 9th July, seem to be "sicklied o'er with the pale cast" of the War Office on the 28th, as will be seen by the last paragraph but one of the report, when they disappear and give place to the very mild conclusion that the questions that have been agitating the best heads for months, have after all been very much overrated, and don't much signify. It will be observed from beginning to end, that the report *does not contain a single opinion of anyone but the writer*, and a more meagre and flaccid document it would be difficult to conceive. If the object of Her Majesty's Government in sending out Colonel Grove was to furnish themselves with an apology for doing nothing, it may be scored a success.

As a set-off to the above report, attention is especially directed to the following substantial and instructive telegram which ought to have made a deep impression on Her Majesty's Government.

No. 96.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH.
(*Received August 14th.*)

Alexandria, August 8th, 1886.

MY LORD,—Yesterday the *Sheikh Ibrahim-el-Senussi* called on me. He is a cousin of the great Sheikh, and head of the sect of that name, and representative of the order here. He is also Agent for Morocco, a rich man, and the proprietor of estates in Egypt.

He was very cordial, and spoke highly in favour of friendship between the Mussulman races and England. He said that England was the only country on whom the Mussulmans could rely, and that he hoped the friendship would never cease.

I told him that England was deeply interested in the prosperity of Mussulmans, many of whom resided in India, and, as a proof of this interest, I instanced the steps recently taken by Her Majesty's Government through Messrs. Cook to facilitate the journey to and from Mecca of Indian pilgrims.

The Sheikh replied that he had already heard of this arrangement, and that it had produced a most favourable effect in the Mussulman world.

I then asked him if he had any news from the Soudan.

He replied that he thought the Mahdist movement was practically over. *He advocated the opening of the trade, which he said would content three-fourths of the population, who, in the absence of facilities for commerce, were thrown into the hands of the dervishes. If the Soudanese could not* TRADE *they must* FIGHT. A considerable traffic was carried on through Tripoli, as the commodities of life must be procured somewhere. But this was a difficult and expensive route, and he trusted, in the interests of peace, that trade would soon be reopened through the usual channels.

I found him very reticent about his order, the importance of which he endeavoured to minimize. He was profuse in the expression of his desire to be serviceable to Her Majesty's Government and to myself personally, and is coming here to pay his respects to His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh.

With reference to the question of trade, I have the honour to forward the summary of an article in "El-Ahram" of the 6th instant, and an extract of a letter from General Watson to Sir Frederick Stephenson.

The following is important, as showing the view that is taken by English merchants of the vexatious obstructions to trade caused by the action of the British military authorities in Egypt.

Inclosure in No. 99.

MESSRS. MATHESON AND CO. TO MR. J. FOX TURNER.

66, *Peter Street, August* 19*th*, 1886.

DEAR SIR,—*Our Egyptian customers complain very strongly to us of the difficulties thrown in the way of their trade with the Soudan* by the action of the BRITISH *military authorities*, who refuse to allow packages of goods to cross the frontier lest arms or ammunition should be concealed in them.

They are prepared to do a fair business with Manchester in cotton goods, and to submit to any examination that may be necessary, if only they can be allowed to reopen the trade, for which they assert the Soudan population is quite prepared.

A profitable and not inconsiderable trade in Lancashire manufactures is being stopped, which we feel sure needs only bringing under the notice of the Government for measures to be taken which will enable the trade to be carried on, with proper precautions to keep out the war material, which the merchants here have no desire to introduce.

We have had *considerable orders for Lancashire manufactures*

nipped in the bud during the last few weeks, and feel much aggrieved at this unnecessary restriction to our trade.

Whether the fault lies, as we have been told, with the home authorities, or with those in Egypt, we feel sure that it only wants a proper representation making at head-quarters for the application of the necessary remedies.

We are, &c.
(Signed) D. MATHESON AND CO.

Sir H. D. Wolff, after four months' experience of the question, consistently persists in his advice to raise the blockade.

No. 111.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH.
(*Received September 11th.*)

Alexandria, September 4th, 1886.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inclose a Report addressed by Watson Pasha to the Soudan Department.

This document will, I hope, be satisfactory to your Lordship. Osman Digna has left Tamai for Khartoum, which circumstance, together with those reported by Youssouf Pasha Shudhi, confirms the views I have already expressed to your Lordship as to the gradual collapse of the revolutionary movement in the Soudan.

I cannot but repeat the opinion I have so often ventured to submit to Her Majesty's Government, *that it will be very desirable* AS SOON AS POSSIBLE *to open trade* on the Nile frontier. If the measure be unsuccessful, the blockade can always be renewed. If, on the contrary, it proves to be a success, as offering a test of the pacific disposition of the tribes, Her Majesty's Government will have ample justification for speedily and largely reducing the number of Her Majesty's troops in Egypt.

General commanding in Egypt opposes the above advice.[2]

[2] Yet on the 2nd July and the 2nd October—previous and subsequent dates to the following—General Stephenson concurs in the advantages of opening trade and raising the blockade. It is very strange that some time between these two dates, he should express an entirely opposite opinion. We regret that there is no copy of the telegram published, for it would be interesting to learn in what terms the General Officer commanding expressed this temporary divergence.

No. 116.

SIR R. THOMPSON TO SIR J. PAUNCEFOTE.—(*Received September 17th.*)

War Office, September 16th, 1886.

SIR,—With reference to your letter of the 30th ultimo, and War Office reply thereto of the 3rd instant, I am directed to acquaint you, for the information of the Earl of Iddesleigh, that the *General Officer commanding in Egypt has stated by telegram that he does not consider it advisable to reopen trade with the Soudan at present;* and I am to state that, in view of this opinion of the General Officer commanding, MR. SECRETARY SMITH *regrets that he is* UNABLE TO RECOMMEND THE *reopening of the trade in question.*

Proposal to decree trade open with the Soudan at a definite period.

No. 126.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH. (*Received October 2nd*, 3·30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October 2nd*, 1886, 3·10 P.M.

Moukhtar Pasha is pressing very strongly for the reopening of trade with the Soudan. He says that the Soudan trade is diverted to Massowah.

General Stephenson and General Grenfell, whom I have consulted, CONCUR in the following proposal:—

That a Decree shall be issued for the opening of trade with the Soudan on the 15th November, provided that the peace is not disturbed or seriously threatened in the meanwhile. Only such persons *as may receive permits* on the frontier or at Cairo will be allowed to carry on trade. The blockade may be re-established by the military authorities *at any time* they may consider it to be necessary.

In the opinion of Generals Stephenson and Grenfell, frontier may be considered safe until next high Nile, if hostile force has not started from Dongola by the 15th November.

Please let me have an early answer.

This telegram is very important as showing the opinion of Moukhtar Pasha as to the trade question. It also disposes of the scare that had been promoted by somebody, that the Dervishes were massing—the only tangible excuse for not opening up the trade.

No. 139.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH.
(*Received October* 11*th.*)

(Extract.) *Cairo, September* 30*th*, 1886.

Moukhtar Pasha has just arrived here, and I have had a short conversation with him on the pr sent position of affairs in the Soudan.

A report from Youssouf Pasha Shuhdi throws great discredit on the report given by the son of Hussein Pasha Khalifa of the massing of a large army at Dongola, the alleged details of which I forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch of the 18th instant.

Moukhtar Pasha shares in the belief now generally held, that the report of the advance of large forces is pure invention.

Moukhtar Pasha SPOKE IN TERMS OF SOME ANNOYANCE *at the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to open the trade.* The blockade did not prevent the dervishes from procuring supplies, and the chief result obtained *was the diversion to the Italians at Massowah of the trade which properly belonged to Egypt,* and the concentration of the traffic on the Nile frontier in the hands of ———— and his associates.

General Stephenson puts the question from a point of honour as well as policy.

No. 142.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH.
(*Received October* 11*th*, 4·40 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October* 11*th*, 1886, 4·30 P.M.

General Stephenson concurs in the views expressed in my telegram of the 9th instant, but adds that, *as soon as peace is restored in the Eastern Soudan, we are* IN HONOUR *bound to open the trade at Suakin.* I AGREE WITH THIS OPINION.

Below is conveyed the restrictive and qualified consent of H.M.'s Government. It is obvious that the substantial value of this permission is entirely emasculated by the undefined "restrictions." "As may be required" has so comprehensive a scope that no merchant would care to ship under such conditions.

No. 143.

THE EARL OF IDDESLEIGH TO SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

Foreign Office, October 12th, 1886.

SIR,—I have received your telegrams of the 7th and 11th nstant.

Her Majesty's Government have considered the recommendations made by you, with the concurrence of General Sir F. Stephenson, *that in view of the capture of Tamai by the friendly tribes the trade with the Soudan through Suakin should be reopened.*

I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government agree to the opening of trade at Suakin whenever it may be thought desirable, *subject*, however, to such *restrictions* as may be required to prevent supplies from reaching Khartoum in any large quantity by that route.

The broad issue of these several despatches, which must be apparent to every one, is—That all authorities are agreed that the trade should be opened up with the Soudan—some time or other; the only question being—what time? The authorities on *the spot* say—*at once.* Those *at home* practically say—*sine die.*

Now from this difference arises the very pertinent query: What is the use of an expensive Staff in Egypt, when their advice upon the very subjects they were sent out to inquire into and legislate on is neglected in deference to certain officers at the Horse Guards?

It thus resolves itself into a taxpayers' question, and they have a right *to insist upon a reply.*

CHAPTER XI.

Indecision as to opening trade—Consul Cameron's protest against illegal taxes, damaging to British trade—Absolute abandonment by Egypt confirmed—Coast south of Ras Kasar under Italian protection—Failure of raiding policy as to Tokar—Its mischievous results—5000 troops necessary to clear trenches at Suakin—Dormer advises feeding "friendlies" inside and outside Suakin—Food supplies stopped to "friendlies" for fear of reaching dervishes.

As in the previous chapter, the advantages of opening up the trade were so powerfully urged by Sir H. D. Wolff's despatches, so in this will be found the same subject equally powerfully dealt with by Sir E. Baring, resulting in a consummation of their wishes. How this desirable consummation arrived at by civilians of great ability and large experience was doomed to be dissipated and rendered abortive in its effect, by the action of a military officer specially sent out, backed up by even the more uninformed at the War Office, can only be judged by reading the despatches hereafter quoted. Not only is the policy of pacification and reconciliation by the means of commerce maintained by H.M.'s civil servants from every quarter, but it is urged directly and indirectly by merchants on the spot, the representatives of the London Chamber of Commerce, the International Arbitration and Peace Association, gentlemen so well acquainted with the situation as Mr. Francis William Fox, Mr. A. B. Wylde, and in

fact by all whose opinion is of any weight. In these circumstances the perversity of H.M.'s Government in pursuing practically an opposite course, can only be accounted for on the assumption, as has been remarked before, that *their motives are not what they seem.* To consent to the freedom of trade, but to accompany that consent with obstructive, restrictive, and vexatious edicts, subject above all to "discretionary" military interference, is simply an administrative affectation of a reality that does not in fact exist. It is very much as if a railway company were to declare a line open, the trains being subject to stoppage, anywhere, any time, and for any time, that the officials thought proper. In such circumstances the passengers would be as limited in number as those merchants who have availed themselves of H.M.'s Government trading licence. Until an unfettered system of trade, such as is advised in the following from Sir E. Baring, is fairly established, all hopes of a definite, peaceful, and prosperous settlement of the Soudan may be dismissed as vain and chimerical:—

No. 24.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received by telegraph, January 25th.*)

Cairo, January 25th, 1887.

MY LORD,—I had the honour this day to telegraph to your Lordship, to the effect *that all the authorities here are now agreed that trade may safely be opened with the Soudan.* It would, however, be confined to certain routes. The export of all munitions of war would, of course, be prohibited.

I learn from General Stephenson that he has telegraphed to the War Office on the subject.

I should be glad if your Lordship would inform me whether *Her Majesty's Government has any objection to such a course.*

In view of the foregoing telegram, what could be the necessity of a consultation with the Secretary of State for War, upon a purely commercial ques-

tion? Of course it implies some military restrictions.

No. 25.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, January 28th, 1887.

SIR,—I have received your telegram of the 25th instant, reporting that all the authorities in Egypt are now agreed that trade may safely be reopened with the Soudan.

After consultation with the Secretary of State for War I have informed you to-day, by telegraph, that Her Majesty's Government are ready, under these circumstances, to agree to the reopening of trade upon the conditions specified in your telegram, and in the Memorandum by General Stephenson, inclosed in your despatch of the 9th instant.

Tolls proposed to begin with, by way of encouragement to traders!!

No. 26.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received by telegraph, January 29th.*)

Cairo, January 27th, 1887.

MY LORD,—In connection with the question of reopening trade with the Soudan, I have the honour to report that the desirability or otherwise of imposing a duty on goods arriving from the Soudan by the Valley of the Nile has been carefully considered.

The question presents some difficulties. Although as a matter of fact the Egyptian Government does not exercise authority over any part of the Soudan save the ports of the Red Sea, from a technical point of view the province still forms part of the Ottoman dominions.

It is difficult to fathom the motive for proposing an admittedly illegal and vexatious tax on exports being raised, as the merchants, whose trade has been ruined by the action of H.M.'s Government, would be the sufferers—having to pay the duty directly or indirectly themselves—unless the object was to cripple trade altogether.

No. 27.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, January 31st, 1887.

SIR,—I informed you to-day, by telegraph, that Her Majesty's Government have no objection to the modifications which, for the reasons explained in your despatch of the 27th instant, it is proposed to introduce into the conditions under which trade should be reopened between Egypt and the Soudan.

This letter will well repay the trouble of reading. It gives a most comprehensive, and at the same time, particular and critical view of the situation, and leaves lasting regret that such sound advice was not followed.

Inclosure in No. 1.

SIR E. BARING TO COLONEL KITCHENER.

Cairo, January 15th, 1887.

DEAR COLONEL KITCHENER,—All the recent news from Suakin goes to show that matters seem to be settling down, and that the tribes are rather more inclined than heretofore to come to terms.

Under these circumstances, it may be desirable that I should write to you a few lines on the general political situation, leaving to your discretion, in which I have full confidence, the particular methods to be adopted in giving effect to the policy I am about to indicate.

Your immediate superior in political matters is, of course, Nubar Pasha. I have communicated the contents of this letter to him, and he has expressed his agreement in what I am about to say.

As regards the English Government, *I have received no recent communication authorizing me to give you instructions*, but I think I can state with confidence that I am accurately representing the views which Her Majesty's Government entertain. In order, however, to make certain, I shall send a copy of this letter to Lord Salisbury.

For many reasons, which are too obvious to require mention at length, *there can be no question for the present of re-establishing the direct authority of the Egyptian Government in the Eastern Soudan.* I speak, of course, only of the inland portions, not of the seaports.

Speaking, therefore, only of the inland portions, the objects which the Egyptian Government, acting with the full concurrence of Her Majesty's Government, seek to attain, are two-fold.

In the first place, they wish to ensure peace and tranquillity on the immediate frontiers of their *de facto* possessions. *In the second place, they wish to make such arrangements as will enable trade to be resumed with the more remote tribes. Under existing cicumstances, both of these objects can only be obtained by diplomacy, aided, possibly, by money.* The difficult task which is, therefore, set before you, is, by skilful negotiations, to encourage the amity of the friendly tribes, and to win over to your side the tribes which are hostile or semi-hostile.

The grant of money on good behaviour may possibly be made use of as a powerful instrument.

The policy of granting subsidies to the tribal Chiefs in the Soudan has been frequently under discussion during the last three years. There has always been a very general agreement of opinion that the policy was a wise one. But the difficulty of giving practical effect to it has been very great. This difficulty has principally arisen from the fact that, up to the present time, there have been no leaders of sufficient prominence in the Soudan to make it worth while subsidizing them.

Any recommendations you make in this direction will, of course, receive careful attention. But you will, doubtless, bear in mind that, especially *in the present embarrassed state of Egyptian finance*, it is useless for the Egyptian Government to pay subsidies unless there is a good prospect of attaining the objects for which the subsidies are paid. Those objects I have described above.

Your knowledge of the character of those with whom you have to deal will enable you to judge far better than I can of the sort of language which it will be advisable to hold to them. But it will be desirable to avoid saying anything from which it might be implied that there is any present intention of re-establishing the direct authority of the Egyptian Government *in any of the inland portions of the Soudan.* As I have already explained, *there is no such intention.*

Moreover, all the information I have received leaves on my mind the impression that, although any such prospect might be popular with some classes, it would probably evoke the hostility of others, and tend to delay the return of such a state of tranquillity as will enable trade to be resumed.

In addition to the points to which I have drawn your attention, there is one other subject which you should bear constantly in mind. I mean the desirability of doing everything of which the *circumstances permit* to check and discourage the Slave Trade.

The following reply is another example of the contradictory course the Government seemed bent on pursuing. If the Marquis of Salisbury "entirely

approves," why did he not insist on the policy being carried out?

No. 2.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO SIR E. BARING.

Foreign Office, February 11th, 1887.

SIR,—With reference to your despatch of the 16th ult., I have to state that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the terms of the semi-official letter which you addressed to Colonel Kitchener on the 15th of January upon the subject of the relations between Egypt and the Eastern Soudan.

In Colonel Kitchener's reply on the 6th February, 1887, to Sir E. Baring, he makes the following remarks touching the opening of trade, and more especially as to his views about the future of Tokar and its government—all matters of curious interest:—

During all these wars many of the Sheikhs of tribes have died or been killed; I have, therefore, given some papers to the effect that I acknowledge the Sheikh named as Sheikh of Sheikhs of the tribe; for many Arab reasons these papers please them, and are much prized. I have also refused to give such papers to tribes near Tokar until that place ceases to be hostile. *I have opened trade for the friendly Arabs to a* CERTAIN EXTENT, promising them a complete opening *when Tokar comes in.* I have also allowed SOME trade with Tokar, and as everyone that enters Suakin sees me, I have thus talked to several hundreds from there, until lately the Emir Faki Ali, of Tokar, has closed the trade from his side, evidently afraid of the influence it was having on the people. *This is naturally a very unpopular move on his part*, and I am rather glad he has done it.

Tokar is now a matter of grave importance in all the Eastern Soudan. The place is still in the hands of the Mahdists, and is ruled by an Emir; it forms the outpost of the influence of Khalifa Abdullah or Osman Digna. As there is no place of importance between Tokar and Kassala, where Osman Digna now is, and Tokar and Khartoum, where Khalifa Abdullah remains, it follows that the secession of Tokar from the Mahdi's cause would have enormous influence in this portion of the Soudan, by creating a feeling of security amongst the tribes who have given up Mahdiism.

Lately, the Ashraff tribe came from Khor Baraka to the neigh-

bourhood of Tokar, and I saw the brother of the head Sheikh here.

* * * * * * *

I think that it is not unlikely that the friendly Arabs may take some steps to eject Faki Ali before long, but it is impossible for me to say for certain what they will do. *I should naturally assist them in this object*, as Tokar is the headquarters of the rebels who threaten to attack us, and who frustrate both objects desired by Her Majesty's Government.

With regard to Tokar, I have said if they will give up Mahdiism I will visit them, and try and secure their future tranquillity, and that I will open trade for them.

* * * * * * *

When Tokar comes in, I think it will be absolutely necessary for me to appoint a paid agent there, and also to pay something to my agent at Sinkat. If the head Sheikh of the Ashraffs will act at Tokar, I think he will be able to keep the country quiet, as he has quite sufficient force at his back, and Tokar is his country; besides, being descended from the Prophet Mahommed adds considerably to his prestige. I am not now in any way bound to appoint him, but I expect my choice will fall on him when the time comes.

* * * * * * *

I think the league against Mahdiism is strengthening, and that shortly the Emir Faki Ali will find it necessary to leave Tokar. A few days ago he had some trouble with his people, wanting them to come and attack Suakin, which they refused to do; he then said he would leave them, so I sent him word I would pay the hire of the camels that took him away.

Respecting the above appointment of a nominee of Colonel Kitchener, as Sheikh of Sheikhs, this person having no claim by *lineage or prestige* to exercise authority over all the tribes, they were naturally rather irritated than conciliated by such a step, clannishness being a prominent feature in their character. Again, the opening of trade under certain conditions, and limiting it *to a favoured few* instead of throwing it open to all without fear or favour, would have the same tendency. The desire to obtain an ascendency in Tokar is also open to the same objections. Such a course was not likely to lead to pacification, but rather the contrary, and was in direct opposition to the wishes of

Her Majesty's Government not to interfere with tribes in the interior.

This very sensible exposition of the impolicy of Colonel Kitchener's proposal is deserving of all praise, and claims special attention. It is both instructive and conclusive as to the mischievous effects to be anticipated.

Inclosure in No. 35.

CONSUL CAMERON TO SIR E BARING.

Suakin, January 10*th*, 1887.

SIR,—At the beginning of the year I learnt that Kitchener Pasha had decided, with the consent of the Shenawist Medjliss of native merchants, to impose what I may call a "new 7 per cent. export tax" on produce from the interior intended for export to Europe.

As I required accurate official information for transmission to you, I wrote and asked the Pasha certain questions, so as to leave no doubt about the intended operation of the tax.

The Pasha has not answered my second letter, but in an interview he informed me that he was referring the whole matter to Cairo, and was forwarding my two letters as statements of the case against the tax.

He told me that *his idea was to establish a series of stations in the interior* where natives, upon payment of a 7 per cent. gate or bazaar duty, would be allowed to sell their gum, &c., and that a receipt from the Government would be given to the buyer enabling him to pass gum, &c., already taxed as far as Suakin Custom-house, where of course the usual 1 per cent. export dues would then be levied.

That it would be the natives who would suffer from this 7 per cent. inland tax, and that it would not affect European trade or traders.

That it was an octroi, not an export tax.

I answered that the native traders, once they knew of the 7 per cent. leviable at the inland stations, would be sure to avoid such halting-places, and would trade either in the desert or else sell just outside Suakin gate, and that thus the Pasha would be left face to face with European traders, who would pay these extra 7 per cent. dues under protest, and attack their legality at the Mixed Tribunals.

I also pointed out my idea of the nature of an octroi, which is essentially a tax leviable on provisions and other perishable articles intended for local consumption and not for export.

The Pasha was good enough to admit the force of my arguments, and the whole matter has now gone to Cairo for settlement.

From a European commercial point of view, Suakin is an *entrepôt* merely, a wharf and a custom-house, and the town gate is only an outer custom-house gate a few hundred yards inland.

It will hardly be legal to impose new dues on raw produce or Manchester goods passing in and out through the town gate almost simultaneously with the 1 per cent. export tax and the 8 per cent. import tax leviable at the custom-house according to the Treaty Tariff.

In my opinion, a 7 per cent. export tax will cripple, if not stifle, trade at the outset.

Massowah trade is reviving at the expense of Suakin. I doubt if the Italians dare impose any heavy dues there *for fear of encouraging smuggling.*

Until this province has been really pacified and credit restored, it is too soon to impose taxes.

But with a reviving trade it may be possible gradually, and with great caution, to collect a considerable local revenue by means of sundry petty taxes, such as a toll on camels at the gate, hucksters' licences, house and hut taxes, and so forth.

All this, however, is a matter of policy for the Pasha to deal with.

The new 7 per cent. export tax will affect British trade, and therefore I have ventured to address you on the subject.

Contraband trade, including the slave trade, followed in the wake of the blockade—this trade which Her Majesty's Government profess to be so anxious to suppress, and yet they allow their officers to adopt courses which are so well calculated to encourage it; in fact the Government proceedings are so contradictory, that they suggest a doubt as to their being really genuine supporters of the conciliation policy at all. The following telegram is an example of what was doing at Jeddah:—

No. 42.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received March 8th.*)

Cairo, February 27th, 1887.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to forward, for your Lordship's

information, copy of a despatch which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Jeddah respecting the revival of trade between that place and Berber.

Inclosure in No. 42.

CONSUL JAGO TO SIR E. BARING.

Jeddah, February 17th, 1887.

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you that recently a *large number of Soudan Arab traders from Berber and Khartoum has arrived here from the other side, north of Rowayah, with* A FEW SLAVES, *gold and silver ornaments, &c.* Having disposed of these, they have now left on their return with cargoes of *Manchester goods, dhourra, cloth, &c., for the Berber market,* said to value over 200,000 *dollars,* partly belonging to themselves and partly to Hadramee merchants of Jeddah, whom they have persuaded to join them in the venture. Ten boats have now left, having cleared for Massowah or Yambo. They hug the eastern coast of the Red Sea among the reefs until they arrive near El Wedj, whence they strike across to the Soudan side, fetching as near as possible a place called Alu Bishlish, said to be the nearest point for Berber.

Should these ventures prove successful, they will no doubt increase, as much demand is said to exist at Berber for manufactures.

P.S.—I have brought these facts to the knowledge of Mr. Cameron.

This telegram exemplifies the manner of exercising the "military discretionary" power already referred to—why is Tokar left out? Whatever might have been the reason, it should have been given. Under any circumstances the omission was sure to produce irritation. Was this the motive?

No. 68.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received April 26th*, 10·30 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, April 26th*, 1887, 10·5 A.M.

Cameron telegraphs *Kitchener to-day granted permission for trade from Suakin along Berber road and north,* BUT NOT WITH TOKAR AND SOUTH.

The petition below, of the British Indian Mer-

chants, shows clearly to what straits they were put by the suspension of trade, and the disadvantage at which they stood as compared with other traders, and it also shows how unfavourably the British system compares with the Italian in the same territory. The opinion of the sentiments entertained by the dervishes, should, from such a reliable source, have had great influence. To condense Sir E. Baring's reply, it amounts to "I would if I could," and this is really the substance of all his replies to similar questions, before or since.

No. 81.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received May 9th.*)

Cairo, April 27th, 1887.

MY LORD,—With reference to previous correspondence, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a Petition which has been addressed to me by certain British Indian merchants residing at Suakin, praying for the reopening of trade with the Soudan.

A copy of my reply to this Petition is likewise inclosed herewith.

Inclosure 1 in No. 81.

BRITISH INDIAN MERCHANTS AT SUAKIN TO SIR E. BARING.

Suakin, April 19th, 1887.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,—We, the undersigned British Indian merchants doing business in Suakin, hereby humbly petition your Excellency to extend to us the same privileges given to the traders at Wady Halfa.

For the last three and a half years our trade has been stopped owing to the revolution caused by the Mahdi: during this time our capital has been sinking, and unless trade be opened we shall be forced to leave here.

Our trade consists of Manchester piece-goods and sundry descriptions of cloths from Bombay; we have patiently waited the opening up of the country, and have come to the conclusion at last of humbly petitioning your Excellency to use your utmost power with His Highness the Khedive to have trade opened up as hitherto.

All the tribes are ready to do business, as they are tired of Mahdiism, which prevents their doing any business, *and if the Govern-*

Sampson Low and Co. Ltd. London. Collotype Lemercier, Paris

Slave boys.

ment here would proclaim trade to be free to all, the rebellion would immediately cease.

From Massowah the Italians put no restriction whatever on legitimate trade. We fail to see why *Suakin and the ports along the coast* should be debarred from entering *into competition with Wady Halfa and Massowah.* From the conversations we have had with the so-called rebels, we feel convinced that as soon as trade is declared to be free rebellion will immediately cease.

Praying, &c.,
(Signed) JUGGIWAN LOSAN,
(And 16 other signatures.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 81.

SIR E. BARING TO BRITISH INDIAN MERCHANTS AT SUAKIN.

Cairo, April 27th, 1887.

GENTLEMEN,—I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your Petition of the 19th instant.

The question of reopening trade with the Soudan has for many months been under the serious consideration both of Her Majesty's Government and of the Government of the Khedive, and you may rest assured that there has been every desire to reopen such trade as soon as circumstances would permit.

Since the date of your letter, I have been informed by Her Majesty's Consul at Suakin that permission has been granted for trade from Suakin along the Berber road and to the north.

I trust that means will shortly be found for a further extension of this permission, and *that before long trade with the Soudan will be fully reopened.*

Military "discretion" is shown in its obstructive form, in the following reply to the letter of Mr. Francis William Fox. Colonel Kitchener was not favourable to Mr. Fox's proposal about the cotton seed. It is true he is supported by Colonel Chermside, but the tone of this officer's opinion is suggestive of its having been given in deference to Colonel Kitchener, rather than conveying his own unbiassed view. It is very significant that although the opinion of the Egyptian Government is *wanted, it is not given.*

Telegrams and Mr. Fox's letter.

No. 105.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY TO MR. PORTAL.

Foreign Office, August 12th, 1887.

SIR,—I transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter from Mr. Fox, applying on behalf of the Soudan Company, for permission to send an agent to Trinkitat to distribute cotton-seed to some of the Hadendowa Sheikhs, with a view to the cultivation of the cotton crop in the Tokar Delta.

I requested you to-day, by telegraph, to ascertain and report the views of the Egyptian Government and Colonel Kitchener in regard to this application.

No. 106.

MR. PORTAL TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received by telegraph, August 13th.*)

Cairo, August 13th, 1887.

MY LORD,—I have received your Lordship's telegram of the 12th instant respecting Mr. Fox's application for permission to distribute cotton-seed to Hadendowa Sheikhs at Trinkitat for cultivation in the Tokar Delta.

In obedience to your Lordship's instructions I referred the matter to Colonel Kitchener, and have had the honour to telegraph to your Lordship the substance of his opinion, *which is distinctly adverse to any such distribution of cotton-seed, on the ground that Trinkitat is strictly blockaded*, that if trade is to be opened with Tokar it must be opened for everybody, and not as a monopoly for Mr. Fox or any Soudan Company, and thirdly, that the people of Tokar have already been promised cotton-seed on condition of their remaining peaceable, but that on the contrary, they were reported as intending to advance against Suakin after the hot weather.

I also consulted Colonel Chermside, the Acting Sirdar of the Egyptian army, whose opinion is entitled to the more weight, as he was Governor of Suakin and the Red Sea Littoral in 1884 and 1885. *He, personally, sees no objection at all* to the distribution of seed, but agrees that the greater weight should be given to the opinions of Colonel Kitchener, as being the responsible officer on the spot. He added, however, with regard to Mr. Fox's proposal, that even were the distribution of seed to be permitted, he did not think that the Hadendowa Sheikhs would be at all the proper recipients. The fertile district of Tokar is inhabited by a peasant or labouring population of the Ashraf, Artega, and other tribes, whereas the Hadendowas are seldom, if ever, cultivators, although they exact heavy tithes from the crops of the neighbouring tribes.

No doubt, however, if cotton-seed were given to them, the Hadendowas would barter and sell it to the Tokar people, and then tax the crop when it grows up.

I propose to address your Lordship further on the whole subject of opening trade with Tokar in the course of a few days.

No. 104.

MR. F. W. FOX TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received August* 11*th.*)

8, *Queen Anne's Gate, Westminster, S.W.*
August 10*th,* 1887.

MY LORD MARQUIS,—We are anxious to send a cable message to Suakin respecting the immediate dispatch of cotton-seed to some of the Hadendowa Sheikhs, so as, if possible, to induce them to cultivate a cotton crop this season on their lands in the Tokar Delta.

We propose sending an Englishman to Trinkitat (a port about forty-five miles south of Suakin) to superintend the distribution of the cotton-seed.

A well-known Greek trader at Suakin, conversant with the cultivation of the cotton crop in the Tokar Delta, and who also has the confidence of the Hadendowa Sheikhs, will probably accompany our agent.

As the port of Trinkitat is now virtually closed to trade by orders of the Governor-General of Suakin, we shall be glad if his Excellency will grant permission and facilities, so that our agents can arrange with the Hadendowa Sheikhs for the cultivation of cotton near Tokar.

We believe that the means proposed to be adopted will prove most conducive, and will effectually aid in the restoration of confidential and friendly feelings between the Hadendowa Sheikhs and British traders.

We are advised that Fagi Ali, one of the head Sheikhs of the Hadendowa at Tokar, has sent a message to our agent at Suakin to say that he and his people are tired of fighting, and ready to commence cultivating cotton if we would send them seed.

The Tokar Delta is irrigated by the waters of the Khor Barca during August and September, so that if this season's cotton crop is to be secured to the Hadendowas, there is no time to lose in obtaining, if possible by cable, permission for our agents to proceed without delay to Trinkitat.

(On behalf of the proposed Soudan Company),
I have, etc.
(Signed) FRANCIS WILLIAM FOX.

Official announcements of the opening of trade—

under what vexatious conditions will be seen by the Proclamation.

No. 124.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received October 24th.*)

Cairo, October 12th, 1887.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to report to your Lordship that I have to-day received a telegram from Mr. Vice-Consul Simons at Suakin, informing me that *Colonel Kitchener has proclaimed Agig and all places north and south of the Berber road open to trade at the merchant's risk.*

No. 129.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received October 31st.*)

Cairo, October 21st, 1887.

MY LORD,—With reference to my despatch of the 12th instant, I have the honour to inclose a copy of Colonel Kitchener's Proclamation opening Agig and all places north and south of the Berber road to trade.

Colonel Kitchener has informed Mr. Simons, British Vice-Consul at Suakin, that he intends opening the port of Halaib to trade, and that persons will also be permitted to trade with Sheikh Burghut under special permission.

The following Proclamation above referred to, it will be seen, impose upon merchants and traders the humiliating condition of asking leave of the Governor to earn their living—"only to petition"—this is a large and arbitrary "only," and calculated to offend all of an independent spirit.

The tone of the Proclamation suggests a desire to let everyone know that there is a Governor, and that every want of the inhabitants is to depend upon his beneficence. Again, who is to determine those that are to be "suspected," the police? The Proclamation opens the door to both partiality and corruption.

Inclosure in No. 129.

PROCLAMATIONS BY COLONEL KITCHENER.

(No. 1.)

(Translation.)

To the Chief of Police, &c.—Referring to my Proclamation of the 26th April last, advising the readiness of the Government to accept the Petitions of merchants desirous of sending merchandise to Berber and all places north of the Berber road, according to the stipulated conditions, I now supplement the original Proclamation with the following:—

The Government are prepared to promptly accept the Petitions of persons desirous of sending merchandise to Berber and to all places north and south of the Berber road, on the distinct understanding that the Government are not responsible for anything that may occur to the merchants, their employés, or their property when once clear of the walls of Suakin; nevertheless, whosoever wishes to send goods to Berber or to places north and south of the Berber road have only to petition the Governor, stating the quantity and description of the goods to be forwarded, when a pass will be given accordingly, without the necessity of guarantee; but in the event of suspected persons endeavouring to leave the town of Suakin with a consigment of goods, the police have the right and power to stop the said suspected person at the gates.

To be proclaimed generally by the Chief of the Police.

(Signed) H. H. KITCHENER,
Governor-General of the Red Sea Littoral.

Suakin, October 11th, 1887.

(No. 2.)

You are directed to inform the merchants of the town of Suakin that the Government are prepared to receive petitions from those desirous of trading between this and the port of Agig, on the understanding that merchandise forwarded hence is both here, and at Agig, under the jurisdiction of the Custom-house, and are not prohibited articles, such as arms, ammunition, &c.

Should any prohibited articles be found in the dhows proceeding hence to Agig, the cargo will be confiscated by the Government, and the crew of the dhow and those implicated will be tried by court-martial. The Government have the right of searching all dhows proceeding hence to Agig.

The Government do not hold themselves responsible for any harm, damage, or interference that may occur to the merchandise, dhows, or persons engaged in the trade in question.

A copy of this Proclamation has been forwarded to Agig for the information and guidance of the Mamour of that port.

(Signed) H. H. KITCHENER,
Governor-General of the Red Sea Littoral.

Suakin, October, 11th, 1887.

With reference to the subject of trade, and the above proclamations, the following letters from the London Chamber of Commerce are full of interesting matter. That of the 2nd November, points out the existing resources of the Soudan, its value as a market for British goods, and the tendency that trade would induce towards pacification. That of the 13th December, in reply to the answer from the Foreign Office, dated 8th November, quoted below, most deservedly condemns the conditions of trading announced in the Proclamation of Colonel Kitchener; but no comments can add force to the criticisms, and attention is especially directed to the whole correspondence.

No. 131.

THE LONDON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received November 4th.*)

Botolph House, Eastcheap, London, November 2nd, 1887.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the question of opening up trade with the Soudan through Suakin and the adjacent tribal ports of the Egyptian Red Sea Littoral has engaged the attention of many influential members of this Chamber and others in association with them.

Such a trade, if opened up, would very largely contribute to the pacification and material development of the Soudan; but, in view of the hitherto unsettled condition of the country, any new enterprise would necessarily be attended with considerable risk. From the point of view of British trade, however, the importance of obtaining unrestricted access to such a district—possessing, as it does, rich and varied natural resources, and affording an extensive new market for British goods—must be admitted; and your Lordship will therefore realize the desirability of merchants and others interested being able, if possible, to obtain precise information as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government in opening, and keeping open, these ports for trade both by land and sea. Under existing conditions, it is equally important that

those engaged in legitimate trade with the Soudanese tribes should have an assurance that they may rely upon the good offices of the representatives of Her Majesty's Government at Suakin.

I am respectfully to ask your Lordship to favour the Chamber with any information which may bear upon these subjects, and which your Lordship may be pleased to place at the disposal of those interested through the medium of this Chamber.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) KENRIC B. MURRAY, *Secretary.*

No. 133.

FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE LONDON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.

Foreign Office, November 8th, 1887.

SIR,—I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant on the subject of trade with the Soudan, and in reply to your inquiries, I am to state that it has been decided by the Egyptian Government to open trade fully at Suakin, with only such restrictions as are necessary for custom-house purposes, and to prevent the importation of arms and ammunition. Such trade must, however, be carried on at the merchants' own risk.

South of Ras Kasar the coast of the Red Sea is under the surveillance of the Italian authorities, who have expressed the intention of opening a port at Taklai, where trade will be allowed under the same conditions.

I am to add that British merchants may, as a matter of course, count upon the good offices of Her Majesty's Representatives in Egypt in all matters connected with their business in so far as official assistance can properly be afforded to them.

A copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, forwarding the Proclamation issued by Colonel Kitchener, opening Agig and all places north and south of the Berber Road to trade, is inclosed for the information of your Chamber.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) JULIAN PAUNCEFOTE.

No. 139.

THE LONDON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY. (*Received December 15th.*)

Botolph House, Eastcheap, London, December 13th, 1887.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 8th ultimo relative to the trade in the Eastern Soudan, with which was inclosed a copy of a letter from Sir Evelyn Baring, dated the 21st October, and of a

Proclamation of Colonel Kitchener, the Egyptian Governor-General at Suakin, dated the 11th October.

In reply, I am to express the best thanks of the Council of this Chamber for your Lordship's letter, and to observe that if its provisions are carried out in the spirit in which they are conceived, they could not fail to give satisfaction to all concerned.

It appears, however, *that considerable objection is taken to the proposal to establish a system of police permits*, on the ground that it would subject trade to the espionage of clerks and others in a service which in eastern countries is not generally esteemed for probity, and would lay bare facts as to markets and goods to those who might be tempted to part with the knowledge so obtained, to the detriment of the merchants concerned. It is feared also that the proposed system would be as cumbersome and dilatory in working, as it certainly is repugnant to the feelings of well-known and respectable houses, that they should be controlled by a Police Department when conducting their legitimate trading operations.

I would venture to point out to your Lordship *that no such restrictions are in force in Egypt proper*, and, therefore, it is hoped that it will be found sufficient to reorganize the Suakin Custom-house *on the same basis as before the war*, when competent men trained at Alexandria were in charge of it, and general satisfaction was given. I am also to express the hope that no restrictions, other than those of the Customs, may be imposed in the case of British subjects at their own risk and responsibility, entering into agreements for legitimate business such as the cultivation of land in the Tokar and other suitable districts, as to which some uncertainty at present exists.

Trusting that the points to which I have referred will receive your Lordship's favourable consideration, I have, &c.

(Signed) KENRIC B. MURRAY, *Secretary*.

The following despatch from Sir E. Baring on the questions raised by the London Chamber of Commerce shows how carefully he seems to have weighed the several issues, and therefore his opinion is all the more valuable. Although moderate throughout, the tendency is to steadily encourage trade as the "only possible policy:"—

No. 24.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received January 2nd*, 1888.)

(Extract.) *Cairo, December 25th*, 1887.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lord-

ship's despatch of the 16th instant, inclosing a letter from the London Chamber of Commerce on the subject of the system under which trade is now permitted at Suakin.

On receipt of your Lordship's despatch I telegraphed to Mr. Cameron, and received a reply from him. I then wrote him a despatch. I have the honour to inclose copies of the telegrams and of my despatch, which will, I trust, meet with your Lordship's approval.

On the general question of trade at Suakin, I have to submit the following observations to your Lordship.

A good deal of difference of opinion has during the last year or two existed *amongst the local authorities at Suakin* as to the desirability of opening trade.

Your Lordship will also remember that a precisely similar question in connection with opening trade along the valley of the Nile caused, at one time, a good deal of discussion. Trade has now for a considerable time been opened at Wady Halfa, but the adoption of this measure cannot be said to have produced any political effect whatever.

I cannot help thinking that the case of Suakin is very analogous to that of Wady Halfa. Experience has shown that the fears of those who oppose the opening of trade were exaggerated. On the other hand, the advocates of the policy have been somewhat over-sanguine of the results to be obtained by the adoption of their views.

I still think that the best, and indeed the only possible, policy to pursue at Suakin is to encourage trade, but I cannot say that I am hopeful of any very immediate results being obtained in the way of tranquillizing the country.

I find it difficult to believe that the restrictions so far imposed by Colonel Kitchener have of themselves produced much effect in the way of hampering trade. Your Lordship will observe that no complaints appear to have been made by the Suakin merchants, and that Mr. Cameron does not cite any specific cases in which it can be said that any harm has been done.

At the same time, *it is certainly desirable that at Suakin as elsewhere the regulations of the Government should be framed with a view to interfering with trade as little as possible.* I am unable to agree with Mr. Cameron, that no supervision whatever is necessary, but I think that the *amount of Government supervision should be strictly limited to such measures as the peculiar military situation of Suakin demands.*

Your Lordship will observe that I have instructed Mr. Cameron in this sense.

As regards the hope expressed by the London Chamber of Commerce, that no restrictions other than those of Customs may be imposed in the case of British subjects at their own risk and

responsibility entering into agreements for legitimate business, such as the cultivation of land in the Tokar and other suitable districts, your Lordship will observe that Mr. Cameron reports to me that no restrictions are at present imposed.

The following has reference to certain inquiries by Sir E. Baring as to the operation of restrictions —it is quoted here for the sake of the last three lines touching the freedom of trade:—

Inclosure 2 in No. 24.

CONSUL CAMERON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic) *Suakin, December 25th*, 1887.

Your telegram of 23rd.

No specific case can be cited. Last paragraph, no restriction. Respecting modification, Kitchener is willing to abolish system of registration on its being clearly understood that he began it for the advantage of trade as a valuable register of each caravan route's success or difficulty, that without it Government will be under difficulties to effectually assist trade, and that there has been no complaint from merchants.

He thinks present policy of supervision at the gate necessary, owing to military situation, and also possible difficulty with foreign trading Consular Agents. My opinion is, that owing to Osman Digna, trade is now indefinitely deferred. But arguing on *status quo ante* the 11th October or recurrence of that *status quo ante, let us leave trade alone and give it a fair chance without restriction, or registration, or police supervision. As we have no aggressive force, let us try reconciliation of Tokar by trade.*

The foregoing opinion was given notwithstanding the irritating tactics of some days before as shown by the telegram below. The question is, Who sent the Friendlies?

Inclosure in No. 15.

CONSUL CAMERON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, December 12th*, 1887.

The force of Friendlies SENT AGAINST TOKAR *began to lift cattle, whereupon they were attacked, routed, and dispersed in hills beyond Tamai.*

This victory makes the Tokar people masters outside, and spoils hope of reconciliation and trade.

The next despatch from Commander Rooke is very important as to the attitude of the Friendlies towards the Tokar people; if they "never had any inclination for fighting the Tokar people," why did they do it? The answer is plain; some one must have sent them.

No. 25.

COMMANDER ROOKE TO ADMIRAL HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF EDINBURGH.—(*Received at the Foreign Office, January 5th.*)

(Extract.) "*Falcon*" *at Suakin, December* 14*th*, 1887.

I have the honour to report to your Royal Highness that on the 8th instant the friendly Arabs were attacked and dispersed by the Tokar people, and the country up to the walls of this place is now again in the hands of the rebels. The accounts of the affair are so conflicting, that even Colonel Kitchener himself cannot get at the truth of the matter. *There is no doubt whatever that the friendlies never had any inclination for fighting the Tokar people, especially as it would have produced a blood feud with the powerful Hadendowa tribe.*

Many of the friendlies went home again some days ago, and those remaining (about 1000) separated themselves from the small body of "blacks" (about fifty), owing to quarrels. The "blacks" seized and slaughtered some cattle near Tokar, and this provoked an attack. At noon on the 8th they were attacked and dispersed; the "blacks" lost two men killed, some forty-five friendlies are said to be missing.

A mounted party of the enemy passed to the northward yesterday in sight of the forts.

2. *The "Mukbar" and party of Bashi-Bazouks have returned from Trinkitat.*

3. The "*Starling*" returned here on the 11th instant, and is moored in the Northward Creek, so that her guns command the approach on the weakest side of the defences. Lieutenant and Commander Paget during his cruise visited Jeddah, then crossed to Amarar, Khor Shinab, Mahommed Ghoul, and Mersa Durar.

An Italian merchant-steamer is here loading with huts, railway material, tanks, &c., for Massowah.

Just as I was closing this letter, *Colonel Kitchener sent off to inform me that about* 800 *rebels are in sight on the Tamai road, that the guns of the forts cannot reach them by* 300 *or* 400 *yards, and has asked me to open fire on them.* I have ordered the "*Starling*" to fire as soon as she can make them out; I will move

the "*Falcon*" up the creek north of the town as soon as my steam is ready.

Now that the wall is finished the town is almost impregnable, and the presence of the English men-of-war will prevent any rising inside the town.

The following describe various raids on the Tokar people during Colonel Kitchener's time, and the impression which they might almost convey is that they were undertaken with a view of irritating and aggravating that people and in order to furnish the military authorities with an excuse for armed intervention, thus putting an insurmountable obstacle to the encouragement of trade and its anticipated conciliatory effects.

How far this mischievous activity had secretly the countenance of the Government it is impossible to say. That they feared being openly identified with a policy which was diametrically opposed to all their professions for pacification and reconciliation is clear from the despatches which follow.

Inclosure 1 in No. 26.

CONSUL CAMERON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, December 30th,* 1887.

KITCHENER'S brilliant attack last night, wherein *thirty friendly Arabs and sixty slaves captured* 1000 *sheep and* 100 *camels,* following reported repulse of rebels in north by Amarars has proved Osman Digna's force to be of no danger to Suakin.

Inclosure 2 in No. 26.

CONSUL CAMERON TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, December 30th,* 1887.

Recent defeat of rebels in north was not an Amarar victory, but due almost entirely to independent Hamdahs and other Hadendowahs, who lost considerably. Advantage to us. *But yesterday's raiders killed Hadendowah woman. This fresh feud is a disadvantage.*

No. 29.

GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON TO MR. STANHOPE.

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 17th*, 1888, 4·40 P.M.

About 400 friendly Arabs and deserters attacked the Dervish camp at Handoub this morning at daybreak. MOUNTED TROOPS WENT OUT IN SUPPORT OF THE ATTACK, and, if successful, to endeavour to capture Osman Digna. The Friendlies surprised and captured the camp. The Dervishes having scattered in pursuit re-entered position from the rear and drove off Friendlies, as their supplies of ammunition were superior. The Dervishes had a large number of rifles. Colonel Kitchener and Lieutenant McMurdo were slightly wounded. Five Egyptian soldiers and fourteen Friendlies were wounded; six Friendlies were killed. Fifty deserters have come in. *Colonel Kitchener has been instructed not to take part in any such operations as these with British officers or the Egyptian regular forces.*

No. 30.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received January 17th*, 3·15 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 17th*, 1888, 2·40 P.M.

Following from Consul, Suakin :—

"130 deserters, *battalion*, and 300 friendlies and Bashi-Bazouks attacked Handoub at daylight. Captured camp, pursued enemy, but *afterwards obliged to retire under heavy fire*, then supported by cavalry and Camel Corps; 20 deserters killed; Kitchener wounded by bullet in jaw, McMurdo slightly; 23 blacks, 5 Egyptians wounded; 60 more deserters have come in, including women."

Inclosure in No. 43.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE ATTACK ON HANDOUB.

(Extract.) *Government House, Suakin, January 18th*, 1888.

Colonel Kitchener WENT OUT *the night before last with the friendly force, about* 400, *which was going to attack the dervish camp*, and took with him the cavalry and Camel Corps to try and capture Osman Digna, should the former be successful. WE STOPPED ABOUT THREE MILES FROM HANDOUB, while the Friendlies, Mowelledin deserters, &c., went on.

At daybreak they surprised the dervishes and rushed the camp, dispersing them all over the country, and had they remained there the affair *would probably* have been a brilliant success, but instead they all scattered in pursuit of the dervishes, a lot of whom took

advantage of the opportunity to come round the hills again and re-enter their camp during the Friendlies' absence.

Such was the state of affairs when we arrived with the mounted corps, thinking it was all over.

The dervishes, however, having got back to their arms, and having any amount of ammunition, made it too hot, and *we had to cover the retirement of the irregulars.*

Colonel Kitchener was wounded in the jaw, and Mr. McMurdo in the knee; the latter is quite fit, the bullet having avoided the bones; he will be all right soon.

The Colonel's wound is now serious, though the doctors do not at present consider it dangerous. He is much better this morning, and I believe the question depends upon whether the bullet is inside or not; they are going to have a look this afternoon.

They both think he had better go to Cairo for complete rest, though Kitchener himself doesn't like the idea.

Our losses, which at first seemed comparatively large, are rapidly diminishing, as many of those missing, who seem to have been cut off by the dervishes, have come in or are coming, as they were seen by those already arrived. Only three of the mounted corps were wounded; 160 fugitives rescued and come in.

Some of the damaging effects of these raids and discouragement of trade are referred to in the following extracts from a letter to Sir E. Baring from Consul Cameron, 27th February, 1888:—

But though the tribes may get rid of him (Osman) they will not help us. *We have lost Sherif Abu Fatma and his Ashrafs since last April. We have lost the Shayabs quite lately. We have never won over any tribe of Hadendowas. Some minor Sheikhs have come in and then* GONE OUT. *The great Amarar Sheikhs asked the Governor for trade in May,* 1886. *It was refused and they left the town in disgust.*

Osman is now in touch with Berber. There is a talk among the credulous that Ba Kash, Head Sheikh of all the Amarars, is going to rival Digna and be friendly to us. I hope it is true. But Ba Kash came in and went out a year ago. He left us to visit the Mahdi. The Ba Kash theory of pacifying the Eastern Soudan may prove correct. I do not believe it.

* * * * * * *

Our own petty tribe of Fadlabs is in a sore plight. On the 24th February the "*Mukhbir*" and three dhows, followed by a fourth dhow, brought in about 200 Fadlab women from the north. It is the last sign of danger when the women are moved. The best of our Fadlabs appear to be away at Mount Osotriba; the

poor remnant here keep up their spirits with war dances. Colonel Chermside and I in March, 1884, first raised these Friendlies, and I know a little about them. They appear to be spoilt, at any rate they are too few. *We cannot get any other tribe to help us;* deserters and miscellaneous black slave rabble do not suffice.

The accompanying from Sir E. Baring is practically a severe rebuke to Colonel Kitchener's policy:—

Inclosure 5 in No. 53.

SIR E. BARING TO CONSUL CAMERON.

Cairo, March 14th, 1888.

SIR,—I have received your despatches of the 27th and 28th ultimo respecting the condition of affairs in the Eastern Soudan. The information as regards what goes on outside Suakin is, as you point out, defective; it can, therefore, be no matter for surprise that very contradictory reports are received.

The *policy* which it is desirable to follow at the present moment in the Eastern Soudan appears to me so clear as hardly to require any lengthy explanation. It *should consist in standing purely on the defensive against any hostile movement or combination of the Arab tribes, in avoiding any course of action which might involve the ultimate necessity of offensive action, and in encouraging legitimate trade by every means in our power.*

I gather with great satisfaction, from your despatch of the 28th ultimo, that a perceptible increase in local trade has recently taken place.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Lord Salisbury and to Colonel Kitchener.

Sir E. Baring exhibits his desire to facilitate trading as much as possible, and abolishes stamps.

No. 60.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received April 9th.*)

Cairo, March 30th, 1888.

MY LORD,—*A complaint* having reached me from traders at Suakin with regard to the Regulation in force there, *that all applications to the Government Office for the export of goods out of the town should be made on stamped paper of the value of three piastres*, I took the opportunity of Colonel Kitchener's recent visit to Cairo to speak to him on the subject.

Colonel Kitchener now informs me by letter that he has decided to abolish all applications to the Government Office for passing out goods by sea, and that only a notice (not on stamped paper) will be required from merchants passing out of the town gate.

I have the honour to inclose herewith copy of a notice to this effect issued by Colonel Kitchener.

Inclosure in No. 60.

Notice.

On and after the 22nd March merchants exporting goods by sea can go direct to Custom-House, without previous formality, clearing their goods according to Custom-House Regulations.

Those desirous of passing out of the town gate should previously send a notice, not on stamped paper, to the Government Office, in order that proper pass for the gate may be prepared.

Suakin, March 21st, 1888.

The following will be read with interest for the information it contains regarding the defences of Suakin and its capacity for resisting any likely attack, and also for the writer's opinion as to the best way of conciliating and reconciling the various tribes. With respect to paragraphs 4, 5, and 6, they afford a most startling example of how one story may be made to look like two, when told by two people. It would be tedious to pursue the contradictions line by line between these paragraphs, and the reports of the proceedings when they took place, but if reference is made particularly to Consul Cameron's reports in December, 1887, and Commander Rooke's despatch of December 14th, 1887, touching the attitude of the "Friendlies," it will be found utterly impossible to believe that the "Friendlies" referred to by Major-General Dormer can be the same people. This second narrative reminds one forcibly of the "wolf and the lamb." Paragraph 6 says "he (Colonel Kitchener) does nothing to encourage raiding by "Friendlies." Granted, but if so, what does this mean—"Consul Cameron to Sir E. Baring, Suakin, December 30th,

1887, Kitchener's brilliant attack," &c.? If leading is not encouraging, it may be asked what is? Again, on 17th January, 1888, he led Egyptian troops in person some ten miles from the gates of Suakin, in which engagement he was wounded. From whence did the General derive his information?—that is a mystery. It is satisfactory to notice that, although a soldier, General Dormer urges trade and discountenances all raiding.

No. 64.

MAJOR-GENERAL DORMER TO WAR OFFICE.—(*Received at the Foreign Office, May 9th.*)

Cairo, April 22nd, 1888.

SIR,—Having returned from my recent inspection and visit to Suakin, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for War, the following Report on the state of affairs in that district and the information which I have been able to obtain.

I arrived at Suakin on the 6th instant, about a fortnight after his Excellency the Governor, Colonel H. H. Kitchener, had returned to resume the duties of his command.

With regard to the military works and defences of the town, I was much struck with the great improvement that has been effected by Colonel Kitchener since my last visit to Suakin in the autumn of 1884. The outer line of works, which now consists of five small forts, or redoubts, are well known, and plans thereof have already been sent home. They are well placed and practically impregnable against any assault which is likely to be made on them.

H Redoubt, on the right, is in course of reconstruction on a better site, about 300 yards to the north of the present redoubt, which is a work on too extensive a scale, and requires too many men to garrison it.

The inner line of defences has been considerably strengthened and much contracted, to suit the reduced garrison now left for the defence of Suakin. It consists of a substantial stone wall and forts very cleverly planned and constructed by Colonel Kitchener, though not quite completed.

I consider that Suakin thus protected, and with at least two gun-boats in the harbour, and with a garrison of one battalion of black troops and one Egyptian, should be quite safe against any attack that Osman Digna is likely to make. At the same time I

am convinced that any further reduction of ships or garrison would be perilous.

2. With regard to Osman Digna, I believe I had every opportunity of obtaining reliable information, and I may safely state that, at present at least, eight-tenths of the two adjacent important tribes—*the Amarars and Hadendowas—are thoroughly sick of the state of affairs and of the country, whereby trade and commerce have been destroyed, the cultivation of land hindered, and their lives and homes disorganized. They are most anxious for a Government.*

Their faith in the Mahdi can with difficulty be kept alive, and should Osman Digna be killed or captured, I believe the Khalifa would find but few adherents in this part of the Soudan. I had opportunity given me by Colonel Kitchener of speaking with several influential Sheikhs of both the Amarars and Hadendowas.

They all told the same story: that up till lately there had been much wavering, that many had believed in the Mahdi; that as there was no other Government but his in the country, they could not, even if they would, resist the Mahdi's power.

For these reasons, they have never joined heartily in any of the expeditions which have been made against Osman Digna during the last four years. *Now, they say, the tribes are tired of this continued disturbance of their lives, tired of Osman Digna and his cruelties, tired of, and losing faith in, the Mahdi.*

They all asserted that if only the Egyptian Government would make one more attack against Osman Digna, who is at Handoub, eight miles from Suakin, with only 2000 fighting men, their whole tribe would gladly join this time in driving the enemy from their country, and in capturing or dispersing for ever Osman Digna and his forces.

These Sheikhs were told that they must not expect this; that the Government had already sent expedition after expedition, and defeated Osman Digna, routing his forces over and over again; but that their tribes had only acted half-heartedly with us, and had failed to prevent the return of the enemy into their country.

They were asked why, if they were now so united, they could not attack Osman Digna themselves; and they were told that the Government could no longer interfere, and that they must settle their own affairs and the enemy themselves.

To this, while acknowledging the truth of what was said, they replied that they had no arms, and were not strong enough alone to attack the only Government which now existed in the Soudan —that of the Mahdi—and an enemy organized and armed, as they were not.

The day may not be immediately at hand, but I believe it is not far distant, when Mahdiism and Osman Digna's power in this part of the Soudan will have ceased to exist.

3. Meantime, *I am convinced that the friendly tribes should be subsidized, and that those who have left their homes and property to come in and live at Suakin should be fed.* They very justly say: *We have thrown in our lot with your Government; we have left our property and lands; how are we to live? You will not let us organize raids nor procure food for ourselves, while you allow the enemy to make raids on us. You say you cannot feed us yourselves.* There is nothing left for us but to return to our homes, and, in that case, we shall be forced, in semblance at any rate, to ally ourselves with the Mahdists.

4. With regard to these raids. It is not the fact that raiding by the Friendlies has been led, organized, or encouraged by the Government at Suakin; on the contrary, the Sheikhs have been told that these raids are not approved nor recommended; but when these poor Friendlies come and say, "The enemy has been suffered to make raids on our lands and villages; may we not make reprisals? We have been deprived of our cattle and our food; may we not go out and obtain these for ourselves?"—it is difficult to prevent or answer them.

5. After several months of comparative peace, and the commencement of the opening out of trade, this peace was disturbed, not by any raid organized at Suakin by the Government, as has been stated, *but by an unprovoked attack by the dervishes from Tokar*, who carried off camels and cattle of our friendly tribes near Suakin, killing one man, and taking three others prisoners, whom they hanged at Tokar.

This caused a blood feud, and the Friendlies of their own accord clamoured for reprisals, and made an unsuccessful raid on Tokar.

Soon after this, Osman Digna, hearing that Suakin was to be abandoned, and that the black battalion had been withdrawn, marched to Handoub, where he has been ever since, investing and threatening to attack that town. From this time all trade was stopped, and the road to Berber closed and strictly watched by order of the Khalifa.

6. The Governor at Suakin is fully alive to the importance of establishing legitimate trade, and *he does nothing to encourage raiding by the Friendlies:* but he has great difficulty in always preventing the latter when it takes the form of reprisals, or is necessitated by the want of food.

7. It is not for me perhaps to suggest a policy, but I would respectfully beg to recommend the continuance of the occupation of Suakin at any cost, and with no further diminution whatever of the present naval and military defensive force.

I do not advocate any offensive action by the present garrison, although I believe that at this moment Osman Digna and his small army could be easily and completely routed with an addi-

tional battalion (of blacks), and with the assistance of the friendly tribes.

I strongly advise that the friendly Sheikhs, inside and outside Suakin, be subsidized and fed.

Beyond this, things should be allowed to take their course, while a keen eye should be kept on any possible opening for trade, and all unnecessary raiding be discouraged.

The following letter from Messrs. Fox and Wylde urges the withdrawal of all restrictions on trade:—

No. 66.

MESSRS. FOX AND WYLDE TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.
(*Received May 15th.*)

8, *Queen Anne's Gate, Westminster, May 14th*, 1888.

MY LORD,—We have the honour to enumerate to your Lordship the Resolutions submitted to you by the deputation that waited on your Lordship at the Foreign Office on Friday, the 11th May, regarding the pacification of the Soudan by trade:—

1. That the British Government will countenance and support British trade merchants in their endeavours to restore the trade of the Soudan, by procuring the opening of the tribal ports north and south of Suakin with reasonable customs dues.

2. That a small naval force be retained on the Soudan coast, with the view to suppress the Slave Trade, and to afford protection and support to the merchants who may establish themselves at the ports, and that known and notorious slave-dealers and traders shall be punished and removed from the sphere of their operations.

3. That merchants be not interfered with by the Egyptian authorities as long as they confine themselves to legitimate trade, and do not import contraband of war, and they engage to use their best endeavours to bring about peace between the tribes and the Egyptian authorities.

In reference to your Lordship's reply to the deputation, we should deem it a favour if you would kindly forward us an answer to the Resolutions submitted you, assuring us that Her Majesty's Government are willing to instruct the Egyptian Government to grant English traders every facility for dealing with the tribes of the Eastern Soudan, and that no obstacles shall be placed by the Egyptian authorities in the way of goods, not contraband of war, leaving Suakin for the tribal ports north and south of that place, paying the usual customs dues, as before the war, based on those levied in Egypt at Alexandria.

With regard to Resolution No. 2, the only support from the

naval force required is their patrolling for the suppression of the Slave Trade, and the prevention of attack on the tribal ports by armed dhows from Jeddah, and the punishment of slave-dealers residing at Suakin when cases are brought against them as set down by Treaty.

We have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS WM. FOX.
A. B. WYLDE.

Reply to the above—the Egyptian Government never *did* do anything obstructive. This is more than Lord Salisbury can say of his own Government.

No. 67.

FOREIGN OFFICE TO MESSRS. FOX AND WYLDE.

Foreign Office, May 18*th*, 1888.

GENTLEMEN,—I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, recapitulating the Resolutions submitted to his Lordship on the 11th instant by a deputation of gentlemen interested in the pacification of the Soudan by trade.

In reply, I am to state that Lord Salisbury is not acquainted with anything in the conduct of the Egyptian Government on the Red Sea Coast which is at variance with the general policy recommended by those gentlemen.

I am, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN PAUNCEFOTE.

As a set-off to the bellicose Colonel Kitchener, the Senior Naval Officer at Suakin relies upon trade.

No. 72.

ADMIRALTY TO FOREIGN OFFICE.—(*Received July* 19*th*.)

Admiralty, July 18*th*, 1888.

SIR,—I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the following extract of a letter addressed to the Commander-in-chief on the Mediterranean Station, by the Senior Officer at Suakin, dated the 20th June last:—

"Everything has been quiet, and there is no appearance of any alteration in the situation. *It is hoped, however, that trade with the interior will be opened shortly.* Osman Digna's policy still is to prevent this, but his power is not quite so great as it was before

the arrival of Abu Girgeh, who, by command of the Mahdi, has equal powers with Osman Digna."

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Question of renewal of hostilities in the Soudan. Correspondence between "International Arbitration and Peace Association" and Marquis of Salisbury.

No. 84.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND PEACE ASSOCIATION TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received October* 11*th*.)

40 *and* 41, *Outer Temple, Strand, London,*
October 10*th*, 1888.

MY LORD,—I am directed by the Committee of this Association to forward to your Lordship the inclosed copy of a Resolution passed at the last meeting of the Committee on the subject of the renewed hostilities in the Soudan.

I am to add that the Committee will be greatly indebted to your Lordship if your Lordship can oblige them with the information for which they ask.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. FREDK. GREEN, *Secretary*.

Inclosure in No. 84.

RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND PEACE ASSOCIATION, *October* 9*th*, 1888.

Hostilities in the Soudan.

Resolved,—That this Committee desires respectfully to draw the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the letter of Mr. F. W. Fox, published in the *Times* of the 3rd October, in reference to the renewed hostilities at Suakin, and especially to the passages therein referred to as having been contained in a letter sent to the Foreign Office, under date 31st August, 1887, and begs to be favoured with any information that can, without prejudice to the public service, be given as to how far the statements in Mr. Fox's letter are to be relied on, and whether Her Majesty's Government has deemed it advisable to act in furtherance of the policy indicated in the letter.

Reply—in which the Marquis of Salisbury commits himself to the policy of encouraging trade "by every means in his power." It will be

judged how this has been done, hitherto, from the foregoing despatches.

No. 86.

FOREIGN OFFICE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND PEACE ASSOCIATION.

Foreign Office, October 15th, 1888.

SIR,—I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, calling attention, on behalf of your Association, to the renewal of hostilities near Suakin, and requesting information as to the policy of Her Majesty's Government in the Eastern Soudan.

In reply, I am to state that, since the date of Mr. Fox's letter of August 1887, to which you refer, trade with the Eastern Soudan has been thrown open, and is now practically unrestricted, except as regards contraband of war.

I am to add that the *policy followed by Her Majesty's Government has been to stand purely on the defensive* against any hostile movement or combination of the Arab tribes, *avoiding any course of action which might involve the ultimate necessity of offensive action, but encouraging legitimate trade by every means in their power.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) JULIAN PAUNCEFOTE.

Whatever might be the "means," &c., of Her Majesty's Government, they were frustrated by the policy pursued at Suakin, as will be seen by the following from Sir E. Baring:—

No. 93.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received November 5th.*)

Cairo, October 22nd, 1888.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inclose a copy of a Report on recent events at Suakin which I have received from Commander May, R.N.

Your Lordship will observe that on the 8th instant a portion of the garrison marched out and engaged the enemy, with the result that considerable loss was inflicted on Osman Digna's forces, and, on the other hand, that the Egyptian troops had two men killed and twenty-six wounded. On receipt of this intelligence, *Sir F. Grenfell at once telegraphed to the Officer commanding at Suakin,*

to the effect that he did not consider the advantage gained at all commensurate with the loss incurred. The instructions, *previously given, to remain strictly on the defensive,* were at the same time renewed.

All the accounts I hear from Suakin are to the effect that the town is quite safe, but that the Mahdists may possibly remain in their present positions outside the town for some time to come. As long as they do so, desultory hostilities will continue. This is not only the view of the English authorities, but I may mention that *the Italian Consul-General informed me yesterday that the reports which he had received from Suakin from his agent were of a similar nature.*

However harassing may be the intermittent warfare which is becoming a chronic incident of the Egyptian situation at Suakin, it is not, I fear, possible, for the present at all events, to apply any drastic and effectual remedy with a view to its cessation. I can only repeat what I have often said before, namely, that for the moment only two alternatives present themselves, whether at Suakin or Wady Halfa. The first is to stand strictly on the defensive. The second is to undertake extensive operations, with a view to the reconquest of the whole or the greater part of the Soudan. It is useless to consider whether it would be desirable to adopt the second alternative, *for it is quite certain that the Egyptian Government has neither the men nor the money necessary to its adoption.* A strictly defensive attitude is, therefore, imposed by the circumstances of the situation.

A middle course has often formed the subject of discussion. It is to negotiate with the tribes, and especially to open up trade. It is possible that circumstances may arise in the future which will enable the trade policy to be manipulated with better results than heretofore. But for the present, there appears little prospect of any great results being achieved from a commercial policy, however intelligently directed. I regard the views put forward from time to time by Mr. Fox and others on this subject as visionary and impracticable.

It is difficult to disconnect the position of Suakin, as reported below, from the policy of Kitchener above referred to—it is easy to provoke a state of ferment, but not so to subdue it. The good feeling exhibited by the tribes in the neighbourhood is a very encouraging feature, and reflects greatly on the want of judgment of those in authority in not having done their best to propitiate them instead of doing the reverse.

Sampson Low and Co. Ltd., London. Collotype Lemercier, Paris

Soudan veteran.

Sampson Low and Co. Ltd., London. Collotype Lemercier, Paris.

Soudan Veteran

No. 97.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received by telegraph, November 15th.*)

Cairo, November 15th, 1888.

MY LORD,—With reference to my despatch of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to state that Sir F. Grenfell has returned from Suakin, and that his report as to the situation there is satisfactory in this sense: *that none of the tribes in the neighbourhood are taking part in the present operations. The besieging force consists entirely of tribes from a distance.*

I have discussed the situation thoroughly with him, with Riaz Pasha, and with General Dormer. *We are fully agreed that no offensive measures should be taken beyond what are necessary to drive away the enemy from the trenches they now occupy close to the forts. Riaz Pasha is particularly strong on this point.*

It is proposed, subject to the approval of a Council of Ministers to be held to-day, to send another black battalion to Suakin, in addition to that which is already under orders to proceed there. Sir F. Grenfell will then again go to Suakin, and will attack the trenches.

I agree with the military authorities in thinking that the enemy should no longer be allowed to occupy their present position, from which they throw shells, not only into the forts, but into the town.

It is also proposed to send half an English battalion temporarily to Assouan whilst the two black battalions are at Suakin.

In this I also agree. It will, I think, have a good effect. The cost will not be great, provided they do not go south of Assouan. I see no objections to this proposal.

Sir F. Grenfell is anxious to borrow a portion of the Aden Troop temporarily for service at Suakin, as he is short of cavalry. I have told him that I would submit the request to your Lordship. Their presence would, without doubt, add to the success of the operations, but Her Majesty's Government may not consider it desirable to employ British troops.

I have had the honour to telegraph the above to your Lordship this day.

The refusal to permit the presence at Suakin of two such locally well-informed and well-known men as Mr. Fox and Mr. Wylde, men so admirably fitted to treat with the Sheikhs, is sufficient evidence in itself of the confusion that had been brought about by the filibustering policy. No doubt it would have

been "embarrassing" to Sir F. Grenfell to have two men on the spot who were better informed of the merits of the situation than himself and all his Staff, civil or military. Sir E. Baring even takes alarm, and is the first to put a stop to the proposed visit of Mr. Wylde to Suakin.

No. 130.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received December 12th*, 1·10 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 12th*, 1881.

It appears from a private letter received here that Mr. Wylde contemplates proceeding to Suakin with a view to negotiating with the tribes.

It is a question whether his visit can be permitted at this moment. Upon this point it is desirable that I should consult General Grenfell, if the report is true. Can you inform me if it is?

Sir E. Baring loses no time in wiring Sir F. Grenfell.

No. 131.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received by telegraph, December 14th.*)

Cairo, December 14th, 1888.

MY LORD,—I yesterday telegraphed to ask General Grenfell his opinion as to the desirability of *Mr. Fox or Mr. Wylde proceeding to Suakin* to negotiate with the neighbouring tribes on behalf of the trading Syndicate with which these gentlemen are connected. Sir F. Grenfell telegraphs, in reply, that *he considers that their presence at Suakin at the present juncture would be embarrassing*, and I have therefore to-day had the honour to ask your Lordship, by telegraph, to use your influence to *dissuade Mr. Wylde* from coming if he has not yet started.

I look upon Suakin as being at the present moment under military government, and I do not therefore, unless I should receive instructions to the contrary from your Lordship, *propose to interfere with the discretion of the military authorities in the event of their deeming it desirable to prevent any individual from landing there.*

From the following telegram it may be fairly in-

ferred that Sir E. Baring was rather alarmed at the interpretation that might be put upon his refusal to permit any mercantile agencies in Suakin. No wonder the anticipations of those who were opposed to the opening of trade were realized, when the military men who were in authority did so much towards making them true prophets. No doubt the "greatest care" would be required in the selection of negotiators. This good advice is hardly observed by a recommendation of the "present local authorities"—military men—about the worst as a class that could be selected for such a purpose—while such competent authorities as Mr. Fox and Mr. Wylde are not to be permitted *even to land*. Again, in the discussion with Sir F. Grenfell as to negotiating with the tribes, why was it not proposed to open trade with the tribes that never fought against H.M.'s Government? The fact is the soldiers wanted to settle everything their own way.

No. 134.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received December 19th.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 19th*, 1888, 12·20 P.M.

I hope that it is understood that there is not the least opposition here to the policy of facilitating trade, and negotiating with the tribes. Ever since the evacuation of the Soudan, I have persistently advocated that policy. But the experience of the past renders it impossible to be sanguine of the results likely to be effected by the commercial policy.

Along the Nile Valley trade has now been carried on with the Soudan for some time past, but no political effect whatever has been produced. Experience, moreover, has shown that those authorities here who doubted whether it was prudent to open trade at Suakin were to a great extent in the right, for the supplies of food which the Dervishes have been enabled to import have, there can scarcely be a doubt, much facilitated and prolonged their siege of Suakin. I cannot shut my eyes to this evidence. The subject of negotiations with the tribes was fully discussed between myself and General Grenfell before the latter's departure. Advantage will, of course, be taken of any favourable opportunity

which may present itself for opening negotiations, as soon as the military operations are over.

The selection of the European Agents to conduct any such negotiations will require the greatest care. I should recommend their being intrusted to the present local authorities at Suakin, for they could not be in better hands. In view, however, of the fact that religious fanaticism is the main feature of the Dervish movement, I repeat that I am unable to feel any great confidence that much can be done, for the present at all events, either by negotiation or a proclamation of commercial policy.

The views on this subject which have been so generally expressed in the English press are no doubt unexceptionable in principle, but they seem to me to be far too sanguine, and to take too little account of the practical difficulty of giving effect to the policy advocated.

No. 139.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received December 21st*, 9 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 21st*, 1888, 7 P.M.

I have consulted General Grenfell as to whether there was now any prospect of negotiating with the tribes successfully on the basis of the opening of trade.

The following is his reply:—

"I am assured by those in whose opinion I have confidence that there is no basis on which negotiations are possible with the Dervishes. Any Emir who treated with the Egyptian authorities would, it is believed, be at once removed and replaced by a greater fanatic.

"*The tribes round Suakin would gladly welcome the reopening of trade and are sick of Osman,* but trade would result in the feeding of the hostile force. In my opinion, it would be most mischievous to attempt to negotiate with the Dervishes now, as it would be misunderstood by the wavering tribes."

"Feeding the hostile force:" this is the stereotyped objection by the military to all trade. The Dervishes are a peculiar people, doubtless, but they don't eat Manchester goods.

Throughout these despatches there is constantly apparent a conflict, more or less veiled, going on between the civil and military officers, in which the latter almost always get the upper hand, to the damage of trade and the progress of civilization,

and the advancement of the Soudanese, accompanied by a heavy expenditure, and a needless and useless sacrifice of human life.

The heavy responsibility of all this mischief, however, does not rest with the military, but with Her Majesty's Government, which sanctioned all their actions, as is proved by the two following telegrams, showing that Sir E. Baring refused to interfere on behalf of a British subject:—

Inclosure in No. 24.

GENERAL SIR F. GRENFELL TO SIR E. BARING.

(Telegraphic.) *Suakin, January 3rd*, 1889.

I arrested, yesterday, two Suakin merchants, for selling dhurra to Dervish camp. One, Mahmoud Shenawi; the other, Gholan, an Indian and British subject.

In latter case am reporting through Paget, Acting Consul. Inquiry not yet finished.

No 24.

SIR E. BARING TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY.—(*Received January 14th.*)

Cairo, January 4th, 1889.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inclose copy of a telegram from Sir Francis Grenfell, informing me that he has arrested two merchants, *one of whom is a British Indian subject*, for selling grain to the Dervishes.

As I have already mentioned in previous despatches, I consider that Suakin is at present under military government. Unless, therefore, some very exceptional incident should occur, *I do not propose to interfere* with the discretion of the military authorities in respect to any treatment they may consider it necessary to accord to British subjects.

If a *British subject* is refused protection from his sovereign's ambassador, and left to the tender mercies of military autocrats, what security is there for protection of person and property? The punishment that was eventually awarded has not been recorded, and the question should be asked in the House of Commons.

CHAPTER XII.

Cost of military expeditions to 1885—Estimated Soudan trade—Area of cultivable land—Value of produce—Contraband trade from Jeddah sustained by sale of slaves—Fellaheen destitution demonstrated—Decadence of Soudan trade—Comparative statement of Soudan budgets 1881 and 1882—Net cost to Egypt of retaining Suakin 1890 and 1891—Cost to H.M.'s Government 1886 and 1887.

THIS chapter deals principally with statistics, relating more especially to the cost of the military expeditions in the Soudan—the Egyptian Customs' returns—the imports and exports—capacity and extent of land capable of, and the small area really under, cultivation—diversion of trade from Suakin to Massowah—the decadence of trade inwards and outwards generally—the value of cotton—other products—the budgets of the provinces of the Soudan collected from Colonel Stewart's reports, and other matters associated with the condition of the Soudan.

Attention is first directed to the following statement, as it deals with a subject that claims the consideration of the British taxpayer, irrespective of any particular commercial interests.

Extract from three official returns of expenditure laid before Parliament:—

	£
Vote of credit "Relief of Gordon" . .	300,000
Expeditions 1882 to 1883 . . .	5,134,171
„ 1883 to 1884 . . .	785,005
„ 1884 to 1885 . . .	3,475,377
Expended by Foreign Office . . .	21,415
Extra cost of First Suakin Expedition .	352,352
„ Second „ „ . .	2,127,762
Suakin-Berber Railway and Water Supply	865,369
Total	£13,061,451

Being the cost which was incurred, over and above the normal charge for the maintenance of troops, &c., concerned.

This shows an annual outlay of some three and a quarter millions for four years of military operations, let alone the amount that may have been spent in the succeeding period up to the present time, of which no accounts have, as far as we can discover, yet been published. Now the English people are usually disposed to be free with their money when a tangible and advantageous object is in prospect, but when they find, after spending largely for eight years, the object, whatever it may have been, is if anything farther off than ever, they naturally exhibit a justifiable impatience, and the question must arise to every taxpayer—What has the country got by it? Is it territorial dominion? Has trade been fostered and increased? Has the country that has been the theatre of the military operations been developed? Has the condition of its inhabitants been improved? Has the cause of civilization and humanity been advanced? To all these questions, and many more of the same character, the answer must be in the negative. But there remains one item, not hitherto mentioned, that the military would claim to the credit of the account, and that is "Glory." Well, whatever glory may be elicited from initiating an incipient process of extermination of the aborigines by sword and starvation, it must be admitted that the claim has been established. For a proof of the justification of the above comments, we refer with confidence to the despatches contained in this volume. It must however be clearly understood that these remarks have no application whatever to the "Gordon Relief Expedition," where we feel that the British soldier set an example to the world, but are confined exclusively to the operations in

the neighbourhood of Suakin, and it is to alter and reverse the iniquitous system that has so long prevailed there, that constitutes the main object that we have in view, and for the accomplishment of which we refer to our proposals contained in the next chapter.

The following despatch with inclosure has special reference to trade, &c :—

No. 65.

SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF TO THE EARL OF ROSEBERY.
(*Received July 5th.*)

Cairo, June 28th, 1886.

MY LORD,—Since my arrival in Cairo I have endeavoured to obtain as much information as I could relative to the trade with the Soudan.

In this I have been assisted by Mr. Ismaloum, of the Finance Department, who was charged with making inquiries on my behalf by Blum Pasha.

I now enclose some statements sent me to-day by that gentleman. These are very contradictory, but Mr. Ismaloum is of opinion that the value of the Soudan trade may safely be estimated at 2,000,000*l.*

One of these papers has been prepared by the Consul-General of Morocco, and one by a merchant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

Inclosure 4 in No. 65.

REPORT ON THE EGYPTIAN PROVINCES OF THE SOUDAN, RED SEA, AND EQUATOR.

Return showing the Value of Articles of Merchandise of the Soudan sold at the Bulak Bazaar during the year 1873-74.

	£	s.	d.
Ostrich feathers	824,013	0	9
Various gums	647,390	14	9
Elephants' teeth (ivory)	50,816	14	7
Tamarinds	716	3	11
Wak	1,759	5	4
Senna	4,082	16	2
Calves' skin	13,622	19	1

	£	s.	d.
Whips	54	4	6
Coffee	12,112	10	6
Red pepper	5	16	6
Tiger skins	0	3	1
Monkeys	1	19	5
Crocodiles	4	7	0
Sacsin skin	0	10	3
Rhinoceros' horn	8	8	7
Ostrich eggs	1	5	7
Medicinal plant called "Charco macade"	9	3	7
Total	£1,554,600	3	7

War Office, July, 1884.

The foregoing despatch with inclosure furnish in themselves a significant example of the distracted and desultory condition of the official departments of the Egyptian Government in connection with commerce, exhibiting no exception, it is true, to every other department, but thus further illustrating the general incapacity of Egypt to govern.

Imagine the special agent of H.M.'s Government, presumably with every means of ascertaining the answers to his inquiries, obliged to accept for his reply "some very contradictory statements," and "an *opinion*" only, arrived at manifestly from very inconclusive data.

The next remarkable feature in the situation is the "inclosure." Doubtless this was the nearest approach to something bearing the semblance of an official statement that Sir H. D. Wolff could discover, but the most extraordinary part of this document, professing to give particulars of transactions in Egypt, is that it seems to issue from the *British War Office* some twelve years earlier than the period of Sir H. D. Wolff's inquiries. Is it to be assumed that in the interval there are no records at all? In their absence it is the only possible conclusion. But irrespective of the somewhat

unaccountable origin of the document, it is really of little or no value upon which to base any calculations. It is strictly confined to sales at the Bulak Bazaar, and this list of articles omits cotton, cotton-seed, wheat, barley, beans, maize, other seeds, sugar and many other products, and no mention is made of exports to foreign countries.

The speculation that the Soudan trade may be safely estimated at 2,000,000*l.* is about all that is to be gathered from Sir H. D. Wolff's despatch, which is not much. It must be remembered that this estimate was arrived at some five years ago, and for the future prospects of the Soudan trade under a different dispensation, unless the produce of the uncultivated land was considered, which it could not have been, is absolutely worthless.

A much better estimate of the future trade of the Soudan may be arrived at by a consideration of the following particulars extracted from the Blue Book Egypt No. 2, 1887. Inclosure 2 in 65.

Arable land in the Mourdiriths of Khartoum, Senaar, Fazoglu, Bahr-el-Abiad :—

		Feddans.
Between Blue and White Nile		7,000,000
Islands on Blue and White Nile		1,000,000
Between River Rahad and Dender		3,000,000
West of the Atbara		3,000,000
Tokar		125,000
		14,125,000
Under cultivation.	Feddans.	
Berber	150,318	
Kordofan	36,000	
Tokar	25,000	
Suakin	600	
Agig	500	212,418
		13,912,582

Now it appears from all authorities entitled to

respect, that this vast tract of country being out of cultivation is due entirely to the corrupt and oppressive Government administered by depredating pashas, and to the utter want of security to the cultivator that he would reap the just return for his labour. Were this assured, accompanied with facilities for transport, it may be safely inferred from the evidence of the same authorities that the present insignificant fraction of land under cultivation would rapidly increase, until the whole was cultivated. Now Consul Baker estimates the amount of cotton that could be grown in Tokar as 500,000 cwt. annually; comparing this with the above estimate of the Tokar districts, it would give four cwt. to a feddan, which at the price of cotton in Alexandria would yield 1,500,000*l.* This yield being based upon a high average, for the sake of being within more probable limits, it might be taken at say two cwt. per feddan all round; yet at this reduced estimate if one quarter of the whole area were in cotton, it would yield some 20,000,000*l.* Assuming the statistics to be correct, there is only room for one opinion.

The following quotations from the Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance—trade of Suakin for the year 1888—exhibit almost a total extinction of the export trade, and an immense falling-off in both import and export since the British occupation, as shown by comparison with the years 1882 and 1883 :—

That some cotton goods went up the Berber road there can be no doubt, but the decrease of the cotton goods trade is probably mainly due to the small amount that was carried into the interior.

With regard to the sources of the import trade, it will be noted that the trade with India has decreased. This is doubtless due to the smaller amount of cotton cloth sold to the Arabs.

The exports have fallen from 11,704*l.* to 4,724*l.*; in fact the export trade has been nearly extinguished. A considerable

quantity of mother-of-pearl shell has been exported, but, in other respects, *trade is at the lowest ebb.* No cotton is grown now, owing to the unsettled state of the country, and nothing comes down from the interior.

Only four British merchant steamers have called during 1888—two with cargo, two with coals. The Khedivial line of steamers have maintained the fortnightly mail service with regularity. The Austrian Lloyd steamers now call once in two months only, in lieu of once a month.

Owing to the great increase in freights, the salt trade at Roweyyah is in a languishing condition.

As reported by Consul Cameron in 1887, *there is still a good deal of contraband trade between Jeddah and the western shore of the Red Sea, slaves being often taken in exchange for contraband goods.* There has undoubtedly been a good deal of this pernicious traffic south of Ras Kasar, where the coast is temporarily under Italian surveillance. *Nothing would tend more to extinguish this trade than the increase of legitimate trade* conducted by Banians with such minor ports as Halaib, Roweyyah, and Agig; but at all these places the Dervishes have made trade almost impossible.

SUAKIN.

A.—Return of Principal Articles of Export from Suakin during the Years 1888, 1887, and 1886.

Articles.	Value.		
	1888.	1887.	1886.
	£	£	£
Gum	15	5,000	1,500
Cotton	...	...	500
Hides	970	1,100	1,600
Coffee	...	10	...
Ivory	...	1,050	...
Feathers...	95	144	...
Mother-of-pearl	2,870	2,900	...
Other articles	774	1,500	4,700
Total	4,740	11,704	8,300
Should be ...	4,724		

Showing a discrepancy of 16*l.* Table B further

on dealing with the same subject makes total 4,740*l.*

A. (2).—Return of Principal Articles of Import into Suakin during the Years 1888, 1887, and 1886.

Articles.	Value.		
	1888.	1887.	1886.
	£	£	£
Cotton Goods	20,000	31,900	7,000
Grain	35,000	32,000	24,500
Cattle	7,100	1,322	11,000
Liquors	2,640	2,160	6,000
Other articles	36,836	26,900	47,000
Total	101,576	94,282	95,500

B.—Table showing Total Values of all Articles Exported from Suakin and Imported into Suakin during the Years 1888–87.

Country.	Exports.		Imports.	
	1888.	1887.	1888.	1887.
	£	£	£	£
England ...	...	1,423	7,146	7,500
Ottoman flag (Egypt and Turkey)	570	2,193	...	7,000
India (*viâ* Aden) ...	857	2,156	26,760	30,000
Other countries	3,313	5,932	17,810	3,500
"Raftiehs" *	...	...	49,860	46,282
Total ...	4,740	11,704	101,576	94,282

* Paid customs duty at some other Ottoman port and entered here without further payment, according to "raftieh" or transmission certificate.

The curse of the Soudan has been this Raftieh system, by which Turkey and Egypt apppropriated part of the revenues due to the Soudan. In the above it will be noticed that almost half of the total imports enter into the Soudan without payment at Suakin. This injustice was a bone of contention between General Gordon and the Egyptian Government, when he was Governor-General of the Soudan.

Consul Baker reports (in No. 20, 1885, Inclosure 1 in No. 77) 2nd March, 1885:—

				£
4. In 1882	Suakin	Imports	amounted to	240,535
	„	Exports	„	157,978
	Total value of trade		... ...	397,513

Discrepancy in the total of 1000*l.*, should be 398,513*l.*

				£
In 1883	Suakin	Imports	amounted to	288,054
	„	Exports	„	127,263
	Total value of trade		... ...	415,317

N.B.—These returns are not remarkable for accuracy. In the return of Suakin exports under "article" 88 a difference of 16*l.* is shown with the total under "Country," which is not explained. And Consul Baker's gross total of trade for 1882 is 1000*l.* less than it should be, as the figures show. This is not by any means the first time we have had occasion to notice similar inaccuracies in the Blue Books. Probably an odd thousand one way or another was not thought much of by the officials when Her Majesty's Government were dropping millions, and hence these blunders.

From the above it appears that not only is the export trade dwindling to a vanishing point, but

Sampson Low and Cᵉ, Ltd., London. Collotype Lemercier, Paris

Soudan youths, armed

the production of cotton, the staple of the country, has ceased altogether.

As regards the import trade, besides the causes affecting it referred to in the foregoing report, it will be found by reference to Consul Jago's report, dated Jeddah, 17th February, 1887, see Chapter XI., that contraband trade was carried on in Manchester goods, &c., to the extent of $200,000, or say, 40,000*l.*, which were run in one shipment from Jeddah, thus showing the futility of the blockade; and Consul Cameron, it seems, refers to the same practice, but he does not state the amount, yet it is a fair assumption that the legitimate and contraband trade taken together would not equal more than a third of what it was in 1882 and 1883, as the figures quoted show at a glance; and it seems that shipping interest suffered as well as local. But Consul Cameron, while referring to contraband trade, also calls attention to its serious consequences in the shape of "slaves being often taken in exchange for contraband." Therefore we have as the result of the blockade, and obstructive measures, not only the destruction of commerce, but the indirect encouragement of the slave trade! Surely the Anti-Slavery Society should intervene here! The report is also emphatic on the point that legitimate trade would do more than anything else to stop the slave trade, but it says that this is rendered impossible by the dervishes—and it might have added with ample justification, "and also by H.M.'s Government."

The following is from the same Report, and refers to Alexandria only:—

EGYPT.

Annex B.—Return of Principal Articles of Export from Alexandria during the Years 1887 and 1888.

Articles.	1888.		1887.	
	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.
		£		£
Cotton ... lbs.	263,800,170	6,993,892	310,843,904	7,729,281
Cotton seed qrs.	1,412,023	1,342,507	1,556,890	1,308,977
Sugar ... lbs.	92,389,035	554,696	101,307,043	502,138
Beans ... qrs.	444,002	481,651	465,025	537,489
Wheat ... ,,	282,393	312,799	140,099	175,810
Metal and metal goods	...	170,085	...	147,001
Rice ... qrs.	31,769	112,576	36,807	137,396
Maize	...	102,148	...	8,226
Onions	...	73,946	...	42,767
Wool, raw lbs.	3,012,202	59,239	3,823,019	70,048
Vegetables ...	...	50,045	...	45,065
Flour ... lbs.	13,699,927	44,021	9,794,720	33,694
Tanned hides ...	...	43,355	93,898	46,963
Raw hides { lbs.	6,586,902	} 33,588	7,927,518	35,115
Raw hides { pieces	110,868	}		
Cotton fabrics ...	...	32,221	...	27,870
Molasses	...	30,627	...	29,480
Animals, quails, & animal food ...	...	27,494	...	19,507
Rags, paper ...	14,517,535	25,744	16,238,814	28,719
Lentils ... qrs	19,504	20,027	21,343	32,171
Coal, wood, &c. ...	...	18,568	...	17,621
Barley	...	17,729	...	17,946
Dates	...	13,795	...	11,711
Henna ... lbs.	1,668,111	12,480	1,854,256	13,515
Chemical products and medicines...	...	5,967	...	5,692
Gum Arabic ...	85,735	1,995	...	9,645
Other articles ...	...	87,951	...	104,573
Total... ...	...	10,669,146		11,138,420

The above shows the value of cotton and cotton seed as amounting to about 9,000,000*l.* annually, or about $\frac{9}{10}$ths of the whole export trade, which proves its paramount importance as an article of commerce, but the return shows a decline of 701,859*l.* in 1888 as compared with the previous year, and also an immense falling-off in gum arabic amounting to 7650*l.*, or say 500 per cent.

The following extract from Egyptian official

reports is well worthy of attention, not so much for the amounts involved, which are trifling, as from the source whence they are derived, and it is quoted for that purpose, as it is an unfailing indication of extreme financial pressure when Eastern women sell their ornaments—it is their last resource—and thus is shown the distress for means to which the Fellaheen were driven :—

EXTRACT, EGYPT, No. 1 (1890).

"FINANCES OF EGYPT DATED 20TH FEBRUARY, 1890—*re* GOLD AND SILVER INGOTS EXPORTED SINCE 1885.

"It is stated on good authority that these ingots consist for the most part of melted down gold and silver ornaments, sold by the more well-to-do portion of the agricultural population in the villages. According to the Customs' returns, none were exported in 1884 or 1885—the figures for the following years are :—

1886.		1887.		1888.		1889.
£		£		£		£
61,000	...	97,000	...	122,000	...	281,000

"These figures appear to point to the conclusion that the fellaheen have recently been paying for the imported articles which they consume, with the accumulated savings of previous years."

The next extract, from the same source, deals with the decline in trade, and is drawn up by Mr. J. L. Gorst, and forwarded by Sir E. Baring :—

"Inclosure 2 in No. 1 Memorandum.

"The falling-off in trade shown by the returns of the Egyptian Custom House for the last few years has lately attracted considerable attention, and caused a certain amount of uneasiness, and even alarm, among certain sections of the community.

* * * * * *

"I have not considered it desirable to go farther back than 1884, firstly, because the Custom House returns previous to that year are incomplete, and the details of doubtful accuracy, and, secondly, because the circumstances of the years immediately preceding 1884 were very abnormal, and it would be consequently impossible to base on the statistics of those years any conclusions of real practical value.

* * * * * *

TABULAR STATEMENT REFERRED TO ABOVE.

	1884.	1885.	1886.
	£	£	£
Imports	8,214,000	8,989,000	7,848,000
Exports	12,549,000	11,425,000	10,130,000
	20,763,000	20,414,000	17,978,000

	1887.	1888.	1889.
	£	£	£
Imports	8,137,000	7,738,000	6,950,000
Exports	10,876,000	10,418,000	11,940,000
	19,013,000	18,156,000	18,890,000

Showing a falling off in the aggregate of imports and exports between 1884 *and* 1889 *of* 1,873,000*l.*

The next statement shows the decline in the exports to the United Kingdom from Egypt proper, under Class A. Class B is strictly confined to the Soudan, but it must not be assumed that the Soudan could not yield and export the same produce as Egypt proper, were transport available. The years 1884 and 1885 are purposely excluded from the calculation of averages, as the totals of these years are abnormal, owing to the presence of the British troops.

The following extracts from the Consular Report of trade at Suakin and Alexandria 1889 give information touching the decline of exports of mother-of-pearl, and the diversion of that trade to Massowah —showing the desire of the Sheikhs to deal with English trading companies; also referring to the price of cotton, the appreciation of barley in the United Kingdom, the decadence in the gum arabic

COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF EXPORTS FROM EGYPT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.

CLASS A.	Average for 4 years, 1880—3	£8,589,051
"	" " 1886—9	7,252,740
	Average falling off per annum	£1,336,311

CLASS B.	Average for 4 years, 1880—3	£237,556
"	" " 1886—9	30,779
	Average falling off per annum	£206,777

CLASS A.

	1880.	1881.	1882.	1883.	1884.	1885.	1886.	1887.	1888.	1889.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Cotton, Raw	4,951,090	5,785,311	5,034,785	5,976,674	6,243,709	5,707,573	4,795,991	5,098,226	4,297,872	5,704,017
" Seed	1,748,986	1,691,172	1,458,203	1,741,225	1,458,131	1,704,374	1,368,061	1,393,876	1,480,305	1,683,767
Corn, Wheat	808,611	525,754	80,947	520,364	345,002	38,321	15,211	67,293	236,236	104,002
" Beans	700,868	618,899	503,064	1,001,053	771,712	761,748	487,400	462,043	391,375	315,358
" Barley	41,969	20,888	16,733	29,126	65,225	16,815	...	12,066	17,284	83,922
" Maize, or Indian Corn	5,425	27,817	177,738	26,817	188,550	23,847	1,500	772	66,165	158
Coffee	6,964	2,646	655	2,045	562	620	443	3,338	552	437
Seeds, Tares and Lentils ...	22,381	22,313	86,783	64,129	75,108	38,998	10,092	7,109	12,605	4,131
" other sorts	13,379	11,641	8,338	6,311	22,378	25,472	2,064	14,482	1,248	2,127
Sugar, Refined and Candy ...	78,645	29	265	5,215	840	...	14	...	...	...
" Unrefined	229,381	111,125	24,200	147,315	141,411	159,730	166,084	155,022	278,009	270,079
" Molasses	9,408	387	2,022	7,109	...	10	...	226	...	...
	8,617,107	8,817,982	7,393,733	9,527,383	9,312,628	8,477,508	6,846,860	7,214,453	6,781,651	8,167,998

CLASS B.

	1880.	1881.	1882.	1883.	1884.	1885.	1886.	1887.	1888.	1889.
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Gum, Arabic	149,021	182,084	168,626	92,028	68,002	75,335	38,858	38,812	11,506	12,455
" other sorts	19,450	25,408	11,668	7,058	14,582	5,611	2,816	2,836	1,200	354
Ivory Teeth, Elephants', &c...	74,850	46,640	4,166	114,519	16,560	680	4,332	4,927	...	50
Feathers, Ornamental	26,770	5,780	11,331	10,825	4,700	2,450	1,003	2,651	495	820
	270,091	259,912	195,791	224,430	103,844	84,076	47,009	49,226	13,201	13,679

trade to *nil*, and calling attention to the "rotting away" of ivory and other products of the Soudan for want of means of transit, and alluding to the decline of the Manchester trade.

SUAKIN.

"There has been a marked decrease in the export of mother-of-pearl, and there are reasons which induce me to think that the export will cease altogether.

"The passage of slaves from the Arabian to the Soudanese coast is very commonly effected in pearl boats. They are, in consequence, liable to be searched whenever met with by men-of-war; *but finding that they are allowed more liberty in Italian waters*, they prefer to spend the season in the south. Moreover, the *Italian Government is said to pay a small bounty to pearl fishers* who bring their shells into Massowah for sale. They fetch a higher price there than here, and the freight to Trieste is cheaper by Italian boats from Massowah than by Egyptian boats from Suakin.

"The total value of the exports is tenfold that obtained in 1888.

"In attempting to forecast the future of trade in the Eastern Soudan, we are encouraged to take a hopeful view from the friendly attitude of all the local sheikhs, and their eagerness to engage in trade with the Soudan Trading Company.

"This company commenced operations last autumn by inducing the Tokar sheikhs and others to plant cotton, and the crop will be gathered very shortly. The political conditions of the country are, however, such that it is impossible to form an estimate of the measure of success which will attend the enterprise until the cotton has been forwarded to Suakin two or three weeks hence."

* * * * * *

ALEXANDRIA.

Respecting cotton crops and prices thereof:—

"The amount of the crop is determined by the exports between September 1st and August 31st, and it is estimated that the exports for the season 1889-90 will amount to 3,250,000 cantars (the cantar = 98 lbs.).

"This fine crop was therefore about the same as that of 1879, the largest previously known, and was of a good, healthy quality. The trade was fairly good throughout the year, and prices did not fluctuate to any great extent. The average price of the 1889-90 crop was P.T. 260 per cantar (1*l.*=P.T. 97½). Export merchants may be said to have done moderately well, *while the cultivators*

reaped a handsome profit. At the beginning of the season the stocks of Egyptian cotton in England and on the Continent were very small, and owing to the expectation (which, however, was not fully realized) that high prices would be paid for first arrivals, the cultivators sold their produce at high rates, a large amount of cotton having realized from P.T. 320 to P.T. 345 per cantar."

* * * * * *

Respecting barley :—

"The total quantity exported in 1889 was about 15,000 quarters, as compared with about 28,000 quarters in 1888. The Upper Egypt crops were poor, but at Mariout the harvest was fairly good, owing to the beneficial rainfall in the winter and early spring. Mariout and the other better qualities of barley are much appreciated by English and Scotch brewers and distillers; but the barley from Upper Egypt and some parts of Lower Egypt, owing to want of proper attention, contains an admixture of helba seed or fenugreek, which renders it unfit for brewing purposes. Prices were moderate at the beginning of the season, but advanced later on owing to the demand for local consumption."

* * * * * *

Gum arabic :—

"The exports of this once important article are now almost *nil*, having steadily declined since 1884, when the total exports amounted to 131,000*l.* Large quantities of gum arabic, ivory, and other valuable products are rotting away in the Soudan, where there is no possibility of exporting or properly storing them.'

* * * * * *

Cotton fabrics :—

"Besides the bad harvests, the closing of the Soudan, which formerly took a large quantity of Manchester goods, has contributed to the gradual decline of the imports of these manufactures from 1,665,196*l.* in 1885 to 1,074,672*l.* in 1889."

The above refers only to the port of Alexandria, and of course does not deal with goods sent direct to Suakin, and those supplied from India and transhipments from Jeddah.

The following give the Soudan budgets of 1881 and 1882, with full details as to the latter and comments thereon :—

ACCOUNT OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE FROM COL. STEWART'S REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1882.

		Revenue.	Expenditure.	Surplus.	Deficit.
		£E.	£E.	£E.	£E.
	EAST SOUDAN.				
No. 1.	*Province of Taka* (Capital, Kasala) ...	...	...	...	67,820
	Revenue—Tribute from Arabs (£E.62,090) ... Recd.	46,727			
	,, Various taxes, such as works, customs, petitions, &c. ...	2,432			
	,, Tobacco duty, weighing tax, measuring tax, sale of hides, &c.	1,097			
	,, Assistance to Government, i.e. 10% of salaries for 5 months	2,921			
	,, Telegraph receipts	327			
	,, 10% salaries of employés ...	92			
	Expenditure—Salaries	...	69,612		
	,, Rations	...	40,949		
	,, Various items	...	8,269		
	,, Salaries of telegraph employés...	...	2,586		
	Deficit	67,820			
	Error in Blue-book— Revenue overcast £E.25.	121,416	121,416		
No. 2.	*Province of Suakin* (Capital, Suakin)	...	...	6,176	
	Revenue—Tribute, Arab (£E.8994) Recd.	7,030			
	,, Customs	9,083			
	,, Works, octroi on butter, weighing, &c., causeway dues, &c.	1,525			
	,, Taxes from Sarkat, O'Kik, Ruwayia, &c.	8,225			
	,, 10% on salaries	402			
	,, Telegraph receipts	388			
	,, 10% salaries	15			
	Expenditure—Salaries	...	9,647		
	,, Rations	...	1,072		
	,, Clothing	...	3,576		
	,, Various items...	...	5,280		
	,, Telegraph	...	917		
	Surplus	...	6,176		
	Error in Blue-book— Revenue undercast £E.722 $\frac{50}{100}$.	26,668	26,668	6,176	67,820

		Revenue.	Expenditure.	Surplus.	Deficit.
		£E.	£E.	£E.	£E.
	Brought forward	...	...	6,176	67,820
No. 3.	*Province of Massowah* (Capital, Massowah)...	...	...	...	18,535
	Revenue—Tribute from tribes	2,357			
	,, Dues on causeway, water-rate, revenue from salt, &c.	3,477			
	,, Customs	15,648			
	,, Various taxes...	722			
	,, 10% salaries	935			
	,, Telegraph	2,965			
	,, 10% salaries	21			
	Expenditure—Salaries, including that of Governor - General of East Soudan...	...	24,430		
	,, Rations	...	14,766		
	,, Clothing	...	1,329		
	,, Various items	...	3,632		
	,, Telegraph...	...	503		
	Deficit	18,535			
	Error in Blue-book—Expenditure undercast £E.2000.	44,660	44,660		
	CENTRAL SOUDAN.				
No. 4.	*Province of Senaar* (Capital, Senaar)	...	...	...	1,832
	Revenue—Tribute from Arabs, and taxes of districts (£E.50,917) Recd.	37,188			
	, Works tax at Senaar and other places	222			
	,, Ferries at Senaar and Fazoglou, excise on beer, &c. ...	1,396			
	,, House tax at Senaar and Karkotsch	76			
	,, Various items	325			
	,, 10% of salaries	1,416			
	,, Telegraph	224			
	,, 10% salaries	29			
	Expenditure—Salaries	...	33,989		
	,, Rations	...	6,160		
	,, Clothing	...	1,319		
	, Various items	...	500		
	, Telegraph	...	740		
	Deficit	1,832			
		42,708	42,708	6,176	88,187

		Revenue.	Expenditure.	Surplus.	Deficit.
		£E.	£E.	£E.	£E.
	Brought forward ...	...	...	6,176	88,187
No. 5.	*Province of Berber* (Capital, Berber)...	...	...	23,916	
	Revenue—Sakiyés	9,988			
	,, Island lands	16,316			
	,, Gerouff	4,508			
	,, Lands cultivated in the rains	32			
	,, Date palm	2,266			
	,, Nomad tribes...	5,809			
	,, Trade and profession tax ...	801			
	,, House tax, &c.	1,980			
	,, 10% on salaries	453			
	,, Telegraph	329			
	,, 10% salaries	48			
	Expenditure—Salaries	...	10,877		
	,, Rations	...	3,469		
	,, Clothing	...	723		
	,, Current expenses, trans-				
	,, port	...	2,356		
	,, Telegraph	...	1,189		
	Surplus	...	23,916		
	Error in Blue-book—	42,530	42,530		
	Revenue undercast £E.$\frac{20}{100}$.				
No. 6.	*Province of Fashoda* (Capital, Fashoda)	...	...	...	18,102
	Revenue—Arabs and districts				
	(£E.18,724) ... Recd.	6,477			
	,, Taxes from town of Fashoda	1,023			
	,, Telegraph	96			
	Expenditure—Salaries	...	19,424		
	,, Rations	...	3,405		
	,, Clothing	...	1,798		
	,, Various items	...	831		
	,, Telegraph	...	240		
	Deficit	18,102			
		25,698	25,698	30,092	103, 28

		Revenue.	Expenditure.	Surplus.	Deficit.
		£E.	£E.	£E.	£E.
	Brought forward	...	...	30,092	106,289
No. 7.	*Province of Khartoum* (Capital, Khartoum)	...	...	...	49,252
	Revenue—Taxes from districts, and Arab tribute (£E.71,647) Recd.	53,739			
	,, Works, tobacco duty, house taxes, &c., of the towns of Khartoum, Wed Medami, Messelensia, Ghedariff, Refaa, &c.	13,237			
	,, By sale of ferries	185			
	,, Excise on beer	620			
	,, Postal receipts	237			
	,, Printing	50			
	,, 10% on salaries	2,976			
	,, Arsenal	923			
	,, 10% salaries (arsenal)... ...	330			
	,, Telegraph	1,721			
	,, 10% telegraph salaries ...	121			
	Expenditure—Salaries, including the department of the Minister of the Soudan ...	...	76,313		
	,, Rations	...	22,862		
	,, Clothing	...	4,118		
	,, Various items	...	2,263		
	,, Travelling expenses for Minister...	...	1,836		
	,, Arsenal	...	12,724		
	,, Telegraph	...	3,275		
	Deficit	49,252			
	Error in Blue-book— Revenue overcast £E.1691$\frac{27}{100}$.	123,391	123,391		
No. 8.	*Equatorial Province* (Capital, Lado)...	...	...	...	4,064
	Revenue—By sale of ivory, caoutchouc, &c.	31,385			
	Expenditure—Salaries	...	16,170		
	,, Rations	...	10,311		
	,, Clothing	...	1,983		
	,, Various items	...	6,985		
	Deficit	4,064			
		35,449	35,449	30,092	159,605

		Revenue.	Expenditure.	Surplus.	Deficit.
		£E.	£E.	£E.	£E.
	Brought forward	...	...	30,092	159,605
	WEST SOUDAN.				
No. 9.	*Province of Dongola* (Capital, Dongola)	...	...	45,076	
	Revenue—Sakiyés	30,381			
	,, Amtars	270			
	,, Shadoofs...	41			
	,, Island lands	3,349			
	,, Gerouff	3,305			
	,, Island and Gerouff lands, only paying half tax	1,530			
	,, Date palm	12,950			
	,, Nomad tribes (tribute, £E.523)	441			
	,, Works tax at Dongola... ...	1,003			
	,, Tax on boats	145			
	,, House tax, &c.	1,543			
	,, Quay duty	387			
	,, 10% on salaries	119			
	,, Telegraph	186			
	,, 10% salaries	31			
	Expenditure—Salaries	...	6,474		
	,, Rations	...	2,630		
	,, Clothing	...	390		
	,, Various items	...	329		
	,, Telegraph...	...	782		
	Surplus	...	45,076		
	Error in Blue-book— Revenue undercast £E.1103$\frac{52}{100}$.	55,681	55,681		
No. 10.	*Province of Kordofan* (Capital, Kordofan)	...	...	4,055	
	Revenue—Tribes and districts (Tribute, £E.75,471) ... Recd.	67,112			
	,, From Kordofan town, various taxes...	6,325			
	,, Taxes, various places	753			
	,, Telegraph	248			
	,, 10% telegraph employés ...	21			
	Expenditure—Salaries	...	46,614		
	,, Rations	...	15,580		
	,, Clothing	...	5,039		
	,, Various items	...	2,432		
	,, Telegraph...	...	739		
	Surplus	...	4,055		
		74,459	74,459	79,223	159,605

		Revenue.	Expenditure.	Surplus.	Deficit.
		£E.	£E.	£E.	£E.
	Brought forward	...	...	79,223	159,605
	PROVINCE OF DARFOUR.				
No. 11.	*Memuriat of Dara* (Capital, Dara) ...	...	...	4,013	
	Revenue—Districts and Nomads	22,444			
	,, Works	230			
	,, Various taxes...	454			
	Expenditure—Salaries	...	9,324		
	,, Rations	...	6,929		
	,, Clothing	...	1,885		
	,, Various items	...	1,027		
	Surplus	...	4,013		
		23,178	23,178		
No. 12.	*Memuriat of Kebkebiya* (Capital, Kebkebiyoh	...	...	...	7,480
	Revenue—Taxes on Nomads and districts	10,857			
	,, Works	26			
	,, Various taxes...	118			
	Expenditure—Salaries	...	9,789		
	,, Rations	...	5,995		
	,, Clothing	...	1,563		
	,, Various items	...	1,134		
	Deficit	7,180			
	Error in Blue-book— Revenue undercast £E.3.	18,481	18,181		
No. 13.	*Mudirié of Fasher* (Capital, Fasher)...	...	...	...	10,954
	Revenue—Districts and Nomads... ...	20,311			
	,, Taxes, towns of Fasher-Kobbé, Omchanga, Rerio, Argod, &c.	1,566			
	Expenditure—Salaries	...	18,613		
	,, Rations	...	9,730		
	,, Clothing	...	2,448		
	,, Various items	...	2,010		
	Deficit	10,954			
		32,831	32,831	83,236	178,039

		Revenue.	Expenditure.	Surplus.	Deficit.
		£E.	£E.	£E.	£E.
	Brought forward	...	...	83,236	178,039
No. 14.	*Province of Bahr-el-Ghazelle* (Capital, Dem Idris)	...	...	...	3,856
	Revenue—By sale of ivory, caoutchouc, &c.	14,669			
	Expenditure—Salaries	...	10,815		
	„ Rations	...	1,445		
	„ Clothing	...	1,452		
	„ Various items	...	4,813		
	Deficit	3,856			
		18,525	18,525	83,236	181,895
No. 15.	Section of the *Nile Valley Railway*, charged against the Soudan Provinces	...	...	...	6,746
	Receipts for 1882	2,994			
	Expenditure—Salaries	...	2,990		
	„ Working expenses	...	6,750		
	Deficit	6,746			
	Error in Blue-book—Expenditure overcast £E.10.	9,740	9,740		
	Total deficit, Soudan Provinces, £E.105,405.			105,405	
	Not taking into account arrears due.			188,641	188,641
	Brought down net deficit.				105,405

N.B.—The above accounts are put in a more concise and correct form than in the Blue-book; piastres and paras being left out; but, the total values £E. will be found to be correct.

The following are the comments on the Soudan Budget for 1882, particular attention being called to the fact that the revenue of the country £E.506,774 was all swallowed up in the maintenance of troops and civil officials, and in addition to this £105,405 had to be found by the Egyptian Government. This was a most deplorable state of affairs.

The annexed tables of receipts and expenditure should be carefully examined to show the reckless manner in which the country was administered, not a single penny of the amounts wrung from the Soudanese was spent in road-making, or bettering the condition of the country.

A few remarks on each of the 15 accounts of provinces would not be out of place as proving the maladministration of the funds at the disposal of the Egyptian Government. The troops considered necessary for guarding the country, according to Colonel Stewart, were 18 battalions of 872 rank and file; black troops, the only ones that ought to be employed, should cost for maintenance per annum, including pay, rations and clothing, £E.8636 per battalion, i.e. the sum of £E.155,448 for the 18 battalions to be distributed as follows:—

Between Berber and Dongola	1
At Massowah	1
„ Senaar	1
„ Kassala	1
„ Khartoum	2
Province of the Equator	2
„ „ Bahr-el-Ghazelle	2
„ „ Obeid	3
„ „ Darfour	5
	18

No. 1. Province of Taka alone.—The expenditure on administration, i.e. troops and a few civil employés, was £E.121,416, leaving a deficit for this province of £E.67,820; but it must be borne in mind that arrears of tribute, not collected on account of the rising of the Mahdi, was as much as £E.15,363; that the vast sum of money must have been squandered is apparent on the face of the account. N.B.—Taxpayers not benefited in the slightest degree out of the money paid to Government.

No. 2. Province of Suakin.—Expenditure of £E.20,492 for so small a place—an island about 600 yards in diameter—seems much too heavy, considering that the place could be so easily defended by a handful of troops; no doubt the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar are also included in the above.

Customs' dues only amount to £E.9083, the reason of this being that all goods from Turkey, Egypt, or Jeddah, having already paid duty in the Ottoman dominions, are entered in Suakin free of duty on production of "raftieh" or transmission certificate; thus the actual earnings of the port are considerably reduced, and other ports reap the benefit of dues on goods actually consumed at Suakin and in the interior. In spite of these drawbacks the province shows a surplus of £E.6176.

No. 3. Province of Massowah.—Notwithstanding this town is also a small island, the expenditure, amounting to £E.44,660, was a crying evil; that the cost of a Governor-General and troops should amount to such a vast sum proves more conclusively than any amount of arguments the utter inability of Egyptian officials to rule a country with any chance of success; the deficit of £E.18,535 needs no further comment.

No. 4. Province of Senaar.—The "granary of the Soudan," where, on account of want of transport, crops were frequently allowed to rot on the ground, yielded a revenue of £E.40,876; expenditure amounted to £E.42,708, thus leaving a deficit of £E.1832; arrears of taxes due amounted to £E.13,729; so that, if it had not been for the rising of the Mahdi, a large surplus would have accrued from this province.

No. 5. Province of Berber.—Notwithstanding the number of sakiyés (water-wheels) abandoned by the fellaheen on account of the oppression of the

Bashi-Bazouk tax-collectors, who ruined the poor people, the revenue of this province amounted to £E.42,530; expenditure, £E.18,614, compares far more favourably with any of the preceding, the consequence being a surplus of £E.23,916. The sakiyés, or water-wheels, were taxed on a sliding scale in this province, viz. from 450 to 281¼ piastres, irrespective of the amount of land irrigated by each wheel. *Generally the tax was far larger than the net profit arising from the land under cultivation, the cultivator had to draw on his capital until ruined, when he was forced finally to abandon his land.*

The sakiyés lying idle in 1881 in this province were 1442, showing how the country was being ruined by the rapacity of the tax-collectors. It is marvellous that, notwithstanding the difficulties the population had to contend with, the amount of money paid into the treasury was so large.

No. 6. Province of Fashoda.—Revenue £E.7596 collected, arrears due, £E.12,247, expenditure £E.25,698. Deficit for the year £E.18,102 seems an incredible state of affairs, nevertheless, such is the fact; no comments can condemn such a financial muddle more than the account itself.

No. 7. Province of Khartoum.—The seat of Government in this year 1882 had to be charged with two Governors-General and a minister in Cairo, who no doubt contributed largely, by each pulling different ways, to increase the heavy deficit of £E.49,252.

The third Governor-General was paid in the accounts of the Province of Massowah.

Arrears of revenue not collected were £E.17,908. As the items are in lump sums, it is difficult to call particular attention as to what the expenditure was really for. The cost of the new administration of governing the country with three Governors-General and a minister at Cairo, instead of the old plan of a

resident Governor-General in Khartoum, increased the expenses £E.20,000 per annum. The question is, who could have been so insane as to increase the deficits of the Soudan in such a needless manner?

No. 8. Equatorial Province.—Returned a revenue of £E.31,385, expenditure £E.35,449, leaving a deficit of £E. 4064; as usual, this expenditure is spent on troops.

No. 9. Province of Dongola.—Shows the large revenue of £E.55,681, the expenditure *mirabile dictu* only amounted to £E.10,605, leaving a surplus of £E.45,076, in spite of the fact that 613 sakiyés had been abandoned in 1881, owing to excessive taxation; originally, each sakiyé was taxed 200 piastres, but this sum was raised by successive Governors-General till it reached 500 piastres in the time of Jaafer Pasha, who unblushingly stated that he knew the amount was excessive, and wished to see what the peasant would pay, to enable him to arrive at a just mean after three years' trial.

TAXES ON FIRST-CLASS SAKIYÉS.

	$\frac{1}{40}$ Piastres.
Tax in 1862	350·00
Increase by Jaafer Pasha . . .	150·00
Share of Arrears, 1862 to 1869 . .	64·20
,, ,, Ferries, &c.	27·23
,, ,, Salaries of Officials . .	15·32
Total	607·35

As an instance of the injustice of the manner of levying:—

A commission of Dongola notables carefully calculated the earnings and cost of working two sakiyés irrigating fair average land; after deducting all expenses and cost of maintenance of the cultivators, they found the net returns, exclusive of taxes, were 391 and 201 piastres, sums totally inadequate to pay the taxes, which had to be paid

out of capital, viz. sale of cattle, or if the cultivator were a poor man, by borrowing money at an exorbitant rate of interest. The result of this ruinous policy being to reduce the inhabitants to destitution, who were thus forced to abandon their means of livelihood and emigrate.

This being a fair example of the suicidal policy adopted by the pashas, there is no cause to wonder at the deficits, and that the people should, at the first opportunity, rise against their oppressors.

No. 10. Province of Kordofan.—Although remote, returned a revenue of £E.74,459. Arrears of taxes due £E.8359; yet leaving a surplus of £E.4055. Here again the pay of the troops swallow up almost the whole revenue collected.

Province of Darfour was divided into three memuriats, viz. Dara, Kebkebiya, and Fasher, each of which is dealt with on its own merits.

No. 11. Memuriat of Dara.—Revenue £E.23,178, expended for pay, &c., of troops, leaving a surplus of £E.4013.

No. 12. Memuriat of Kebkebiya. — Revenue £E.11,001; expenditure in keeping up troops £E.18,481, leaving a deficit of £E.7480.

No. 13. Mudirié of Fasher. — Revenue £E.21,877; exorbitant expenditure for troops £E.32,831, leaving a heavy loss £E.10,954, i.e. the revenue and 50 per cent. in addition being the cost of troops ! ! !

No. 14. Province of Bahr-el-Ghazelle.—Revenue of £E.14,669 insufficient to pay for troops, deficit being £E.3856.

No. 15. Section of the Nile Valley Railway.—Why the deficit of £E.6746 should be charged against the Soudan it would be hard to say, unless the object was to swell the deficit.

Result of the above fifteen accounts:—Total deficit £E.105,405.

QUOTED HERE FOR COMPARISON, THE REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNTS FOR 1882 SHOW FAR MORE DETAILS.

(*From* COLONEL STEWART'S *Report.*)

BUDGET FOR 1881.

	Expenditure.			Revenue.		
	£E.	$\frac{1}{100}$ p.	$\frac{1}{40}$ p.	£E.	$\frac{1}{100}$ p.	$\frac{1}{40}$ p.
Central Government at Khartoum, Courts, &c. ...	22,877	94	3	1,452	47	31
Province of Khartoum	55,193	41	6	60,500	62	20
Arsenal, Khartoum	15,706	21	25	2,709	30	23
Printing office	1,265	80	0	8,149	35	0
Telegraph, Soudan	10,082	35	23	3,865	65	30
Province of Senaar	26,808	60	6	39,774	90	2
,, Dongola	10,303	88	19	55,118	26	14
,, Berber	14,410	98	29	40,683	55	33
,, Taka	151,433	99	37	51,805	84	14
,, Kordofan...	46,364	82	1	74,405	40	0
Railway	9,646	52	18	7,563	60	34
Province of Fashoda	18,454	90	7	7,816	49	14
,, Fasher	33,975	42	16	16,394	57	38
,, Dara...	19,787	59	27	20,331	53	26
,, Kolkol	18,679	97	3	10,825	80	27
,, Bahr-el-Ghazelle	14,301	65	32	12,198	0	0
,, Equator	42,450	0	0	52,239	0	0
Total	511,684	9	12	474,843	40	35

Deficit ... ... £E.36,840 $\frac{70}{100}$.

SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTS OF THE PROVINCES OF THE SOUDAN FOR 1882.

	Revenue collected.	Revenue arrears due.	Expenditure
	£E.	£E.	£E.
Province of Taka	53,596	15,363	121,416
,, Suakin...	26,668	1,964	20,492
,, Massowah	26,125	...	44,660
,, Senaar	40,876	13,729	42,708
,, Berber	42,530	...	18,614
,, Fashoda	7,596	12,247	25,698
,, Khartoum	74,139	17,908	123,391
,, Equatorial	31,385	...	35,449
,, Dongola	55,681	82	10,605
,, Kordofan	74,459	8,359	70,404
,, Darfour, Memuriat of Dara	23,178	...	19,165
,, ,, ,, Kebkebiya	11,001	...	18,481
,, ,, ,, Fasher	21,877	...	32,831
,, Bahr-el-Ghazelle	14,669	...	18,525
Section of the Nile Valley Railway, charged against the Soudan Provinces	2,994	...	9,740
	506,774	69,652	612,179

Arrears, £E.69,652; Deficit, £E.105,405.

THE following account contains, in the first portion, the actual state of affairs, and proves the fact that if arrears had been collected, there would have been a deficit of £E.35,753 only, as compared with loss of £E.36,840 in 1881, in spite of 1882 expenditure being increased by some £E.20,000, owing to the new arrangement of three Governors-General and a Minister in Cairo, in lieu of one Governor-General. As the Soudan was debited with all the cost of troops which were guarding the frontier of Egypt, besides its being a settlement for penal servitude for Egyptians, and for which no allowance was made, in common justice, Customs' dues levied on Exports and Imports should have been credited. This being done as under, it is gratifying to find that, instead of a deficit, a handsome surplus, viz., £E.119,516, results. (See Consul Baker's report on trade of Soudan, in Chapter VIII., page 173, and Sir H. Drummond Wolff's dispatch, page 286.)

DR. THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT IN ACCOUNT WITH THE SOUDAN GOVERNMENT. CR.

1882, January to December.	£E.	1882, January to December.			£E.
To expenditure as per following 15 accounts extracted from Col. Stewart's report	612,179	By revenue realized from all sources, as per previous accounts, 15 in number, extracted from Col. ... Stewart's report			506,774
		By arrears of revenue due, which in ordinary times would have been recovered			69,652
		By loss			35,753
	612,179				612,179
To loss brought down	35,753	By Customs' dues on imports for Soudan, not credited in above, estimated as in Sir H. Drummond Wolff's dispatch, page 286, £E.2,000,000 at 8%		160,000	
		Do. Imports, £E.2,000,000 at 1%		20,000	
				180,000	
		Less received at Suakin, per account 2...	9,083		
To profit	119,516	Less received at Massowah, per account 3	15,648		
				24,731	
					155,269
	155,269				155,269
		By profit ... ... As it should be made out by the Governor-General of the Soudan.			119,516

When it is considered that these satisfactory results shown by this last account, based, it must be admitted, upon very moderate speculative estimates, are derived from data furnished during the corrupt Government of Egypt, the conclusion is inevitable that they exhibit at least a minimum of prosperity, and what might be attained under a different dispensation is best indicated by the following report of Colonel Wodehouse's government, extracted from a despatch from Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury, dated Cairo, 4th May, 1889:—

"The success of the English administration is indeed remarkable. It is shown more particularly by the absence of complaints and by the prompt payment of taxes and arrears. Nearly all the old law-suits—some of which had been pending for years—have been settled. Sir F. Grenfell, a year ago, recommended many of the litigants to submit the cases in dispute to the arbitration of the Sub-Governor. This they have very often done with the best possible results. Contraband trade has been stamped out. The Egyptian Treasury has gained, whilst the people are more happy and contented than heretofore. The statement which Sir F. Grenfell makes about the payment of the sheep tax is a very remarkable illustration of what may be done by improved administration. In one district only 1552 sheep paid the tax in the year previous to Colonel Wodehouse's administration. Last year no less than 4292 paid the tax in the same district. It can scarcely be doubted that *previously bribes had been paid to the officials with a view to evading payment of the tax.* Naturally enough, now that the tax is properly collected, it weighs more heavily on the inhabitants than heretofore. Sir F. Grenfell has therefore, proposed that the tax shall be reduced, and I understand that his proposal has been adopted. The result will be that both the Government and the honest taxpayers will gain, and that the only losers will be the officials who previously received bribes.

"In view of the improved state of affairs set forth in Sir F. Grenfell's Report, I am not surprised to learn that the people of adjoining districts are anxious to be placed under Colonel Wodehouse's government.

* * * * * *

"The results of the past year's administration of this province reflect the utmost credit on Colonel Wodehouse.

The following are a few pertinent quotations and remarks from a report of the Finances of Egypt, forwarded by Sir E. Baring, 29th March, 1891, presented to both Houses of Parliament, published 25th May; reported by Mr. Elwyn Palmer, financial adviser to His Highness the Khedive, with a memorandum from Mr. Clarke, one of the secretaries attached to Her Majesty's agency.

In the above the advantages of improvement in irrigation are so earnestly insisted on, as to be credited with the saving of Egypt from bankruptcy!

Respecting the revenues of Suakin it is shown that in 1889 they amounted to £17,641, in 1890 they amounted to £13,773, showing a decline of £3868.

That the revenue for Egypt proper amounted to £10,237,000, of which the land tax composed more than half, viz., £5,215,000, equal to about £1 per acre. Now bearing in mind the official statistics of the area of the cultivable land in the Soudan already quoted, it will be at once seen what enormous sources of revenue could be anticipated, if the country were developed.

Touching the cost of the army of occupation, the British troops incurred an outlay for 1890 of £61,000.

Again as to the Government of Suakin,—

The civil administration costs . . .	£29,287
Military do.	84,000
	£113,287
Receipts of Government of Suakin . .	13,773
Net cost of retaining Suakin . . .	£99,514

The estimate for the year 1891 is:—

Civil administration	£27,428
Military do.	84,000
	£111,428
Receipts	13,000
Net cost of retaining Suakin . . .	£98,428

Yet the total deficit in the *whole of the Soudan* was only £105,405, when the customs' dues collected in Egypt proper were not credited to the Soudan Government!

The undermentioned shows the further expenses borne by H.M.'s Government on account of the Soudan:—

Egypt No. 2, 29th March, 1891. No particulars given why £E.411,175 should have been paid in the two years, 1886-7.

	1885.	1886.	1887.	1888.	1889.	1890.	Total.
	£E.	£E.	£E.	£E.	£E.	£E.	£E.
Guerre	124,169	362,336	134,793	...	...	...	621,298
Police	42,717	49,200	...	...	...	...	91,917
Soudan	225,129	94,766	61,752	70,608	36,150	8,093	496,498
Pensions	...	110,496	90,000	...	...	...	200,496
	392,015	616,798	286,545	70,608	36,150	8,093	1,410,209
A déduire— Les versements faits par le Gouvernement Anglais ...	...	195,000	216,175	...	...	...	411,175
	392,015	421,798	70,370	70,608	36,150	8,093	999,034

Or an average to Egyptian Government for the years 1885 to 1890 of £166,505 per annum, being one-sixth of the above £E.999,034.

From the foregoing somewhat meagre and desultory statistics, though they are the fullest we have been able to obtain, it is manifest that the enormous resources of the Soudan are practically totally undeveloped; that during the presence of the British at Suakin no effort has been made to encourage production, but rather the contrary; that in consequence of the blockade and other

obstructive measures, trade both inwards and outwards has steadily declined, accompanied with loss to the revenue of Suakin, and that the outlay of the Egyptian and British Governments has been enormous, without any corresponding return being apparent. These results are so clearly shown by the figures quoted that comment would be supererogatory.

In the next chapter suggestions will be offered for the adoption of measures which it is hoped and believed will open the door to the future prosperity of the Soudan and Soudanese and the expansion of trade with Great Britain.

CHAPTER XIII.

Retrospect of previous chapters—Responsibility of H.M.'s Government defined by War Office—Governors-General at Suakin under orders of General commanding in Egypt—Financial and political difficulties of Egypt render it impossible to successfully develop the Soudan—Railway Suakin-Berber a *sine quâ non*—Sundry proposals to H.M.'s Government to open trade—Egypt's right in Soudan, *de jure* and *de facto* extinct—Italy by treaty with England occupies a large portion of abandoned territory—Zeila and Berbera British possessions since 1884—British protection advocated over remaining portion of abandoned Soudan.

IN this concluding chapter will be given a brief retrospect of the events as narrated in this volume, with the view of drawing particular attention to the grounds which are relied upon as a justification for the "title," more especially as to the question of responsibility; some proposals for dealing with the future of the Soudan with the object of developing the resources of the country and regenerating its inhabitants; and, in conclusion, some suggestions for the adoption of some strong measures, of a drastic character, with the motive of preventing a recurrence of those distressing circumstances associated with the British occupation, which can only be viewed as a blot on the national escutcheon, unless indeed it is intended that the Royal Standard, for the future, is to be supplemented in its quarterings with the ensign of the Duke of Brunswick at Waterloo, or, strictly speaking, Quatre Bras, viz., "Death's Head and Cross

Bones," to which might be added "Aborigines' Extermination."

In the first chapter, it will have been seen that the history of the Soudanese testifies, at no very distant date, to their high intellectual qualities, but that in consequence of a succession of untoward events they became demoralized, and this led finally to their subjection to Egypt, accompanied eventually with such damaging results to both the conquered and the conqueror. The second chapter shows, on the authority of Colonel Stewart and Besati Bey, late secretary to General Gordon, by what oppressive, cruel, and exasperating measures these damaging results were brought about, making it apparent that the continuance of such a government could tend to nothing else but the utter destruction of the country, exhibiting a complete incapacity in both civil and military administration, weighted afterwards by the injurious effects of dual control, making bad worse, as the Governments of Egypt and Great Britain were diametrically opposed in their views. This divergence caused the enforced resignation of Chérif Pasha, one of the most capable of Egypt's ministers; it is then shown how this confusion, worse confounded, led to the employment of General Hicks, for which H.M.'s Government were unquestionably indirectly responsible, and to the difficulties in which that officer became involved [1] (as appears on page 33).

Chapter III. deals with the question of abandonment, as recommended by H.M.'s Government, thus inevitably incurring responsibilities, though seeking to ignore them, but which subsequently had to be reckoned with. The views of many high authorities

[1] "Hicks (who, by the way, never wanted to go to the Soudan) would have held his own at Khartoum, and have worn out the Mahdi, and we would have had none of this late work."—"General Gordon's Diary," Book V., 25th October, 1884.

on the subject of abandonment, whole, or in part, and causes of revolt, all concurring in the condemnation of the Egyptian Government, are here given, showing a complete harmony as to the advantage that abandonment would be to the Soudanese, as also the circumstances that finally resulted in the appointment of General Gordon as Governor-General of the Soudan, by a Firman of H.H. the Khedive, approved by H.M.'s Government, which as a British officer on active service, and being also in direct communication with Sir Evelyn Baring, whose instructions he was ordered to obey, necessarily involved H.M.'s Government in the question of responsibility. The next two chapters treat especially of the events associated with his appointment, and the expedition intended for his relief, and perhaps the responsibilities and shortcomings of H.M.'s Government are more forcibly demonstrated in this phase of the situation than at any other period. All the advantages—and they were manifest—that would, it may be said without question, have arisen from the unfettered exercise of General Gordon's sound judgment—the result of many years' experience of the country and its people—were wantonly thrown away by the arbitrary interference of officials at home, who were confessedly quite uninformed, and the catastrophes that followed may most unequivocally be attributed to this unwarrantable course. As to the expedition itself, while it amply testifies to the responsibilities of H.M.'s Government, it at the same time evinces that lack of prevision and provision which alone could have insured it a successful issue.

The remaining chapters which, with the exception of Chapter XII. dealing solely with statistics, showing *inter alia* the enormous outlay incurred by both Egypt and Great Britain, refer especially to the

movements in the neighbourhood of Suakin and the adjacent territory in the Eastern Soudan. The events there described prove most conclusively the completion, at the hands of Her Majesty's Government, of the Ruin of the Soudan, initiated by the former maladministration[2]—(see footnotes of Gordon's opinions emphatically showing this)—of that of Egypt, and as regards justifying its title,

[2] "If you ask me what is to be done to regenerate these people (the Egyptians) I could not answer it. They are the most hopeless set. Continual oppression has made them of such a material that you could find no sound principle to work on. Nations have generally some regenerating qualities, either a commercial, military, religious, or patriotic spirit. These people lack each one of these motive influences."—"General Gordon in Central Africa," 10th April, 1876.

"I feel sure that it is the fault of a series of bad Governments which has ruined the people."—"General Gordon in Central Africa," 11th April, 1876.

"I met some 2000*l.* worth of coffee, which my friend Raouf Pasha had sent down to be sold on his private account at Aden, meaning to buy merchandise and retail the same at exorbitant cost to the soldiers at Harrar. I have confiscated it all. It is the only way to punish him; for his H.H. doing much the same thing, will never do so."—"General Gordon in Central Africa," 20th April, 1878.

"We never get in so much as five-sixths of our revenue, and this is the cause: the collectors of revenue say to the heads of communities: 'Pay me four-sixths of the sums due, and give as *backsheesh* to me one-sixth; then I will certify that you cannot pay the remaining sixth.' I almost despair of being able to check this peculation in so vast a country."—"General Gordon in Central Africa," 24th January, 1879.

"His (Gessi Pasha's) difficulties, which were great enough in themselves, were increased by the villainy of some of the Egyptian officers. In one district the commander of the troops was carrying off not only the flocks and herds of the natives, but their young girls."—"General Gordon in Central Africa" (Campaign of Gessi Pasha).

"My line of action is clear: it is to keep aloof from Cairo, and to do my best in the Soudan, leaving those at Cairo to involve, as I think they are doing, the country more and more."—"General Gordon in Central Africa," page 433.

"The Government of the Egyptians in these far-off countries

these chapters are perhaps more important, and deserving more attention than any others in this volume.

From the very beginning, in spite of the advocacy of a policy of pacification and encouragement of trade, pleaded by the most trustworthy authorities on the spot, a system was adopted by the authorities at home which entirely thwarted the attainment of these desirable objects.

Instead of seeking to conciliate the conflicting tribes with each other, and endeavouring to adjust their internecine differences, and further, of making every effort to reconcile them all to the presence of the British power, a course was adopted calculated to aggravate the existing fermentation, and prejudice every tribe against the English people. The practice of encouraging raids by one tribe upon another, and of assisting in these with troops commanded by British officers, coupled with the operation of the blockade that was simultaneously established with the object of starving the whole population, whether friend or foe, associated as it was by way of apologies with an affected desire to check the slave trade, that stereotyped stalking horse that is trotted out on all occasions as an excuse for any enormity—has brought the whole country into its present deplorable condition, for which Her Majesty's Government are wholly and solely responsible. That these proceedings were undertaken with the varying overt and clandestine sanction of Her Majesty's Government is evident from the official despatches, and moreover, from the subsequent promotion of

is nothing else but one of brigandage of the very worst description.

"One thing is certain, that the Egyptian should never be allowed out of his own country."—"General Gordon in Central Africa," 11th April, 1879.

Colonel Kitchener as Chief of the Egyptian Police, the most prominent promoter of this detrimental policy—a policy which it is to be regretted was afterwards pursued by his successor Colonel Holled-Smith, who seems to have adopted Colonel Kitchener as his general prototype, with variations of his own.[3]

In closing this brief retrospect, a fervent hope is expressed that we are within a measurable distance of the end of the last act of this terrible "Tragedy of Errors," and that the proposals that are about to be made will lead to the means of securing a brighter future for the unfortunate Soudanese.

Though not within the limits of a retrospect, as the following two despatches have not been quoted before, it is trusted that their interpolation here will be excused, as the purpose is to remove the shadow of any lurking doubt that might be entertained as to the irrevocable responsibility of Her Majesty's Government.

Inclosure 1 in No. 86.

GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON TO MR. SECRETARY CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN.

Cairo, April 6th, 1886.

SIR,—As the withdrawal of the English and Egyptian troops to Halfa, Korosko, and Assouan will be effected in the course of the next few days, I have the honour to request instructions upon the following points :—

1. Upon which force, English or Egyptian, will devolve the command of the future garrisons at Halfa and Korosko, these being furnished exclusively by Egyptian troops?

2. Upon whom will devolve the responsibility for the future protection of the Egyptian frontier?

[3] See Appendix "A," containing Dr. Harpur's and General Haig's letters, extracted from "The Aborigines' Friend."

3. In the event of its falling upon the General Officer commanding Her Majesty's troops in Egypt, and with regard to the decision contained in your telegram of the 31st ultimo, under what circumstances will he be authorized in moving English troops to the south of Assouan for the support of the Egyptian troops stationed at Korosko or Wady Halfa or for the protection of the Egyptian frontier?

I have also the honour to request instructions as to who is to be held responsible for the future protection of Suakin in the event of the command being intrusted to an officer holding a commission from His Highness the Khedive, as that garrison will shortly be formed entirely of troops belonging to the Egyptian army?

Inclosure 2 in No. 86.

DRAFT OF DESPATCH TO GENERAL SIR F. STEPHENSON.

War Office, , 1886.

SIR—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch dated the 6th instant, in which you request instructions upon certain points connected with the approaching withdrawal of English and Egyptian troops to Halfa, Korosko, and Assouan.

In reply to your first inquiry as to the force, English or Egyptian, upon which will devolve the command of the future garrisons at Halfa and Korosko, I have to remind you of the arrangements made with the Egyptian Government in June, 1884, under which *the Egyptian army was placed under your general direction and control.*

As to the second point, viz., the responsibility for the future protection of the Egyptian frontier, Her Majesty's Government consider that this responsibility rests with you, and that *you have full power to name the officers to command at every military post.*

In regard to moving English troops to the south of Assouan for the support of the garrisons at Korosko and Wady Halfa, or for the protection of the Egyptian frontier, Her Majesty's Government leave it to your discretion to act according as circumstances may appear to you to call for such a movement.

The garrison of Suakin will in like manner be under your command, and you will also be responsible for the protection of that place.

With regard to the future of the Soudan, the unanimous opinion of all whose judgment is most entitled to respect, is in favour of a settlement with the Soudanese through the medium of a company, chartered by the British Government, with power

to construct a railway, as an initiatory and absolutely essential step, from Suakin to Berber, and all other works necessary for the development of the resources of the country.

The establishment of some such company may be considered as the common starting-point for the new departure. The manner of carrying out such a scheme, and under what conditions it should be worked, are questions necessarily subject to divergent views, though all having in prospect the attainment of a common purpose. The first, and perhaps the most important point to be determined is the question—Who is to hold Suakin and the Red Sea littoral, Egypt or Great Britain? In our opinion the presence of the former power, if it were only manifest by the Egyptian flag, in spite of an absolute control by Great Britain, would be fatal to any successful settlement. A long experience of the temper of the Soudanese—an emotional and sensitive race—harbouring as it does so intense a hatred and suspicion of their former governors, convinces us of the utter futility of any attempt to treat with these people while a vestige or a symbol of the Egyptian power is apparent. But even if this insuperable difficulty did not exist, the financial condition of Egypt renders it impossible for her, in the event of the reconquest of the Soudan, ever to develop its resources, as shown in Mr. Gorst's reports, dated Cairo, 20th February, 1890, Egypt, No. 1, 1890, in which stress is laid on the fact that 11,000,000*l.* had been borrowed during the last six years *to balance the account* between Egypt and Europe, and that in future only small loans could be contracted, and those strictly for remunerative purposes.

Now whatever objections may have existed at an earlier period to the assumption of an undivided authority being exercised by Great Britain,

they have, in our opinion, been entirely removed by the march of events. The fact that the British flag now flies at Berbera and Zeyla, and that H.M.'s Ambassador at Rome, the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, last April came to an understanding with the Marquis di Rudini, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Italy, as to the extent of the area in the Soudan where British and Italian influences shall prevail over the heads of H.H. the Khedive and his Suzerain, the Sultan—(for these dignitaries don't appear to be parties to the contract [4])—should convince the most sensitive as to the respect due to the pre-

[4] GREAT BRITAIN AND ITALY IN EAST AFRICA.

The protocols between the British and Italian Governments for the demarcation of *their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Africa*, which were signed at Rome on March 24th and April 15th were presented to Parliament on Wednesday. The protocol of March 24th is as follows :—

The undersigned,

The Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, Ambassador of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India ; and

The Marquis di Rudini, President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the King of Italy ;

After careful examination of the respective interests of the two countries in Eastern Africa, have agreed as follows :—

1. The line of demarcation in Eastern Africa between the spheres of influence respectively reserved to *Great Britain and Italy* shall follow from the sea the mid-channel (Thalweg) of the River Juba up to latitude 6° north, Kismayu with its territory on the right bank of the river thus remaining to England. The line shall then follow the 6th parallel of north latitude up to the meridian 35° east of Greenwich, which it will follow up to the Blue Nile.

2. If future explorations should hereafter show occasion the line following the 6th parallel of north latitude and the 35th degree of longtitude east of Greenwich may, by common agreement, be amended in its details in accordance with the hydrographic and orographic conditions of the country.

3. In the station of Kismayu and its territory there shall be equality of treatment between the subjects and protected persons

scriptive rights of these sovereigns, that they are no longer admitted as factors in dealing with the Soudan, and that it would be a mere affectation to regard them in one district and ignore them in another.

But we are inclined to go further than admitting that the assumption of authority by Great Britain is now *permissible*, we think in the circumstances of the case that it is *obligatory*—morally as an act of justice to the Soudanese—and substantially as the only means of bringing them in contact

---

of the two countries, in all that relates to their persons, their goods, or to the exercise of any kind of commerce and industry.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, the 24th March, 1891.

DUFFERIN AND AVA.
RUDINI.

The following is the protocol of April 15th:—

Being desirous of completing, towards the north as far as the Red Sea, the demarcation of the respective spheres of influence of England and Italy, which the two parties have already agreed on by the protocol of the 24th of March last, from the mouth of the Juba in the Indian Ocean to the intersection of 35° east longitude Greenwich with the Blue Nile, the undersigned:

The Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, Ambassador of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India;

The Marquis di Rudini, President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the King of Italy;

Have agreed as follows:

1. The sphere of influence reserved to Italy is bounded, on the north and on the west, by a line drawn from Ras Kasar on the Red Sea to the point of intersection of the 17th parallel, north, with the 37th meridian east Greenwich. The line, having followed that meridian to 16° 30′ north latitude, is drawn from that point in a straight line to Sabderat, leaving that village to the east. From that village the line is drawn southward to a point on the Gash twenty English miles above Kassala, and rejoins the Atbara at the point indicated as being a ford on the map of Werner Munzinger "Originalkarte von Nord Abessinien und den Ländern am Mareb, Barca, und Anseba, de 1864" (Gotha, Justus Perthes), and situated at 14° 52′ north latitude. The line then ascends the Atbara to the confluence of the Kor Kakamot (Hahamot), whence it follows a westerly direction till it meets the Kor Lemsen, which it descends to its confluence with

with civilization, and of developing their own personal qualities and resources of their country, while at the same time securing access to channels for a most profitable trade with the United Kingdom, and thus obtaining some return for money that has hitherto been fruitlessly laid out,[5] and

---

the Rahad. Finally, the line, having followed the Rahad for the short distance between the confluence of the Kor Lemsen and the intersection of 35° east longitude Greenwich, identifies itself in a southerly direction with that meridian, until it meets the Blue Nile, saving ulterior amendment of details, according to the hydrographic and orographic conditions of the country.

II. The Italian Government shall be at liberty, in case of being obliged to do so by the necessities of the military situation, to occupy Kassala and the adjoining country as far as the Atbara. Such occupation shall in no case extend to the north nor to the north-east of the following line:—

From the right bank of the Atbara, in front of Gos Rejeb, the line is drawn in an easterly direction to the intersection of the 36th meridian east Greenwich; thence, turning to the south-east, it passes three miles to the south of the points marked Filik and Metkinab on the above-mentioned map of Werner Munzinger, and joins the line mentioned in Article I., twenty-five English miles north of Sabderat, measured along the said line.

It is nevertheless agreed between the two Governments that any temporary military occupation of the additional territory specified in this Article shall not abrogate the rights of the Egyptian Government over the said territory, but that these rights shall only remain in suspense until the Egyptian Government shall be in a position to re-occupy the district in question up to the line indicated in Article I. of this protocol, and there to maintain order and tranquility.

III. The Italian Government engages not to construct on the Atbara, in view of irrigation, any work which might sensibly modify its flow into the Nile.

IV. Italy shall have, for her subjects and protected persons, as well as for their goods, free passage without duty on the road between Metemma and Kassala, touching successively El Affareh, Doka, Suk-Avu-Sin (Ghedaref), and the Atbara.

Done at Rome, in duplicate, this 15th of April, 1891.

DUFFERIN AND AVA.
RUDINI.

[5] *Footnote*, see page 284.

further as the British authority will be non-aggressive, and simply to be exercised, *not to subjugate, but to establish* the independence of the Soudanese, and to protect their property and the fruits of their labour, no objection of an international character could possibly be taken to such a course.

On the hypothesis that it is resolved to take this fundamental step, which is so essential as a basis to all future operations, and without which it would be idle to speculate upon formulating any scheme whatever, subsequent proceedings are not likely to be met with any formidable difficulties.[6] The Sheikhs would be only too ready to come to terms in the matter of subsidies with any chartered company, and to agree among themselves, *provided it was made apparent to them that by acting in harmony they were promoting their own common interests.* They would be prompt in furnishing all necessary assistance in the construction and protection of any necessary public works, among which the most important to begin with would be a railway from Suakin to Berber. When this is completed, not only would the produce of the more immediate neighbourhood of Berber be brought within easy reach of the markets of the civilized world, but that also of the more remote regions farther south—the most fertile in the country—via Khartoum and thence down the Nile. If an example were needed of the developing powers of railways, their effects in British India might be quoted as

[6] "Our (English) Government lives on a hand-to-mouth policy. They are very ignorant of these lands, yet, some day or other, they or some other Government will have to know them, for things at Cairo cannot stay as they are. H.H. will be curbed in, and will no longer be absolute Sovereign: then will come the question of these countries."—"General Gordon in Central Africa," 20th April, 1878.

especially pertinent to the occasion, where produce has increased year by year in almost geometrical progression, and there is every reason to be satisfied that similar results would accompany similar causes in the Soudan.[7] The foregoing are the broad features of the situation, and for more specific details we feel that the views of Mr. F. W. Fox, a gentleman who has for years identified himself with the Soudan and its surroundings, are most worthy of serious attention. In the main we entirely agree with that gentleman—*the points where we are at issue are the presence of the Egyptian power, and the administration of Colonel Holled-Smith.*

With respect to these proposals and the energy Mr. Fox has displayed for some years in the cause of the Soudan, we feel that we cannot do better than let that gentleman speak for himself, and we therefore call particular attention to the following letters, accompanied with inclosures, with which he has favoured us, demonstrating his capacity for grappling with the then existing difficulties in that distracted country, and at the same time exhibiting the disinclination of H.M.'s Government to second his efforts without giving any reasons for their culpable inactivity:—

14, *Dean's Yard, Westminster,*
March 18th, 1891.

DEAR MR. RUSSELL,—I beg to inclose for your perusal a few letters relating to certain negotiations in connection with the Eastern Soudan, which, I think, will be interesting to you to read, and which I will thank you to return when done with.

As you are aware, I have for the past six years devoted much time and attention to the political affairs of the Soudan, and in endeavouring to promote the opening up of the commercial resources of that country, and have, in season and out of season, been constantly pressing on the authorities at Downing Street and Cairo the importance of adopting such measures and methods, as would be best calculated to restore and maintain peace and

See Appendices "D" and "E."

establish good government, and to the reopening of British trade, which had grown into such considerable proportions before 1881.

It may be interesting to you to know that our action in this direction may be said to have first assumed shape when a small party of gentlemen, interested in the future well-being of the Soudanese, met at the house of the late Right Honourable W. E. Forster, M.P., in the spring of 1885. The negotiations resulting from this meeting were indirectly referred to by the Marquis of Hartington in his speech a few days afterwards which he made in the House of Commons upon Eastern Soudan affairs.

The policy which was discussed at the meeting at Mr. Forster's house may be briefly summarized as follows:—

To federate the various Soudanese tribes between the Red Sea Littoral and the Valley of the River Nile, by means of a Federation bound together by self-interest and mutual protection for the purpose of maintaining order, promoting the development of trade along the several tribal trade routes, and securing the confidence and good will of the tribes towards the authorities at Suakin, and in this way through and by means of the agency of the Friendly tribes between Berber and the Red Sea Littoral, to win over by degrees the friendship of the hostile tribes between Berber, Khartoum, and Lado.

It was suggested that a confederation of the Soudanese tribes might be encouraged and facilitated by commencing the building of the longed-talked-of and much-needed railway from Suakin to the province of Berber, and it was proposed to subsidize through their respective Sheikhs the several tribes, so as to secure their assistance in the construction, as well as to police, and protect the railway as it was carried forward.

The construction of the railway was, in effect, to be the principal agent for pacifying and uniting the several tribes, in a Federal community; owing, however, to the strong opposition which Lord Hartington met with from both parties in the House, it was found impossible in the spring of that year to make any progress with our proposals, but in the autumn of 1885 I happened to be present at a meeting of the Royal Colonial Institute, when Sir Charles Warren, who had just then returned from South Africa, read a paper descriptive of his Bechuana Land Expedition, which he had successfully carried out without the loss of any lives through military operations. As he seemed in such a marked degree to have the necessary qualifications for handling the tribes of the Eastern Soudan, very soon after the meeting I put myself into communication with him, and ascertained that he would be willing to undertake the task of the pacification of the Soudan on the lines of policy which we had advocated and considered in the spring of that year.

I took an early opportunity of seeing Sir J. Pauncefote at the Foreign Office to suggest that Sir Charles Warren might be sent out on a mission to Suakin.

This interview, and those subsequently with Sir Charles Warren led to the letters being despatched to the Foreign Office, copies of which are inclosed herewith.

The Marquis of Salisbury subsequently appointed Sir Charles Warren as Governor-General of the Soudan Red Sea Littoral, and he left London the end of January, 1886.

Before Sir Charles Warren left for Egypt, a meeting at the Westminster Palace Hotel was convened to take leave of and wish Sir Charles Warren God-speed.

Amongst those who were present at this meeting were Earl Stanhope, Cardinal Manning, William Fowler, Sir Charles Warren, General F. Haig, Messrs. Arnold Foster, Loring, Bennett Burleigh, and others.

Sir Charles Warren arrived at Suakin as Governor early in February, 1886, and was commencing with good effect to carry out a policy of pacification, and had succeeded within only a few weeks of his arrival to inspire the tribesmen around Suakin with confidence and feelings of friendship, when, unfortunately, Lord Salisbury's Government went out of office and was succeeded by that of Mr. Gladstone, who, apparently, did not sympathize in our views, and Sir Charles Warren was withdrawn just as he was on the eve of accomplishing most useful and important work in the Eastern Soudan.

The Cairo authorities reversed our policy, and from that time until within a very recent date a *military policy of coercion and constant raids* has been enforced, and no serious attempt has since been made to federate the tribes or to restore peace otherwise than by force.

I think the inclosed papers will briefly explain the action we have taken since 1885, and will show how our labours and policy of pacification have been entirely frustrated by the opposition of the military authorities of Cairo, and you have had opportunities of knowing better even than I do, all the terrible disasters, the misery, the loss of life, and the large expenditure which have been involved, and worse than needlessly wasted since 1886, when Sir Charles Warren's policy was stopped by his unfortunate withdrawal, and when that line of action, which has since been carried out more especially under the Governorship of Colonel H. Kitchener, was enforced, causing all our hopes and good wishes for the pacification of the Soudan to be dashed to the ground and destroyed.

I am glad, however, to be able to report that, at the date of writing this, peace reigns in the Eastern Soudan under the judicious administration of the present Governor-General, Colonel

Holled-Smith, and it may be interesting to know that a more friendly feeling of the Hadendowies and other Soudanese tribes was greatly promoted by the famine relief distribution made during last year to the starving Soudanese. This relief was partly undertaken by the Local Government authorities, and partly by a committee organized and initiated by some members of the Aborigines' Protection Society, and some few others.

This committee and the authorities of Suakin fed twice a day for some months from 5000 to 6000 persons—men, women, and children. The money for this relief was generously contributed by a few persons interested in the Soudanese, and the good work was greatly aided by the self-denying labours of Dr. Harpur, an agent of the Church Missionary Society, and General F. Haig, who both volunteered to go to Suakin to take the management of the relief-work, and who, besides distributing food daily for many weeks, treated medically, and otherwise showed great kindness and sympathy to the poor Hadendowies, who, but for the relief given would undoubtedly have perished by hundreds more than they did during the great terrible famine which raged last year throughout the Eastern Soudan.

The tone and the attitude of the whole people of the Eastern Soudan were so completely changed and altered by the kindness shown them during this period of famine and pestilence, that when Colonel Holled-Smith considered the time had come to drive Osman Digna and his dervishes out of the Tokar delta, I believe I am correct in saying that not a gun, spear, or sword was raised by the Tokar Hadendowies against the advance of the troops under Colonel Holled-Smith, and that amongst the several hundreds of dervishes who were slain at the attack upon Tokar and Affafit, not a single body of a Hadendowie was found.

We contend that if only this pacific policy of kindness and just dealing towards the Soudanese had been carried out in 1886, for which some of us were so anxious and worked so hard to attain, all the bloodshed, terrible misery, and suffering that have been endured in those regions during the past five or six years would have been saved, and we should have probably witnessed in the autumn of 1886 the same comparative peace and contentment reigning throughout the Eastern Soudan, as now, for the moment, is happily the case.

But we think it our duty to point out that, unless the authorities at Downing Street and Cairo are prepared to adopt and carry out the lines of policy advocated by us in 1885, and more or less constantly ever since, *a policy which is opposed to the conquest and annexation of the Soudan*, but is one in favour of creating a confederation of the tribes under the guidance and control of British interests co-operating in friendly alliance with the Egyptian Government, there is much danger of renewed

difficulties and hostilities, arising from the present position of the tribes and the general surroundings of the situation.

I am, yours very truly,
(Signed) FRANCIS WM. FOX.

H. RUSSELL, ESQ.

This letter sets forth broadly, comprehensively, and perspicuously, the salient features of the situation, and we now quote the inclosures referred to in the sixth paragraph :—

December 18*th*, 1885.

MY LORD MARQUIS,—The question of the pacification of the Soudan has not become of less importance during the past year, and indeed, when we consider the gravity of the present situation on the Egyptian frontier, it is of urgent necessity that some steps should be taken at once both in the interests of this country and of Egypt, which will put an end to the existing most unsatisfactory condition of affairs.

It must be remembered that the forces we now have to cope with will not be recruited only from the provinces which supplied the principal part of the forces of the Mahdi, but also from all the Mohammedan states which stretch across from the Nile to the Niger, south of the Sahara.

The military operations which have already taken place, although they have conclusively proved the superiority of our soldiers to the Soudanese, have done next to nothing in causing the natives to cease from their aggressive action.

We have, therefore, to submit to your Lordship that a solution of the question may be found in handing the country over to a powerful chartered company, which should devote its whole energies to the important task of the pacification and development of the Soudan and its future Government.

The conditions under which such a company could work, and the powers it should exercise would necessarily have to be approved by Government, and we would most respectfully submit that at the outset it should be granted a subvention or subsidy, to enable it to cope with the difficulties that it would primarily have to encounter.

The reports of General Gordon and Sir Samuel Baker prove most conclusively that the commercial prospects of the Soudan, if order can be restored, are of the highest class, and that such a company would not only prove of use to the world in a political sense, but also in a few years become self-supporting, and repay those who invested their capital in the undertaking.

The Nile should be one of the great mercantile highways, and the development of legitimate commerce along its course would

tend to the civilization of Africa, and the extinction of the slave trade.

At present, the tribes of the Tchad Basin have to depend, for their supplies of European goods, on the passage of the Sahara at great cost and risk by caravans; but if the Nile were utilized, as it should be, it would be by that route, perhaps supplemented by a railway from Berber to Suakin, that they would find the readiest means of communication with Europe.

We would suggest that as a tentative measure we should attempt to enter into negotiations with the Caliph Abdullah and his subordinates, and that some person be deputed to examine into the actual condition of the country, and advise as to the measures which should be taken by the company to attain the end in view.

If Sir Charles Warren could be deputed by the Government to undertake this duty, and is willing to proceed to Egypt, we would respectfully request that his abilities and experience be utilized, and that he be commissioned to at once enter upon the work.

We have for some time been in communication with ——, ——, ——, ——, ——, and others, and as far as we have proceeded in the matter, have had their assurances of support and approval.

Those we have endeavoured to interest financially have fully agreed that the scheme is a good one, and would be willing to join in the undertaking if they were assured of such guarantee as would be afforded by Government subventure and approval.

The lines on which we propose to act, and any more particulars which your Lordship might desire, we will furnish as soon as we are informed of your wishes on the subject.

The subsidy or subvention which would be necessary to enable such a company to enter upon its operations with a good prospect of success, would be a mere fraction of the sums which would have to be expended in the military measures which now seem imminent.

We would also respectfully submit that, as time is of great value, your Lordship would take this letter into consideration at your earliest convenience.

We have the honour to be,
Your Lordship's most obedient servants,
(Signed) V. LOVETT CAMERON, C.B., D.C.L.
FRANCIS WM. FOX.

To the Right Honourable
The Marquis of Salisbury, K.G., &c.,
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The "interview" mentioned in the 6th para-

graph of Mr. Fox's letter to Mr. Russell, and the foregoing letter, appears to have so far influenced the Government as to have led to the appointment of Sir Charles Warren as Governor-General of the Soudan Red Sea Littoral, for the purpose of inaugurating a policy of pacification, which unfortunately was doomed to be nipped in the bud by his shortly subsequent appointment as Chief Commissioner of Police, and the instalment of Colonel Kitchener as his successor, who at once reversed the policy of his predecessor, and established one of irritation and aggravation in its place, as has already been shown in this volume.

In the whole course of the contradictory policies that have been pursued in the treatment of this question of the Soudan, there is perhaps no such signal instance of want of definite purpose on the part of H.M.'s Government than this change in the local executive. Two men, within the space of a few months, holding diametrically opposite views of action, are commissioned to legislate for the same Government, as they think proper. It is impossible to arrive at any other conclusion than that H.M.'s Government have *no* policy of their own, and that they were content to leave the settlement of an admittedly most distracted situation, that bristled with difficulties, to the individual opinion of whomsoever they might appoint as their representative. To excuse H.M.'s Government for their apathy on the ground that "the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought" would be paying them an undeserved compliment, for they appear to have been wanting in both "thought" and "resolution."

That H.M.'s Government were clearly responsible for the actions of their Governors-General, is established by the patent fact of their appointment of Sir Charles Warren; and as regards Colonel

Kitchener, in reply to charges brought against him by Mr. Fox for his raiding propensities, in his letter to the *Times* of 30th January, 1888, dated Suakin, 9th of the same month, seeking to justify himself, he alludes to his being a nominee of the British Government, and he says, "I think he (Mr. Fox) forgets that the Egyptian officials, whom he designates as 'bullies unworthy to govern,' have been English officers *nominated by the English Government.*"

The next letter is a reply to Captain Cameron's and Mr. Fox's letter of the 18th December, and refers exclusively to the creation of a chartered company; it is simply one of inquiry, and needs no comment.

Foreign Office,
24th December, 1885.

GENTLEMEN,—I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th inst., suggesting that a solution of the present difficulties connected with the Soudan might be found through the instrumentality of a chartered company which should for a time receive a subsidy from Her Majesty's Government, and should devote its energies to the pacification and to the commercial and administrative development of that country.

Lord Salisbury desires me to thank you for your communication and to state that your recommendation shall be carefully considered by Her Majesty's Government, and that a reply will be sent to you as soon as a decision has been come to.

His Lordship will be glad to be furnished by you with details as to the amount of the subsidy and the powers which the company would require from Her Majesty's Government.

I am, Gentlemen,
Your most obedient, humble servant,
(Signed) J. PAUNCEFOTE.

Captain V. L. Cameron, C.B.
Francis W. Fox, Esq.

January 29th, 1886.

SIR,—1st. With reference to our letters of the 18th ult. and the 4th inst., respecting the pacification and organization of the Soudan by the development of its commercial and agricultural resources, we beg leave to state that as some of the suggestions therein contained involve intricate and debatable questions, and

as it is necessary that prompt measures should be taken, we consider that it may be as well that their discussion should be postponed until some commencement has been made in carrying out the objects we have in view.

2nd. The first thing that should be done would be to open the negotiations with the Hadendowa, Bishareen, Kabbabish and other Arab tribes with a view to inducing them to desist from their present hostile, or semi-hostile attitude and becoming well disposed to our undertaking.

3rd. From information we possess and our knowledge of Arab character we have confidence that these negotiations might easily be set on foot and soon brought to a favourable termination. These negotiations should be conducted under the orders of the Governor of Suakin, Sir Charles Warren, and should be carried on in accordance with his views and wishes.

4th. An approved syndicate is now in progress of formation to find the capital necessary to complete and work the Suakin-Berber Railway, now laid for a distance of twenty miles from the former place, and will endeavour to carry out the works as speedily as possible.

5th. In order to again establish trade a temporary station and market should be formed at the existing terminus of the line where Manchester and other goods should be exchanged for the products of the country, and friendly relations cultivated with the neighbouring people.

6th. We would suggest that H.M.'s Government might properly sell and hand over, at Suakin, the permanent way, rolling stock and other plant of the Suakin-Berber Railway now stored at Suakin and elsewhere, and the thirty small river steamers built for service on the Nile, in order that they may be used in connection with the railway in opening up communication with the interior by way of the Upper Nile.

7th. The proposed company should pay for this plant and the steamers on a valuation in preference stock bearing interest at 4 per cent., or in such manner as hereafter may be agreed upon.

8th. The Government authorities of Suakin should grant the railway and trading company an annual subsidy of 30,000*l.*, which should be a first charge on their Customs receipts.

9th. If this is approved of by H.M.'s Government we should suggest that the negotiations should be conducted by the representatives of the proposed company directly with the Governor of Suakin.

10th. In return, in order to recoup the Suakin Government for this outlay, the company should, after completion of the railway, pay that Government 30,000*l.* a year out of the net receipts, such payment to be a first charge on the net receipts.

11th. The reduction of expenditure in connection with the

present charges of administration at Suakin by the completion of the railway, and the increase of revenue caused by the re-establishment of trade would more than cover the amount proposed to be granted to the company, even without taking into consideration the repayment mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

12th After consideration we have come to the conclusion that a 2 ft. 6 in. gauge would be the best in which to complete the railway to the Nile, and whilst the present broad gauge should be maintained as far as it is now laid, a third rail on that portion would provide for the passage over it of the 2 ft. 6 in. rolling stock.

We have the honour to be, sir,
Your most obedient servants,
(Signed) V. LOVETT CAMERON, C.B., D.C.L., COMR. R.N.
FRANCIS WM. FOX.

Sir Julian Pauncefote, G.C.M.G., Foreign Office.

The following is the reply to the foregoing:—

Foreign Office, 19*th March*, 1886.

GENTLEMEN,—I am directed by the Earl of Rosebery to inform you that Her Majesty's Government have given their careful consideration to your suggestions for the solution of the present difficulties connected with the Soudan, which were first submitted to the Marquis of Salisbury in your letter of the 18th of December last, and were more fully described in your further letters of the 4th and 29th January. I am to state to you that after giving due weight to your recommendations and to all the circumstances connected with the question of the Soudan, Her Majesty's Government feel unable to entertain the proposals made by you.

I am, gentlemen,
Your most obedient, humble servant,
(Signed) J. PAUNCEFOTE.

Captain V. L. Cameron, C.B.
F. W. Fox, Esq.

From the above it will be seen that H.M.'s Government declined on the 19th March to *entertain* propositions they had *apparently acceded* to in the preceding January, by the appointment of Sir Charles Warren, whose avowed mission was to carry out the views expressed in the letter of Captain Cameron and Mr. Fox, dated 18th December, 1885.

As associated with the subject of the foregoing

correspondence, we quote an extract from the Marquis of Hartington's speech, referred to in Mr. Fox's letter to Mr. Russell, 18th March, 1891, touching the Suakin-Berber Railway.

EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH OF LORD HARTINGTON'S IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 12TH MAY, 1885.

"There remains, then, the question of the railway.

"The decision I have arrived at is that it is not required and there is no intention of pushing it on.

"But a very large expenditure has been already incurred.

"A very general opinion among many of the *best authorities* on the Soudan question, is that both as a civilizing influence and as a means of checking the slave trade, and further, *for the defence of Egypt itself*, the construction of a line of railway would be a substantial benefit to the country.

"We have been unwilling, therefore, to abandon the hope that the railway, which has been commenced as a military work, may ultimately be prosecuted as a pacific and civilizing work.

"We are unable to say *at present* whether it will or will not be possible that this hope may be realized.

"It is probable that within a short time we shall be able to state more definitely to the House what our intentions with regard to this railway are.

"We, however, desire to suspend our judgment, whether the expenditure which has already been incurred upon it is to be entirely abandoned, or whether *some other course is to be taken* with the material which has been accumulated, and which *there is some reason to hope* may ultimately, if not immediately, be made use of in the continuance of a work which has been long contemplated, and which, in the opinion of many authorities, will still be of great value to the country."

The meaning of this speech is rather obscure, and the reflections are inconsequent. The Marquis of Hartington expresses a decided opinion that the railway is not required, and immediately afterwards urges strong arguments in favour of its construction. From what follows it would rather appear that in his own mind the work should be continued, but that he let "I dare not" wait upon "I would." This conclusion is encouraged by the reference made by Mr. Fox in his letter, above alluded to,

to the fact that *both* sides of the House were opposed to such a work, which is only another way of putting it beyond a doubt that the House knew nothing at all about the question, otherwise why should they object to a course which was persistently advocated for most cogent reasons by, according to the Marquis of Hartington, "the best authorities"? The British House of Commons, when once its sensibilities are aroused, has never shown itself apathetic in the cause of humanity. The fact that they paid down 20,000,000*l.* in hard cash to the planters, some sixty years ago, to emancipate the slaves in the West Indies, is sufficient guarantee that consideration would be given to the distressing condition of the Soudanese if the truth were only brought home to them, quite regardless of the commercial phase of the question. It is, therefore, that we venture a digression to express a hope that the contents of this volume will reveal sufficient to encourage the members of both Houses, and the public generally, to seek for themselves the verification of the statements it contains—the end we have in view in this publication. Just about this time a syndicate was formed in London to build a railway from Suakin to Berber, which is a most substantial evidence that commercial men were ready to supply the necessary capital if they had met with the encouragement they were justified in expecting from both the Government and the Houses of Parliament; and what was, would be again, if the wanting element of Government countenance were forthcoming.

Undaunted by repeated failures to come to some understanding with Government, Mr. Fox determined to inquire for himself on the spot, and in 1887 he was in Suakin from the 3rd to the 20th of March, and on his return through Cairo he interviewed Sir E. Baring with regard to a concession

of the Eastern Soudan to a chartered company, but the only practical result of his journey was the publication of an admirable pamphlet on the subject, from which we make some valuable extracts. In these will be found most interesting information as to the fertility and other resources of the country, and the successful efforts that have been made to develop them in certain districts, and some historical allusions indicating the power and wealth of the ancient inhabitants; the proposal for the Suakin Berber Railway, with estimates as to its cost of construction and the return that might be expected for the capital invested, and the opinions of some of the best judges as to the commanding importance of such a work; and, lastly, an approximate estimate of the probable revenue, and the cost of administering and opening up of the Soudan, portions of which have been verified by the last Blue Book published in May, 1891, especially as to the cost of holding Suakin, thus testifying to Mr. Fox's accuracy.

EXTRACTS FROM MR. FOX'S PAMPHLET.

THE FERTILITY OF THE SOUDAN.

With the exception of the belt of desert which extends across the north of the Soudan from Suakin to Berber and Dongola, and which forms, as it were, a natural frontier separating the Soudan from Egypt, the larger proportion of the land of the Soudan may be described as most fertile, offering great capabilities of development, and abounding in agricultural resources, and it is believed in mineral wealth.

It is true that a considerable proportion of the provinces of Kordofan and Darfur are desert, but even these provinces export large quantities of gum, ostrich feathers, and raw hides, and the export of these articles of merchandise can be undoubtedly greatly increased as soon as peace and order are restored in these provinces.

In the Bahr-el-Gazal and Equatorial provinces there are vast areas of fertile country which are at present quite undeveloped.

Lupton Bey, who was the Governor of the Bahr-el-Gazal province until taken prisoner by the Mahdi's troops, writes from the Bahr-el-Gazal in November, 1883: "This province is one of the largest in Soudan, and the richest, and yet we are less thought about than the others. I am the only one of the Soudan

Governors who can give this year to Government, after paying all expenses, a clear profit of somethiug like 60,000*l.*"

Emin Bey writes, in 1883, from the Equatorial provinces, that though no help had been received from Khartoum for five years, cotton, indigo, sugar-cane, rice, &c., are all being cultivated.

Ostrich farms have been started, roads made, oxen trained to the yoke, and the net profit of the province for 1882 was 8000*l.*

In a letter Dr. Felkin received from Emin Bey in 1883, he said that if he could only have one or two Europeans to help him, and a small allowance from Khartoum for a year or two, to enable him to buy seeds and agricultural implements, he had no doubt that in four or five years he would make a clear profit of over 20,000*l.* a year, and all this not including ivory, which was a Government monopoly.

Within a year from the time that the late Gessi Pacha had conquered the slave-dealers in the Bahr-el-Gazal province he was able to write :—

"Many looms are at work making damoor cloth, all worked by young negroes, who have been taught by people from Darfur. The cotton is here superior in fineness, softness, and length of staple to that of America and Lower Egypt."

Dr. Felkin adds, and this I can confirm, as I have examined it and seen how luxuriantly the shrubs grow, and how well they bear:—

"Gessi had also taught the people to collect india-rubber, and a large quantity had already been sent to Khartoum. Gessi, in speaking of one district in Bahr-el-Gazal, said, 'That it would be easy in that district to produce 10,000 cantars (or about 10,000 cwt.) of india-rubber yearly, worth about 75,000*l.*, whilst the expense would not exceed from 3200*l.* to 4000*l.*'"

But besides the rich and fertile Bahr-el-Gazal and the Equatorial provinces, and the comparatively sterile, but by no means non-wealth-producing, provinces of Darfur and Kordofan, and the fine agricultural province of Dongola, there are in Eastern Soudan and in the provinces bordering on it, at a comparatively easy distance from Suakin, four exceedingly fertile tracts of country, which offer a fine field for an immense development of their agricultural resources.

1st. There are the vast alluvial plains of Sennar between the White and Blue Niles, extending from near Khartoum to the base of the Abyssinian mountains, whose cultivable area has been variously estimated at from 8,000,000 to 15,000,000 acres.

Colonel Stewart, in his report on the Soudan in 1883, describes the Sennar and the adjoining district of Ghedariff as celebrated for their corn-growing capacity, and it may be said to be the granary of the Soudan; and were easy communications opened with the sea, there can be little doubt that a considerable export trade in grain would spring up. At present grain is allowed to rot

in the ground in these districts, while it is perhaps at famine price at Suakin and Jeddah.

Thousands of tons of grain are now annually imported into Suakin and Jeddah and other Red Sea ports from India, which, as soon as the railway was opened from Berber to Suakin, would be supplied from this district.

The quality of the soil and the climate of Sennar are favourable to the cultivation of cotton, coffee, tobacco, &c.

2ndly. The island of Meroe, a large tract of country between the river Atbara and the Blue Nile, and which, although now lying waste and uncultivated, possesses a most fertile alluvial soil, only requiring water, and this soil can easily and at a comparatively small outlay be irrigated from the two rivers, the Atbara and the Blue Nile.

The island of Meroe was at one time densely populated, and there are still to be seen ruins of towns and villages scattered everywhere over this extensive plain.

The province of Sennar and the island of Meroe were apparently the seat of Government of the ancient and great Ethiopian nation so frequently referred to in the Bible, and the country over which the Queen of Sheba, mentioned in the Book of Kings, is supposed to have reigned.

This country subsequently came under the dominion of the Fungi, a race of people from Western Soudan.

At a still later period Christianity seems to have spread up the Nile, and in the 10th century the most flourishing state of Ethiopia was the Christian kingdom of Alwa, on the Blue Nile, with Soba for its capital.

The ruins of Soba may now be seen about fifteen miles from Khartoum.

The area of cultivable land in the island of Meroe is about 10,000,000 acres.

3rdly. The important province of Taka, with Kassala as its capital, is very fertile, and possesses great capabilities for the cultivation of cotton.

The cultivable area of Taka may be roughly computed at 2,500,000 acres.

4thly. And lastly, the rich plains of Tokar, situated in the Suakin province, has a most fertile delta of alluvial soil formed by the waters of the Khor Barca, where it is estimated there are 500,000 acres of excellent cotton and grain growing land.

The cotton grown in the Tokar Delta has a longer and finer staple than the Egyptian, and fetches ½*d.* to 1*d.* per lb. more than Egyptian cotton.

The Tokar cotton crop can be shipped to England by the end of February.

THE PROPOSED RAILWAY BETWEEN THE SOUDAN RED SEA LITTORAL AND THE NILE.

In connection with the future possibilities of the Soudan, a line of railway connecting the Nile basin with a port on the Red Sea is undoubtedly a most important factor to be taken into consideration, and its construction should be commenced at an early period, as it will tend more than any other measure to ameliorate the condition of the people of the Soudan and Equatorial Africa.

The railway will not only prove a powerful instrument in assisting the Government to maintain order and peace in the Soudan, but it will be the most effective agency for stopping that "open sore of the world," the abominable slave trade of Equatorial Africa.

In connexion with a line of light draught steamers on the Nile and its numerous tributaries, it will develop to an undreamt-of extent the vast agricultural resources of those large areas of land in Sennar, the island of Meroe, Tokar, and the Shilluk and Dinka countries; it will greatly stimulate the production of gum and grain, and it will open up new markets for Manchester goods in the densely populated regions of the Equator, Bahr-el-Gazal, Monbuttu, and the Zandeh or Nyam-Nyam countries.

The late General Gordon attached great importance to the construction of this railway :—

"Speaking from long experience in the Soudan, I feel convinced that until such communication [a railway between Suakin and Berber] is made, no real progress can be reckoned on in these countries. Their being so near Egypt proper, and yet so backward as they are, is simply owing to the great difficulty existing in getting to and from them to the Red Sea; a belt of arid sand of 280 miles separates them from civilization, and till this is spanned no real progress can be made.

"The Khedive, Ismail Pacha, fully recognized this great point, for, as His Highness often told me, he wished the railway made up the Nile simply for the facilities he would then have of supervising the Government of the Soudan, and though the line up the Nile is wrongly chosen, yet he was right as to the importance of a regular communication from Egypt to the Soudan.

"*There can be not the least doubt but that the route, Suakin to Berber, is the true natural route to be opened.*

"Had this route been opened when I was in the Soudan, it would have been infinitely more simple to have governed those countries.

"The hidden misery of peoples in the dark places of the Soudan exists because no light is thrown on those lands, which light this railway would give; and it is certain that when it is known that the railway is completed, an entire change will take place in the whole of this country.

"Had I time I could say much more on the subject. I conclude in saying that the railway is a *sine quâ non* for the well-being of the Soudan."

The Earl of Dufferin, in his Report on Egypt, in 1884, most strongly advocates the construction of this railway.

His Excellency says :—"The first step necessary is the construction of a railway from Suakin to Berber, or what would be still more advisable, to Shendy on the Nile.

"It would bring Cairo within six days and a half of Khartoum, the time required to run from Suakin to Berber on the Nile being only sixteen hours.

"The completion of this enterprise will at once change all the elements of the problem. Instead of being a burden on the Egyptian Exchequer, these equatorial provinces ought to become, with anything like good management, *a source of wealth* to the Government.

"What has hitherto prevented their development has been the difficulty of getting machinery into the country, and of conveying its cotton, sugar, and other material to the sea."

Later on Lord Dufferin says :—"*If a railway were made from Suakin to Berber, it would do more to stop the slave trade than any other measure.*

"The railway would bring Lado within thirty days of the Red Sea, the Bahr-el-Gazal within twenty days, and from both these points trade could be carried on in every direction."

Colonel Stewart, in his official Report on the Soudan (1883), after suggesting general measures for the suppression of the slave trade, says :—

"When all, however, is done that can be done, I look with more hope on the opening up of the country, and in the extension of legitimate trade, to bring slavery to an end, than on the most stringent treaties that can be devised, and I am convinced no instrument will be more effective in bringing about this result than a railway bringing Khartoum within an easy distance of the sea."

Mr. Bennett Burleigh, the special correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* in the Soudan, says :—"That a somewhat varied and extensive experience in the Soudan has convinced me that the most humane campaign, and the one best calculated to secure a complete victory, and confer lasting benefits upon the Arabs and ourselves, is to build a railway from Suakin to Berber.

"It will, in any event, interpose itself as an insurmountable barrier between civilization and barbarism, dealing the final death blow at slavery.

"Such a road would open up the whole of vast Equatorial Africa, with its navigable rivers and chains of gigantic lakes, to British commerce.

"'Let us do all we can for the poor Soudanese,' was always Gordon's theme—*the most glorious and lasting memorial to his fame would be the completion of the pacification and civilization of the Soudan by the irresistible influence of trade and commerce.*"

The distance between Suakin and Berber in a direct line is about 250 miles, but the mileage of the railway will be about 280 miles, as to avoid expensive earthworks it will have to wind round the base of the hills.

Metre gauge railways recently constructed in India have, including permanent way and rolling stock, cost from 4000*l.* to 5000*l.* per mile, but in this sum are included some comparatively expensive bridges and earthworks.

4 feet 8½ inches gauge railways in Canada have been completed under 2000*l.* to 3000*l.* per mile.

Taking into consideration the present extremely low prices of railway materials, and that the proposed railway would be constructed as a metre gauge surface line, the cost of the line, including rolling stock, will probably not exceed 3500*l.* per mile, or for the 280 miles at 3500*l.* per mile, a total sum of 980,000*l.*

I should mention that although there are many circumstances in favour of the direct Suakin and Berber line, there are other routes between the Red Sea and the Nile which also offer certain advantages.

If we assume only one train ran daily each way, the cost of working the traffic and maintaining the permanent way, &c., would not probably exceed 40,000*l.* per annum. And if the railway is completed for 1,000,000*l.*, the interest at 6 per cent. per annum on this sum would amount to 60,000*l.*, which, with the working expenses of 40,000*l.*, will represent a total expenditure of 100,000*l.* a year.

Without taking into consideration any receipts from passengers, mails, and Government officials, the transport of 70 tons of goods daily each way, or say 50,000 tons per annum, at a charge of 2*l.* per ton, will realize a sufficient revenue to balance this debit charge of 100,000*l.*

But if interest charges are omitted, the transport of 25 tons daily each way, or say 18,000 tons per annum, will probably cover cost of working expenses.

In conclusion, it may be useful to submit an approximate estimate of the probable revenue, and the costs of administering and opening up of the Soudan.

In these estimates it is of course assumed that peace is restored, and a settled form of Government is re-established, that the trade routes are re-opened, and every facility is granted to the development of legitimate trade by introducing improved means of communication, and by encouraging the cultivation of cotton, and that

the revenue receipts are those which would be realized at the expiration of three or four years after good government has been introduced.

Taking then as a basis the estimates of the Soudan exports and imports prior to the rebellion, and making a fair allowance for an increase in trade owing to the improved communications and system of administration, as well as development of the agricultural resources of the country, we arrive at the conclusion that—

The value of the exports in a year may be estimated as follows:—

	Tons.		£		£
Cleaned cotton . .	7500	at	56	=	420,000
Cotton seed . .	15,000	,,	10	=	150,000
Gum, best quality .	6000	,,	60	=	360,000
,, inferior quality .	6000	,,	30	=	180,000
Ivory	200	,,	750	=	150,000
Ostrich feathers . .	150,000	lbs.	3	=	450,000
Wheat and grain.				say	50,000
India-rubber				,,	50,000
Hides.				,,	50,000
Salt				,,	60,000
Tobacco, indigo, sugar, coffee, senna, wax, pepper, mother-o'-pearl, &c. . . .					80,000
					£2,000,000

And that the imports will consist chiefly of—Manchester cotton goods, linen, hardware, &c., and may be estimated to amount to about the same value as the exports, or say 2,000,000*l.*

The Customs duties receipts will thus amount to—

	£		£
Exports, 8 per cent. on	2,000,000	=	160,000
Imports, 1 ,,	2,000,000	=	20,000
		or say	£180,000

It is suggested that the new Soudan Government. should abolish many of the existing methods of taxation, and that no taxes in future should be collected in cash, and that the Government should only impose a light land tribute, *payable in and by a definite quantity of produce.*

This proposed land tribute payable in produce may be estimated to yield something like 150,000*l.* per annum.

It is also assumed that the Soudan would be opened up by the agency of a chartered company, and would be administered by small district committees of Sheikhs, who would be advised by

some twenty or twenty-five resident agents and three inspector-generals of the company.

The annual revenue available for proposed Soudan company may be thus estimated as follows:—

	£	£
Land tributes . . .	150,000	
Customs	180,000	330,000
Ivory monopoly . . say	50,000	
Assuming company to control about one-third of the whole Soudan trade, then, say, 5 per cent. profit on imports, 660,000*l.*, equal . .	33,000	
12½ per cent. profits on exports, 660,000*l.*, equal .	82,500	165,500
		£495,500

The annual expenditure of proposed Soudan company may be estimated as follows:—

		£	£
25 Resident agents . .	at	2,000 each =	50,000
3 Inspecting officers .	,,	3,500 ,, =	10,500
Sub-officials, clerks, and office expenses, say			25,000
100 Sheikhs	,,	100 ,, =	10,000
500 Sub-sheikhs . . .	,,	30 ,, =	15,000
2,500 Police	,,	30 ,, =	75,000
6 per cent. interest on 1,000,000*l.* invested in railway to the Nile . . .		. .	60,000
			245,500
Leaving a balance for profit on working capital of, say 500,000*l.*, and for general management		. . .	250,000
			£495,500

The Government of Suakin and the Red Sea Littoral is at present costing the Egyptian Government somewhere about 100,000*l.* a year.

	£
The civil and naval expenditure is about . .	40,000
Military	60,000
Or say	£100,000

In addition to the Egyptian naval and military force at Suakin, three of Her Majesty's gun-boats, commissioned for the suppression of the Red Sea slave trade, are generally stationed at Suakin, or along the Soudan Red Sea Littoral.

FRANCIS WILLIAM FOX.

10*th May*, 1887.

Soon after the above report was made public, the *Times*, in a leader and in a special article in their issue of the 3rd June, 1887, commented on Mr. Fox's report, and supported his view throughout in both articles, and as they are well worthy of careful perusal, we quote them in Appendix B and C. All the salient points are vigorously and logically dealt with, and particularly the absolute necessity of the construction of a railway is urged as the essential means to assist the proposed company to develop the resources of the country and the energies of the people.

It is not our purpose to follow the arguments of the *Times*, as they are so completely in harmony with our own opinions and those of the best authorities quoted in this volume; but it is a remarkable fact, associated with the consideration of this subject, that we look in vain in every direction for any reasons worthy of the name that can be urged against them, and the fair inference is that they do not exist. In the absence of any practical objections, we can only conclude that such objections that may be pleaded are of a diplomatic and political character, which the Government do not care to disclose. Be this as it may, when it has been made clear that the paramount interests of civilization and philanthropy and those of British trade and

commerce, which are only second to them, are at stake, a time *must* come when the public *must* insist upon knowing what those motives are which paralyze the action of the Foreign Office. That time is *now*—and when this book is published, making known to the world the whole truth of the situation from official documents, we trust that the *Times*, with this additional evidence to Mr. Fox's report, will pursue the subject, with more earnestness if possible, than they did in 1887.

The following letter of recent date, with which we have been favoured, completes our brief narrative of Mr. Fox's laudable and practical efforts, spreading over so long a period, in the cause of peace, trade, and humanity; the opening paragraph explains the occasion of its being written, and we seriously commend it to particular attention.

14, *Dean's Yard,*
Westminster, S.W.
April 15th, 1891.

Re EASTERN SOUDAN POLICY.

DEAR MR. RUSSELL,—In reply to your inquiry as to the outlines of the policy which I and others have advocated, and the various proposals which have been submitted to the Downing Street and Cairo authorities during the past five or six years, briefly, they may be summed up as follows:—

That the tribes throughout the Eastern Soudan from the Red Sea to the Nile Basin should be informed there was no intention on the part of Great Britain to reconquer their country and hand them over again to the Government of their former oppressors of Egypt.

That the Government of Great Britain is anxious to see them free, contented, and prosperous. That Englishmen would render them assistance through their respective Sheikhs, to maintain peace and order by forming a confederation of their several tribes.

That the trade routes should be kept open and protected from oppressive raids.

That the Sheikhs of the several tribes should enter into an agreement engaging to assist the representatives of a Soudan company in the construction of the railway from Suakin to Berber,

and, after its construction, to police and protect the railway. Annual payments to be made to the several Sheikhs for services rendered in connection with maintaining and keeping the railway in good working order.

That the Egyptian Government should grant to an approved company a concession or right to build the said railway from Suakin to Berber, and as a guarantee of interest of the capital invested in railway should set aside one moiety of the gross Custom House receipts of the Egyptian Soudan.

That one-half of the net receipts of the railway earnings and from the Customs over and above a fixed minimum amount of, say 200*l.* per annum per mile, of railway opened and worked shall be paid to the Egyptian Government—the remaining moiety to belong to the railway company. The representatives of the railway company to be responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in the Eastern Soudan within a limited but reasonable distance on each side of the railway. The Egyptian Government to administer and collect the Customs, and to be responsible for the civil and military government along the coast of the Egyptian Soudan, Red Sea Littoral, including the town of Suakin.

Or, as an alternative plan—

The Egyptian Government might farm or lease, for a term of years, all the Customs and other revenues of the Egyptian Soudan Red Sea Littoral to an approved company, in consideration of that company undertaking to be responsible for the collection of the Customs, and for the civil and military administration of the country, the British Government to maintain a sufficient number of gunboats at Suakin and along the Red Sea coast for the effectual suppression of the slave trade, and for the maintenance of order.

The company to undertake to construct the railway from Suakin to Berber.

In consideration of the company constructing the railway, and undertaking the administration of the country, the Egyptian Government to guarantee that the gross receipts from Customs, and other sources of revenue, shall not be less than 70,000*l.* per annum.

The company to hand over to the Egyptian Government one half of the Custom and other receipts in excess of the said minimum amount of 70,000*l.* per annum.

We, of course, should not advise the commencement of the construction of the railway until peace and order were guaranteed by the Sheikhs, who, of course, would have to be assembled and consulted from time to time in a collective body, as well as negotiated with separately and individually, and we should only advise the railway to be built in sections of twenty or forty mile lengths at a time, so that a good government may be established at the

Suakin end of the railway, sufficiently stable and united to offer a strong combination against any hostile attacks on the territories adjacent to the railway.

With respect to dealing with the tribes along the Nile Basin from Berber to Khartoum and Albert Nyanza, I should rely and trust simply upon subsidizing the tribes, upon diplomacy, by the pacifying power of trade, and the working of steamers on the Nile in connection with the terminus of the railway at Berber.

Of course, after a time, as the confederation of the tribes became a realized fact, light tributes levied upon the produce raised might be made to supplement the revenue received from Customs and railway earnings to cover costs of administration and profit on capital invested.

Hoping the foregoing will be some service to you, I am,

Yours very truly,

(Signed) FRANCIS WM. FOX.

Henry Russell, Esq.

Referring to the foregoing proposals of Captain Cameron and Mr. Fox, as broad and general outlines for the preliminary consideration of the subject, they are all that could be desired, open of course to such alterations as change of circumstances renders necessary since they were promulgated, *as also the objection we have already emphatically taken to any recognition of Egypt whatever.*

Now Zeila and Berbera were occupied permanently by the British, as strategical ports to command the entrance of the Red Sea in 1884, thus strengthening materially our position at Aden and also commanding the gulf from both shores.

In 1885 Italy occupied Massowah as a temporary measure, which occupation has now become permanent, as shown by a despatch from the Foreign Office to the London Chamber of Commerce, dated 8th November, 1887—(See Blue Book Egypt 2, 1888, No. 133)—acknowledging that the Italian authority extended from Ras Kasar on the 18th parallel N. to Massowah—an extent of about 170 miles of the Red Sea Littoral. By despatch from Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring, 3rd December,

1883, it is shown that the British Government undertook on behalf of Egypt to protect the littoral *and all its ports*. The above facts prove that this promise could not be kept. It being apparent that the possession merely of the littoral was useless without a certain portion of the interior, the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava handed over a large slice of this "no man's land" to Italy, as per protocol quoted previously.

The question that arises out of this agreement is, What are the grounds and claims of Italy to this concession of so large a portion of the Red Sea Littoral and valuable interior territory, when Great Britain, which has sacrificed both life[1] and money[2] has hitherto gained nothing, and yet is still responsible for the protection of the country?

Now we think that the above facts establish beyond all possible doubt that the power of Egypt in the Soudan is both *de jure* and *de facto* extinct, and that therefore the only objection to entertaining any enterprises for the development of that country is removed once and for all.

Admitting this as the accepted situation, a fine opportunity is presented to England for exercising that remarkable aptitude for colonization which is the peculiar characteristic of her people, as the universal experience of the manner in which the British Empire has grown abundantly proves. The method in which this addition to our dominion has been almost always effected, has been through the medium of chartered companies, with the moral support of H.M.'s Government. The Marquis of Salisbury testified to this in his speech at Glasgow, on being presented with the freedom of that city on the 20th May, 1891, when he said as follows:—

[1] See Appendix F. [2] See page 284.

THE PARTITION OF AFRICA.

Well, then, the other matter which has occupied the attention of the Foreign Office in recent years, and which was alluded to both in the resolution which has conferred upon me the honour for which I am now thanking you and also by the Lord Provost —is what is called the partition of Africa. It is a subject of activity which was thrown upon us with most startling rapidity. When I left the Foreign Office in 1880 nobody thought of Africa. When I returned to it in 1885 the nations of Europe were almost quarrelling with each other about the various portions of Africa they could obtain. I do not exactly know the cause of this sudden revolution, but there it is. It is a great force—*a great civilizing, Christianizing force, and it was our duty, when we found that force was in operation, to make use of it to secure that this country should have its proper share in carrying out an undertaking of which all the world might be proud.* (Cheers.) We have done it in a very characteristic manner. (A laugh.) We have done it by companies. (Laughter and cheers.) We incurred some ridicule and not a little discontent from our foreign friends by our peculiar mode of action. They prefer to do everything officially, by the action of the bureau, and by the order of the sovereign State, but we have conducted almost all our enterprises in Africa through the agency of three companies—the Niger Company, which was instituted in the days of my predecessor, and the South African and the East African Companies, which were, I think, not instituted till after I had taken office. But they all of them have the same characteristics, that though, with regard to broad questions of policy, they are subject—and necessarily subject—to Her Majesty's Government, *they conduct, according to their own fashion, with their own resources, by their own lights, and to a great extent at their own risk, the development of the regions committed to their charge.* (Cheers.) Of the Niger Company, it possesses the happiness of those countries which have no history. It has been very prosperous, and, barring an occasional difference with its neighbours upon those questions which neighbours always have between them, I think there is nothing to be said with respect to its history. It has a most fertile—a wonderfully fertile—country to develop, and a very large population, and the greatest results both to commerce and civilization may be hoped for from its action. The two other companies are in a more interesting condition. There is the South Africa Company, which you will probably know better in the concrete form of Mr. Cecil Rhodes—(laughter and cheers)—a very considerable man, a man of very remarkable powers and remarkable resolution, and this South Africa Company has taken over an enormous tract of Central Africa—*a tract which certainly could not be brought without*

enormous sacrifice on our part under the dominion of the Crown, but which, if they have fair good fortune and are not disturbed by any untoward accident, they have every prospect of developing highly. They have great mineral wealth in prospect, and that mineral wealth will give them the material with which to pursue their administrative task. They are interesting to us at the present moment because their territory covers the country with regard to which we have been negotiating now for a year and a half with the kingdom of Portugal, and in respect to which we hope we have come to some conclusion. (Cheers.)

Thus the Marquis of Salisbury makes it unmistakably apparent to the meanest comprehension, that there is no other means than by that of a chartered company.

On the same subject Sir Samuel Baker, who is the greatest living authority on the Soudan, having formerly explored the country for the Khedive with a view to territorial acquisition, and necessarily acquiring in these expeditions a thorough knowledge of the country and its resources, as also the character of the people, to say nothing of his remarkable geographical researches, and the information that he acquired in his wanderings as a sportsman bringing him in contact with the Soudanese, both in hostile and friendly intercourse—says in his letter to F. W. Fox, Esq., dated 9th July, 1891, read by that gentleman on the 13th of the same month at the London Chamber of Commerce, on the occasion of an address by Mr. Russell (one of the authors of this book) on "British Trade Prospects in the Soudan:"—

The Arabs are a brave and splendid race, that would become true friends of the English when once we shall have established confidence. *This can only be effected by an assurance that we shall remain in the country to protect them in person and in religion, and that we never shall desert them. Until they are convinced of this, all attempts at improvement will be vain.* We have slaughtered them in thousands through a criminal policy; we have deceived them by an absurd assurance that we intended to evacuate Egypt and Suakin; we handed over Massowah (the

Khedive's territory) to Italy; and every step we have taken has tended to destroy the British reputation as friends of the Arab people. Poor Gordon was right when he exclaimed, "The reputation of England *was never made by her Government*, but through the power of individual Englishmen." It was so in India by the East India Company; it will be the same in Africa when commonsense and energy combined can act without hesitation, freed from the strangulation of red tape. I thoroughly believe that should a railway be made *by an English company* from Suakin to the Nile, unfettered by any Government, but morally and financially supported by a guarantee, the *bona fides* of our people would be quickly appreciated by the Arab tribes, and *they would be converted into friends through commerce, although they have been made enemies by the sword.*

The Marquis of Salisbury shows himself as emphatic and as enthusiastic on the subject of railways as Sir Samuel Baker. In the same speech from which we have already quoted, he says:—

AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE.

Well, then, there is the third company of your countryman—Sir William Mackinnon—(cheers)—whose enterprise, philanthropy, determination, and wisdom deserve to be mentioned with honour in any audience, especially in a Scotch audience. (Cheers.) This company possesses the territory leading from opposite the island of Pemba, which is just north of Zanzibar, to the great Victoria Nyanza Lake, and possesses the valley of the Nile from there until it meets with the frontier of Egypt. Of course, it will take a long time to carry out that colonization. It is far more purely philanthropic than any of the other undertakings. Its great object, I believe, has been to deal a deadly blow at the slave trade—(cheers)—the destruction of which has been, along with our own commercial and material progress, the animating impulse of English policy in these regions for nearly a century. (Cheers.) I think that we are, to use a hackneyed phrase, within measurable distance of the utter destruction of that hateful traffic. (Cheers.) The slave trade on the sea now only exists on the Eastern Coast of Africa and on the shores of the Red Sea. The Sultan of Zanzibar, under the guidance of Sir Charles Euan-Smith and also of Mr. Portal, has taken very strong measures with respect to slavery in Zanzibar and Pemba, measures which I think must insure its disappearance within the life of most of us who are here present; but the district where the caravans still go, and where it is of great importance that we should stay them, is the tract which lies between this great Victoria Nyanza Lake—the

size of which I shall bring home to you by telling you that it occupies about precisely the same area as Scotland—the territory which lies between that lake and the Eastern Coast of Africa at Mombassa, our new settlement. That territory, passing round the base of Kilimanjaro and across the lands of the Masai, is territory which does not become remunerative, and in which colonization cannot spread till you have got some way into the interior. There is no doubt that the slave caravans across that territory can be destroyed by one method, if that method can be applied. Sir William Mackinnon is doing his best to lay a railway from the coast to the line of the Victoria Nyanza. (Cheers.) Now the peculiarity of a railway—which every one may have had the opportunity of observing in this country, is that when it is once laid it kills every other mode of locomotion that formerly occupied the same ground. After a railway has existed some time there cannot be, except as a matter of luxury or caprice, any other kind of locomotion to compete with it. If a railway could exist from this lake to the coast, caravans could no more be employed as they are employed now to carry ivory and other produce of the interior to the coast or back again, and it is by these caravans that the bodies of slaves are brought along. It costs one, two, or three hundred times as much as to bring them by railway. Of course, when once a railway existed caravans would become a matter of antiquity, and *if no caravans existed there would be no means of carrying the slaves from the interior to the coast*, because I need not say that any slave-dealer who presented himself with a body of slaves to be carried on trucks to the coast would not be very civilly received. (Laughter and cheers.) From a purely Foreign Office point of view I take a very deep interest in this railway, but I must tell you fairly that it is from a purely Foreign Office point of view, because Sir William Mackinnon is of opinion that he cannot construct this railway without Government help, and I always speak of the Treasury with awe—(laughter)—and still more of the Treasury when it is acting, as in this case it necessarily must act, under the guidance and according to the principles of the House of Commons (Cheers.) Whether the Treasury will be able, consistently with the sound principles of finance which it has always upheld, to give Sir William Mackinnon the assistance which he requires, or whether it must be deferred to a more distant date, I do not know, *but whenever that railway can be made, I believe that the end of the African exportation of slaves will have been attained at the same time*—(cheers)—because it will not only, as I explained to you, prevent the passage of caravans from the Victoria Nyanza eastward, but it will place you in command of the Valley of the Nile, so that slaves will not be able to cross from thence to the Red Sea. We have done something in our time to aid in

this abolition of slavery; to add our stone to the pile which the devotion and foresight of our ancestors began. The Brussels Conference on the slave trade will, I believe, be a very great social and philanthropic event in the history of Europe. The resolutions which have been come to by all the Powers concerned bind them to certain measures for arresting the progress of slaves across any European territory of which they are in possession; and therefore, under that conference we are bound to do our utmost to prevent the passage of slaves across the territory that we have undertaken. We now spend large sums on ships and boats to arrest this accursed traffic with considerable success, but also at great cost, not only to the Treasury at home, but also to the lives and health of the sailors who under that sun have to give themselves to that tremendous labour. (Cheers.) If we are able, instead of taking this expensive and difficult precaution, to pursue the evil to its home and kill it at its root, we shall not only have saved mankind from a fearful curse, but we shall have spared the lives and the treasures of our own people and the lives of the gallant sailors who give themselves to this work. (Cheers.)

Again, on the same subject, General Gordon in his "Central Africa," 7th July, 1878, comments on the mistaken route selected by Ismail, the late Khedive, and indicates the Suakin to Berber as the proper course. He says:—

"Unfortunately in his wish to bring the Soudan trade down the Nile through Egypt proper, he (Ismail, the late Khedive) was led to abandon its natural outlet by the route from Berber to Suakin across the 280 miles desert."

We are as much alive to the absolute necessity of constructing a railway as the authorities we have quoted; and the necessity is more urgent than ever, as through the starvation policy adopted by the nominees of Her Majesty's Government, the greater portion of the camels have been slaughtered and eaten, and therefore other means of transit and locomotion must consequently be provided. On the other hand, we are convinced, that *unless the railway and the proposed chartered company are one and indivisible*, so that by means of the company,

which should be absolutely unfettered in its action, the railway could be insured the produce of the soil for conveyance to the littoral, capital invested in its construction would be simply thrown away. The necessity of such a company being entirely homogeneous is best illustrated by the full and comprehensive powers conferred by Royal Charter upon the Imperial British East Africa Company, which include the purchase of steam vessels, creating of banks and other companies, construction of railways, telegraphs, and all public works necessary for the development of the country, and, most important of all, with powers to contract treaties with tribes under their influence and jurisdiction, without any let or hindrance at the hands of H.M.'s Government. In the event of the incorporation of a Soudan Company on the same lines as the Imperial British East Africa Company, it would, we think, be the obvious duty of H.M.'s Government to grant them as liberal a charter in the interests of both England and the Soudan.

As the success of such a company would necessarily depend almost entirely upon the produce of the soil, the following quotation from the letter above referred to is most reassuring and conclusive, and can leave no doubt at all that capital invested in developing such a country would yield a handsome dividend.

The cotton plant is indigenous throughout the fertile provinces; it was mentioned by Pliny as the "wool-bearing tree of Ethiopia." A three months' regular rainfall, including June, July, and August to the middle of September, renders that portion of the Soudan *independent of artificial irrigation*. At the time when the cotton crop ripens, there is neither dew nor rain; therefore everything is in favour of the gathering and storing; but it would be impossible to transport a tenth part of the cotton with the present limited means by camels, as was proved by Moonitagg Pasha when Governor of the Soudan. That enterprising governor in 1871 made the cultivation of cotton compulsory for one season, at

this abolition of
devotion and f
Conference on t
social and philan
resolutions which
had then to certa
[illegible] any Emp
and therefore, we
[illegible] prevent
we have underta
[illegible] to meet th
almost greatest [illegible],
the lives and lib
give the [illegible]
able, in [illegible] of t
pursue the [illegible]
only have [illegible] in
spared the lives
[illegible] of the philan
(Cheers.)

Again, on th
his "Central A
the mistaken
Khedive, and i
proper course.

"Unfortunately
the Nile through E
[illegible] to abandon its
Speaking across the g

We are as m
constructing a
quoted; and t
ever, as through
the nominees o
greater portion
and eaten, and
locomotion mus
other hand, we
way and the
and indivisible,

the duty of England to energize in harmony with the opinions of the Prime Minister and the greatest ring authority on the Soudan, with a view to help- the Soudanese in obtaining the freedom which herself enjoys, and of which she is so proud.

With regard to certain atrocities in the neigh- urhood of Suakin, to which reference has already en made, we think it incumbent on the Abori- ines' Protection Society, whose special function is he protection of the oppressed, as shown in this xtract from their journal—

"The object of this association," it was stated in its first nouncement to the public, "is sufficiently indicated by its name. is established *as the protector of those who have no power to tect themselves.* By diffusing correct information concerning e character and condition of the aborigines, *by appealing to the vernment and to Parliament when appeal is needed*, and by nging popular opinion to exert its proper influence in advanc- the cause of justice, it is hoped that much may be done ards the diminution of those gigantic evils the continuance of ich reflects such deep dishonour on the British name" .

insist upon the institution of a parliamentary inquiry into the conduct of the nominees of H.M.'s Government while Governors of Suakin. Such a proceeding would exercise a most beneficial influence on the minds of the Soudanese, who would readily understand that England was determined to inquire into any case where an injustice was suspected to have been perpetrated by a British officer. This is a movement which in fact all con- generic societies should for their own interests assist in. To wit, the London Chamber of Com- merce, in the interest of trade, should appeal to all the Chambers of Commerce in the United Kingdom to hold meetings as to the best means of settling the vexed question of the Soudan and to pass reso- utions on the subject.

The International Arbitration and Peace Asso- iation, in the interest of peace, who have already

interfered by addressing Her Majesty's Government for the purpose of staying hostilities in the Soudan, are also called upon to use their influence for the same object.

And the Anti-slavery Society, for the suppression of slavery, knowing that the Soudan is the hot-bed of slavery and supplies Turkey and Egypt, it is to be hoped would naturally do their utmost to assist in any course which would tend to stop the slave trade.

In conclusion, it is not for us to pronounce a verdict, we leave that to the authorities that the Aborigines' Protection Society may appeal to, and to the country. We simply lay our indictment, and whether the result should establish its justification or otherwise, we urgently plead "*Fiat justitia ruat cœlum.*"

Sampson Low and Co. Ltd London

Collotype Lemercier, Paris.

Gate commanding causeway between Suakin and mainland, built by General Gordon.

APPENDIX A.

EXTRACTED FROM "THE ABORIGINES' FRIEND," DECEMBER, 1890.

LETTERS FROM DR. HARPUR.

"SUAKIN, *Sunday, 20th July.*—I could do nothing as a doctor without food to give to the starving. . . . Since we got your telegram on Thursday we have been able to give out dhoora each morning. A large number of new cases have just arrived from Tokar, so that the last two mornings when we came out we found the town wall on both sides of the Sharter gate lined for hundreds of yards. We calculate that there were 2000 each day. Some of them are better for the relief they have already been receiving; but by far the greater number are starving. We purpose making a zereba of bushes, and when the people are collected to give them dhoora, each as he passes out. I have been offered a tent, and we hope to pitch it inside the zereba to form a hospital, and to have a stretcher for the sick made of sticks and matting. We have chosen a piece of ground that belongs to nobody; so that, if afterwards we should want to make a garden, we can do so round it. . . .

"*Monday.*—This morning the number who came for dhoora was greater than ever; and this evening I watched the Government distribution, and never saw such a number of bad cases or such a large number at their distribution. . . . I do trust that England will show her sympathy with the poor Hadendowas by continuing to send relief until the famine is over."

"SUAKIN, *5th August.*—We had hardly made a zereba and tents of matting and sticks for the sick, when a large number of new cases came in, dying, from the interior. We allow the people to collect in the zereba early in the morning, keeping the strong ones out as far as possible, and then, opening one door only, give them dhoora as they pass out. The first

morning sixty people were left lying on the ground, too bad to be turned out; so we took them into our hospital. Next day we took in fifteen more, and the people began to carry the dying on sacks and beds to our zereba. Of the first sixty we took in many died; but this has not in the least prevented new cases being brought in. . . . The first day we distributed food in the zereba I found that some poor weak ones who had been lying outside the walls (where we had been in the habit of giving out dhoora) had not been able to get to the zereba. A policeman put them in shelter, and we found them out that evening and gave them food. One was a poor woman with a little girl of about two years old. Two days after the poor woman crawled to our zereba, and she and her child were taken in. She lingered two or three days and died, and we have the little orphan. The same day another woman died, leaving five children in our zereba. Her husband is alive but starving. He came next day, and said he wanted me to take care of the children. What could I do but say the children could stay with us, and that we would give him some food in the morning, and that he was to get some work as soon as possible? We have over fifty children now in the hospital. Some will die, and others will be left orphans. . . . There are hundreds of cases about Suakin *who are too far gone to attempt a journey, even if there were food in the mountains.* Tokar is full of starving people, and those who can come down here. Notwithstanding our efforts to keep down our numbers, there were 157 in the hospital this evening, and we have had fifteen deaths in eleven days. We give two meals daily. They consist of medala (a kind of paste made of flour, salt and water) and milk, or belelah (porridge mash with the unground dhoora) and milk. To those who are able to eat it, or prefer it, we give dhoora, and they get someone to grind it and make cakes of it for them. We have a general distribution of between three and four sacks of dhoora every morning to about 1,200 picked cases. . . . I forgot to mention what we do medically for the sick. We dress a large number of ulcers, and treat diarrhœa and dysentery, which are very common. Those that die have nearly all phthisis. We have also cases of scurvy. We cannot keep smallpox cases, and have turned out four, as they have to be sent to the smallpox hospital."

"On Saturday week (20th September) *the distressed were all expelled from Suakin and turned outside the forts* (a mile away from the town) by the cavalry and police, the reason given being cholera precautions, as cholera had broken out in Massowah, and there was a slight danger of its being carried here overland by starving people coming in. The Governor told me of his intention on Wednesday, so that I was able to give out

on Thursday and Friday thirty-one bags of dhoora in two days, in order that the people *might not start starving.* Fortunately I did so, as it was the last I saw of them. On Friday I was asked to go to the Governor's house to be present at a consultation, so that all would understand the course about to be adopted. . . . All the 'miskeens' were to be paraded, widows and orphans to be sent to Aghig by boat, there to be supplied by Government, and all unable to travel to be put in a Government zereba and not allowed to come near the town. All supposed to be able to travel were to be supplied with enough dhoora for four days. . . . We had taken in a number of bad cases, and Hamed and I went carefully through all and sent away the strong ones, keeping only a few to do the baking, &c. We then filled up the hospital with the worst cases. The Governor was out until long after dark, watching the dhoora being given out. All our people were warned not to leave the zereba next morning *for fear of being sent away by the soldiers.* Early in the morning Hamed and I went out. Before passing the gate I went on the wall to see how things were going on. At a distance of about three-quarters of a mile, just on a level with our zereba, *the cavalry were spread out in single file* about thirty yards apart, and advancing slowly, *driving before them any poor people that were to be found.* All was quiet, so Hamed and I passed out, feeling rather sick at heart at what was going on. Our own people were undisturbed, and several children came seeking admittance. The soldiers seemed glad that I should take in any that were near our zereba, as it saved them the task of turning them out. I found that a panic had taken place in the night, and some of the children's parents came for them, others had thrown away their tickets and run away. . . . The gates were kept shut all day, so that no information should reach Osman Digna, and that the poor people might have a chance of getting away with their dhoora. *The Government intended to send off* 650 *widows and orphans in dhows, but* 250 *went away in the night.* The rest were in a frightful state, thinking they were going to be made slaves of, or sent to Osman Digna. *They requested to be burned here rather than go in the dhows.* They did not want to take the dhoora provided for them. Two days after 150 were sent by boat to Rewaya. Since then another party has been sent. . . . On Sunday we gave the children a great treat, each a lump of dates with their bread. About 180 children got 5*s.* worth of dates. It was very good for almost all of them, and they were very much pleased. A young woman who was employed to bake went off, giving up her ticket, to go the mountains. Some of the children ran away, and two who, I was certain,

were orphans, came to me saying they wanted to go. I asked why, and found out they were afraid of being sent off to the sea, so that I had to assure the children that I would keep them, and they were not to be afraid. The two who wanted to give up their tickets then went off quite happy, and I have heard nothing more of it. The poor woman came back yesterday, half-starved, and asked to be taken in again. I sent a message by Dr. Myles to the officer who is secretary of the Recreation Club here, to ask for some old tennis balls, and Dr. Myles's boy came over with half-a-dozen. Yesterday evening I brought one out and started them all playing cricket on a minor scale, with bits of wood for bats. Even the sick people from the huts got quite excited looking on. When Hamed and I started for home and were just outside the zereba we heard a general rush behind us, and there were all the children, the police, and grown-up workers along with them, coming out of the zereba. They said they were all going to escort us to Suakin. I suppose it was meant to be a sign of appreciation of the old tennis ball. In any case, they were very much pleased. These little things are more than reward for the trouble spent on them; but it does not make up for troubles of other kinds."

LETTER FROM GENERAL HAIG.

Suakin, November 1st, 1890.

"I arrived here on the 26th, and took charge from Dr. Harpur on the 28th ult. I gather from the papers that people at home are now pretty well informed as to all that has taken place here since the suspension of the import trade with the interior. It was followed by the establishment of a sanitary cordon round Suakin (in view of the cholera reported at Massowah) and the simultaneous *expulsion of some thousands of the distressed and starving poor*, 3000 *of whom were in daily receipt of relief*. The weaker ones who were considered unfit to travel were sent, to the number of a few hundreds, to an island some distance down the coast, where they have since been maintained at the expense of the Government. A few were kept in the Government zereba, and Dr. Harpur retained about 400 in his, but some 2000 received four days' rations each of dhoora, were sent outside the cordon, and told *to shift for themselves as best they could*. As to what actually became of these poor people accounts vary. No one being allowed to go outside of the cordon, there has been no means of testing the report that *great numbers perished*. The authorities deny this, but it is certain that the poor creatures were turned out into a country which, as far as food was

concerned, was little better than a desert, and in which great numbers had already *died of starvation.*

"I am *reluctant to condemn officers* who were no doubt in a very difficult position, and they ought not to be condemned unheard, but *I certainly think that there ought to be an official or Parliamentary investigation.* The whole course of action of the authorities from the time they closed the gate up to the expulsion of the starving multitude seems to me *simply inhuman, and incapable of defence upon any ground.* If, in order to prevent supplies reaching Osman Digna and his people, they considered it necessary to stop the importation of food, they were bound to feed the starving thousands who were from this very cause compelled to flock to Suakin for relief. If, on sanitary grounds, in view of a possible outbreak of cholera, they considered that such large numbers should not be allowed to congregate in and about the town, then *they should have opened the gates and encouraged importation into the country to the utmost. But to stop import and at the same time to expel the famishing thousands who flocked to them for relief, was simply extermination.* The closing of the gates of course intensified the famine in the Tokar country. This led to a great increase in the numbers coming here for relief, and then, fearing the consequence of such a concentration of starving people about the town, they drove them from it out into the very country which the poor people had only left because no food was to be had in it. This may have been done by Egyptian officers, but *England is responsible for it, and her honour and fair fame have been tarnished by these cruel and inhuman measures. I think you should press for inquiry.* There are reports here that the local authorities were not solely responsible, but acted under orders from London. Whichever way it was, surely the matter cannot be allowed to rest there. The case should be investigated by competent authority, and we should all know with whom the responsibility rests.

"I hope I am not overstating the case, but from all the inquiries I have been able to make I can come to no other conclusion than the above. One of the Government police said to me yesterday, 'The Arabs of the mountains are *all dead*, and at Tokar they have been burying the dead *in carts.*' This meant either that the living had not strength to carry (as they always do) their dead to the grave, or that the dead were so numerous that they were buried by cartloads. Yet while this was going on only forty miles from here, there were *never less than* 25,000 *bags of dhoora in store in Suakin, and the whole efforts of the authorities were directed to prevent a single bag of this reaching the scene of this fearful mortality* lest Osman

Digna's people, who were themselves starving or in great distress, should benefit by it.

"I am thankful to say that I learnt from good authority last night that the price of dhoora at Tokar, which a month ago was thirty dollars a bag, has fallen to seven, only twice the price here, but this on account of importations from Berber, and the new crop being ripe enough to be partly available. . . .

"As to the relief operations, the numbers in our zereba, as counted three days ago, are 194 men and women and 176 children. Three or four have been admitted since, cases which it was impossible to refuse, but as many have died, for I am sorry to say ten died in the week. This mortality is mainly due to the loss of milk. Owing to the cholera cordon no milk is admitted to the town, though there are great quantities in the town outside. *This cordon, too, I look upon as nonsense.* It is being constantly violated, and the only effect is to shut out sorely-needed supplies of all kinds. Many of the poor creatures have come in in such a reduced condition that milk is the only food suitable for them, and it is pitiable to see dying children begging for it. . . .

"As to when the relief operations will really come to an end, no estimate can be formed at present. We are all so strictly shut in here that no one knows at all what sort of a crop is now being gathered in, or what will be done with it. If peace could be restored and communications and trade with the interior opened, things might improve and a normal condition of affairs be re-established. I will write as soon as I feel I can say anything definite on this point. Meanwhile the people remaining must be fed and cared for until fit for work. Our present rate of expenditure is about 60*l.* per month."

"*6th November.*—Colonel Holled-Smith arrived yesterday. The cordon has been removed, and imports into the interior are to be permitted *under restrictions.* This, as far as it goes, is an improvement."

The following telegrams have since been received from General Haig:—

"*Suakin, 24th November.*—Two hundred children will require support for some months. The new rules *practically prohibit import of food to the interior.* The extent of relief by the new crop is unknown, and the future is uncertain. The recurrence of scarcity is possible."

"*Suakin, 1st December.*—Many deaths this week, mostly old and helpless cases. A few starving people have been admitted. Two hundred children and one hundred adults will require support for some months longer."

On 24th November also a letter was received from Dr. Harpur, reporting his return to Cairo. In it he wrote,—

"There will be for a long time to come poverty and sickness, resulting simply from want, about Suakin, and I trust your Committee will be able to continue to relieve, in a small way, these poor sufferers. The children must be kept and fed for a long time; and *not only the orphans.* The poor people will take some time to recover and to find work to support themselves and their relations. It would be a great blessing if work was arranged for them, as there is little to be got in Suakin."

APPENDIX B.

THE FUTURE OF THE SOUDAN.

(Reprinted from a Leading Article of "The Times," Friday, June 3rd, 1887.)

WE publish to-day an interesting communication, well calculated to arrest the attention of the mercantile community, on the possible development of the Soudan by commercial agencies. Our correspondent informs us that Mr. Francis W. Fox has recently visited Suakin for the purpose of inquiring as to the facilities which now exist, or which might without much difficulty be created, for the promotion of trade between the Soudanese and Europe, and that the results of these inquiries are in a high degree encouraging. The details are contained in a report which will, in the first instance, be submitted to the Foreign Office, but which will no doubt be rendered accessible to any who are in a position to base practical action upon its recommendations. These, briefly stated, are that the task of opening up the Soudan to trade should be undertaken by a company, and that a sufficient number of ports or factories should be established on the coast of the Red Sea, both north and south of Suakin, to allow the inhabitants of different regions to resort each to the one which may be most convenient to them, and at the same time, to avoid the collisions between tribes at feud with one another which would be almost inevitable if the transactions were confined to any single centre of operations. Mr. Fox does not propose that his projected company should enjoy a monopoly, or even that it should hold any definite relations either to the English or the Egyptian Government, and this is so far fortunate, because it may certainly be assumed that such relations would not be established, and that to ask for them as a necessary element of the scheme would be fatal to its adoption. Nothing more seems to be intended than an organization sufficiently powerful to overcome certain inevit-

able preliminary difficulties, and rich enough to make provision for the establishment of the proposed ports, and for the improvement of existing means of transit to the interior. In this regard, much stress is laid upon the desirability of constructing surface railways of mètre gauge, in the first place from Suakin to Berber, and afterwards to such other points as experience might indicate. Our correspondent quotes the opinions of General Gordon and of Lord Dufferin in support of the railway proposals, and adduces figures, founded upon the cost of constructing such lines in India and Canada, in order to show that the outlay would not, even at first, be in excess of the probable return. The mètre gauge, as is well known, permits the use of waggons which combine, in the best attainable proportion, capacity for carriage with the *minimum* of dead weight; and a line constructed on this principle offers not only the great initial advantage of being cheaply made, but the continuing and ultimately still greater advantage of being cheaply worked. Accessory steamers on the Nile would form another portion of the suggested chain of communications; and if anything like this plan could be carried out, the inhabitants of a country *which has until now been left almost outside of civilization* would be brought into close and convenient contact with European markets, alike for the sale of their produce and for the supply of their necessities.

That the tendency of wars, especially when waged between peoples of very different degrees of civilization, is to lead afterwards to the active promotion of commerce, is one of the most familiar of the lessons which are taught by history. So long as the superfluous corn of the Senaar was left to rot upon the ground for want of a market, so long as the inhabitants were separated from the possibility of obtaining, or even of seeing, European commodities by a belt of almost impassable desert, the tribes had no inducement to curb their ferocity, or to refrain from the feuds which seem to have been their chief amusement whenever they were not united against a common enemy. But even the last war must have brought home to thousands of the Soudanese, probably for the first time, the superiority of many things of European manufacture, and must have filled them with eagerness to obtain them. That desired objects should be purchasable at a convenient Red Sea port, where they would also be sufficiently protected to be secure against predatory attack, would inevitably direct the Soudanese mind towards expedients for obtaining by fair means the treasures which were not accessible by force or fraud; and this kind of operation, when exerted upon semi-savages, leads to the first step towards a career of honest industry. If men want a thing and cannot steal it, the only

remaining resource is to labour for its possession; and we think it cannot be doubted that the establishment of the factories proposed by Mr. Fox would speedily begin to exert the customary influence of such institutions. As on a thousand other occasions in the history of the human race, war has enlarged knowledge, knowledge will create desire, and desire will seek its gratification in industry. It must not be forgotten, of course, that the security of the goods is a condition essential to success; and this may be the condition most difficult to fulfil. As we have already said, the English Government would certainly be indisposed to undertake responsibilities in the matter: and hence the servants of the company must be in a position to set at defiance any attempted raid upon their stores. But the undertaking, after all, would not be essentially different from many others which English enterprise has conducted to a successful issue.

The power of the Soudanese to avail themselves of the opportunities offered by the projected company, would depend, of course, upon the possible productiveness of the country; and on this point the statements of Mr. Fox are exceedingly encouraging. Prior to the late rebellion the united export and import trade of the Soudan amounted to a total of two and a half millions sterling; and it is probable that this was practically limited to the most accessible fringe of the population. The larger proportion of the land is described as being "most fertile, offering great capabilities of development, abounding in agricultural resources, and, it is believed, in mineral wealth." Even the desert portions yield an abundance of gum, ostrich feathers, and raw hides; and the quantities of these would no doubt be much increased by a proper organization of the industry supplying them. Emin Bey asserts that in the equatorial provinces he has cultivated cotton, indigo, sugar-cane, and rice, and that ostrich farms have been started; while the Senaar is described as being of almost unlimited corn-growing capacity, and fit also for the production of coffee and tobacco. With these natural advantages there is every reason to believe that the inhabitants, when in constant contact with the products and resources of civilization, would speedily develop a taste for things which at present are unknown to them, or are known only as almost inaccessible luxuries; and so the old sequence of events would once more be set on foot. *Wants would create industry, before which tribal feuds and foreign wars would of necessity die out,* and industry would soon produce a demand for education. The dismal trade of slave hunting, with the precarious profits and heavy risks attending its prosecution, would be replaced by pursuits calculated to offer a shorter

and more easy road to wealth; and *thus man's natural love of comfort and luxury would once more become a powerful agency in the elevation alike of his material and of his moral condition.* It is necessary to speak of such prospects with all reserve, because the practicability of realizing them evidently depends upon dry facts concerning the natural resources of the country; and it is possible that Mr. Fox may be too sanguine in the account of these resources which he furnishes as the result of his investigations. If he is not too sanguine, if his project can be carried into effect, at first even by a comparatively small beginning, he will, as our correspondent justly says, deserve to be reckoned among the great benefactors of Africa. We can imagine *with what eagerness Gordon would have employed all his energies for the promotion of a scheme which promised prosperity and advancement to the people whom he loved so well;* and, in so far as this scheme is the outcome of war, we may cherish, along with our regret for the betrayal of the dead hero, the hope that his blood may not have been shed altogether in vain.

APPENDIX C.

THE SOUDAN.

(*Reprinted from an Article in "The Times," Friday, June 3rd,* 1887.)

IN an article in *The Times* in January last, it was said:—"The Soudan question, in fact, is dormant, but not dead. Even in the desert we cannot evade the obligation of acting, and of acting wisely—whatever the path of wise action may be—by simply shutting our eyes. For the present it is sufficient to point out that sooner or later our position towards the Soudan must inevitably pass from the negative to a positive stage."

This prediction is likely to be fulfilled sooner than might have been expected. There can be little doubt that the result of Mr. Stanley's expedition will be to open up the general question of the government and trade of the Soudan. There are several letters from Emin Pasha in the hands of his correspondents in this country, in which, among other things, he expresses astonishment that nothing is being done by England to rescue the Soudan from anarchy and the hands of the slave hunter. Not only so, but I believe he has suggested methods by which this desirable end might be effected. In this view it may be of interest to give some account of the results of a recent private mission to Suakin, the main purpose of which was to inquire what would be the best method of opening up the Soudan to legitimate trade. This mission was undertaken at his own expense by Mr. Francis W. Fox, who has just returned. He went out in March last for the purpose of collecting on the spot information which would be of service to him in devising a scheme for the restoration of peace and prosperity to the Soudan. Mr. Fox saw various officials during his visit, and took some trouble, not only to find out how they would regard any such scheme, but also to discover what is the present attitude of the leading tribes and chiefs on

whose goodwill success would largely depend. Mr. Fox has put the information he has collected into the form of a report, which I understand will be submitted to the Foreign Office. In this report he enters at length into details concerning a company which he proposes should be formed, somewhat on the principle of the Borneo Company, but without any monopoly whatever, leaving the trade open to all comers with honest intentions. He does not wish our Government to commit itself in any way, nor does he anticipate any difficulties in the case of either Turkey or Egypt. At the same time it will be maintained by all capitalists that it would be extremely unsafe for them to commit themselves to any risk, unless the English Government gave them some sort of assurance of protection in case of necessity. There is reason to believe that some of the leading sheikhs in the immediate interior have expressed readiness to sign any reasonable agreement as to trade with reputable Englishmen. Without any expression of opinion either for or against Mr. Fox's scheme, it may be useful to the many who are interested in the Soudan to have some account of the leading points in Mr. Fox's report.

With reference to the opening up of the Soudan, Mr. Fox has come to the conclusion that the best method of procedure would probably be to organize small district committees of sheikhs, who shall be advised and guided by Englishmen residing in each district in the commercial centres of the several provinces; and that the leading tribes, who have in former times suffered from tribal feuds and trade disputes, shall in future be kept as far as possible distinct, and have their respective trade routes to, and tribal ports on, the Red Sea coast. The tribal ports which may, with advantage, be opened in the first place, and at which it would be advisable to establish trading posts or factories are, to the south of Suakin, Aghig Seghir, and a port on the Lebkha; to the north of Suakin, Aw-Teri and Halaib, making Suakin the central headquarters of the several tribal ports. Mr. Fox suggests that some twenty or twenty-five Englishmen be appointed, in the first instance, by the proposed Soudan Company, as their agents at the stations or factories at the tribal ports on the Red Sea coast, and at the several commercial centres in the Soudan; and that three inspector-generals should also be appointed, whose duty it would be to visit and confer with the resident agents, to inquire on the spot into any cases of oppression and injustice, and generally to see that liberty and order are maintained, and justice is administered throughout the provinces of the Soudan. The inspector-generals and the resident agents would, of course, frequently and periodically

despatch to the Governor and Council of the Soudan Company full reports of the political position of their respective districts, as well as of the trading operations of the company. Mr. Fox also suggests that the proposed Soudan Company should refrain from entering into any commercial or trading operations direct with the small retail traders, but only, as a rule, buy and sell through the leading native, English, Greek, and other local merchants, as in this way the trading operations of the company will be greatly simplified, and the risk of losses reduced to a minimum.

Besides acquiring and maintaining control of a great proportion of the export and import trade of the Soudan, the company would probably, in Mr. Fox's idea, engage in the cultivation, ginning, and pressing of cotton; also in the management and working of the proposed railway from the Red Sea coast to the Nile, and of the small light-draught steamers on the Nile in connexion with the railway.

In the report which accompanies his letter Mr. Fox enters in somewhat minute detail into the resources of the Soudan, the particular kinds of cultivation capable of development, the probable future of the country, and the value of the trade that might be expected by his proposed association, basing his calculation on the trade of the past so far as its figures may be regarded as trustworthy.

Mr. Fox recalls the fact that for administrative purposes Egypt divided the Soudan into the Eastern Soudan, Central Soudan, Western Soudan, and the Harrar district. He gives the approximate area at two and a half million square miles, and the population at from twelve millions to fifteen millions. All this territory was virtually abandoned by Egypt in 1883.

Although there are few countries in the world which have been so misgoverned as the provinces of the Soudan, yet, in spite of the utter disregard of the economic prosperity, happiness and welfare of the people, the export and import trade of the Soudan before the late rebellion is computed to have exceeded two and a half million pounds sterling (2,500,000*l.*) per annum, of which amount about one half, or 1,250,000*l.*, represented the value of the exports, and 1,250,000*l.* that of the imports. There is every reason, Mr. Fox believes, for supposing that when peace and order are restored, and an improved government is established in the Soudan, a great development in the export and import trade will take place, and that it will assume much larger proportions than before the rebellion. Brewster Bey, the Director of Customs at Suakin, writes to Mr. Fox as follows:—"I am of opinion that when the tribes are pacified and the roads opened there will be a large increase given to commerce, and if some new ports

are opened in the north and south (of Suakin) the merchants will be able to communicate with the different tribes, and trade with them on their own ground and districts." This would stop to a great extent the illicit trade that is at present carried on so largely. Mr. A. B. Wylde, of Suakin, is also of the same opinion, and says :—"There never has been such a future for the Soudan as at present. It is now a known country comparatively to what it was before, and the world's attention has been drawn to the Soudan, and old reports and old knowledge have been got together which even in the late Gordon Pasha's time were not thought of, and the geography of the country, as far as the fertile part of it is concerned, is now known and an estimate of what this fertile country can produce can be arrived at." From the opening of the Suez Canal began the value of the Soudan as a field for British commerce, and gradually since that time Christian merchants, with civilized ideas of commerce, have begun to supplant the Moslems and the Moslem idea of trade. Suakin, being the only place where Christian traders could come to trade, soon became the depôt as against Cairo. At an earlier period it required over a year to bring a transaction to a close; but before the war goods from Manchester could be delivered, *viâ* Suakin, in Khartoum in seven weeks; and the roads got so glutted with goods that the camels of the country were not sufficient to carry on the work, and a railway was needed to cope with the trade and to develop it. That trade, as it existed before, will revive again, Mr. Fox maintains, after the country is pacified, and then a line of railway will be wanted to Berber, to develop the Soudan and its fertility. "There can be no doubt in my mind that a chartered company, properly worked in a quiet and unaggressive manner, would soon be firmly established in the Soudan, and as soon as touch could be got with the Nile at Berber and steamers could be placed there the whole Blue and White Nile valleys would be at the company's feet."

With regard to the fertility of the Soudan, Mr. Fox informs us that, with the exception of the belt of desert which extends across the north of the Soudan from Suakin to Berber and Dongola, and which forms, as it were, a natural frontier separating the Soudan from Egypt, the larger proportion of the land of the Soudan may be described as most fertile, offering great capabilities of development, and abounding in agricultural resources and, it is believed, in mineral wealth. It is true that a large proportion of the provinces of Kordofan and Darfour are desert, but even these provinces export large quantities of gum, ostrich feathers, and raw hides, and the export of these articles of merchandise can be undoubtedly

greatly increased as soon as peace and order are restored in these provinces. In the Bahr-el-Gazelle and Equatorial Provinces there are vast areas of fertile country which are at present quite undeveloped. Lupton Bey, who was the Governor of the Bahr-el-Gazelle Province until taken prisoner by the Mahdi's troops, writes from the Bahr-el-Gazelle in November, 1883:—

"This province is one of the largest in the Soudan and the richest, and yet we are less thought about than the others. I am the only one of the Soudan Governors who can give this year to Government (after paying all expenses) *a clear profit of something like* 60,000*l.*"

Emin Bey wrote in 1883 from the Equatorial Provinces that, although no help had been received from Khartoum for five years, cotton, indigo, sugar-cane, rice, &c., were all being cultivated. Ostrich farms had been started, roads made, oxen trained to the yoke, and *the net profit of the province for* 1882 *was* 8000*l.* In a letter Dr. Felkin received from Emin Bey in 1883, the latter said that if he could only have one or two Europeans to help him, and a small allowance from Khartoum for a year or two, to enable him to buy seeds and agricultural implements, *he had no doubt that in four or five years he would make a clear profit of over* 20,000*l.*, *a year, and all this not including ivory, which was a government monopoly.*

But besides the rich and fertile Bahr-el-Gazelle and the Equatorial Provinces, and the comparatively sterile but by no means entirely unproductive provinces of Darfour and Kordofan, and the fine agricultural province of Dongola, there are in Eastern Soudan and in the provinces bordering on it, at a comparatively easy distance from Suakin, four exceedingly fertile tracts of country, which offer a fine field for an immense development of their agricultural resources:—

1. There are the vast alluvial plains of Sennaar, between the White and Blue Niles, extending from near Khartoum to the base of the Abyssinian mountains whose cultivable area has been variously estimated at from 8,000,000 to 15,000,000 acres. Colonel Stewart, in his report on the Soudan in 1883, describes the Sennaar, with the adjoining district of Ghedariff, *as celebrated for their corn-growing capacity*, and it may be said to be the granary of the Soudan. Were easy communications opened with the sea *there can be little doubt that a considerable export trade in grain would spring up.* At present grain is allowed to rot in the ground in these districts, while it is perhaps at famine price at Suakin and Jeddah. Thousands of tons of grain are now annually imported into Suakin and Jeddah and other Red Sea ports from

India which, as soon as the railway was opened from Berber to Suakin, would be supplied from this district. The quality of the soil and the climate of Sennaar are favourable to the cultivation of cotton, coffee, tobacco, &c.

2. The island of Meroe—a large tract of country between the river Atbara and the Blue Nile, which, although now lying waste and uncultivated, possesses a most fertile alluvial soil, only requiring water—can easily, at a comparatively small outlay, be irrigated from the two rivers, the Atbara and the Blue Nile.

3. The important province of Taka, with Kassala as its capital, is very fertile, and possesses great capabilities for the cultivation of cotton. The cultivable area of Taka may be roughly computed at 2,500,000 acres.

4. And lastly, the rich plain of Tokar, situated in the Suakin province, has a most fertile delta of alluvial soil formed by the waters of the Khor Barca, where it is estimated there are 500,000 acres of most excellent cotton and grain-growing land. The cotton grown in the Tokar delta has a longer and finer staple than the Egyptian, and fetches ½*d.* to 1*d.* per pound more.

In connection with the future possibilities of the Soudan, a line of railway connecting the Nile basin with a port on the Red Sea is, in Mr. Fox's opinion, a most important factor to be taken into consideration, and its construction should be commenced at an early period, as it will tend more than any other measure to ameliorate the condition of the people of the Soudan and Equatorial Africa. The railway will not only prove a powerful instrument in assisting the Government to maintain order and peace in the Soudan, but it will be the most effective agency for stopping that "open sore of the world," the abominable slave trade of Equatorial Africa. In connection with a line of light-draught steamers on the Nile and its numerous tributaries, it will develop to an undreamt-of extent the vast agricultural resources of those large areas of land in Sennaar, the island of Meroe, Tokar, and the Shilluk and Dinka countries; it will greatly stimulate the production of gum and grain, and it will open up new markets for Manchester goods in the densely populated regions of the Equator, Bahr-el-Gazelle, Monbuttu, and the Zandeh or Nyam Nyam countries.

The late General Gordon attached great importance to the construction of this railway:—

"Speaking from long experience in the Soudan," he says, "I feel convinced that until such communication [a railway between Suakin and Berber] is made *no real progress can be reckoned on in these countries.* Their being so near Egypt

proper, and yet so backward as they are, is simply owing to the great difficulty existing in getting to and from them to the Red Sea; a belt of arid sand of 280 miles separates them from civilization, and till this is spanned no real progress can be made. The Khedive Ismail Pasha fully recognized this great point, for, as His Highness often told me, he wished the railway made up the Nile simply for the facilities he would then have of supervising the government of the Soudan; and though the line up the Nile is wrongly chosen, yet he was right as to the importance of a regular communication from Egypt to the Soudan. *There can be not the least doubt but that the route, Suakin to Berber, is the true natural route to be opened.* Had this route been opened when I was in the Soudan it would have been infinitely more simple to have governed these countries. The hidden misery of people in the dark places of the Soudan exists because no light is thrown on those lands, which light this railway would give, and it is certain that when it is known that the railway is completed *an entire change will take place in the whole of this country.* Had I time, I could say much more on the subject. I conclude in saying that the railway is a *sine quâ non* for the well-being of the Soudan."

The Earl of Dufferin, in his report on Egypt in 1884, most strongly advocates the construction of this railway. He says:—

"The first step necessary is the construction of a railway from Suakin to Berber, or, what would be still more advisable, to Shendy on the Nile. It would bring Cairo within six days and a half of Khartoum, the time required to run from Suakin to Berber on the Nile being only sixteen hours. The completion of this enterprise will at once change all the elements of the problem. Instead of being a burden on the Egyptian Exchequer, these Equatorial Provinces ought to become, *with anything like good management, a source of wealth to the Government.*"

Mr. Fox adduces the opinion of other authorities on the Soudan in favour of the proposed railway. The distance between Suakin and Berber in a direct line is about 250 miles, but the mileage of the railway will be about 280 miles, so as to avoid expensive earthworks; it will have to wind round the base of the hills. Mètre gauge railways recently constructed in India have, including permanent way and rolling stock, cost from 4000*l.* to 5000*l.* per mile; but in this sum are included some expensive bridges and earthworks. 4′ 8½″-gauge railways in Canada have been completed under 2000*l.* to 3000*l.* per mile.

At the present extremely low prices of railway materials,

the cost of the proposed railway, a mètre gauge surface line, including rolling stock, will probably not exceed 3500*l.* per mile, or for the 280 miles, at 3500*l.* per mile; a total sum of 980,000*l.* Mr. Fox enters into calculations as to probable traffic and profits, and, on modest expectations, endeavours to show that such a railway would pay. Supposing peace restored, the people quiet, and trade routes open, on the basis of the trade statistics before the rebellion, Mr. Fox estimates the value of the exports for a year at two millions sterling, with imports to an equal amount. He would abolish all taxes, and levy only a tribute on produce, estimated to yield 150,000*l.* a year; the whole administration to be in the hands of a company organized as indicated above. From the land-tribute, customs, monopolies, &c., Mr Fox estimates the annual available revenue of the company at 495,500*l.*, and the expenditure on administration at 220,500*l.*, leaving a balance of 275,000*l.* for directors' fees and general management and profit, on a proposed working capital of 500,000*l.*

These are the leading points in the remarkable scheme proposed by Mr. Fox for the rescue of the Soudan from anarchy and barrenness. If practical men find it practicable, then Mr. Fox ought to be reckoned among the great benefactors of Africa. Perhaps, however, it would be prudent to await the results of Mr. Stanley's expedition to Emin Pasha. If Emin's province is restored to stability, it is doubtful whether any scheme for the working of the Soudan could be devised without taking that province and its organization into account.

APPENDIX D.

Article from "The Times of India," 9th May, 1891.

EXTRAORDINARY INCREASE IN THE WHEAT TRAFFIC.

AT the present moment the Prince's and Victoria Docks and the other Port Trust Ground in the vicinity furnish a spectacle which has perhaps never been witnessed in Bombay before. Every godown near the docks and on the other Port Trust land in proximity to them, and every available piece of open ground in and about the docks is occupied by towering tiers of bags filled with grain—principally wheat—awaiting the arrival of ships to load it, and take it away to other ports, where abnormal prices have been paid for it, and where its arrival is eagerly awaited. A mere sight of the piles of bags is enough to show the most casual observer that something extraordinary is taking place, but the full strength of the position of affairs can only be grasped by a glance at statistics for the past fifteen years or so. In 1874, that being the first year a separate record of the wheat trade was kept by the Chamber of Commerce, the total shipments of wheat from Bombay for twelve months was 33,071 tons, while in 1886, or twelve years later, the figures went up to 617,834 tons, this being the largest total shipped from 1874 up till and including last year, and there is reason to believe, judging from the amount of wheat received, that that total will be exceeded this year. But should this not prove to be the case, the fact still stands on record that never since 1874, the year when the wheat trade practically began, have the receipts of wheat in Bombay been so large, or nearly so large, as in the first four months of the current year—that is, from January 1st to the 30th April. They have reached during that period the enormous total of 198,097 tons, as compared with 97,420 in the corresponding four months of the previous year, 178,686 in the same period of 1886, in which year, as already stated, the shipments were larger than had ever before been

known, and 180,708 in 1887, the last mentioned figures representing the largest receipts in any four months up to the first four months of the current year. As to the shipments this year, of course, we cannot yet speak definitely, but an idea of their magnitude is gathered from the fact that steamers representing a total carrying capacity of between 350,000 and 400,000 tons are expected to load here in the course of the present month; and looking at the way in which the grain is pouring into Bombay almost every hour of the day, it is evident that despite the provision of this large carrying accommodation, it will be no easy matter to get the bags, or at least those that are not under cover, shipped before the rains. Naturally these bags are got out of the way first; but the receipts continue to be so great that as fast as the ground is cleared of one consignment it is occupied by another, the wheat being rushed into Bombay to secure the exceptionally high prices now obtainable. Of course the real cause of this unprecedented traffic is the damage sustained by the French wheat crop, which is likely to be about 25 per cent. under the average; and as the French crop is the biggest of all the European wheat crops, a loss of 25 per cent. is a most serious matter. For the last fortnight a state of things apparently approaching a panic has prevailed in France in consequence of the failure of such a large percentage of the crop, and prices have been increasing by leaps and bounds. Last week they were going up as much as 2 and 3 per cent. in a day. Wheat, Club No. 1 for instance, which was being sold in the autumn of last year for spring shipment to the Continent on cost freight and insurance terms on the basis of 35*s*. per quarter, has this week been sold up to 43*s*. 6*d*., but it has now declined to 40*s*. 9*d*. as the panic has somewhat subsided, owing to an improvement in the weather on the Continent. This may be the means of checking in a measure the vast influx of grain into Bombay, but up to the present it continues to pour in, and the traffic shows no signs of an immediate decrease; for, beyond the all-powerful inducement held out to growers by reason of the high prices, they are also encouraged by the great facilities offered by the railway companies for bringing their produce to the coast for shipment. The traffic over the different railway systems has been gigantic during the past few months, and it is not a little interesting in this connection to reflect on the extensiveness of the facilities now offered by the railway companies. *As recently as the year* 1876 *wheat was simply rotting in the Central Provinces, which is now regarded as the granary of India;* but owing to the railway extensions carried out since that time—the through route to Calcutta being one of the

most important—the number of growers has increased materially, and it is now well worth their while to produce grain as extensively as they can. The lines have thus far been literally overcrowded with grain, the receipts in Bombay being so vast that the greatest difficulty is experienced in finding godown accommodation for the hundreds of tons which are daily brought in from up-country. Indeed, the competition for godown accommodation is so great that the rentals have gone up to more than 100 per cent. beyond the ordinary charges. The price of labour and the cost of carting have also followed suit, and so all branches are benefiting more or less by the rush caused by the partial failure of the French crop.

For the information of those of our readers who may care to follow the fluctuations in the wheat traffic in greater detail, we append the following table, giving the receipts and exports for the years 1884 to 1890, inclusive, and the four months ended on Thursday last:—

(in tons.)	Receipts of Wheat at Bombay.	Exports (clearances).
1884	420,656	364,833
1885	611,218	542,562
1886	684,782	617,834
1887	503,496	462,428
1888	595,641	483,035
1889	345,078	305,044
1890	355,295	272,644
First four months of 1891	198,097	(approximately) 125,845

APPENDIX E.

(*Article from "The Times" Weekly Edition, July* 31*st*, 1891.)

INDIAN AFFAIRS.

THE THREATENED FAMINE.

WHEN the last mail left India the uppermost question was whether that country would not again be plunged in the horrors of a great famine. A delayed and deficient monsoon, a heat so terrible that the tramway horses were dropping in the streets and a single company reported 113 of their animals incapacitated up to date, armies of locusts marching across the Northern Provinces, the plough-cattle dying of hunger and thirst in Rajputana, the green crop-fields turned into fields of straw throughout large areas in Southern India and fresh sowings impossible on the baked and cracking ground, the nucleus of a pauper population already formed and thronging the relief works in Madras, while wheat had been pouring out of the country during the preceding three months under the stimulus of high prices in Europe, and native journalists were in vain demanding restrictions on the exportation of foodstuffs—such was the sad summary of news on which to estimate the prospects of the Indian year.

Later intelligence by telegraph has to some extent relieved the strain. A high authority has given his opinion that the actual damage done by the locusts in the north will not prove so serious as had been feared. The monsoon, although retarded and failing to bring a sufficient rainfall in the south, has at length broken, and there is still a chance that disaster will be averted. That there will be scarcity and suffering is unhappily beyond doubt. But whether the scarcity will amount to famine, and the suffering to wide-spread starvation, still hangs in the balance. One morning's telegram flashes tidings of comfort, another fixedly declares that "a famine is regarded

as inevitable in the North-West Provinces if there is not an adequate rainfall within a week hence."

But even an alarming despatch of this sort fails to bring out the intensity of the strain which the Government and the peoples of India are now bearing. For it is not merely a question of rain or no rain, as announced with necessary brevity by the telegraph. Rain there will always be in India during the monsoon months, and it seems certain that this year the rainfall will be deficient. But whether the deficiency will mean merely high prices and scarcity, or whether it will mean famine and starvation, is a complex question of meteorological probabilities from pre-existing *data*, which scarcely emerges in the telegrams, but on which at this moment depends the life or death of thousands of our fellow-subjects. "We are still," says a private letter by last mail from an experienced observer in Bombay, "we are still in trepidation about the monsoon. The rain has come at last, and falls steadily for some hours. But there is no wind and no sea. For the most part of the time there is a dead calm which is regarded as suspicious. A cyclone might take the monsoon back to Zanzibar. We must hope for the best." One thing is clear, that the threatened failure of crops extends both to Northern and Southern India—a failure of a general character such as has only once occurred during the memory of living men, and which, if realized, means a widespread catastrophe that must task to the uttermost alike the resources of the Government and the endurance of the people. Meanwhile, the British rulers of India stand waiting but ready for the answer which the next fortnight will bring—for a possible declaration of war by the elements themselves, a war which will cost millions of money, and hundreds of thousands of lives, and which is foredoomed, from the outset, to be more or less a defeat of the piteous efforts of man against the overwhelming forces of nature.

In the presence of those overwhelming forces it may almost seem vain for man to enter on the struggle at all. This was the view practically taken by most of the native dynasties of India—the view which continued to be more or less accepted by their British successors down to the present century. In 1838 an effort was made by the East India Company in Northern India to deal with famine on a great scale, and proved sadly inadequate. In 1866 a similar effort was made by the Queen's Government of India to deal with famine in Orissa, and again the failure was lamentable. As the result of that failure, however, Lord Lawrence boldly declared that the British Government of India must accept the responsibility of providing for its people during famines, and *he*

fixed the responsibility for deaths by starvation on the district administrators with a directness which showed how inadequately even his powerful intellect realized the difficulties and the magnitude of the problem. Science seems to indicate that the deaths of hundreds of thousands in Hindustan may be silently predestined by climatic conditions, in distant trans-oceanic zones, or by the snow-fall of the Himalayas and Central Asia, six months before a breath of warning reaches the doomed peasantry of India. The next famine of 1877-8 passed for a time beyond human control in Madras and Bombay, as the famine of 1838 had passed beyond human control in the North-Western Provinces, and that of 1866 in Orissa and South-Western Bengal. In spite of mitigations by man, the cruelty of nature wrought out its relentless work. During the height of each crisis it almost seemed that the old Indian famine proverb still remained true, and that the most lavish expenditure and the utmost human efforts were merely "watering the top of a tree whose roots are cut."

The thirteen years since the last terrible famine in 1877-8 have given the Indian Government a breathing space to consider afresh the complicated problems involved. The valuable investigations of the Famine Commission have been slowly tested and expanded by the Agricultural Department at Simla, and by the provincial staff working under its supervision in each of the great divisions of the country. The main conclusion arrived at is that, as war must be prepared for during peace, so the inevitable and apparently cyclic years of Indian famine must be provided for during the intervening periods of plenty. The four main factors of famine are—first, the failure of the periodical rains; second, the absence of a sufficient reserve or staying power on the part of the people; third, the tardy or insufficient action of the Government in the early stages of distress; and, fourth, the isolation of the stricken tracts. The Government of India has accepted the hard necessity of having to face a recurring famine at periods, so far as can be determined by statistics, of about eleven to fourteen years.

As regards the first factor and the proximate cause of Indian famines—the failure of the rains—the rulers and the people of India are alike powerless. Large and important areas may, indeed, be protected at a great expenditure by irrigation. But experience proves that, except under favourable conditions, this expenditure will not be reproductive in ordinary years, and that, in spite of such expenditure, a general failure of the periodical rains in India means a general failure of the crops and a scarcity of food which may reach the famine point. Something also is hoped for from the re-

afforesting of denuded woodland tracts; but any improvement in the rainfall from this source is powerless to compensate for a retarded monsoon. As regards the second factor of famine —the absence of a sufficient reserve or staying power on the part of the people—the Government can only watch for new possibilities of developing the material capacities of the country and of opening up new branches of industry or potential sources of wealth. What lies in its power to aid that development, by the diffusion of information and the spread of education, it can patiently and vigilantly perform. But, while much has been accomplished in this direction since the last Indian famine of 1877-8, the advance of a vast agricultural empire into the many-sided resources of the manufacturing and commercial stage of human activity is the slow work of time—a work in which the interference of Governments is in the long run as often disastrous as beneficial. That much still remains to be accomplished in increasing the staying power of the people, by removing the economic causes that lead to chronic poverty and unthrift, is attested by the account which we lately gave of the pariah population of Madras. All that has been done since the last famine to extend irrigation works and to develop new branches of industry in India is at this moment quite powerless to avert a famine if the monsoon should fail during the next four weeks.

But in regard to the third and fourth factors of famine the Government may make its action more effectually felt. There can now be no reasonable doubt that the mitigation of the distress largely depends on early measures for dealing with the calamity before it has passed beyond human control. Such measures, if they are to be really effective, must be based on a preconcerted scheme of obtaining speedy information, and on a preconcerted scheme of taking prompt steps as soon as the information is obtained. The Indian Government claims, as the result of the labours of the Famine Commission and of the system slowly built up by the Department of Agriculture, that it has elaborated such schemes for obtaining early information and for taking prompt remedial measures. The warnings of its meteorological office—warnings commenced long before any actual anxiety is felt by the people—and the weekly reports of crops and prices from every district-mart in every province, have this year unquestionably served as danger-signals, whatever the practical result may be.

Nor can it be said that a preconcerted scheme of action is now absent. Since the last great calamity in 1877-8, a famine fund has gradually, although with some intermissions, been provided. A famine code has been carefully elaborated, and

the whole administrative body, from the Governor of a province to the district officer and the talukdar or tahsildar, knows what is expected of him and what he has got to do. In Madras, as usual the first to feel the pinch, relief works and food distributions were commenced in time to arrest the preliminary panic which in former famines cast the population adrift from its local moorings, and set it drifting in hopeless congested masses. It was that drifting of the people in the Orissa famine of 1866 which helped to turn the relief centres into cholera camps and breeding-grounds for epidemics. This year the Indian Administration, aided by early information and a prearranged scheme of action, have so far managed to keep the scarcity well in hand.

It is, however, in regard to the fourth factor of famine—the isolation of the stricken tracts—that the provision of the Government can make itself most effectively felt. In the famine of 1866 Orissa was, to revive a phrase which then had an appalling significance, like a ship at sea without provisions. It was for a time in vain that the Government bought up stores of rice for its relief. The province was almost cut off from the rest of the world—no railway, the roads rendered impracticable by swollen unbridged rivers, the seaboard a long line of perilous surf, with a couple of open roadsteads and one difficult harbour, all more or less at the mercy of the monsoon. The lesson of the famine of 1866—a lesson bitterly emphasized by the next famine in 1877-8—*was that the isolation of an Indian province may any year cost half a million of human lives.* In the scheme of railway communications for India, submitted to the committee of the House of Commons in 1884, the necessity of protective lines against famine was as firmly insisted on as to the necessity of protective lines for the military frontier. During the breathing space since the last starvation years of 1877-8, much has been done towards executing this double series of strategic railways against a possible enemy from without and the inevitably recurring famines within. The important line recently completed, *the Bengal-Nagpur Railway, opens up a tract of food-yielding country, heretofore without a practicable outlet, yet capable of relieving from its superfluity the distress of other provinces.* Local observers report that it is marvellous to see the quantities of grain loaded from wayside railway stations, which were formerly in the jungle, and *from which no freight at all had been anticipated.* With certain serious exceptions, the old isolation of the famine-areas of India has been broken through. Perhaps the most conspicuous exception is Orissa, the very province which a quarter of a century ago formed the unhappy object lesson of the results of isolation, and which, so far as regards railway communication,

might any year again find itself in the condition of a ship at sea without provisions.

But while the Government of India has effected much during the past thirteen years, and has attempted more, to enable it to deal with famine, one thing it has steadily refused to do. In Oriental countries the first demand of the people on the outbreak of a famine is to put a stop to the exportation of grain. Each native state struggles to keep its store of food for itself. Each district, each town and village down to the pettiest hamlet, tries to retain its own hoard within its own boundary. An immediate dislocation of trade takes place, the natural distribution of the whole available food supply of the country is stopped, and when the distress waxes sore the granaries of the grain merchants are broken open and plundered, or even burnt by the populace. The total food supply which, if equally distributed under the impulses of unrestricted trade might have sufficed to keep the scarcity below the starvation point, ceases to be available for this purpose. Traffic in grain becomes dangerous, sometimes illicit; and while parts of the country go on consuming almost at their ordinary scale, in others prices leap at once to starvation rates, or food absolutely ceases to be procurable at any price whatever.

This year the demand for restrictions on the exportation of grain from India has been intensified by the drain on the wheat supply which had taken place in the spring. Owing to short crops in Europe, and especially in France, the price of wheat in England ran up from 33*s.* 2*d.* on March 14th to 41*s.* 1*d.* a quarter on May 2nd. The Indian market at once responded to the demand, and shipped *seven and a half millions of hundredweights of wheat during the first six months of the year,* as against four and a half millions during the first six months of 1890. So vast an exportation had not been reached since 1886, and native journalists bitterly complained that with the shadow of famine settling heavily on the land, the food which might save thousands of lives in India was being sent off to prevent a passing discomfort in Europe.

The Government of India has thought it expedient to deal publicly with the question thus raised, and has issued a paper by Mr. O'Conor reviewing the whole situation. In a lucid and able narrative, Mr. O'Conor shows the relations which the wheat exported really bears to the total food supply of India. He then asks the question whether the cessation of the wheat export trade would add to the normal stock of food in India; and finally examines the popular demand for the prohibition or restriction of grain exports. In the wheat-bearing British

provinces for which statistics are available, wheat occupies only 18 millions out of a total of 93 millions of acres under food grains. *The total yield of wheat is calculated at seven million tons*, and the annual average exportation at three-quarters of a million tons. Mr. O'Conor estimates these exports of wheat at about two per cent. of the food stuffs of (apparently) the wheat-growing provinces for which statistics are available, or "probably not more than one per cent. of the food grains produced" in British India including Burmah. The exportation during the first six months of the present year would make, therefore, about one per cent. of the food-stuffs of (apparently) the wheat-growing provinces, or not more than half per cent. of the total food grains produced in British India including Burmah.

Having thus brought out the actual relations of the wheat exports to the total food supply of India, Mr. O'Conor proceeds to state that "a considerable proportion of the wheat which is exported is grown specially for that purpose, and for that purpose alone, and that if this demand for export did not exist the farmer would not grow the wheat. Consequently, while the discouragement or prohibition of exports would not have the immediate effect of adding largely to the stock of food stuffs, it would have the ultimate effect of reducing it in exact proportion to the average quantity exported."

Sir Edward Buck, the Secretary to the Government of India in the Agricultural Department, maintains, indeed, that "the existence of a large wheat export is of importance to India in providing what may be called a safety valve against famine. As soon as any serious diminution occurs in the food stocks prices go up above the limit at which it is profitable to export wheat, and keep in the country a large supply of food over and above the outturn of the area originally intended for home consumption."

Mr. O'Conor's paper concludes with an exhaustive examination of the theory of prohibiting food exports during famine. It is needless to say, after the foregoing paragraphs, that he again arives at an unqualified condemnation of such proposals. Apart from the arguments which have long ago convinced political economists in Europe, however, he adduces several considerations which render restrictive measures peculiarly unjustifiable if applied to the Indian export trade in wheat. He points out that while the production of wheat for exportation is a source of wealth and of staying power to the Indian peasant, the main consumers of wheat in India are the well-off classes. "Let us again consider," he says, "for whose benefit the reduction of price is to be effected by the violent interference with trade which is suggested." "It is certain that

wheat is the ordinary food of not one-tenth of the population That tenth is not the 'submerged tenth.' It is, on the contrary, that section of the population which is best off and best able to take care of itself in times of emergency. Can State interference be justified for the purpose of cheapening wheat—assuming that this result would be achieved—to this fraction of the population? At most we should add one or two per cent. to the food stocks, and by so much assist that section of the consumers who are not the most in need of assistance, but in doing so we should injure the producer, who is also a consumer."

The space at our disposal only enables us to indicate the main points in this frank discussion of the views which regulate the action of the Government of India in regard to restrictions on the grain trade during famine. But we have said enough to make two points clear. First, that the existence of the wheat export trade, as a normal factor in Indian food production, aids instead of weakening the staying power of the Indian population in their recurring struggle with famine. Second, that if famine again lies before India during the present year, merchants may safely make their arrangements for moving the food supply to the provinces where it is most needed, or exporting wheat and rice, without fear of the local Governments or officials listening to the demand for placing restrictions on the grain trade.

APPENDIX F.

1st January, 1882, *to* 31*st July*, 1885.

RETURN OF THE OFFICERS AND MEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR LIVES, AND OF THE NUMBER INVALIDED HOME IN CONSEQUENCE OF OUR OPERATIONS IN EGYPT BETWEEN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DATES.

——	Died.	Invalided.	Period.
British Troops { Officers . .	79	303	To 1st June, 1885.
British Troops { Men . . .	1,495	5,084	To 1st June, 1885.
Royal Navy, Officers and Men	288	1,176	To 26th May, 1885.
Indian Contingent	107	300	To July, 1885.
New South Wales Contingent	2	No returns	March-July, 1885.
	1,971	6,863	

RALPH THOMPSON.

War Office,
6th March, 1886.

INDEX.

ABBA ISLAND, 22, 30.
Abdel Latif Pasha, 4.
Abdul Kader-el-Ghulami, 22.
Abdul Kadir Pasha, 24, 25, 33, 35, 188, 224, 234.
Abdul Kadir, Sheikh, 213.
Aborigines' Protection Society, relief from, accepted, 221.
Abou Klea, 108; description of battle of, 110; wells discovered, 113.
Abou Kru, battle of, 114.
Aden, 354.
Adlan, King, 3.
Administration, corrupt, 5; illegal imprisonments, 13.
Afghanistan, 67.
Ain, 118.
Ajemi, Egyptian Government boat, 209.
Akasheh, 192.
Ala-ed-Deen Pasha, 14, 29, 35.
Alexandria, 102, 116; falling-off of imports and exports, 1,873,000*l.*; exports, Class A, falling-off, 1,336,311*l.*; Class B, 206,777*l.*, 297; cotton, crops and value, 298; barley, gum arabic, cotton fabrics, 299.
Ali Kerai, Sheikh, 155.
Ali Wad Amara, 11.
Ambukol, 103.
Amr-el-Makashfi, rebel chief, 10, 24.
Anti-Slavery Society, appeal to, 293, 364.
Arakel Pasha, 4.
Assiout, 102, 186, 188.
Assouan, 4, 58, 103, 115, 186, 188, 192.
Atbara River, fertile regions of, 5, 328, 329.
BAADI ABU SHELLOUK, 3.
Baggara, 5; slave-hunters, 17.
Bahr-el-Ghazelle, 38, 42, 64, 82.
Baker, General Valentine, 30, 36, 44; advocates employment of Zebehr, 46; opinions on Soudan, 57, 66; battle of El Teb, Egyptians defeated, worthless troops, 136, 139.
Baker, Consul, 120, 123, 127; abject cowardice of Egyptian troops, 136, 140, 145; report on trade estimates, Soudan export trade shows £E.2,244,500, Suakin-Berber railway a financial success, 171–174.
Baker, Sir Samuel, 335; experience of Soudanese, advocates Protectorate and railways, 357; facts as to fertility of soil, 361.
Baring, Sir E., 35; expected defeat of Hicks, and suggesting aid by H.M.'s Government, 39; reports Egyptian programme, 42; advises Zebehr being sent, 44; advocates Zebehr's employment, objection to him not justified, 46; Egypt averse to employ Gordon, 47; again declines Gordon or Wilson, 47; again being pressed replies Gordon would be best man, 47; general approval of Gordon's appointment, 49; instructions virtually giving freedom of action to Gordon, 53; advises Granville of firman giving full power to Gordon, 65; opposed to Gordon, 70; Gordon submits against his own judgment, 71, 73; Anarchy ruinous, politically, financially, or in a military point

of view, 74; responsibility of H.M.'s Government irrevocably fixed, 75; urges that Zebehr succeed Gordon, 75; 50,000*l.* annually to be paid, economical for Egypt, 75; success of Gordon's mission dependent on the Suakin-Berber route being opened by British and Indian cavalry, 81; advises appointment of Zebehr with subsidy, 81; telegraph cut, 14th March, 1884, 83; most important to open Suakin-Berber route, 83; every authority in Egypt in favour of Suakin-Berber route, Gordon expecting help from Suakin, 86, 87; thwarts Gordon's appointment of Zebehr, 90; advises Granville of failure of telegraphic communication with Gordon, 90; advises Granville Zebehr would go if indemnified for losses, 92; Nubar fixes responsibility of fate of garrisons on H.M.'s Government, 95, 97; Gordon severs connection, 97; Gordon will reimburse Foreign Office, 98; undesirable Abyssinians should relieve Kassala, 119; to Granville, *re* Kassala, 119; *re* Gallabat garrison, 120–122; *re* relief of Kassala, 123; details of Egyptians' loss, 137; declares Suakin in state of siege, 139, 141, 142; tribes rejoin Osman Digna to save themselves, 168, 171, 180, 181, 186, 188; wants more warships, 200–202; advises negotiations, repudiates encroachments, 204; suggests proclamation to open trade, and that Egypt should not re-occupy abandoned territories, 205, 206, 208, 209; Kitchener loyal to instructions, 210, 212; deprecates raids on Tokar, 215; interdicts inter-tribal raids as it paralyzes trade and perpetuates disturbances, 216; clears himself of starvation policy, 217; Egyptian Government give 500*l.* to relieve distress caused by their own officers, 218, 221, 224, 228; blockade a grave political blunder, 232, 235; all authorities agree to open Soudan, 245; suggests tolls, 246; semi-official instructions to Kitchener, 247, 251–253; British Indian merchants petition, 254; on 27th April, 1887, promises to open Suakin trade before long, 255, 258; arguments in favour of trade, 262, 264, 266, 267; conciliation policy urged on Cameron, 269; abolishes stamps, 269; reports Suakin garrison raiding, Grenfell renews orders against raids, 277; Italian consul confirms reports, Egypt financially incapable, various alternative policies considered, 278; Grenfell reports neighbouring tribes neutral, requires fresh troops to drive enemy from trenches, 279; alarmed at Wylde's proposed visit to Suakin, 280; telegraphs Grenfell, reply, Fox and Wylde's presence embarrassing, 280; decides not to interfere on behalf of British subjects, 280; all at Cairo from the first consistently advocated policy of facilitating trade, 281; tribes sick of Osman Digna and anxious for trade, 282; refuses to protect a British subject, 283; corruption and bribery, 315, 342, 354.

Barnham, Consul—employé of Holled-Smith raiding, fatal results thereof, 215; 3000 starving people to be fed, 217; help required from England, 218; Salisbury's inquiries move local authorities to relieve long-standing starving population, 219; advocates publicity, 220; describes emaciated condition of people, 220; local reliefs, subscription 500*l.*, 221.

Bashi-Bazouks, robberies, 6, 12.

Batn-el-Hajar, 192.

Belgians, King of, 70, 71.

Beni Omr, 2.

Berber, Sakiyés abandoned, 6, 21, 82 192, 309.

Berbera, 327, 354.

Besant, Major, 181.

Besati Bey, opinion *re* rebellion, 10.

Beshir, Sheikh, 155.

Birkeet, Sheikh, 161.

Bishareen, 5, 58.

Blue Nile River, 329.

Blum Pasha, 286.

Blumenbach, Professor, negro intelligence, 8.
Bohndorff, Dr., opinion of Zebehr, 81.
Brewster, A. B., 153, 155, 160, 169.
Briggs, Dr., 111.
British forces, sickness and mortality of, 395.
Briton, H.M.S., 136.
Burrell, Consul, 48.
Butler, Brigadier-General, 187, 189; unanswerable reasons for opening trade, 191, 225; damaging results of blockade, 226; our rule, not dervishes', blocks trade, 232; discusses effect of blockade, 233, 235.

CAIRO, 64, 102, 188.
Camel corps, *see* Desert column.
Cameron, D. A., Consul, 130; information *nil*, 149, 181, 189, 228; protests against a new 7 per cent. tax, 251, 253; advocates reconciliation of Tokar by trade without restriction, or registration, or police supervision, 264; friendlies sent against Tokar, spoil chance of trade or reconciliation; 264; reports Kitchener's raid, 266; woman killed causing blood feud, 266; Kitchener's strategic movement to the rear, 267; reports loss of all tribes as allies, 268, 269.
Cameron, V. L. Commander, R.N., 336, 338.
Campbell, 109.
Campbell, Major, 181.
Campbell-Bannerman, 176, 186; unwise to open trade, 190, 324.
Carysfort, H.M.S., 138.
Chérif Pasha, 28, 30, 35; objects to abandonment, 44.
Chermside, Colonel H., 118; reinforcements alone can save garrisons, 120; Mudir of Kassala refuses to leave his post, 124; suggestions for relief of Kassala, 127, 128; considers cost to relieve Kassala, 100,000*l.* to 200,000*l.*, 129; instructs Marcopoli, 132; Brewster arranged, Korb Hamed and 11,000 to stop rebellion, 153, 164, 165; Amarars in favour of peace, 166; Osman Digna's tactics, 166; urges capture of Tokar, 167.
Clarke, Major-General Sir Andrew, 104.
Clarke, Mr., 213, 316.
Condor, H.M.S., 159.
Coquette, H.M.S., 136.
Cotton, why not grown, 13; nine-tenths Alexandria exports consist of, 294, 362.
Currie, Sir Donald, state of Kassala, 123.
Cygnet, H.M.S., 182.

DABAGNÉ, centre of Fakis and Dervishes, 25.
Dal, 192.
Darfour, 4, 5, 31, 38, 64, 188.
De Coetlogon, Colonel, situation explained, advises retreat to Berber, and opening route to Suakin, 43.
Deeb-el-Bahr, Egyptian gun-boat, 160.
Dervishes, followers of Fakis, 24; untaxed, 25.
Desert Column, how composed, 102; arrival at Dongola, 103; arrival at Korti, 103; time Alexandria to Korti, 103; difficulty *re* guides, 105; Abu Hashim or Hambok wells nearly empty, El Howeiyat wells meagre supply, Gakdul wells 100 miles from Korti, ample supply, forts erected, defective and insufficient transport, start for Metemneh, 106; wretched condition of water transport, 107; naval arrangements admirable, 107; short supply of fodder, short of ammunition, 108; losses, killed and wounded, water exhausted, 112; intelligence department at fault, 113; forlorn hope to reach the Nile, 114.
Djaaleen, 10.
Doka, 329.
Dongola, primitive inhabitants, 5; Sakiyés abandoned, 6, 21, 58, 64, 103, 188, 192, 194, 310.

Donne, Major, 181.
Dormer, Major-General, denies the raids of Kitchener reported by Cameron, Rooke, Stephenson and others, 271; advises subsidizing and feeding all friendly tribes, 273, 279.
Dryad, H.M.S., 136.
Dual control, in diametrical opposition, 28; Hicks and Suleiman Pasha at issue, 36; Hicks and Ala Ed Deen, disastrous differences, 58; mischief of, demonstrated by history, 61.
Duem, 30, 42.
Dufferin, Earl, 30, 34; attributes rebellion to Egyptian corruption, and advises contraction of frontiers, 60; treaty with Italy, 327, 355.

EDINBURGH, DUKE OF, 201, 265.
Egerton, Mr., 93, 126–128; McDonald proposed as British Commissioner, 130, 149, 153, 156, 164, 165.
Egypt, presence of, in Soudan incompatible with any advancement, 354, 355.
El Affareh, 329.
El Arbain, 188.
El Kakurah, newspaper article showing injustice of blockade, 195, 204
El Teb, 136.
Elias Pasha, traitorous advice, 23.
Equatorial province, 64.
Esneh, 191.

FAKI supernaturally endowed, 24; influence of, and immunity from taxation, extortions prejudicial to government, 25.
Falcon, H.M.S., 150.
Fasher or El Fasher, 42.
Fashoda, 42.
Fazoglu, 33.
Fellaheen destitution, 295.
Filik, 329.
Fiscal statements, budget for —, '82; gold and silver ornaments sold, 295; Soudan, budget for '82, in detail, 300 to 306; comment thereon, 307 to 311; Soudan budget, summary 1881, revenue £E.474,843, expenditure £E.511,684, deficit £E.36,840, 312; summary for 1882, revenue £E.506,774, arrears £E.69,652, expenditure £E.612,179, deficit £E.105,405, 313; account current between Egyptian and Soudan Governments for 1882, Cr. balance £E.119,516, 314; H.M's Government reimburse Egyptian Government in 1886 and 1887 £E.411,175, 317; Soudan expenses 1885 and 1890, 999,034*l.*, 317; 11,000,000*l.* borrowed to balance accounts, 326.
Fox, Francis William, application to Salisbury *re* cotton seed for Tokar, 257; letter to Salisbury forwarding resolutions submitted by deputation *re* trade, 274, 275, 277, 279, 281; letter to Mr. Henry Russell, his views, etc., on the development of the Soudan, 331–335; letter to Salisbury *re* projected company and appointment of Sir Charles Warren, 335; proposals for a Soudan company, 338, 342; report on Soudan and estimates, 343—351; letter to Mr. Henry Russell, showing alternative plans for forming a company, 352—354.
Fremantle, General, 164, 167.
Fung, 2, 3.

Gaffaria, Egyptian gun-boat, 160.
Gallabat, 119, 120.
Galbraith, Surgeon-Major, 182.
Gannet, H.M.S., 182.
Gash River, 328.
Gebel Ain, 29.
Ghedaref, 7; illegal taxes, 11, 329.
Gheera, 120.
Giegler Pasha, 39.
Gladstone, Right Honourable W. E., plea for liberty, 15, 62, 154.
Gleichen, Count, 101; itinerary, 102.

Gondokoro, 42.
Gordon, General C. G., 4, 10, 15, 19, 27, 43, 46, 47, 48; Granville's instructions, 48; memo. sent on (important, not published), 49; Khedive's firman and proclamation, 50; instructions, 51; unlimited discretion given, 53; complications feared, views explained, full discretion necessary, 56; review of situation, 58; programme of action, 63; five English officers required to assist in pacification, 64; advises Turkish troops in British pay, 65; confident of success, 66; anarchy inhuman policy, 66; Zebehr strongly recommended, 67; rapidity in reaching Khartoum, 68; primary Ministerial interference, 68; submits against his own judgment, enthusiastic reception, 72; proclamation at Khartoum, 73; refusal to send Zebehr necessitates presence of Indian troops, serious consequences if Mahdi victorious, 76; predicts his fate, 78; evacuation of garrisons impossible without Zebehr, 79, 81; he insists on remaining at his post as a point of honour and duty, 83; indecision causes increase of dervishes, 84; delay dangerous, 84; commission resigned, 84; ironical thanks, 85; his opinion as to trumpery character of rebellion, 88; indignant at prospect of being abandoned, 88; proclamation of abandonment and promise to appoint Soudanese governors, 89; appoints Zebehr Sub-Governor-General, 89; appeals to Sir Samuel Baker for foreign aid, 91; fixes indelible disgrace on H.M.'s Government, 93; determined not to abandon his post, 94; four months without news, 96; final decision, and general description of situation at Khartoum, 96; upbraids both Governments, 96; asks for troops for Berber, complains of neglect, 97; why Kassala deserted, 97; severs his connexion with Baring and the Foreign Office, 97; personally responsible for all monies drawn on Foreign Office, 98; adieu to Watson, 98; if garrisons abandoned resigns, 99; advises inaction at Suakin, 141; advises proclamation, 142; Egyptians hopeless, people ruined by bad government, how pashas robbed the soldiers, cause of deficit in revenue, "villainies" of Egyptian officers, Cairo officials involve Soudan, 322; Egyptian Government, brigandage, 323; predicts the extinction of Khedive's authority in Soudan, 330, 335; natural outlet of Soudan trade, Berber to Suakin, 360.
Gordon, Major, 181.
Gordon Relief Expedition, "Desert column" an afterthought, 101.
Gos Rejeb, 329.
Graham, General Sir Gerald, V.C., reports two victories, proposes further advance, 144; sheikhs tender submission, 145; slaughter at Tamai, 151.
Granville, Earl, 28, 31; refuses to render aid, recommends abandonment of Soudan, 39; ignores responsibility, 44; refuses British or Indian troops and expenditure except for retreat of garrisons, opposes appointment of Zebehr, undertakes defence of Egypt and Red Sea ports, 45; suggests Gordon, 47; Gordon sent out under Baring's orders to act for Khedive, 48; Gordon's memorandum sent to Baring, urging prompt action, 49; inquiries *re* Gordon, 65; forbids Gordon to go south of Khartoum to save Bahr-el-Ghazelle and Equatorial provinces, 70; obstruction, 72; Gordon's proclamation advised, 73; frivolous reasons for refusing Zebehr, 76; procrastination, 77; gives Gordon a free hand and hopes he won't resign, 85; absolutely refuses help from Suakin although troops there, 87; already anticipating failure as early as March 28th, 1884, 87; refuses aid by any route, 93, 137; undertakes defence of Red Sea ports, 137; orders

Egyptian troops at Suakin to be replaced by marines, 138; declares Suakin in a state of siege, 139; proclaims British defence of Suakin, 139; orders troops to Suakin, 141; advised that eight tribes, representing a total of 2200, submit, 145; orders withdrawal of Hewitt's proclamation, 147, 153, 164; authorizes 5000*l.* for subsidies, 165, 168, 171, 354.
Grenfell, Major-General Sir F., 178; sanctions Kitchener's expedition to Tokar, 197, 204, 205, 206; confused instructions, 212, 215, 241; forbids raids, 277; neighbouring tribes neutral, 279, 280, 281; arrests a British subject, 283, 315.
Grove, Colonel, strong reasons for re-opening trade, 235; official report, 235.

HABAL OTMAN, SHEIKH, 155.
Hadendoah, 5.
Hahamot, 328.
Haig, General, 324; military expulsion from Suakin of starving people, great numbers perished, inhuman and indefensible, and simply extermination, advocates parliamentary investigation, expulsion orders from London, Arabs buried in cartloads, 368—371.
Hamagh, 2, 3.
Hamid, Mahmoud, Sheikh (Head Amara), 156.
Hamlin Bey, reports Kassala garrison massacred, 134.
Handoub, 157, 202.
Harpur, Dr., 324; atrocities at Suakin, 365–368.
Hartington, Marquis of, 104; defines period for return of Nile expedition, 105, 115, 141, 145, 151; would, if he could, make Suakin-Berber railway, 341.
Hay, Admiral Lord John, 121, 151, 155, 156, 157.
Hewett, Admiral Sir William, reports Egyptian defeat at El Teb, 136, 140, 143; 4000 Friendlies ready to co-operate, 143; reward offered for Osman Digna, 146; withdrawn, 147.
Hickman, Major H., 181.
Hicks, General, 27, 28; deplorable equipment and destitution, 29; tribes submitting, 30; unheard-of difficulties, 31; suggests his recall, 33; counsels defence, not offence, 33; hopeless muddle, 35; asks for reliable troops, not raw recruits in chains, 36; tenders resignation through Malet, 36; withdraws resignation, 38; nominated Commander-in-Chief, 38, 103, 320.
Hodding, Brigadier-General, 181.
Hoghali, Sheikh, Patron Saint Khartoum, 21.
Holled-Smith, Colonel, Governor-General, 205; two proclamations, 207, 212, 214, 215; instructed not to occupy Tokar, 215, 324, 331, 360, 363.
Hussein Pasha Kalifa, 59, 188.

IBN MUSA, SHEIKH, 166.
Ibrahim Bey, principal cause of Haddendowa revolt, 59.
Ibrahim Bey Fevzi recommended as General of Brigade, refused, 69.
Ibrahim-el-Senussi, Sheikh, advocates re-opening trade, because if Soudanese did not trade must fight, 238.
Ibrahim Hamid Dow, Sheikh, 156.
Iddesleigh, Earl of, 194; congratulates Kitchener, orders 2000*l.* to be paid to the Friendlies, 195, 240–242; agrees to re-opening trade, but subject to military restrictions, 243.
Idris, Sheikh, 3.
International Arbitration and Peace Association, 9th October, deprecates all hostilities which were renewed in December, 276; reply from Salisbury, 277, 363.
Isa Abdullah, Sheikh, 155.
Ismael, his barbarities and retribution, 3, 56.
Ismaloum, Mr., 286.

JAAFAR PASHA, 6.
Jago, Consul, reports slave trade from Suakin and contraband to Jeddah, one shipment 200,000 dols., 253.
James, F. L., Egyptian cruelties to natives, 14.
Jebel Nuba, 17.
Jeddah, 7, 199, 253.
John, King of Abyssinia, 119, 124.
Jones, Commander, R.N., 150.
Juba River, 328.

KAKAMOT, 328.
Karkotsch, 7, 16.
Kassala, 12; works ruined, 13, 44, 97, 120, 123; King John's offers of terms to assist in relief of, 125, 127; atrocities in, 133; Mudir assassinated, 134, 159, 328, 329.
Kerkoj, 33.
Khartoum, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 15, 19; undisciplined troops, 26; incapacity of officers, 27, 29, 31; Egypt determines to hold, 42, 76, 82, 188, 330.
Khedive, H.H. The, his firman appointing Gordon Governor-General, proclamation to all subjects, 50; instructions *re* evacuation, and establishing governments, 51, 189, 224.
Kitchener, Colonel H. H., Governor-General, 194; Tokar fiasco, 196, 200, 202, 209, 211, 214, 247; anxiety to take Tokar, 249; trade partially opened, 253; proclaims limited area open to traders, 258; trade with Sheikh Burghut permitted with persons under special permission, 258; proclamation (1) and (2) necessitate permission to do business, suspected persons police have power to stop at gate, 259; raid reported by Cameron, 266; strategic movement to the rear in raid on Handoub, 267; under pressure abolishes his stamp duty, 270, 324, 337; states he is "nominated by English Government," 338, 360, 363, 364.
Korb Hamid, Sheikh, 153, 155.
Kordofan, 17, 31, 33, 36, 58, 188.
Kor Lemsen, 328, 329.
Korosko, 58, 186, 188, 192.
Korti, 102, 103.
Kurshid Pasha, reforms, 4.

LAND, area cultivable 14,125,000 feddans (or acres), under cultivation only 212,418, lying waste 13,912,582, 288; comments hereon, 289; table showing total exports nine-tenths cotton, 294; produce parallel case to India, 331.
Land tax in Egypt, 5,215,000*l.*, 316.
Lennox, Major-General, 180.
Lesseps, Count, 56.
London Chamber of Commerce, Salisbury urged to permit unrestricted access to trading districts, 260, 261; police permits objected to, innovation to be abolished as detrimental to merchants, 262; Salisbury appealed to, 363.
Lupton Bey, 71.
Lyons, Viscount, 52.

MACDONALD, MAJOR, 130.
MacGregor, Evan, 276.
Mahdi Mahomed Achmet, 10, 17, 20; history, 21; preaching and personal appearance, 22, 76.
Mahmoud Ali Bey, 146, 153, 169.
Mahomet Ali, invaded Soudan, 3.
Mahomet Saleh, 22.
Malet, Sir E., virtually recommends Hicks, disclaims responsibility, 30, 31; foresees disaster, 32; congratulates Hicks, 34; smoothing Hicks' difficulties, and request not press resignation, 37.
Marcopoli, 130; instructions to, from Chermside, 132, 182.
Massowah, 4, 44, 76, 118, 160, 354.
Matheson and Co. ask for blockade to be raised, 239.
May, Commander, R.N., describes fight at Suakin, 201, 202; his idea of clemency, 209, 277.

Metemna, 329.
Metemneh, 103; misinformation about, 115.
Metkinab, 329.
Military expeditions, cost of, '82 to '85, 13,061,451*l.*, 284.
Mirza Kuwai, 202.
Molyneux, Commodore, critical state of Kassala, Gallabat, Gheera, 120, 121; situation, Suakin generally, 152, 153; advises subsidizing Sheikhs of league formed, 155; Northern Amarars, 6000 gained over, 156; state of affairs generally, 5000*l.* subsidy required, 157; several tribes propose submitting, inhabitants starving, 158; coast voyage to Massowah, 160, 163; Bishareen tribe hostile, 163, 168.
Morghani, 120, 124, 161.
Moukhbir, Egyptian gun-boat, 182.
Moukhtar Pasha, 189, 224, 234, 235, 241.
Mousa Bachieri, Sheikh, 155.

Noor Bahr, Egyptian gun-boat, 202.
Nubar Pasha strongly in favour of Zebehr, 75; throws all responsibility on H.M.'s Government, 95, 124, 165, 186, 188, 224, 234, 235.
Nur-el-Daim, Sheikh, 21.

OBEID or EL OBEID, 23, 25, 76.
Osman Digna, 123, 134; number of followers, 140, 144, 155, 166; terrorizes the tribes, 167.
Osman Morghani, *see* Morghani.

PAGET, CAPTAIN, R.N., force at Suakin and number of enemy, 201.
Palmer, Elwyn, 316.
Pauncefote, Sir. J., 190, 241, 275, 277, 338.
Philæ, 103.
Phillipps, Lieut., R N., 155.
Portal, Mr., 256.
Portsmouth, 102.
Power, F., 71.
Prinsep, Lieut., 211.
Protectorate, England's duty to establish, and why, 328, 330.

Racer, H.M.S., 201.
Rahad River, 329.
Railways, British India, case in point 331 and Appendices D and E; advocated by Lord Salisbury for Africa, 358; essential to be made by a chartered company, 360; charter on same lines as Imperial British East Africa Company, 361; cause of prosperity in India, 334—386.
Ras Aloula, 119, 124, 127.
Ras Kasar, 261, 328, 354.
Religion, 5.
Réouf Pasha, 14.
Reshid Pasha cheats Hadendowah tribe, 59.
Revolt, cause of, 19.
Riaz Pasha objects strongly to inland operations, 279.
Rooke, Commander, R.N., 200; Friendlies' disinclination to attack Tokar, Bashi-Bazouks returned from Trinkitat, exasperated enemy in sight, Kitchener requests to open fire, 265.
Rosebery, Earl of, 174; obstructs reopening of trade, 187, 190, 224; obstructs, 224, 225, 227, 228, 230; opinions of military authorities in Egypt and at home at variance, 231; refuses opening trade, 232; Special Commission to be sent out to report, 232, 235, 286; rejects Fox's proposal, 340.
Rudini, Marquis de, treaty with England, 327.
Rundle, Colonel L., 181, 194.

SAAD, MAJOR, 125.
Sabaloke, 43.
Sabderat, 328, 329.

Said Pasha, 56.
Sala Kababish, 186.
Salisbury, Marquis of, 126–128; inquiries *re* cost of relieving Kassala, 128; agrees to Chermside's proposals, with warning to shift for himself if made prisoner, 129; authorizes Macdonald to be sent, 130, 169, 200, 201, 204; approves negotiation and proclamation, 205; approves Colonel Holled-Smith's proclamation, 208, 209, 212, 213, 215; disapproves of raids on Tokar, 216; discourages all inter-tribal raiding, 216; first to inquire about starvation, 217, 221, 245; agrees to open trade, 246, 247; indorses Baring's semi-official letter to Kitchener, 249, 252–254; wants opinion of Egyptian Government *re* cotton seed, Kitchener objects, Egyptian Government not consulted, Chermside personally sees no objection, 256, 258, 260; south of Ras Kasar under Italy, 261, 267, 269, 274; diplomatic reply to Fox and Wylde, 275, 276; peace and pacification policy professed by H.M.'s Government, 277, 279, 283, 315, 336; promises to consider Fox's letter, 338; Glasgow speech, May, 1891, advocates chartered companies, 356; railways advocated, best check to slave trade, 358.
Sanheit, 118, 124.
Scout, H.M.S., 209.
Selim Agha, 133.
Senaar, 3, 9, 16, 21, 24, 25, 31, 33, 42, 64, 82.
Seyd Mahmoud, complaint against Kitchener, value of spoils at Tamai $101,800; 300 captured slaves shipped to Jeddah for sale. 198.
Seyd, Mahomet Osman, 96.
Shabadub, 103.
Shagiyeh, 192.
Shendi, 3, 21.
Shubush, Sheikh, 21.
Simons, Vice-Consul, 258.
Sinkat, 66, 140; garrison annihilated, 140.
Slatin Bey, 59.
Slave trade, means of ending, 8; Baggara slave hunters, 17; how encouraged, 17, 18; principal supporters, 58; supported by contraband from Jeddah, 253, 293, 358.
Smith, W. H., M.P., 196, 203, 241.
Soba, ancient capital, 2.
Socotra, 67.
Sodeli, 190.
Soudan, brief history, 1; term of Egyptian dominion, 4; reasons for ruin of, 7.
Speedy, Captain, proposal *re* Kassala, 118, 127.
Sphinx, H.M S., 155.
Stanhope, Mr., 200, 267.
Starling, H.M.S., 201, 202.
Stephenson, General, Sir F., advises opening Suakin-Berber road, 44, 104, 141; advocates fighting, 141, 164, 176, 178, 180; strongly advocates trade, 186, 188, 191, 196, 197; another warship wanted, 200; advises twenty Hadendowa Sheikhs tendering submission, 203, 224, 226, 233, 235, 241; considers we are in honour bound to open trade at Suakin, 242, 245; raid in which Kitchener and McMurdo wounded, raids forbidden, 267; asks extent of responsibilities, reply, all rests on him, 325.
Stewart, Sir Herbert, guides, 106; fatally wounded, 113, 144.
Stewart, Lieut-Colonel, richness of Soudan soil, 7, 11; on slave trade, 8; summarized reports, 9; financial difficulties of Soudan, 10; falling off of cultivation, 11; robbery by Egyptian Government, 12, 14; Baggara slave hunters, 17, 20, 22; how dervishes attack, 25; tactics of Egyptian troops, 26; urges Gordon's advice to be acted on, failure otherwise, 57; appointed Sub-Governor-General, 69; supports Gordon's views about Zebehr, and why, 79; insists on absolute necessity of establishing a government, 80; essential to send Zebehr with a force to Berber, 82; resolves to follow the fortunes of Gordon, 94; importance of Kassala,

117, 284; troops necessary for Soudan eighteen battalions, cost £E.155,448 per annum, 307.
Stewart, Captain, R.N., 162.
Suakin, 7, 44, 76, 87; state of siege, 139; situation of, 148; H.M.'s Government pay for Egyptian troops 56,440*l.* per annum, 176–181, 186; Government report, 267; senior naval officer urges opening trade, 275; decadence of export trade, 289; slave trade and contraband flourishing, 290; Consular statements *re* trade, 290–292; iniquitous Raftieh system, 292; Consul's report showing utter collapse of all trade, 298; decadence of revenue, 316; in 1890 net cost of retaining 99,514*l.*, 316; estimated net cost of retaining for 1891, 98,428*l.*, 317; who is to hold? 326; atrocities to be inquired into, 363.
Suakin-Berber route, and railway, Hick's anxiety, 34; Egypt determines to reopen, 42; Coetlogon insists on opening, 43; opening strongly urged, 59; Gordon determines to open, 64; Gordon's anxiety for securing, 68; Stewart advises small force by this route as a moral support, 80; Gordon advocates opening, 83; Baring on necessity of opening, 83; supported by every authority in Egypt, 87, 103; proposal by Graham to open, 146; tribes cannot open without English help, 166; Hartington's speech on railway, 341; Gordon considers best, 360.
Suk-Avu-Sin, 329.
Sukkote, 192.
Suleiman Pasha, 35.
Sultans, Petty, referred to by Gordon, 54, 55, 57.

TAHAR, SHEIKH, 159.
Taka, 12, 188.
Tamai, 151; capture of, 194.
Taxation, oppressive, 6.
Thompson, Sir R., 190, 241.
Times articles, June 3rd, 1887, Appendix B and C, 372–383; threatened famine in India, how its effects mitigated by railways, and cultivation encouraged, 387–394.
Times of India, India parallel case to Soudan, railways sole cause of prosperity, 384, 386.
Tokar, 66, 136, 139, 140, 161.
Trinkitat, 136.
Troops, Egyptian, how paid, 18; arrears of pay, 32; heavy arrears and insubordination, 33; in chains, 36; refuse, old, and blind, Gordon's opinion of, 65.
Turner, Mr. J. Fox, 239.

WADAI, 188.
Waddington, M., 52.
Wad-el-Zaki, 29.
Wady Halfa, 44, 58, 76, 103, 188, 192.
Warren, Sir Charles, 170, 209, 211, 336, 337, 340.
Watson, A., Captain, 181.
Watson, Major C. M., farewell from Gordon, 98, 165; advises reopening trade, deprecates change of governors, garrison to be paid by English, 170, 178, 181; anxious to reopen trade, 189; fifteen sheikhs ready to treat, 193, 197, 211, 224, 228, 364.
Wheat, 362: growth of, and exportation from India, due to railways, 384–386.
Wilson, Sir Chas., 114.
Wodehouse, Colonel, 315.
Wolseley, General Lord, 96; arrival at Korti, 103, 104, 114, 121, 122.
Wolff, Sir H. Drummond, reports five Soudanese notables at Cairo, 169; generals refuse opening trade, 170; merchants petition to open trade, 174, 175, 180, 186; presses trade question, 187; disposes of Rosebery's objection, 187; plans for reopening trade, 188; import-

ance of trade, 191; capture of Tamai, 194, 195; advocates trade, 224, 225; urges raising blockade, 227; military objections to trade withdrawn, 227; an exhaustive review of the advantages of opening trade, 228, 230; Butler's protests against obstructions, 231; starving Soudanese forces attack, 232, 233; necessity of taking initiative in opening trade, 234, 235, 238; again urges trade, 240; Moukhtar Pasha pressing for reopening trade, 241; advance of Dervishes pure invention, 242; Soudan trade 2,000,000*l*, 286; Soudan produce sold in Cairo years 1873 and '74, 1,554,600*l*. 3*s*. 7*d*., 287.

Wood, Sir E., advises opening Suakin-Berber road, 44, 66, 153.

Wood, Major, R.E., 138.

Wylde, A. B., 131, 274, 275, 279.

YOUSSOUFF PASHA SHUHDI, 191.

ZEBEHR PASHA, 19, 44, 46, 72, 74, 75; sued for debt, 78; appointment of by Gordon as Sub-Governor-General of Soudan, 89; watched in Cairo, 90; if indemnified for losses would go to Khartoum, 92; grateful to Gordon, regrets he cannot go, 92.

Zereba, 26.

Zeyla, 327.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, LD.,
ST. JOHN'S HOUSE, CLERKENWELL, E.C.